 And one of the things that I want to stress today is that crisis and policymaking, they're very related. Countries in development as usual, as I call it, policymaking in these countries, it's very different from countries coming out of crisis. It doesn't matter what type of crisis. Now the other issue I want to emphasize is that for the first time I heard Rachel some years ago. I don't like the term fragile. In part because I was a risk analyst and I think the risks involved in countries coming out of conflict are very different from those coming out of other fragility. And the main objective in conflict countries is to make sure that you don't go back to conflict because the propensity to do so is very, very high. In a recent study I did for the 30th anniversary of Wyther, I look at operations in which the UN has set up multidimensional operations that is not only peacekeeping but also in the political, economic and social aspects of the transition. And looking at those 21 operations, looking at the first decade after the operations were set up, I found that 57% of them went back to conflict. So I mean that is a very, very high risk, over 50% risk of returning to it. And for me that should be the objective. So let me just mention first of all, I don't want to go through this very carefully because I have written a new book that it's coming out soon and if you are interested I can send you chapter eight with all the premises for effective reconstruction of the economics of peace. So I don't want to go through this in great detail but basically countries in this transition they go through a multidisciplinary transition that has political, security, social and economic reconstruction aspects. But the issue is that we have, and I think one of the big failures is this silo approach that somebody was talking about. I think Rachel and Tony the first day, this silo approach, security people, especially in the US, the security people talk to the security people on the issues in Afghanistan and sometimes they have some contact with the political people but they never meet with the people working on the economic reconstruction, the economics of peace and on national reconciliation which is the social transition. So the first problem for me is that this has been done in a silo with a silo mentality and not in an integrated way. And in fact the West Point tried to do this. In the case since David mentioned Afghanistan so much, in Afghanistan what happened was the same as in Iraq that the military and the civilians actors were working together in these provincial reconstruction teams. They were working together and then that led to something called expeditionary economics which is basically economic reconstruction done by the military and it was a big disaster because it was extremely expensive and very ineffective and it was very difficult also to gain the hearts and minds when you were bombing at the same time. So it didn't work out. So the efforts of West Point to put these things to ensure that we were looking at this double causality between these four sectors did not prosper very much but I think it's something we should focus on. The first thing that when I started working in the secretary general's office in the early 90s our first main challenge was the reconstruction of Afghanistan where the UN had been involved in the peacemaking, in the peacekeeping and also in the monitoring of the agreements. And there we thought country coming out of war at very low, of civil war at very low levels of development this is something we can leave to the World Bank and the UNDP and it was a big disaster. First of all, because these development organizations have a mandate to collaborate with governments so they are not adaptable or they cannot really at least they are not perceived as impartial by their former insurgent group, in this case the FMLN. So after a few months we realized that this was not development as usual something that the World Bank and UNDP resisted very much. For instance, we tried to involve the World Bank in the land program. There was an exchange of arms for land and we tried to involve the World Bank and the World Bank said, well we can't do that because there are 300,000 cappesinos without land and we can't give credit to a few who were related to the war when there are so many others in the same need. So these things made us realize that this is not development as usual. First of all, the economic transition takes place in the midst of the other transitions, the political, the national reconciliation and the security transition. National reconciliation in countries coming out of civil war is really a must because these former combatants usually come back to the same villages in Afghanistan and elsewhere and they have to live with each other. So national reconciliation is essential for this process to succeed and it's a very expensive process. So basically, when I said that the economics of peace of economic reconstruction is not development as usual means that the political in this, it's an intermediate phase between the economics of war, the economics of conflict resolution and the economics of normal development and during that transitional period, the political objective should prevail over the economic one, which means that optimal economic policies, financial policies which are sometimes even imposed by the IMF and the World Bank are not desirable or even attainable. So this has been a major factor when you look at these operations and why they fail, this has been a major factor. The other thing I want to mention is that policymaking in crisis situation, I hear I'm including financial collapse and I'm including natural disasters is completely different from normal development. Development economies usually have the luxury to think in terms of the medium and the long term and design their policies accordingly. This does not happen after a crisis. After a crisis you have to take measures and sometimes you know they are distortionary and you know you are going to regret it later on and you have to do it. And one of my worst experiences was in Kosovo when I was the economic policy advisor to Kushner and in August we knew that the people living on the top of the mountains whose roofs had been destroyed by the war that they would have snow and we had to do something about that. And because of restrictions with the European Union that we couldn't buy local materials and things like that, we ended up buying something like, it was like a kit with a plastic to put all around a room so people could sleep there over the winter and then in the spring we had to start the reconstruction seriously. But we knew this cost a lot of money and we knew it was going to be wasted after the summer they had to be destroyed. But these are the things you have to do and you have to do after a crisis. The other thing that it's very difficult in terms of policy making is that and the normal development you have stable and low flows of aid. And during this crisis there is a spike in aid and you have to be very careful how you use that aid so you don't create the high degree of corruption and you use it as effectively as possible which doesn't mean that you have to delay it until the country has the capacity. This is something Collier says and I'm totally against. He says, well you should delay aid until the fifth or six years when the country has higher absorptive capacity by then most of these countries have gone back to war. So you have to balance these things. It's not as easy. In theory, yes you should wait but in practice you shouldn't because the chances of going back are very high. The other thing is that and it's very difficult for the World Bank to accept but finally over a decade later they accept it that you have to make a apply the reconstruction principle rather than the development principle where you treat every group with the same needs equally. Here you have to make either after a natural disaster you have to help the people that are most in need even if there are others with the same needs elsewhere. And especially after war the people that have suffered the war most seriously you have to do something about them particularly those that have the guns and that have gone to conflict to start with because you know that if you don't give them a way of living they are going to return to war. The other thing, well there are other issues involving the international community. I mean in the crisis I work in Latin America if you had that degree of interference from foreigners countries would be very upset but here countries like Afghanistan that got 55% of GDP in aid every year for the first 10 years after the military intervention you have to deal with the international community whether you want it or not and then the issue is whether your policies whether you're going to have any ownership at all of your policies and you have to have ownership countries have to have ownership for policies to be sustainable. So there are other premises and I want to go very quickly over them because as I said you can look at them in detail but basically one of the big problems in Afghanistan was that Ghani and here people like to blame the IMF and the World Bank but here it was Ghani now president but finance minister at the time who created this absurd perfect macroeconomic framework that countries like Uruguay and Brazil don't have with total independence of the central bank and things totally absurd in a country that needs the flexibility and the simplicity of having a very low skilled civil service. So this has most of the aid in Afghanistan something like 80% of the aid that has gone into the country has been to support foreign experts into the ministry. So this is something that conflict countries cannot afford. They have to have a simple macroeconomic framework that which they can work with the people they have. And the other thing is that the more complex the framework the easier it is for corruption to take place because people don't understand how it works and then the premise for is that the private sector has to be effectively engaged and one of the problems is that at the UN for instance the UN gets into the mediators team they get experts on gender on human rights on this and that but they don't get economies. So the issue is that whatever you put into these peace agreements whatever they have to be implementable and in many cases in the economic and social area they set up arrangements and programs that are not economically feasible in this economy. So it's very important that peace negotiators have the economic capacity to work out with the private sector what the private sector can provide and is feasible in the post-conflict period. The fifth premise has to do with the impact of aid that it has to be not only maximized through effective and integrated and sequenced and non-correct practices. What we have at the present time is totally fragmented aid which is mostly in the case of Afghanistan again but in the case of Liberia and in the case of Haiti for instance it mostly channeled according to donors' preferences outside the national budget and that has several problems. First of all there is no ownership on the part of the government but also if it's channeled outside you are not building the capacity in the public sector that you need to build in these situations. And besides I mean in addition you have that channeling aid outside the national budget is much more expensive. I mean there are all kinds of studies about that how much more expensive it is. The other issue is how you move from aid to foreign direct investment. The bank and the fund had made incredibly optimistic projections on how much aid was going to come. They talk about all the minerals in Afghanistan and all that. The issue is that foreign direct investment peaked at 4.5% in 2005 and since then it had dropped to 0.3% despite all the minerals and despite all the... And when it peaked to 4% it was mostly in construction and services for the international community that was in Afghanistan in Kabul at that time. So I mean so they haven't benefited at all despite the resources they haven't benefited at all on FDI. And this is where I've been doing a lot of work because I've been doing no reconstruction zones where the foreign investors come and work in a win-win project with the communities. Up to now in Liberia some work I've done for you and you are in Liberia. Foreign investment, particularly in plantations and in mining, they displace the communities, they ruin the livelihoods and then they are in confrontation with the communities. The issue is how the communities can provide security to the investors so that they can be productive investment in all these resources that most of these countries have. The use of resources has to be fair because otherwise you are creating a new conflict. And also you have to compensate the spoilers because like in Angola, if you take the diamonds away from the insurgency you have to give them something in exchange otherwise they are not going to be supporters of the peace process. Premise seven is that growth is not enough. I mean, the IMF and the World Bank complement each other all the time about the 9% growth in Afghanistan, the 9% growth for the first decade in Liberia and all that. The issue, the truth of the matter is that 80% of the population has not got any benefit from that growth. Most of the infrastructure is built for the domestic elites and the foreign investors and there is no level playing field for the 80% of the population that lives in the rural sector. And in fact, I wanted to mention to Rob Boss today because he mentioned the need to increase the productivity in the rural area. And you know, one thing that it's very clear and there are lots of studies is that of that 80% that lives in rural areas in these fragile states, over 40% are women. I mean, 40% are women but women represent more than men in the rural labor. And the difference in productivity between men and women is tremendous. So if you want to increase productivity, give inputs to the women and that's the easiest way to increase the productivity. I mean, everybody talks about it but they don't do it. At the UN there is lip service about gender rights and all that but you have to empower women if you want them to have any rights. Finally, because this is so different from development as usual because reconstruction in countries coming out of war or rather a large crisis is so different, you have to use a different yardstick. For instance, if we judge the arms for land program on economic or financial criteria, like we would do a normal rural reform, I think it was very bad. But it was very good in the sense that it kept, you know, the ceasefire was a perfect ceasefire and not even in Mozambique there was a perfect ceasefire. So we have to use a more qualitative measure and the basic, during this period of, during the reconstruction period, the measurement, the yardstick should be to ensure that the country does not reverse to war. It's just to end. I don't agree Mozambique was a big success. I was doing some work on Mozambique and a country that if you believe in the human development report, which I do as a good measure of human development, you know, Mozambique, first you don't compare a country from a period of war to reconstruction. You should start from a period where there was no war because otherwise you are really distorting the statistics, but most importantly, I think that Mozambique after two and a half decades in peace, the improvement in human development has been nil and even negative. In 92, in the human development report, it was at the bottom 10% and now it's worse. So we have to be very careful how we measure success in these countries. Thank you.