 is always a thing to be watched and heard without taking much time that we since we know that it's a Sunday and people would like to slightly relax but the passion to learn from a speaker like Justice Pious is always a pleasure. Over to you sir. Thank you Mr. Vikas. Good evening to everybody and particularly to Mr. Vikas, yourself. Then we have advocate R. Renjeet from Kerala. We have advocate Saji Rafail. We is in fact the convener of my own academy for continuing illegal education. Then I can see Shiva Sharath, who my believer will become a judicial officer shortly and the other faces unfortunately I do not know that. Then Sunil, my disciple, Sunil from Trivandrum is there and everybody and I good evening to all the participants. Let us get down to business. The other day he had started dealing with decisions. Of course during the course of my lecture also I had referred to decisions but then I had started dealing specifically with Kaisaloo, mostly Supriyanko decisions and 102 Kerala decisions also. Now we will continue with that. The first decision which I want to refer you to today is a judgment of the Supreme Court. Citation is 1995 SCC 468 and in only one citation 1995 SCC 468 and the Leonard Duddes are which consist of justices M. M. Poonchi and K. Venkateswamy. Then Kaisi's DCM Limited and another versus Union of India and another which had applied for and completed their expansion projects during 111975 to 2010 1990 granted incentive of higher percentage of livery free sugar quota. Subsequently, control on sugar lifted with effect from 16, 18, 1978 as a result of which classification livery and livery free sugar ceasing to assist and benefit under the incentive scheme of 1975 no longer required. But with effect from 17, 12, 19, 7 sugar policy again modified providing partial control with the dual pricing as existed prior to 16, 8, 1978. Government before refusing the incentive before refusing the incentive scheme of the year 1975 have taken into account various factors including the decontrol of sale of sugar for the period from 16, 8, 78 to 17, 12, 79. Benefits under the subsequent scheme in force from 15 November 1980 has already been accorded to them in full measure according to the petitioner's DCM. Held on the facts of this case, the principle of promissory estopal has no application at all. Administrative law, promissory estopal, nature and applicability based on equity doctrine is applicable against the government in the exercise of its governmental. I tell you friends that most of the decisions which I came across and which I propose to refer to are all of the supreme court are in the context of promissory estopal which actually is not a regular estopal in the strict sense of the term. But since those cases are in public law, no wonder promissory estopal is the common subject matter of all these decisions. Now I take you to, I told you the other day it said that I will be citing a decision of the Bombay High Court and the author of the judgment being a judge who was in my parent High Court, Kerala High Court, then transferred to Bombay High Court and now he has demoted office, he has resigned and we are given to understand that he is going to start practice, he is going to down the ropes of a lawyer again. A very brilliant man, very learned man, just is Dhamma Sheshadri Naidu. So this is Naidu's judgment. The citation is AAR 1920 Bombay 31. I think it has already appeared, it was reported in Baran Benj. Oh I see. He was very friendly towards me, he had been sponsoring prizes for my academic use competition. Yes. Dhamma Sheshadri Naidu. Then case is Vasanthi Sridhar Banguera, doctor and others, versus Vishala Bhogapattana Lakshman. This is the case. Now Court of Civil Procedure section 24 because that also, in fact even though I am only reading those parts, those portions of the judgments pertaining to my topic estoppel, I expect you as students of law to read the whole decision because you know especially Naidu's decision is authority for several other important propositions of law which will be relevant in your day to day practice. Anyway, section 24, the transfer powers, then estoppel, suit for eviction of occupant, filed before the High Court was transferred. Now Bombay High Court, some of you know, has got the original jurisdiction also. So suit for eviction and suits for money can be filed before the Bombay High Court in its original jurisdiction. In this particular case, suit for eviction of a tenant, not a tenant but the occupant was filed before the Bombay High Court. But then the Bombay High Court, the judge who came to deal with the suit found that the suit was not maintainable. According to him, the suit was maintainable before the small court and it was transferred. And the point now decided is suit for eviction of the occupant filed before the High Court was transferred to small court when the defendant was already on record. Transfer was effected when the defendants were already on record but still the defendants are not stopped from questioning that transfer at any stage. They are not stopped from questioning transfer at any stage. Now it will be necessary to take two to the facts very till. Not fact but the discussions of Justice Naidu here pertaining to how the estoppel, how he deals with estoppel. Yes, issue number one. Issue number one was this. The plaintiff filed a suit before one forum. One forum means here it was the Bombay High Court in the original jurisdiction and put the defendant on notice. But that forum ruled that it had no jurisdiction. Instead, it transferred the file to the forum which it felt has the jurisdiction. Does this estope the defendant from questioning the plaintiff's choice if it were a forum? Question. Then the consideration of this particular issue by Justice Naidu. This issue, para 60. This issue concerns the small court's inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Vaishala first invoked this court's original jurisdiction and filed the suit before it. Vaishala, Asandi and her husband entered appearance before they could file their defense this court on its own. I reckoned that the suit ought to be filed by the small court's court. So, it sent the suit to the small court's court. The order in fact reads the transfer order is courted. This suit is for recovery of possession and mean profits from gratuitous licensee. The civil court, I am quoting the order, the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Perpires and proceedings are sent to the small court's court Bombay for continuation of trial. Then at a 17 from the above order, I gather that this court has not returned the plane. Rather, it has transferred the suit and it ordered continuation of the suit at that. Had it been a case of return of plane, it would have been governed by order 7 rule 10 CPC. Now therefore, we need not live around that provision in the transfer a suit general is governed by section 2225. And then there was a discussion on that, the powers of the court to transfer suits. And then in paragraph 20, here I have already noted that this court invoked section 24 of CPC and transferred the case. Then I must hold that the transfer was effected when the defendants were on record. Put differently, defendants were parties to that decision of transfer, but still the defendants are not stopped from questioning that transfer at any state. First, neither any court nor any consenting party can confer the restriction on a court, which otherwise lacks it. Second, the inherent lack of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter. And third, the order or the judgment of the transfer report may render the transfer report may render the same knowledge, a product of four of non-judice. That is the proceedings are before a judge, but not the proper one or one who cannot take judicial legal consequence of the matter. So the judgment too suffers for one of legitimacy. As a result, so that being the position, it's a fundamental question of jurisdiction, lack of even inherent jurisdiction. If that is the position, there is no estoppel at all. That is, the defendant can challenge it, even though it was a transfer by the court or so on. Yes, so that is, this is Naidu's view and that seems to be correct also. Then I take you to Supreme Court judgment in Satyendra Kumar and others versus Rajanadhu Dubey, Satyendra Kumar and others versus Rajanadhu Dubey and others. The citation is AAR 2016 Supreme Court, 2231. Judges are Deepak Mishra and Shivagilthi Singh. Judges on the bench are Deepak Mishra and Shivagilthi Singh. Now the Lordships are dealing with the questions of resjudicator and issue estoppel. Important paragraph is 12 and this is what their Lordships say. Resjudicator issues estoppel and estoppel by judgment. Principles discussed behind this discuss evidence act 115, 116 and 117 held the distinction drawn by the High Court in the impugned judgment that an erroneous determination of a pure question of law in a previous judgment will not operate as a resjudicator in the subsequent proceedings. For different property, though between the same parties is clearly in accord with section 11 of the CPC. Strictly speaking, when the cause of action as well as the subject matter, that is the property and issue in the subsequent suit are entirely different. Resjudicator is not attracted and the competent court is not debarred from trying the subsequent suit which may arise between the same parties in respect of other properties and upon a different cause of action. In such a situation, since the court is not debarred, all issues including those of facts remain open for adjudication by the competent court and the principle which is attracted against the party which has lost an important issue fact in the earlier suit is the principle of estoppel, more particularly issue estoppel. Now, my request to all of you is that you should read the decisions pertaining to issue estoppel. It's a confused area which creates a lot of confusion, the distinction between issue estoppel, regular estoppel, resjudicator. Anyway, here this is what their lordships say. The issue estoppel which flows from the principles of evidence such as from section 115, 160 and 117 of the Indian Evidence Act and from the principles of equity. As a principle of evidence, estoppel is treated to be an admission or in the eyes of law something equivalent to an admission of such quality and nature that the maker is not allowed to contradict it. In other words, it works as an impediment or bar to a right of action due to affected persons conduct or action. Estoppel by judgment finds reference in the case of Asan Hussain Abdul Ali Bahani, proprietor of the shop versus my wife of Nathu Thalanga, then 38 Nakhur 129. It is taken as a bar which precludes the parties after final judgment to re-agitate and really take the same course of action or ground of defense or any fact determined by the judgment. If the determination was by a court of court of commitment jurisdiction, bar will remain operative even if the judgment is perceived to be erroneous. If the parties fail to get rid of an erroneous judgment, they as well as persons claiming through them must remain bound by it. Actually, I told you the other day also estoppel by judgment is nothing other than residue indicator and we say it is by section 11 of CBC. Then next note, 115, 116 and 117, estoppel no equitable principle or principle or estoppel can impede powers of the court to determine an issue of law correctly in a subsequent suit which relates to another property founded upon a different course of action, though the parties may be the same. Section 11 held as explained and held by this court in the case of Mathura Prasad Sarju Jayeswal, where the decision is on a pure question of law, then a court cannot be precluded from deciding the such question of law differently. Such a bar cannot be invoked either on a principle of equity or estoppel. No equitable principle or estoppel can impede powers of the court to determine an issue of law correctly in a subsequent suit which relates to another property founded upon a different course of action, though the parties may be the same. As explained earlier, in such a situation, principle of residue indicator is strictly speaking not applicable. So whereas principle of estoppel is concerned, it operates against the party and not against the court and gets nothing comes in the way of competent court in such a situation to decide a pure question of law differently if it is over and dead. Issues of facts once finally determined will however stare at the parties, stare at the parties and bind them on account of earlier judgments or for any other good reason where equitable principles of estoppel are attracted. So findings of facts, even if the judgment isn't operator residue indicator, they are finding a fact may bind the party as issue estoppel. That's what the Lord should say. Then next decision. Next decision is yes, this is by my dear Chief Justice, Justice Telemesher and Abdul Naseer, Supreme Court decision. The citation is AAR 2017 Supreme Court 3995. Justice Telemesher and Justice Abdul Naseer, the name of the case is Jaspal Kaur Shema and another versus industrial trade dealings and others. This must be from Punjab and Haryana court. Yes, because this is from Chandigarh. Case is from Chandigarh. Yes. And their lordships say this is their lordships are dealing with section 116 that is the estoppel against the tenant from denying the landlord's title. Section 116 deals with estoppel of a tenant founded upon contract between the tenant and his landlord. It enumerates the principles of estoppel, which is merely an extension of the principle that no person is allowed to appropriate and reprobate at the same time. That tenant who has been led into possession cannot deny his landlord's title cannot deny his landlord's title. Yes. And paragraph 11, the principle of estoppel arising from a contract of tenancy is based upon the principles of law and justice. That a tenant who could not have got possession but for a contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to put his landlord in some inevitable situation, taking undue advantage of the position that he got and any probable defect in the title of the landlord. This court in Ben Siraj, Lelda Prasad, Mishra versus Stanley Parker, Parker Jones, 2006, 63 SCC 91 enumerated the policy underlying section 116 as follows. Then quoted from 2006, 63 SCC 91, the underlying policy of 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement, that will give price to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship with the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the set section. The principle of paragraph 14, the principle of estoppel arising into the contract of tenancy is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right to the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inevitable situation, taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of the landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenancy entry into the possession that the only admission of the landlord's title that a principle of estoppel is attracted. Then section 116 enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of the principle that no man is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time and their lodgings are then dealing with other decision of Supreme God and yes, they are dealing with Thangappan v. Padmavadi etc. etc. Then the now I take you to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sri Siddhali Steals Limited Messers and others v. State of UP and others. The citation is A, 2011 Supreme Court 1175, 2011 Supreme Court 1175. Leonard Judges on the Benjab just is a J. M. Panchal, B. S. Chauhan and Jan Suda Mishra. Yes, the important points are in paras are in paras 11, 14 and 18. I am not reading those paras in full because I will run out of time, short of time. Yes, Evidence Act 115 from Sri Estoppel, principle of there can be no estoppel against the statute. The government authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. Dr. Ina, promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, where public interest warrants, principle of promissory interest for promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. In view of the observations made by the divisionment of the court in the reported decisions, the questions that fall for consideration before these larger benches or whether a benefit given by a statutory notification can be withdrawn by the government by another statutory notification and whether the principles of promissory estoppel would be applicable in a case where concerns and rebates given by a statutory notification are subsequently withdrawn by another statutory notification. It is an admitted position that the notification dated 28th June 1996 granting rebate to the industries set up in hill areas was issued in exercise to the powers conferred under section 49 of Electricity Supply Act 48. By the set notification rebate in electricity charges to the extent of 33.33 percent was given to the industries which were set up in the hill areas during the specified period. It is also an admitted position that thereafter by notifications dated 18th June 1998 and January 25th 1999 issued in exercise the powers conferred by section 49 of act of 1948 percentage of rebate granted by the earlier notification was reduced to 17 percent. However, by subsequent notification dated $7000-2000 the benefit which was granted to the industries set up in the hill areas regarding rebate in electricity charges was completely withdrawn. What is relevant to notice is that it is not in dispute that the notification dated 7th August 2000 withdrawing the benefits granted earlier was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by section 24 of the Uttar Palesi Electricity Reforms Act. The above mentioned fact makes it evident that the benefits which were granted and slash or curtailed in exercise of statutory powers were subsequently withdrawn in exercise of another statutory power conferred by another statute namely UP Electricity Reforms Act. In the light of the above mentioned facts the question whether principle of promissory estopals would apply into exercise of statutory powers will have to be considered. Doctrine of promissory estopals is by now well recognized and well defined in our decisions of this court where the government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promissory and in fact the promissory acting in lands of it orders its position the government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the government at the instance of the promise. Not understanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract by article 229 of the constitution. The rule of promissory estopals being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard and fast rule but an elastic one. The objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. That means both the government authority as well as the promises. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity to avoid ingesties and though commonly named promissory estopals, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estopals. For application of doctrine of promissory estopals, the promissory must establish that he suffered in detriment or out of his position by reliance on that promise. Normally, doctrine of promissory estopals is being applied against the government and depends based on the executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transferred, it will be inevitable to hold the government to the promise made by it or to not raise an equity in favour of the promissory and enforce the promise against the government where public interest warrants principle of promissory estopals cannot be invoked. Government can change the policy in public interest. Then next decision is from Kerala High Court. Kerala High Court, this is Leonard Jett, a division bench. Leonard Jett are just his Harry Prasad whom most of you know because he has taken classes on this particular beyond the CLC platform. Harry Prasad and TV Anil Kumar. TV Anil Kumar, both of them have retired from Kerala High Court now. The citation is, I give you ILR citation, ILR 2051, one Kerala in 966. So this was a case where the, yes, I will just read it, execution of sale deed with a condition, execution of sale deed with a condition for reconveyance, failure of the defendant in reconveyance in the property, whether a suit for declaring the sale deed as a sham document is maintainable, a suit for declaring the sale deed as a sham or wild document is not maintainable when there was failure on the part of the defendant in executing the deed of reconveyance. Appropriate remedy offered to the aggrieved is the suit for execution of the deed for reconveyance or property as in the case of a suit for specific performance. Then the demand being made to the defendant in the suit for execution of deed for reconveyance must be necessarily implied. Now that's the principle, that's the, their lordships are saying that there is a stompel against the plaintiffs in suing for a declaration that the suit is sham, like the sale deed is sham, because they hand admitted the execution of the sale deed and containing, in which condition that there will be reconveyance when the money is paid off. The demand being made to the defendant in the suit for execution of the deed for reconveyance must necessarily imply the plaintiff's admission as to the transfer of his rights to the defendant in the past. Expression reconveyance denotes a demand made for read transfer of rights which has already taken effect through a deed in favor of the transferee. A suitor cannot blow hot and cold that the conveyance has not taken into effect and yet he is entitled to reconveyance the rights. Such a convention is mutually contradictory and cannot go in tandem. A plaintiff having pleaded in his plaintiff that defendant agreed to reconvey the property on receipt of the loan amount back, he is stopped by his act from contending that the sale deed executed by him was not intended to take effect and was therefore sham. No court would be in a position to declare a sale deed executed in such circumstances to which sham or nominal. In fact, this is a stopper by pleading. Having pleaded that I have executed a sale deed containing a clause that they will reconvey it, then he cannot say the sale deed is sham. But he should say there is a condition for reconveyance. He is not complying with the condition. Therefore give me specific performance. Command him to reconvey to me. That is the ceremony. But to say that if he says that this is a sham document that goes against his own argument in the plane that he had executed a sale and the deed contained a clause. So that is the principle of Kerala decision. Then next decision is Supreme Court. This is Lenin Judges R. This is R. Bhanumadi, then A. S. Bapanna and Hrishesh Roy. Hrishesh Roy was Kerala Chief Justice. Everybody knows. Then this is Bhanumadi was President of the Madras Judicial Academy and I had occasion to stay in the Madras Judicial Academy's guest house when she was the President. She insisted that I should stay in their guest house rather than your main guest house and I was one who was very friendly towards me. Now the principle is this. Sandho Chaturvedi versus Kailash Chandra and another. Sandho Chaturvedi versus Kailash Chandra and another. Then citation is A.R. 2020 Supreme Court 270. Then this is yes U.P. Section 116 Evidence Act. Then U.P. Regulation of Letting, Rend and Eviction Act. U.P. Rend and Role Act. Father of the owner had received a property under a registered partnership. Partition D. Though detailed examination with regard to the nature of the right to the property has been made in the present case, the same is only unnecessary in the summary proceeding in the present nature. When the tenant had not set up title to the premises in question, family settlement deed dated 15 November 1999 has entered into to which the father who was the owner was himself a party and had given a portion to his property to his son. Settlement deed ended by the owner in favor of his son. Landlord acquiring title cannot be called in question by the tenant. So that is what the Lordship Supreme Court in this segment say. But then we have seen other judgments already and I think there may be other because that is even though the tenant is not entitled to deny the title of the landlord, tenant is not prohibited from denying that, denying the derivative title of an Asaini landlord. But then here their Lordships are drawing a distinction. This son who got the property from his father, he opicifies a higher pedestal than that of an ordinary Asaini landlord. It should be like that. So once he is in appraise, that is what this is Vanimati and the other tenant did to say. Now I take you to yet another decision was being made. This is a century spinning and marketing company limited and another versus Ullasnagar Municipal Council and another. The citation is AAR 1971 Supreme Court 1021. That is our J. C. Shah, then K. S. Hegde and A. N. Grover, paragraphs 10 to 30. Yes. One minute, one minute. Yes. I am reading from paragraph 10. There is undoubtedly a clear distinction between a representation of an existing fact and a representation that something will be done in future. The former may, if it amounts to a representation as to some fact, alert at the time to be actually in existence, raise, actually in existence, raise an estoppel if another person altires his position, relying on that representation, a representation that something will be done in the future may result in a contract. If another person to whom it is addressed acts upon it, a representation that something will be done in future is not a representation that it is true, that it is true when made. But between a representation of a fact which is untrue and a representation expressed or implied to do something in future, there is no clear antithesis. A representation that something will be done in future may involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. If the representation is not acted upon by another person, it may unless the statute governing the person making the representation provides otherwise result in an agreement enforceable at law. If the statute requires that the agreement shall be in certain form, no contract may result from the representation and acting therefore, but the law is not powerless to raise in appropriate cases and equity against him to compel performance of the obligation arising out of the representation. Then parallel level, public bodies are as much bounded as private individuals to carry out the representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their communities. The obligation arising against an individual out of the representation amounting my promise may be enforced ex-contract you by a person who acts upon the promise when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in a certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by the statute. The obligation of the contract, if the contract may not be in that form, may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity. Then in union of India versus so and so, this court held that court is not exempt from the equity arising out of acts done by citizens to their prejudice, relying on the representations as to future conduct made by the government. Then their lawsuits are caught in denning, law denning in Robertson versus minister of pensions, the crown cannot escape by saying that stoppers do not bind the crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity that is the doctrine that a crown cannot bind itself so as to better its future or future executive action. Then their lordships say paragraph 12, in our nation democracy, if our nation democracy is to thrive, different standards of contact for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body in our judgment is not exempt from the ability to carry out its obligation arising out of the representation made by relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice. Now I will let me continue my lecture for 10 or 12 minutes, then there are a few more decisions. If I am unable to complete the other decisions, the remaining decisions, I will give citations, only that, because you know today being a Sunday, Vigas is very particular that I must stop at one hour, in one hour. Yes, now in continuation of my lecture, different categories. Let us deal with certain other categories of estopals known to law that is referred to in judgments and applied in decisions. Estopal by judgment, I have already told you it is virtually the rest of the get down to section 11. Then estopal by latches, estopal by latches. Estopal by latches belongs to the category of estopal in pay. Pay, I said PIS to be the pronunciation is pay, PIS. Latch means an unreasonable delay in making an assertion or claim which may result in refusal. A party to a contract delays in performing the contract thus causes laws to the other party is said to be latches on the part of the party delaying. It will decentralize to claim the right under the contract. The delay may cause abandonment of his part of the contract. This is estopal by latches. That's a part of estopal in pay. Then third, estopal by negligence. I had just in passing refer to negligence yesterday also, the other day also. Estopal by negligence. This estopal also belongs to the category of estopal in pays. Estopal by negligence is where a man is estoped by another man's misrepresentation. If in breach of some duty to the person deceived, he has supplied the person making the representation with that which was necessary to make it credible. So that is estopal by negligence. Then estopal by warranty. Estopal by warranty also belongs to the category of estopals by deed. It is based on the principle of giving effect to the manifest intention of the grantor appearing on the deed as to the lands or estate or even goods to be conveyed and of preventing the grantor from derogating or destroying his own grant by any subsequent act. So this is estopal by guarantee. Then next, technical estopal. This technical estopal these names I got from textbooks but then they are not referring to any decisions. But anyway, textbooks by seasoned authors, celebrated authors on law of evidence, they say there is a category by name, technical estopal. So if somebody for people who are youngsters who ask for judicial examination, suppose the interview board asks you, what do you mean by technical estopal? You can say this. Technical estopals are those which arise from natural record or the deed of the party estop. Estopals arising from a strict or technical construction of the rules of law. Technical estopals also belong to the category of estopals by deed. Then get another category, title slash right by estopal. Title slash right by estopal are those where a person without title having conveyed without having conveyed with a warranty with an assurance that he has title. But he actually was not having title but he subsequently acquiesced title. That title will anywhere to the benefit of the grantee who is said to acquire estopal. This acquire title by this estopal or estopal by right. I told you the other day I had mentioned about feeding the grant by estopal. This is nothing other than feeding the grant by estopal, which is in fact statutorily incorporated in section 53 of the transfer of property act. Feeding the grant by estopal was a question which we used to ask in our quiz competitions. So this is the title by estopal or right by estopal is feeding the grant by estopal statutorily recognized in section 53 of the ETI. Now we come to promissory estopals. Of course most of the decisions which I had held to were promissory estopals. But I think some more lecture on the topic is necessary because that is the topic where there is abundance of case law. When you go through the case law you will find whether it be of the Supreme Court or the various psych courts, courts are mostly dealt with promissory estopals which are not regular estopals contemplated under section 115, 116 or 117 of the Evidence Act. Promissory estopals arise when there is a promise which a promissor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promissory and which does induce such action or forbearance and such promises binding if industries can be avoided by enforcement of the promise. The object of promissory estopal is to preclude perpetration of fraud or causing injury in a case where the representation or promise has been made to induce an action on the part of the party sitting at the estopal. In such a case the party making the promise is precluded from asserting one of consideration therefore before the doctrine of promissory estopal is invoked it has to be shown one that there was representation or promise in regard to something to be done in future then two that such a representation or promise was intended to affect the legal relations of the parties and to be acted upon accordingly and three that it is one on which the other side has in fact acted to his prejudice. Sometimes there may not be any agreement or contract in the substantial time but a person making a promise may become bowled by the rule of promissory estopal then estopal by waiver that I have discussed already but then that is also another category of estopals actually estopals and waiver differ from each other in various material aspects waiver means to refrain from or insisting on or applying a right or claim waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right or such content waiver creates substantial right as soon as it is made estopal is a rule of evidence it may be in the it may indirectly create a substantial right especially where a party intentionally or need an agreement or need a settlement waives his right in favor of another party he said how waived is right however once he has waived when he has waived his right in a in a contract or property he cannot claim it later if he claims again the estopal by waiver comes into operation in fact estopal by waiver belongs to this category of estopal yesterday in fact the other day while dealing with estopal by waiver I said about a case by an advocate who had joined the practice after he after his retirement from government service and he claimed the benefits of the welfare fund but bar council denied it but then his council his senior council set up estopal by waiver against the bar council the the argument was that the bar council having received contributions from this advocate cannot now turn and say turn around and say there is a rule which prevents advocates of age above a particular age cannot be members of the but then I had said that the Kerala High Court had decided and upheld the argument of estopal by waiver actually I was wrong that was the impression given to the advocates but then the later judge what the later judge ultimately did was when he delivered judgment what he did was when he was reserved and the actual gentleman is he doesn't decide on merits he found that there was a statutory remedy available to the advocate under the advocates act and the advocate was relegated to the statutory remedy and then of course observed yeah after the after he avails the statutory remedy he can come to this thought again so I was not correct in saying that the Kerala High Court has held the plea held held up a plea of estopal by waiver against the Kerala bar council that's not correct I'm sorry for having made such a wrong statement of fact last time now estopal now we have estopals by election when a party has two options in a given circumstance but to choose but not to choose both of them and chooses one of them thereafter he's recruited to take the other option or both the options he's this recruited by estopal by election estopal by election where a party has two options in a given circumstance but not to choose both of them chooses one of them thereafter he's recruited to claim the other option or both the options now in fact there is a there is a directly Kerala decision on this and that is a P.J. Miriam versus Srinjitha and others I will be I have got the decision I will be taking to that this estopal by election Kerala decision then then no then issue a stopper issue a stopper the then all the principles applicable to I guess now I take you to issue a stopper where an issue of fact what is issue a stopper where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favor of one party such a finding would constitute an issue estopal not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different and distinct offense now issue a stopper supplied to criminal proceedings also conviction of the accused for a different and distinct offense but as precluding a reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact already entered into in the previous occasion when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offense which might be permitted by law this is the principle in Masood Khan versus state of UP AR 1974 Supreme Court 28 I think I have brought Masood Khan also then all the principle appropriate to reciprocate on a section 11 will apply to issue estopals also parties that is not fully correct not all the principles then but most of the principles parties in the two proceedings must be same facts an issue proved or not in the earlier trial must be identical with what is sort of re-edited in the subsequent issue issue estopal then the distinction between issue estopal and the rule of WTO party the various difference the former in the former issue estopal only an issue relating to a fact is proved or disproved in the earlier proceeding it operates as a bar in the subsequent proceeding from trying the very same issue but in the latter it is WTO party the accused is convicted and tried for the same offense and there cannot be further trial and convictions for the same offense now let me straight away because I am running short of time let me come to the decision yes now the first decision which I take you to know is the the the judgment of justice Bhagavadi Ian Bhagavadi and Tulsa Pukul reported in citation is our topic is that with scope and ambit of waiver it is elementary that waiver is a question of fact and it must be properly pleaded and proved there can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed last week is right and with full knowledge of such right he intentionally abandons it then then another principle not very much relevant to us but then you should know that because the maximum ignorance of law is no excuse everybody knows ignorance during this non excuse that but their lordships say that is there but there is no presumption that every person knows the law no no such presumption no presumption in law that every person knows the law though there is the rule that ignorance of law does not excuse then estoppel where the government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the prophecy and in fact the prophecy acting in the lens of it or tells its position the government would be held bound by the promise and the promisey promise would be enforceable against the government at the instance of the promisey not to standing that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by article 219 another constitution if a promise is acted upon such action in law must necessarily reset in alteration of position then one minute is a very lengthy decision so the main decision but then if you read this you will get clear idea because see this subject on which I am taking classes now abstract legal principles not very easy because you know decisions themselves confuse there is contradiction between decisions conflicting decisions so you have to be very cautious you have to be very carefully read through the full text of the judgments which I cited if you do that then you will have a somewhat clear idea as to the doctrine of estoppel yes parasix waiver waiver they say they are they are cutting from health worries laws of england i'm not reading it because time we don't have time then then then then their roadships are referring to english decisions to drive home the point that there is no law that there is no rule that everybody knows the law then paragraph seven that makes us that takes us to the question whether the assurance is given by the fourth responder don't we have the state government that the appellant would be exempted from sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement the production could be enforced against the state government by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel though the origins of the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be found in huge sources metropolitan railway company it was only recently in 1947 that it was rediscovered by lord justice denning as he then was in his celebrated judgment in central london property trust limited versus high trees house limited this doctrine has been variously called promissory estoppel palavala pera promissory estoppel quasi estoppel then new estoppel same everything is same wine in different names only the new estoppel it's a principally world in equity to avoid injustice and though commonly called a promissory estoppel it is as we shall personally find out neither in the realm of a crown rite nor in the realm of estoppel it's interesting to trace the evolution of this doctrine in england and to refer to some of the english decisions in order to appreciate the truth just to spice up it's not audible the early cases did not speak of this doctrine as estoppel they spoke of it as raising an equity lord came stated etc etc then later there are lots of say these observation of the lord denning observation lord denning clearly suggests that the parties need not be in any kind of legal relationship before the transaction from which the promissory estoppel takes its origin the doctrine would seem to apply when there is no pre-existing legal relationship between the parties but the promise is intended to create legal relations has various laws of england etc then of course it must be pointed out in fairness to lord denning that he made it clear in the hydris case that the doctrine or promissory estoppel cannot be found cannot found a course of action in itself since it can never do away with the necessity of consideration in the formation of a contract but it totally repudiated in england's case the necessity of a pre-existing relationship between the parties and pointed out in crab versus iron district council that equity will in a given case where justice and fairness demand prevent a person from insisting on strict legal rights even when they arise not under any contract but on his own title is or under statute very link one minute my request to all sincere students of law is to is to go through this decision in full because i have no time to read it now paragraph 14 paragraph 14 the lotions are discussing the american law the american law relating to a i will not interestable and then they come ultimately to indian law yes indian law and in the discussions about indian law this is what they say under our jurisprudence the government is not exempt from liability to carry out representations made by it to future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency pay to carry out the promise solely made by it nor claim to be judged of its own obligation to the citizen the law therefore now be settled as a result of this decision that where the government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the prop up acted upon by the promise acted upon by the promise and what promise that promise would be enforceable against the government and that instance of promise in understanding that there is no consideration for the promise etc etc it is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law no one house however higher law is above the law everyone is subject to law as fully and completely as the other and the government is no exception it is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and the rule of law that the government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned the the power body is equally bound as the other then government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of purpose promissory estopal and repudiated promise made by it on the ground that such promise may better its future executive action etc etc it is it is necessary to point out it's a quite a wonderful decision very lengthy decision and i think the other is just is the Bhagavadhyano not that i'll let me see should be Bhagavadhyam that's not very clear i think it should be Bhagavadhyam because the language the style is that of is not some justice beyond Bhagavadhyam read it in full i have no time then which is the other one citation repeat you know citation is uh 1979 uh uh 19 a.m 1971 6 21 mothilan padam but sugar mills company limited versus state of lupi now another decision i think it is a one minute one minute i will just give the citations i will just give the citations because i'm sorry then masood khan masood khan versus state of lupi referred to in the earlier decisions achar kanna not achar kanna is on the bench achar kanna alagini samy and the arrestor kairiya he is not justice kanna alagini samy is the author of the judgment this is 74 3 scc 469 please no doubt masood khan versus state of lupi this is this is uh this is a beautiful stopper issue a stopper issue a stopper very good decision please read through this now but now 11 yes next decision uh this is uh supreme god decision 19 80 supreme god 12 55 80 supreme god 12 55 please note down the citation nc singhal doctor versus union of india and others jettas are d s i and he is vengadramaya what the point is affidavits by government admissions in the affidavit file by the government which are mere expressions of opinion limited to the context and do not contain specific assurances are not binding on the government or creating a stopper so when the affidavit is filed by the government for the purpose of avoiding orders you should see that the affidavit is in the form of solemn with clear undertakings or assurances otherwise this judgment will go will be applied and they will say it's not binding on the government yes now the other decision yes now next decision is again by d s i uh d s i and rb misra this is uh citation is here 1983 supreme god 848 uh uh d s i and rb misra cases gudharath state financial corporation versus messes lotus hotels privately limited promissory stopper gudharath financial corporation entered into agreement in performance statutory duty to advance long to a company company incurred huge expenses etc etc held the promissory stopper could stop the corporation from backing out etc etc with this now now the last decision this is this is important this is by a lenin singleton to the kerala high court lenin singleton to the kerala high court this is a quiggin versus renjitha the malayali lawyers know who this quiggin is i'm not going to mention his name and this case was you know hit the headlines in those times i'm not saying this but but but this is a case where their lordships say his lordship says lenin singleton just his k m omas shafi his lordship says that the principle of a stopper by election a stopper by election will apply to civil as well as criminal proceedings because here the other side argued that since there was an op already pending this this section 482 under the criminal procedure court petition miscellaneous petition filed by this puryan for quashing the fir that case is not maintainable because they have already invoked the red jurisdiction of the high court in the other repetition where the subject matter side but then the lenin singleton says a stopper by election that any question arose whether the principle of a stopper by election will apply to criminal cases the body cross footage argument it appears was there his lordship says it will apply to following english textbooks his lordship says it will certainly apply but on facts he said in one of the facts of this case it will not apply said 482 petition is maintainable law notwithstanding the other repetition but he did not allow the 482 petition and it was this space kuryan's grimulancy was this space and kuryan had to go to the supreme court and if i understand correctly before the supreme court he engaged just his i mean the senior advocate i then then law minister and gently won the case for kuryan gently could get the fair question mr vigas i'm sorry that mr vigas are you there mr vigas i'm sorry that i could not complete it but then i think i have given the citations the participants i'm sure will read the full text of the citations given and any specific questions you do one thing you could just send me the questions i will try to answer then being a topic being abstract legal principles you know i cannot straight answer but then you give me i will on the basis of textbooks and decisions i will answer but here also you know decisions every decision is when we read one decision you will find that that is correct this is the this is the confusion but still i think to a great extent to the best of my ability i have done justice that's what i believe so thank you mr vigas and thank you all dear participants for the patient listening i think time that i should say stop this yes what you said the stopper has his own legal journey i remember i went to one senior advocates the office way back around 25 years ago at his office at the entrance gate where you enter his office it was written the law is what is decided on that particular day so that's how the law has progressed with the flux of time and i would request you sir that if you could give the entire compendium of the judgment with citation not the judgments as such we will share it in the whatsapp group so that they can let's assume somebody has missed it or somebody watches it already given decisions i have already given almost in a compendium in a compendium form and a title plus citation okay i will i will i will be here okay thank you sir and thank you everyone stay safe stay blessed and it's always a pleasure hearing from you muska thank you