 Good afternoon everyone. I'm Jennifer Cook. I'm Director of the Africa Program here at CSIS. I'm delighted to have you all here this afternoon, clearly from the size of the crowd. We can gauge the interest in the issue. We're delighted to have Assistant Secretary Johnny Carson with us this afternoon to discuss and take questions on the new tack that the Obama Administration has launched in U.S. Somali policy. This new strategy, which was launched was announced last month as being called a dual-track strategy, one that doesn't abandon U.S. support to the fragile and divided transitional federal government in Somalia, but that strengthens engagement with the autonomous governments in Puntland and Somaliland, and that strengthens engagement with other local government authorities and perhaps clans and subclans in South Central Somalia. The stated intention is to strengthen the ability of these governments to deliver development and services that will make their communities less vulnerable to incursion and recruitment by the extremist insurgency al-Shabaab. I think this is generally being viewed so far, and we can hear from Secretary Carson as a positive shift, one that gets beyond a narrow security approach and one that may galvanize even the TFG to make greater effort at resolving its internal divisions and getting on with the governance agenda, which it so far has failed pretty miserably to do. It's clear that there are no easy or quick fixes in Somalia. Disengagement is not an option given the humanitarian, regional, and international impacts that the conflict there is having, but engagement in Somalia has always been risky. The U.S. has made some serious policy blunders, I think, in the last decade. The enemy of my enemy is my friend's strategy, has not really worked out the way it's supposed to in Somalia, and money and assistance tend to skew incentives and alliances in unexpected ways. I'm pretty certain that no one here is more aware of these risks and these uncertainties than Assistant Secretary Carson. He is one of our most experienced diplomats, certainly on Africa, one of Washington's most thoughtful Africa analysts. He has been so actively engaged on multiple intractable and difficult problems recently. Sudan, DRC, Nigeria, Kenya, to name just a few, and we're delighted that you've been able to take time with us today to sketch out a little more in detail what this new strategy entails. Secretary Carson, thanks. Jennifer, thank you very much for that kind introduction, and thank you also for convening this group to discuss the situation in Somalia. I'm extremely pleased by the size of the audience, and I'm extremely pleased to see a large number of people with whom I have had an opportunity to work on many issues on Africa in the past. I see both ambassadors Yates, including John Yates, a dear friend and colleague who probably knows as much as anybody in this town these days about Somalia, and we certainly appreciate what he's contributed in terms of our understanding and analysis. I see others in the audience, including Pauline Baker, who does a marvelous job of keeping us all straight about states going in the right direction or the wrong direction, and her index is one of the things that keeps us on track as well. Many others in the audience as well. Again, good to see all of you, and thank everyone for taking time out of your very busy schedules to come here this afternoon to join in this discussion. Somalia's ongoing conflict is among our top concerns in sub-Saharan Africa today. I would like to address the dual-track strategy that we are currently pursuing in Somalia, but before that I'd like to put into context what we see happening in that country and in that region. Somalia is a long-running and enormously complex political and security problem which has created and also exacerbated an ongoing humanitarian crisis. Over the past two decades, instability has ripped apart Somalia's internal social fabric, spilled into neighboring countries, and produced security threats for nations hundreds, even thousands of miles away from East Africa. Somalia's instability has unfolded like an aggressive cancer which has metastasized from a local to a regional and now to a global problem, a problem that can no longer be ignored by the international community. Somalia's ongoing crisis has spawned one of Africa's worst refugee emergencies. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have fled by land and sea to neighboring states. There are more than 600,000 Somali refugees scattered across the region, including approximately 340,000 in Kenya and over 165,000 in Yemen across the Red Sea. In Kenya, the Dadaab refugee camp, originally established in the 1990s to accommodate approximately 90,000 people, now comprises three separate camps with over 292,000 refugees. Kenya has borne the brunt of the Somali refugee crisis. An average of 5,000 Somali refugees pour across the border each month according to UNHCR statistics, placing an enormous drain on Kenya's infrastructure and financial resources. This year, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has had to request $270 million in international donor assistance to support Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa and this figure is likely to continue to grow in future years. The international community has also been impacted by the dramatic upsurge in piracy off the coast of Somalia. The trends are both alarming and deeply disturbing. In 2007, pirates targeted 30 ships. By 2009, that number had risen to 218. In total, over the past three years, 450 ships have been attacked and pirates have seized nearly 2,400 hostages and received an estimated $100 million in ransom. Currently, Somali pirates hold 17 ships and 366 hostages. Ransom demands average $4 million per vessel. The cost of protecting commerce by sea are large. Nearly 30,000 ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually and some two dozen countries have deployed naval assets to combat piracy in the Red Sea. But Somali's piracy problem stems from the instability and conflict on the land, not the problems at sea. In addition to the problems of human suffering, refugees and piracy, Somalia has also become a flourishing smuggler's bazaar for illegal arms and contraband as well as the safe haven for a small group of al-Qaeda terrorists who were responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and in Nairobi, Kenya. The absence of an effective government in Mogadishu has allowed foreign fighters associated with al-Qaeda to entrench themselves in Somalia and to link up with al-Shabaab, the Somali extremist group that is attempting to take over Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. While al-Shabaab is not a monolithic organization, many of its senior leaders have found common cause with al-Qaeda and have embraced its tactics. Al-Shabaab's suicide attacks are a reflection of this. The ongoing effort to recruit young Somali men from the diaspora, including those who have been attracted from places like Minneapolis and Seattle, has also added another dimension to the challenges we and others in the international community face in dealing with Somalia today. As the global impact of Somalia's instability escalates and causes ripples far beyond that country's borders, the necessity of a more aggressive international response is apparent. The international community's response to Somalia's deepening crisis has been too feeble, too slow, and too uncoordinated to have the desired impact. And the world is paying the consequences today as the humanitarian and security threats continue to emerge. If the status quo prevails, in the years to come we will pay an even greater price in terms of regional destabilization, piracy, and terrorism. No one nation can solve the problem alone. We all must do our part if we want to achieve a durable solution. We must recognize that this problem has been 22 years in the making, and will take more than just one or two or three months to resolve. We must also recognize that we may need to employ different strategies and tactics to achieve our goals, although pundits and academics have provided valuable and very useful analysis for understanding the scope and the complexity of the Somali problem. No one has come forward with a viable or realistic formula for resolving this crisis. The United States intends to remain engaged in the effort to find a long-term solution. Together with our regional and international partners, we will pursue policies that promote stability and security, economic recovery and development, and the improvement in the country's humanitarian situation. We will also work with the government in Mogadishu to slow down and stop the inflow of foreign fighters. We have already devoted significant financial and diplomatic resources in the pursuit of these shared goals, and we will continue to do so in the days ahead. On the security front, the United States supports the African Union and other regional partners in their efforts to stabilize Somalia. We are pushing to strengthen the capacity of the African Union mission in Somalia so that it can carry out its mandate of defending the TFG and its government institution. We have obligated approximately $229 million in financial assistance to Amosam since 2007. This is in addition to our assessed contributions through the United Nations. We have obligated $35 million since 2007 to invigorate the TFG's efforts to establish an effective broad-based national security force that can protect the people of Somalia and to defeat Shabab. This has taken the form of budgetary assistance, in-kind materials, and security training for the TFG's military. In an effort to address the suffering of millions of Somalis, the United States has provided more than $180 million in humanitarian aid and $60 million in development assistance since 2009. We intend to continue these efforts, which include important economic and educational development support. As Somalis struggle to restart and reestablish government institutions, we have provided media advisors to the TFG's Ministry of Information and help set up an independent accounting mechanism to reduce corruption in the TFG's financial operations. With our support, the TFG has established youth employment projects and microfinance programs to assist small-scale entrepreneurs. We hope shortly to provide financial advisors to the TFG's Ministry of Finance. We will continue to back the institutional development of the TFG to help it become more effective, make it more inclusive, and to improve its financial transparency. But the TFG must do more to help itself. It must move beyond being a government in name only, and it must stop its recurring cycle of internal political fighting. Repeated leadership changes at the top of the TFG have undermined its credibility among many Somalis and failed to improve the TFG's record of governance, security, and service delivery to its citizens. Too many TFG leaders have been preoccupied with personal business and clan interests. In the remaining months of the transitional period, which ends in August 2011, our continued engagement with the TFG will focus on supporting progress on key transnational and transitional tasks aimed at moving the political and reconciliation process forward. The international community and the TFG must find a better way to engage with a larger array of Somali actors and to draw them into a broadened peace and stabilization process. Transitional tasks, including the consultations on the Constitution, should be implemented with that broad political goal in mind. Over the last 18 months, we in the State Department in Washington have worked primarily along a single strategic track that focused on supporting the Djibouti process, the transitional federal government, the government of Sheikh Sharif, and Amosam. Clearly at this point, to be more effective, we need to broaden our engagement to include a second, more comprehensive strategic track. This dual-track approach takes into account the complex nature of Somali society and politics and will allow our engagement to become more flexible and adaptable to local needs and aspirations of all of Somali's citizens. Under this new second track of our strategy, we will pursue increased partnerships with the regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland as well as with local and regional administrative units throughout south-central Somalia who are opposed to El Shabaab but who are not allied to the TFG. We believe there are a large number of groups in south-central Somalia that are committed to promoting stability, responsible local governance and economic development in and for their communities. We intend to seek those units out and to work with them. We also intend to allow as security permits more American diplomats and USID development experts to travel to Somaliland and to Puntland and eventually to other regions to engage directly with local government officials in those areas and to initiate small-scale development projects. In the case of Somaliland and Puntland, the dual-track policy recognizes the progress and relative stability in both of those areas as well as the business, clan and marriage-based interconnections among Somali regions and the degree to which stability in one region can potentially contribute to stability in other parts of the country. In June of this year, Somaliland showed the world that it was capable of conducting a free and fair presidential election and a peaceful political transition not only between leaders but between political parties. Somaliland's electoral success demonstrates that Somalia is not inherently unstable and that democracy, governance, peaceful political dialogue and economic progress are indeed possible. The United States will encourage greater political and economic development in Somaliland and intends to enhance our engagement there to support it. While the United States does not plan to recognize Somalia's independence, we think there should be ways for the international community to assist an even greater civic progress in that political country. Before saying something about Puntland, I would want to acknowledge the contribution that former president Riali made to Somali lands, Somalia's stability and political development through his graceful transfer of power to the new administration. That was an important political statement. In Puntland, we are working with non-governmental organizations to build the capacity of governance institutions to address the root causes of instability and piracy. However, we remain concerned that Puntland has reduced the space for free and open media to the detriment of its own political developments. We want to forge a stronger relationship with Puntland and we encourage a renewed dedication by that regional government to the principles of freedom of expression and democracy and we urge that government and leadership to take much more aggressive action against piracy that originates from its shores. In South Central Somalia, we are expanding our outreach and engagement with local and regional leaders and with groups who are working towards peace. In addition, we will continue to reach out to the various elements of Osuna Wa Jema, who are actively engaged against El Shabaab and interested in peace and stability. In the city of Galcaio, we are working with both sides of the historically divided city to promote economic development and political and security cooperation. We are supporting a recent youth initiative and working to improve the IT services at Galcaio University. In Gal Gadug region, we are working with the regional government to develop its governing institutions and to assist its efforts to deliver improved services to its people. I want to make clear that although the United States has a long-term commitment to Somalia's stability, it is the Somalis themselves who must take the lead. The United States can only play a supporting role in collaboration with other international partners. No solution is possible without Somalis themselves, including Somalis who live in the diaspora. All must be committed to working together to find solutions to Somalia's many challenging problems. I am confident that there are indeed local, regional and national leaders among the Somali people inside Somalia in the greater Horn of Africa and including in the United States who are determined, resilient and courageous enough to work towards a more stable Somalia. United States will continue to support such leaders and the Somali people achieve their goals. Somalis living across the United States can play a crucial role, not only here but also back in Somalia as well. We are working hard to explain our efforts in Somalia to this diaspora community and to listen to their ideas, their concerns on how we can help Somalis to bring about positive change in that country. We are also working with our international partners to promote global efforts to work more intensively with their diaspora communities in an effort to magnify our own work. The Istanbul Conference last May made a significant contribution toward this effort to mobilize the Somali diaspora globally including over 80 key businessmen and social leaders from around the world. We will also continue to put on notice whatever their affiliations those who are profiting financially from Somalia's instability will be exposed. Corruption from any sector saps whatever strength there is in the economy and it must be controlled at every level. We will continue to use sanctions as a tool to prevent spoilers from further contributing to Somalia's instability. There are no easy answers or solutions in Somalia. There is no guarantee that our new dual track strategy will achieve the progress that we desire. If our strategy needs to be revised we will do so. Walking away and letting Somali and Somalis fight it out amongst themselves is in no one's interest and Somalia's problems are no longer simply local ones. Refugee flows, pirate attacks and terrorist threats will continue to increase unless we work with Somalia to deal with these issues. We are extremely grateful to a number of countries in the region and in the international community who are making important contributions to security and humanitarian efforts in Somalia. But we encourage many others to join in this effort. However I would be remiss if I did not say that more countries need to come forward with meaningful contributions. Somalia's international contact group meets very frequently in nice cities and capitals around the world. But these forums need to produce more significant financial and material contributions to advance the process of peace and reconciliation in Somalia and to better coordinate international efforts. If we are going to change the situation on the ground the international community will simply have to do more. More countries will have to contribute to Amazon. Thus far only Uganda and Burundi have provided troops for this African-led mission. More African countries and perhaps some moderate Arab and Islamic countries should consider troop contributions. We hope that African states such as Kenya and South Africa and Tanzania will possibly contribute maritime assets to Amazon to help stem the flow of arms and foreign fighters into the port of Kismayu. El Shabaab uses Kismayu to the detriment of the Somali people. The Arab League should be more actively engaged in Somalia. Egyptian, Yemen and Saudi interests have all been hurt by the explosion of piracy in the Red Sea. We understand that at the recent Arab summit in Libya the Arab League agreed to give the transitional federal government $10 million per month in unrestricted budgetary support. I urge the Arab League to fulfill its commitment and to make sure at the same time that its money is spent transparently and in the interest of the Somali people. We have consistently supported UN and AU interests in establishing permanent missions in Mogadishu. And I would take this opportunity to underscore our support for their efforts to put people on the ground on a full-time basis. Amazon forces are putting themselves on the line and playing a part in the solution not just to a national, regional, but a global crisis. And therefore countries around the world from Europe to Asia need to provide increased military equipment and financial assistance to support Amazon and the TFG effort. New or surplus military equipment from European, Middle Eastern or Asian states would go a long way in assisting current and future Amazon deployments. The international response to combating piracy has been incredible, but a task force at sea does little to combat the problem on land. The governments of Kenya and the Seychelles have borne the greatest burdens in prosecuting and incarcerating suspected pirates within their courts. Victim states of piracy should and must assume greater responsibility for pursuing legal action in their own countries against suspects engaged in criminal acts of piracy on the high seas against their maritime assets. At the same time, more must be done financially to assist regional states like Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles to give them the capacity to arrest and prosecute and incarcerate for long periods of time those individuals caught and found guilty of piracy. If victim states and industry representatives funnel even a fraction of the resources they spend on ransom payments into helping Kenya and other regional states to prosecute and jail pirates, this would send a strong message of deterrence for those who attempt those kinds of actions. As a part of our comprehensive approach to Somalia and the Horn of Africa, we have helped past UN Security Council Resolution 1844 that imposed sanctions against those who support Al Shabaab and other violent extremists in Somalia. On a daily basis, we continue to partner with the willing countries in the region to reduce the negative flows of finances, arms and other support to violent extremists in Somalia and to do everything that we can to interdict the spread of violence beyond Somalia's orders. We continue to be willing to improve our relationship with Eritrea but call on that country to join the international community in our efforts to stabilize Somalia and to promote the welfare of the Somali people. The efforts that we are pursuing in Somalia are part of a comprehensive interagency process involving the State Department, the Defense Department, Justice and Treasury, and reflect our strong commitment to advance our overall efforts in a united and consistent manner. I would like now to just briefly thank Jennifer and CSIS for organizing this discussion today. Let me share one last thought with you before we open up for discussion. As I said at the top of my remarks, Somalia's instability is a national, regional and global problem that demands all of our attention. However, the United States can not solve this problem alone. Somalis have the greatest stake in their country's fate and its future and they must unite together to help find a pathway out of the difficult two decades that they have experienced. The United States will aid Somalis in this quest to find peace and we hope that the international community will walk with us as we do so. Thank you. Thank you very much, Secretary Carson. We're going to turn to the floor and take a few questions at a time. I guess I wanted to start out a little bit with how you see our engagement with the TFG ultimately unfolding. How are we building incentives into that relationship to get them to behave in different ways than they have? What are the incentive structures we have there for them? I'll just throw that out one because that one is that plagues me all the time. I'm not sure how to do that. Let's take a couple of questions at a time. Tony here. Tony Carroll Manchester Trade and I teach a course at SICE, Johns Hopkins. Ambassador Carson, with reference to your interagency working group, you noted that Treasury is involved. One of the constraints in trying to get resources into Somalia is to remove the impediments to money remittances. Money remittances represent up to 40% of the GDP of Somalia and represent a valuable but yet underutilized tool for the country's reconstruction and development. Yet money remittances from this country, which are the largest contributions of money remittances into Somalia, are very much impeded by current restrictions largely under FinCEN, which restrict, I think, unnecessarily these flows into Somalia. Treasury is, of course, aware of this problem. It's very tactical, as you know, but we really keep stumbling on the same issue for the less, since 2004, since the August declaration by FinCEN, 2006, so I'm wondering if there's a diplomatic pressure point that can be brought to Treasury to try to help loosen these remittances. Thank you, Jennifer. Ambassador Carson, I did ask almost similar question, and I'm glad today that you spoke about the dual policy that you talked about on the follow-up forum at the White House that I've asked. You're right, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia is much catastrophic than has been talked about worse than that for. My concern, however, is, though I'm glad that you came up with a policy, Somalia has suffered eight years of war on terror, and the problem that it has caused, we have seen 1.5 million people that are displaced, internally displaced, 3.6 million that are on the verge of starvation, and everything else that you have talked about as far as the refugees are concerned. Now my question is, the dual-track policy has been in place for 20 years, and I'm surprised that the United States has been blindfolded and being convinced to take the same route. This policy has been in place and has been provided and taken by Ethiopia. So what difference will it make now if you're only encouraging more regions to become independent and say that they have administrations? And since the policy, two presidents have been declared, by the way, and two regions more are coming. Thank you. I want to take those three to start. Sure, thank you very much for all three of those questions. Very interesting ones and important at the same time. Let me go in reverse order. Our dual-track strategy is new and reflects a evolution in our thinking towards a crisis that has been 21 years, 22 years in the making. I think I said that the first part of that strategy is to continue to support what has been an African-led process. It is support for Djibouti process. It's support for the TFG. It's support for the AU and IGAT decision to place Peacekeepers' Amazon on the ground there. But we also recognize that it is equally important to recognize the relative stability and the progress that has occurred in the other two parts of Somalia, both Somaliland where we have seen elections there that have in many ways been better than some elections in other parts of Africa and also the relative stability that we have seen in Puntland. But we see and have seen the emergence of a number of groups and organizations in clan and subclan structures in South Central that are not allied to the extremist elements of El Shabaab that are not a part of the TFG. I think they too deserve and warrant support. By doing this, we are not in any way attempting to go around what is in fact the principles of the AU, which is to recognize only a single Somali state. We will not as a part of this two-track strategy recognize Somaliland or Puntland. But that does not in any way mean that we do not have any diplomatic and development contact with them if indeed they are providing services and benefits to their people in a stable fashion. This is a U.S. policy made in Washington. It is not an Ethiopian policy made in Addis Ababa. I think that we do in fact deserve the credit of being able to think for ourselves even when we are dealing with the most complex and intractable problems. So it is not an old one. It is a new one and we will as I said in my remarks reserve the right to make further course corrections if we think that the things that we are doing incorrectly in trying to pursue peace and stability are not working. We will in effect look at new approaches, but we will be careful and analytical and thoughtful as we do so. We think that what we are doing now is the right approach. In many ways this is a segue into the question that our host Jennifer Cook asked and that is the incentives and disincentives. Clearly we recognize the importance of trying to support the Djibouti process, but we have also made it very, very clear that the TFG does not have a blank check on its engagement and relationship with the United States government. We are interested in the same things that they are interested in and that is peace, stability, return to economic development and an end to the refugee crisis and an end to the accommodation in parts of South Central of extremist elements. We have encouraged and will continue to encourage the TFG, as I said, to be more than simply a government in name only. It must deliver services to its people. It must end the bitter political infighting that has crippled its ability and effectiveness as a government. It must stop the pervasive corruption that sometimes is alleged and found to be true among some of its members. And we will continue to encourage them to aggressively to follow and pursue the lines of the Djibouti peace process. Not easy, but something that we are determined to push and to push forwardly. I think our discussions and engagements with the TFG are extraordinarily frank and candid. Tony, money remittances. If we only knew where the money was actually going and who in fact was actually receiving it. Indeed, there have been regulations put in place by Treasury and by U.S. authorities to stop remittances. Those regulations were put in place because there was a strong fear in the United States government that these remittances, not all, but some unsure of how many and how much, were going into the hands of individuals who were carrying out or supporting extremist activities. Our ability to determine who gets these remittances has been the primary reason why they have been choked off. We know from the movement of young Somalis from Seattle, from Minneapolis and from places like Cleveland that there are individuals in this country who are sympathetic to extremist influences. I suspect that where the people go, the money has already proceeded. I think we have to be careful and judicious. We should not recognize, punish all, but until we can find a better way of dealing with this, and I hope we can at some point, because we do not in fact want to deprive those people who rightly are trying to do the right thing to in fact do the right thing. So with Pauline and then Reed. Thank you. Pauline Baker, the Fund for Peace. Johnny, thank you for that presentation and I want to commend you for introducing a fresh approach to Somalia. I think we have been stuck in a rut for quite a long time, but the landscape that you described did not really deal with the core question of security and the fact that the TFG still holds only a few blocks of Mogadishu and the developmental and humanitarian thrusts of the new policy cannot take root unless there is some governance in Somalia that is lasting and offers some ray of hope to the people that the fighting will stop at some point. So to get back a little bit to Jennifer's first question, what is the theory of change here that you see, the outcome? Where does all this lead to? And how can people envision, if you will, an exit strategy to use a bad term, but I don't know what other one to use, but that all this effort will lead to that we'll have general support of not only the Somali people, but the African governments. And then as a footnote question, could you describe to us the reaction of other African governments to this new strategy? I'm sure you've had consultations. Are there any African governments that are strongly opposed to it? Are there some who are strongly in favor of it and are willing to back it up with maybe the commitment of more peacekeeping troops, to address the first question? Great. Thank you. And then we'll go to Reid. Reid Kramer from AllAfrica.com. Just really building on Pauline's question. You spoke about the desirability of putting people from many countries on the ground in Mogadishu and even of wanting to have U.S. State Department and AID people in South Central. Somalia, has any consideration been given to creating something akin to the green zone in Baghdad where the big international presence that's now basically in Nairobi serving ostensibly, at least Somalia, could be relocated? Or is a security simply too great a challenge at this point to even consider that option? And then right behind Muhammad? Sorry, sorry. No, Muhammad. Sorry, I didn't see you. You're discriminating against women. Oh, God. My name is Muhammad Ali. I'm with Somalia American Peace Council. Good afternoon, Ambassador. And thank you, Jennifer. You always put Somalia into the high list. We really appreciate it. I have a suggestion and a couple of questions. My first suggestion is that how can the State Department, I mean, this is a suggestion that they should really invite Somalia American Conference nationwide in this country to really put an input. And I will really recommend that should happen soon, maybe. My two questions is, first one is, when will President Obama is going to appoint a high caliber special envoy to show our seriousness about Somalia's situation, somewhere like Mr. Mitchell or Holbrook? And next question is, what are we doing about the companies that are dumping chemical toxic into Somalia's shores as well as the illegal fishing? Thank you. Okay, can we just take one more so that I can go right next door? Oh, goodness. I didn't want to put you on the spot. I'm really sorry. Mariamma, I'm from the Voice of America. Two quick questions. One has to do with piracy. And there was a report that came out just on Monday from the International Maritime Bureau talking about that the area where the pirates are operating is basically too vast and it's almost unrealistic for the navies to control. So I was wondering what your reaction is to that. And the second question has to do with the support of Amisom and the fact that we, there are only basically two African countries, Uganda and Burundi. And recently the Ugandans actually came out and said that they could send more troops if they had more money from the United States. And I was just wondering where that stands and it looks like there were talks between the two countries, between the U.S. and Uganda and where does that stand? Thank you. Great. No. Sorry, I can barely keep track. I can hardly keep track as well. Muhammad Ali actually had three questions wrapped up in one plus a comment. So it gives me a little bit of a challenge. Let me do as I did before start from the rear and move forward. We have heard the requests and the desires of not only Uganda but others to increase the number of Amisom troops on the ground. This issue is likely to be discussed and debated at the UN Security Council within the next 30 days. In principle, we support an increase in the number of troops on the ground but do not take a position on what that number should be. I think it is up to others to make that decision. The United States will continue as it has over the last two years to support Amisom consistent with the amount of budget that we receive in the Department of State and in the U.S. government to do so. So I won't go any further than that. On your first part of your question about the issue of protecting the seas, there are two answers. One is that Somalia has the longest coastline of any country in Africa. And that suggests very clearly that there has in fact a huge amount of maritime space out there around it. Second is what I said in my remarks and that the problem of piracy on the high seas is a problem that ultimately must be solved on the land. The reason why there is piracy is the fact that there is no effective deterrent to prevent those individuals from carrying out criminal activities. There is a weak economy and poor governance structures. Pirates can get away with impunity with their actions. So it has to be a land-based response. Naval can do a lot to help deter, but it is not the ultimate solution. Mohammed... You can pick two. Yeah. A great deal has been said about the dumping of toxic waste and other pollutants and refuge off the Somali coast. But I would say that while some of that clearly goes on, no doubt clearly goes on, the greatest problems are again land-based problems. It is the instability which exists onshore, which allows for those predations to exist offshore. If Somalia had a government that functioned effectively, had a coast guard, a military that defended its economic territorial waters, these things would not happen. And so until there is effective governance, these things will probably likely to continue. But I will add, out of analytic fearness, I think that the issue of dumping of toxic waste is probably greatly exaggerated. It does go on, but I think it is more a distraction than a reality. A conference for Somalis, the Department of State over the last several years has had an aggressive program of reaching out to the Somali-American diaspora across this country. The officers in my bureau have gone from Maine to Seattle, with stops in Cleveland, Minneapolis, where I have met and spoke to the Somali community, into Chicago and St. Louis and other places as well. We try to listen to the voices of the diaspora because you probably have greater insights on many things that we do not see as a result of not being on the ground in Mogadishu. But we also encourage the community not to carry the divisions which exist at home onto the American landscape and therefore undermine your ability to be helpful in bringing about a solution to the problems that exist in Somalia. We want the diaspora to play a positive role. We encourage the diaspora to play a positive role, an influential role, a role that will provide those on the ground with a sense of hope and encouragement that things can, in fact, get much better. A special envoy, not at this time, a special interest, absolutely yes. Read on the green zone. We have supported very strongly the presence of the AU and the UN on the ground on a 24-7 basis. The new SRSG ambassador, Mahiga, signaled and it has been reaffirmed by the Secretary General, Banki Moon, that the UN will in effect put people on the ground in Mogadishu on a permanent but rotating basis. The AU has also indicated that it intends to put an office in Mogadishu, again, permanent but with rotating staff. I think if I can speak modestly for both of those organizations based on what I know, there is a desire to put their flags and their presence on a permanent basis there and as security permits to move from rotational staff to more permanent staff. I think this is a positive signal to the people of Somalia that the international community cares and is concerned. It is a signal to others that the international community will not be easily driven away or turn its back on Somalia. I think that that I think is a good and promising development. UN Secretary General's remarks were made I think on September 24th at a conference he sponsored on Somalia during the UN General Assembly. So there is public pronouncement on that. I'm probably jumping over. Pauline had the first question and that is related to security. Where does this all lead? What is the exit strategy? What are African government reactions to this? Largely to the extent that we've had them the reactions of African governments towards what we are doing have been positive. We've seen I think positive reactions not only among commentators in the United States but we've seen positive commentary on what we're doing from those in Europe who are also following this issue. As I said, we are going to be consistent with the AU position and while our second track clearly moves us into a posture of engagement with Somali land and Punt land we have no intention and I underscore no intention of recognizing those governments. We have no intention of doing anything that is inconsistent with the principle outlined by the AU and EGAD with respect to those states but I think it is also important for us to engage and to acknowledge what has been going on in both of those countries. It's always nice to have a clear roadmap to an exit towards stability and peace but I think the reality is that this is going to be a long, sometimes uncertain and difficult process getting to where we want to go. We're going to see probably a succession of potholes and even defeats certainly some setbacks before we get to where we want to go but I think the most important thing for us is to remain engaged, consistent in our engagement and firm in the kinds of principles and outcomes that we're seeking. It will take us some time to both mobilize international community support as it is required. It's going to take some period of time to get the kind of cohesiveness within the Somali community that is required and it's going to take some time to get the capacity up to speed in Mogadishu to have the kind of stability that will allow for progress. There is no short answer to the exit but I think we have seen clearly what benign neglect can do. We have seen what turning our backs and walking away can do. We have ourselves a very clear history and we should be very frank about this a very clear history of our involvement and engagement in Somalia. It's a difficult period. It's a difficult history but we in this country are not accustomed to closing our eyes to history. We remember Black Hawk down. We remember the reasons for the disengagement. We also remember the very honorable reasons why we went into Somalia before that to address one of Africa's most serious humanitarian crises. But when we walked away from Somalia in 1993 and early 1994 when we closed the door to this very difficult period in our own history we thought that the fire that was raging in the kitchen would probably burn itself out. But over 20 years what we did see is the fire not only consumed the kitchen it consumed the entire house and then it consumed the neighbor's house it consumed the village, the city, the community and the state. And so today what we have is not only a problem in Somalia that I characterize as an aggressive cancer that has spread to the region and has now become a much more serious global crisis a crisis of piracy a crisis of foreign fighters and the continuing flow of illegal arms and weapons and peoples throughout the region undermining some of our strongest friends and colleagues in the area and most especially a country like Kenya. We have seen terrorism and suicide bombings move from a Middle Eastern context to a Mogadishu context to the events dramatically of July 11 in Kampala where we saw two suicide bombers. These are things that we cannot in fact ignore but I also want to make very clear that our goal there is a comprehensive policy our most important desire is to see stability is to see security to see economic development and to see a return to an end to the cycle of humanitarian disaster. That's what we really want to try to achieve and as I said it can only be done by the resolving commitment of the Somali people combined with those states in the region as well as the international community each playing a particularly important part in this process but if we walk away and that is if the United States walks away from a situation most others tend to walk away even faster. Again we can't resolve it singly but it is important for us to try to mobilize international attention and to galvanize the kind of support that's necessary to do it but again Somalis have to be very much a part of the solution. We have two minutes. I want to add one last question if you don't mind. I'm sorry because I think it's an important one it seems that we're hanging a great deal here on the African Union in terms of that core security question that Pauline asked. It's a situation into which even the heartiest UN peacekeepers would not like to go. It's not clear what their task will be in terms of fighting off an insurgency. It's not really a peacekeeping, peace enforcement. It's almost a battle task. It's not simply I think a question of numbers but also capacities and training. I've seen some of the blowback from collateral damage and that counterinsurgency tactics and so forth. I wonder if, and that was a nice ending right there but I had to get this question in, how is our military going to change its engagement perhaps with the African Union, with TFG training and then just to clarify will there be any kind of security assistance to these autonomous governments? Again, a great question which would require a much longer answer than the two minutes. But let me respond again in reverse order. In our new and enhanced engagement with both Somaliland and with Pointland and with especially the groups in south-central we do not view this as a military engagement. We do not envisage the provision of any and I underline any military assistance or support to groups in south-central. We will provide support that is traditionally given by USAID youth empowerment programs, micro-finance, micro-enterprise, water provision points, things like this. We are not trying to harm or to create military establishments in south-central that are in opposition to the TFG. We have no desire to do that, post-op. In our relationship with Pointland and Somaliland we do not see these, we do not see our relationship as a military relationship. Our relationship will be to provide development assistance in small ways that will help those governments to improve their economic and development circumstances and not to make their armies bigger and stronger. Again, very emphatically the desire there is not to create political entities that are in military opposition to the authorities in Mogadishu. We hope that all of these political entities will at some point in the future feel confident enough that they will see that it is in their long-term interest to reunite in some kind of a political relationship that has them under one Somali nation and one Somali flag, which is what the AU recognizes right now. So it is not political relationships, it is not military relationships that we see, but economic development relationships and relationships that will strengthen their respect for democracy, respect for human rights and their desire to continue the level of stability that exists in those countries. Now I'll let you go. We're out of time. Thank you. Join me in thanking Mark.