 Thank you so much for that kind introduction Megan, and may I begin by thanking the organizers of course the Cambridge International Law Journal and Of course, they are and Laura is we're over for having me here Organizing conferences is no easy task more so amidst a International crisis, and I'm happy to see that the academic world keeps turning even in times of COVID. Thanks to your efforts Now to my presentation It is said that the fairness of any criminal justice system should not be adjudged by convictions, but by acquittals That apathetic however seems to be lost to many when it comes to international criminal law Indeed one commentator lamented that acquittals of Jean-Pierre Bemba and Bagwell effectively adjudged crimes that have committed themselves A view which I argue in this presentation Fails to acknowledge the fine distinction between human rights on one hand and international criminal law on the other Teleologically the division is clear as Captured by the Nicaragua Taddage debate human rights law would deal with state Responsibility states and while an international criminal law would deal with individuals and individual criminal liability Now that distinction make no mistake is real, but that is not to say that it is palpable As seen in the critique earlier mentioned, it does not quell all queries indeed One may ask what makes these disciplines so different It grows human rights violations have already been proven shouldn't liability therefore be but a matter of course Unfortunately, the answer is no Human rights and international criminal law may be historically Substantively and even factually entwined yet. They should not be unduly conflated It is submitted in this presentation that the frustrations felt by members of the international community such as that mentioned earlier They're not entirely without basis and at times painful and true Is largely a product of mis-expectation? It is the failure to distinguish between criminality and criminal liability that brings heartbreak This presentation attempts to draw a finer distinction By looking beyond the rational personae the state individual bifurcate and drawing what I will call the epistemological distinction of human rights and international criminal law the standards of knowledge Now there's an old adage that goes we know nothing with certainty, but everything with a degree in Legal parlance the epistemological standard the knowledge threshold Is not factual certainty or pure truths, but moral certainty legal truths And what is morally permissible? Well, that depends on the stakes The higher the stakes the higher the threshold so take for example the curious philippine case Of senator bong revilia who was tried by the sandigan bayon the graft court of the philippines for plunder A rather familiar story in philippine history Rebellia was ultimately acquitted of the criminal charges of plunder But interestingly ordered to return the sum of 124 million pesos. That's about 2.5 million dollars To the philippine treasure strange is it not to hold an individual Innocent when it comes to the crime would recognize the corpus of the crime to be there in flagrante delito On its face the decision seems incongruous unfair and perhaps flat out wrong But is that truly the case? Let's see what we think after hearing what one justice has to say and i'll paraphrase here in her dissent justice estuesta Um in the sandigan bayon argues that senator revilia Having been made to answer for the same civil liability over the same funds as the criminal proceedings should have been held liable criminally liable likewise Isn't this even stranger Initially one would argue that criminal liability should flow for the responsibility Lest we adjudge these crimes that have committed themselves But neither can we accept justice estuesta as point can we? Surely civil liability may flow down from criminal liability, but rarely does the river flow upstream But if we were to take a step back What appears as a doctrinal paradox is in truth, but a product of the strinal distinctions The different results were but the outcome of different rules at play On one hand criminal liability subject to the high threshold of proof the unreasonable doubt And on the other civil responsibility subject to the lower threshold of substantial evidence Criminal liability and non punitive responsibility may be part of the same conversation But that is not to say that they are not separate and distinct considerations Why then does the revilia phenomenon strike us strange? Why do we tend to confuse responsibility with criminal liability? Such is the predicament of the human rights advocate today While grave atrocities may be proven individual liability remains uncertain This is of particular relevance for situations where systematic violations of human rights have been established Yet criminal processes therefore have not or have perhaps only barely commenced Myanmar's reported genocide of lorated India the judiciary recognized war crimes in Afghanistan And the internationally condemned crimes against humanity in the Duterte and drug war of the filibians All these involve mass atrocities duly established yet remain pending judicial scrutiny Certainly international criminal law is not ignorant to these contexts But neither can be demoted international criminal law as mere human rights rhetoric One that merely plays lip service to do process Yet has a foregone conclusion I argue that the paradigmatic paradox can be avoided altogether By not solely relying on descriptive differences between human rights and international criminal law The necrogloattantage distinction but by drawing an epistemological distinction between these disciplines The difference may begin with a shift in the rational persona from state to individual But the difference is felt through the commentant change in rules We have already alluded to that code switch earlier Individual criminal liability is subject to the higher standard of proof beyond reason about While state responsibility Is subject to a range of varying standards of evidence The icj has expressed some 15 different evidentiary thresholds when it comes to states From balancing tests to probability thresholds the certainty standards All depending on what was at stake a territorial dispute or perhaps state responsibility And of course influenced by the common law or civil law underpinning of the one end thing What suffice it to say State responsibility is subject to a lower threshold than proof beyond reasonable doubt There are other distinctions too between these two disciplines We can look at the rules of interpretation International criminal law adopts nulung krimen strikta or nubilo prureo in favor of the accused What human rights subscribes to prohomene presumptions Quite literally in favor of the human rights bear However international criminal tribunals have likewise birthed the distinction between these interpretative rules By incorporating human rights in international criminal proceedings by invoking the vietta convention the law of treaties as a primus interbares treaty customary international law and through the use of article 21 3 of the rome statute which provides That the statute must be interpreted in line with human rights The tribunals one way or another stands for both human rights and criminal justice And this is what daryl robison calls international criminal laws identity prices But more importantly, and I think this is the real game changer here The disciplines vary in institutional bias Unlike the state the accused innocence is not only a possibility. It is a time honored though rebuttable presumption While prohomene presumptions place the burden on the state. There is no presumption of liability in international criminal law On the contrary the prosecutorial process is far from leveled and leans in favor of the dependent in favor of innocence in favor of acquittal so in conclusion The disappointment I think finds its place within the graying between some expectation and reality Equating criminal acquittals with the crimes a judge a judge staff committed themselves ignores the legal differences and at times the innate disagreements between crime and culpability The gaps betwixt context of criminality on one hand and criminal conduct and the criminal mind actus reis and inshara on the other Must still be breached It thus appears That the success and appreciation of international criminal law rests neither on acquittals nor convictions alone But on the reconceptualization of international and criminal tribunals quack criminal courts The international human rights law international criminal law divide involves not only teleological differences But epistemological distinctions And by shifting the fine line of divergence from the rational personing to the rule Perhaps we will be able to rather make sense of this legal system that has crimes without criminals I thank you for your time and attention and I look forward to your questions