 for our next panelist, Neil Levine. Some difficult questions. Sure, he's fully prepared to answer. Teeing up is one way to put it. Thank you very much, Margaret. And it's just a pleasure to be on this panel. And adjusting my remarks, because I think we've just heard a really interesting, aside from the report, a real in-person reflection on what it's like to sit from the partner government side. And I think the headline for the report is that the record of the donors in these six countries is quite modest in some. And the minister's remark tells us two things, I think. One is that we have much to be modest about. We have also another way to say that is we have almost limitless potential to improve on our performance. But I think the last point that she made, and Rich, we had some of this discussion about the temptation to add additional principles. And what struck me in the minister's remark is that we should all be reminded that at the end of the day, the development work that we're in is fundamentally a human enterprise, and that we need to seek out that human connection if we're really going to be effective at whatever level you're working at. So just as kind of an immediate off-the-cuff reaction to what I thought was not only right on point, but delivered in a refreshingly candid way. So thank you. Let me say a few things about our office in USAID and why we've been asked to be here today. And then I want to make a few comments as the designated donor in terms of how the report is received on our end and some of the focus on some of the highlights of our discussions over the past few days, and then finally indicate, as Richard did, a way forward in general terms. And then I look forward to your questions. And I will be brief in respect to a very full panel. I'm also delighted to be here with a good friend and a sometime colleague, Joanna Mendelssohn, and a new friend and colleague, Fatima Sumon. The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation is, in essence, the chief interlocutor with our colleagues at the OECDAC and the Development Assistance Committee. We have a long history, both with the NCAF and with its predecessor organizations and did some of the first work coming out of AID on fragile states. And we found willing collaborators and really some big brains to really help us through some of the fundamental issues on the analytical side in formulating what came to be our fragile states strategy in AID in the early part of this decade and the founding of our office in 2002. The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. Briefly, what do we do? Five things. Technical leadership is a fancy way of saying research and policy development. We are our job is really to find the cutting edge of conflict issues in advance of them showing up on our doorstep in the field. Right now, recently, we've released toolkits that are for kind of the immediate audience is the AID field manager or field office but also we believe builds the knowledge of the field in general and we canvass widely in academia, the practitioner community and deliver these toolkits the last two. One was the relationship between assistance and peace processes and other was on programming in religious environments. But the types of topics we're looking at now are the role of diaspora in conflict, both positive and negative, the role of urbanization and conflict and the topic of climate change and its implications to give you a sense of that. The second area is technical assistance. That's the support we give to field missions and other units of the federal government on program design, evaluation, assessment, reviewing programs for some of the principles that we've heard from under the report, do no harm, conflict sensitivity, sensitivity to the political and economic environment that we're working in. The third area is interagency liaison. As you know, we're always in these environments working in a 3D atmosphere. So engagements with the State Department, the Regional Bureau's State Department, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction Stabilization, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Combatant Commands of the Military, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and others. I would say most of our interagency liaison obviously involves the State Department to a lesser degree the other federal agencies outside the 3Ds. Fourth area is training and cadre development. We train both overseas and in Washington. That training right now is targeted principally to AID staff, but also other interagency staff. But each time we go out, there is a call, this is great for us, but we really need to bring in both the partner countries and to the partner implementing communities. And we've done that sort of on a pilot basis, more ad hoc. Our next iteration of training design really wants to expand the audience in our ability to reach out and exchange with the partner in implementing community what their experience is and to refine our products at the same time. The last area is public outreach, and here we are today. So just to give you a sense, we are very small in terms of budget. Our request of, we request about $9 million in core funding. We will actually operate with much less than that this year, about $3.5 million. We also manage a congressional directive, which we are quite happy to do. $26 million in people-to-people reconciliation programs. It's a small program. It's been around for about six years now. Small grants of between half a million and a million dollars to bring two sides of conflict together for reconciliation, building of trust, and work on cooperatively and development areas. We're about 15 people right now in terms of our staff. In terms of this morning's panel, I wanted to sort of cover three areas. Describe the reception the report received at our meeting the last two days the YINCAF has met for the first time as USAID as the host. How that was received and why. Discuss some of the main issues that the report brought up, and then offer some thoughts about the way forward. First, why was the report, or how was it received and why? It seemed very well, because it was viewed as extremely relevant to the work we're doing. It was timely, the choice of the country's sort of guaranteed that it would get our attention. It was authoritative, the methodology, a combination of qualitative and qualitative approaches, really made some judgment as to donor performance. And Richard has reviewed those, where we were doing good, where we were doing poorly. That tends, any kind of report card tends to get people's attention. It was also based on work that had gone before and the establishment of these 10 donor principles gave us sort of a target, and now we have a baseline of how we're doing and the fact that this is going to continue is, I think, evidence of some of the better work done in terms of evaluative performance. Finally, it had 17 recommendations that you have before you, and while the donors may not agree or embrace all of them equally, I think it really does represent a genuine attempt to measure and distill the lessons that we have in the field and always remembering that these are some of the most difficult working environments that we face in the development area. So in terms of, I think, somewhat unprecedented in evaluative agenda in fragile states. To give you a feel for the reactions, I think, going around the room and responding to the report, each donor sort of picked out their favorites and ones that they thought really spoke to the needs or where we needed to do better, and I just wanted to give you three or four of my own personal favorites and sort of what I took away. I think at the very top, and I said this as Richard will recall, is to recognize that state building is fundamentally a political process and in terms of where we are on that, I think you'll see in the annex of the report, it really can't be any clearer what needs to be done. The appreciation of the domestic environment, the state of state society relations of where the, this is our most international actor's engagement based on sound political and social analysis taking into account the situation in terms of national capacity, state society relations, and societal divisions, reading across for the report of each country, not consistently, Afghanistan, CAR not consistently, DRC not consistently, Haiti not consistently. Timor-Less says yes, overall, but more analysis needed rural, urban divide. I would say that that's probably not consistently enough there. That to me suggests that at a fairly fundamental level is that we need a better appreciation of that state building will work when it builds on that domestic process that we must be paying more attention to the governance issues that drive some of these dynamics, that we need to pay attention to the relationship between state and society in each of these countries, and that we need to involve stakeholders at the national and local level. Second recommendation coming out of the report was to invest in joint analysis of donors. And I think this has to do with what the minister referred to as sort of, if 46 donors all have their individual take on a problem, that's just too much for any partner to kind of embrace and be effective on. And so this is something kids close to home in that the office that I had is the home of where a lot of the conflict analysis methodology is developed, we're often asked to participate. And we are taking this recommendation on board. We have in the past joined up analysis in places like Kenya. We hope to do so in other countries very shortly, but it's done right now on an ad hoc basis. This is really a way to arm ourselves and say we really need to do better and get together when we can. The other area, two more areas, the need for deeper alignment and the more use of host country systems. And this is a good place for some dialogue given the composition of the panel. This issue of capacity and accountability. I think if you think about our relationship with the Congress and with the American people, the issue is we want you to be smart, we want you to be accountable and we want you to be timely. And I think what we have done in the systems we have built, we have from the American perspective really weighted our system to one of accountability. And on the smart one, I think at AID tried ourself on trying to be smart, mixed records, some because it is uncertain enterprise, it is more art than science. We're learning all the time but we strive to make sure that we're smart. And what that has come at is at the cost of rapid delivery and flexibility. And we now face ourselves a system, especially in the context of conflict environments that our delivery mechanisms don't respond to the reality we face. And that is a much bigger topic than we have this morning. But it is that tension between accountability and rapid delivery and the embrace I think more wholeheartedly of the Paris Declaration until there's some understanding about where we can meet up with these countries to provide accountability and responsiveness and still report solidly to the Congress that these funds are not misused or going lost. And then finally, the last point, I always, the attraction, if any of you have ever received a report card, your eyes go directly to the lowest grades and the place where we were weak, these avoiding pockets of exclusion. And again, from an analytical agenda to identify what those pockets are and then in terms of program design, how do we get at them? And not only from the assistance but what is the dialogue in terms of security, in terms of diplomacy to make sure that we do not have pockets of exclusion. The way forward, I think number one, a lot of discussion about how do we disseminate the findings of this report and make people aware of the process, both of the monitoring and the dialogue on international peace building with the partner countries. This gathering today is really step one. I wanna thank the sponsors and the grid work at OECD for allowing us to get this to a broad audience and thank you I should say for being here as part of that. The, again, 60 of my counterparts and donor agencies across the DAC participated in this so and trying to figure out what our follow on activities should be. While this isn't all together nailed down, I can say with fairly high confidence we have a hearty consensus to continue the monitoring process, to continue to consult even more with our partner countries, really using the international dialogue on peace building and state building, which East Timor is a part in other countries and you will be hosting the next meeting in Dilley. And then to focus on particular attention on developing the donor guidance that comes out of this report for state building and that we use these recommendations and get them out to our field partners. This dissemination message is maybe the most important at all. What we talk about is this 3D environment and what we're now calling other policy communities. I can't say, I can't tell you how important the work of the DAC is in this regard when there is an international donor consensus in terms of development practice that when we go and talk to our colleagues at the State Department or with the Department of Defense to say there's a craft here. There's a way of doing this the right way and that all international donors have signed up for to a set of principles. This avoids a violation of one of the central principles which is do no harm. Another principle is don't be stupid. I think the issue is that this is a craft. It isn't for everybody. It can't be done without a great amount of thought and sensitivity and analysis which is our business and the work of the DAC in formalizing that, in getting consensus on that, in monitoring that craft and then reporting back to other policy communities is just simply vital at this time and where we are as a community. Stop there, thank you. Thank you so much Neil, that was a very good response. Next is Johanna Mendelssohn-Forman. Thank you Margaret and thank you Richard for doing this. Thank you Minister Pires for your candor and Neil and Fatima. I guess I'm the, like Richard have been around this development community a long time, both as a donor through USAID and the World Bank and a donor through a private philanthropy at the U.S. Foundation. So I've seen a lot and been around a lot and I think the memorialization of these principles that come forth from the DAC are very important because they confirm a lot of what many of us have seen over the year as being needed to be put down on paper and as Neil mentioned that there is a consensus on this as a way to go forward at least avoids at least two hours of every meeting trying to get to some kind of yes before you start to do it. So I think just for efficiency this is an extremely important contribution. When I was reading through these and I was asked to speak specifically about Haiti but I think I'd like to address first the principles and how they might apply. One of the things that it reminded me of was perhaps the movie Love Story which dates my generation of love is meaning never having to say you're sorry and I think this is what these principles remind me of that donors have finally come together and said maybe we should have to never say we're sorry but we didn't understand the context and we really don't want to do much harm and intervention was not long enough in these countries to really make a sustainable situation and we're really sorry that we really didn't get the analysis right but you know so what you'll go back to conflict because according to Paul Collier half these countries that were on the list go back into conflict so we have a chance to do it over again and I guess for me having looked at these principles and then thinking about the case of Haiti a lot of these principles and a lot of the errors in fact reflect some of the lack of an application of learning over the years that perhaps may not be repeated again as we have yet another chance at something that is obviously one of the greatest tragedies we've seen certainly the worst tragedy in the Western Hemisphere as far as a natural disaster is concerned bigger than the tsunami in many respects because whereas the tsunami covered many countries in South Asia this affected one country so in terms of magnitude we are even seeing more difficult times ahead but I did wanna go back over some of the ratings that came out of this report because to me the principle of taking context as a starting point which the minister so artfully articulated is something very important my sense is in the case of Haiti and I'll refer to that context really didn't matter we had some bad situations and Haiti was not a conflict country it was in fact a state near failure but it had an internal low level civil wars we would talk about it in that it was based on exclusion of people but it wasn't an open violent conflict it was an urban I would say insurgency in many ways where you had people fighting one another because of the nature of the exclusion and the separation so to say that context is the first principle and has to be taken into account is to me an obvious and often overlooked by donors when they work in countries such as Haiti which have tremendous problems for example it shares an island with the Dominican Republic yet when I met with people even when I was with the UN there people from the Dominican Republic who share the island from the UN agencies hardly ever talked to the people on the other side of the island yet one of its primary problems was an environmental degradation which would affect both sides so context matters the second point about do no harm is an interesting point how much more harm can you do in a country where 57% of the population lives on $2 a day or less so that doing nothing often was easier than doing something because of the scale and scope of the problem state building is also an important area because USAID I think does two things extraordinarily well it works in communities and it understands the community context and it also understands institutional development but unfortunately over the years the two were not treated together so that institutions were developed in this capital which often were not spread out to the majority of population in Haiti and that the local institutions were left for fending for themselves so that you didn't have the integration of two important state building components what happens at the local level where the majority of people live versus what happens at a national capital and how you spread the ability or the capacity of the state beyond one central city which is the Republic of Port-au-Prince which is now in rubble and other thing that I think is fascinating and Neil will know this and I don't know if Dick you remember it but security, the word security you could not mention the S word in the early 90s in a meeting of donors if they were aid donors because security was of their boat and topic and yet we now know from post-conflict reconstruction that security is the condition precedent any type of development and of course the minister articulated that too in her crisis in 2006 and yet there was no real sense of how to integrate the needs of a security sector with the broader sustainability of a development program I think that's now ingrained and I think that's a success story and certainly as you mentioned in the report mentioned security is very important in the context of Haiti getting back to that one of the areas that the report rated highly favorably was the training or the retraining of the police I think we finally got it right it's I think our third try it's the 8th UN intervention but we're getting to the point where actually one of the most dramatic moments was when after the earthquake within two days Haitian national police who couldn't even find their uniforms because they were lost in the rubble came out on the street to support Manusta troops in actually directing traffic, directing aid workers and there was a sense of for the first time that I could witness a professionalism that had been ingrained by training now one of the things that security and the dirty little secret about security is often when the donor community believes things are quote secure we go home now we can't go home and that security is something that has to become cultural and actually before the earthquake the exit state for the UN in Haiti was 2011 root you know another year because the sense was that the Haitian national police would have been fully trained to the capacity that was acceptable which is a greater expectation than we have for security but was going to work now the UN Manusta the collective is talking about at least a 10 year presence this may be the best thing that ever happened in that when you have security on the ground it gives some political space to the governing class to be able to at least have an opportunity to build their institutions to be able to make things happen to protect people so they can develop their markets renew agriculture et cetera so that may be another hidden advantage of this terrible tragedy that the UN will stay many many years ago I mean not many but in the early 90s we could not talk about donor presence in a country for more than 10 years in fact my old friend Nikki Ball used to say that if she wrote 20 years in a report the editors would cross it out and say 10 years I noticed in one of the principles about staying power is that we're now not ashamed to say that 10 years is a minimum number of years that is needed in order to be able to see some kind of stability and security established and that in the case of Haiti we will probably see it for a generation probably not at the same level for the next decade but certainly if we really want to get it right things have to happen now I'm not going to leave the nationals off the hook on this because Haiti and I've worked there for many many years is a difficult environment both because the context is difficult from a geophysical perspective it has 98% deforestation over population one central city and no other places to go but it also has a very difficult political class a large wedge that does not really believe in the kind of donor cooperation that we're used to it's very hard to get decisions made it's not easy to work in this context one of the interesting outcomes of such a tragedy is that there was first a growing consensus out of a first tragedy the floods of 2008 that things had to be better and things had to be rebuilt and there was including the elites whom we used to call the morally reprehensible elites had actually recognized that the global community was watching what was happening but there was also a trading and economic advantage to being a team player so one thing that's happened which is very interesting is the economic context that Haiti has changed and it was very well documented when Paul Collier went in and did a report saying look this place is not as bad as you think donors you're close to the US you have a good market you've got a textile peace industry which once was flourishing in the early 80s you can rebuild that and then we'll work on some of the needs of energy and deforestation and start working on that that report in itself was an important sign that accredited economists people who know about failed states were saying hey guys this is not what you think we need to work on it let's take that as the starting point and think that these principles can actually be used and should be used in the context of the negotiations that are going on now for the donor meeting the donor meeting affords a very wide berth for both the Haitian nationals and neighboring governments the Dominican Republic as well to begin to say how do we work with donors because there are large numbers of them I heard a great statistic the other morning that half of American households had contributed money to the Haiti in some form either through text messaging so the generosity of the world is there now we need to be able to figure out transparency and accountability of the funds listening to Haitians about how they want to decentralize their country because they know that has to be centralized figuring out a way to solve their energy problems and looking at the island as a part of the broader American community in the security context and understanding that if it fails its neighbors fail and that we have a communal problem these principles can go a very long way to begin to educate the donors as they sit down in New York next month and also the Haitians who have to be able to contribute to this in many ways as a form and a platform to move so I congratulate the DAC and I congratulate all of you and perhaps Minister Furies you can come to the donor meeting in March and help the government of Haiti to understand that they're not the only ones who complain thank you thank you so much Johanna Fatima can you turn the mic off please is this better? Okay, I apologize we're having a little problem with the mics mine keeps going off spontaneously so if you can't hear any of us there it went off again or Senator Kerry but I wanted to give a quick perspective here of some of my thoughts and what the administration is doing differently on development in Afghanistan building on some of the principles I came out of this report today quickly I'm not sure how familiar everyone is with the context in Afghanistan but I assume we have a lot of experts here in the room so I just wanted to quickly summarize what the major challenges have been for eight years and what's different now under the Obama administration what they're doing well and where I think we still have a lot long ways to go in the five key things that I in my mind have been the biggest development challenges for donors weak state institutions limited capacity and reach but still persistent week leadership coming from President Karzai and recent moves that we've seen with the election reform in recent days and even steps since inauguration have kind of reinforced that for many people that there's still a lot of weak leadership coming from the presidency there's been a reluctance for eight years now for donors to fund the government directly only 80% of donor funding still goes outside of state institutions and that's a huge problem when we're sitting here in 2010 and thinking about that there's been a consistent misalignment of donors to local priorities and while a lot of people tout the very successful rollout of the Afghan national development strategy which was a huge milestone for Afghanistan it is a massive roadmap with very little prioritization of the priorities and so it's very hard for donors to map that to what Afghans really want especially outside of a national context when you get at the provincial and district levels there's still very limited donor coordination this is a role that Unama has taken on as one of its main priorities I do think they're making some headways but it's still a huge problem in terms of where we're going and finally, and this is what Joanna was mentioning the S-word the impact of ongoing military operations and the civilian military coordination challenges we are doing development and reconstruction in an ongoing war zone in some cases and the challenges of that are frankly enormous and I think unprecedented in some ways outside of the Iraq context so I just wanted to talk briefly about what I think have been the main shifts of the Obama administration approach coming from the Bush administration and this is something that I know Ambassador Holbrook and his team have been working really hard on and I want to give them a lot of credit for really thinking differently about how we can do development in Afghanistan because it's the first time frankly in the eight years of conflict that we're thinking in a very fundamental holistic way the first major shift is that we are relying less on private contractors and really focusing on what it means to build capacity of Afghan institutions both in Kabul but also at the provincial and district levels and that's a really important shift the focus at the support on the national line ministries of Afghanistan is a major shift as well when we were there in the fall they announced the US government announced how we were gonna start funding $235 million directly to the Ministry of Public Health for instance a direct line ministry where we know we have leadership coming from that ministry and where we can have a partnership going forward that was a really important signal in terms of how we're spending our money there's increasingly that we're seeing much better civilian military cooperation coordination and what's interesting is it's coming both from embassy Kabul under Ambassador Eikenberry's leadership but also from General McChrystal he has made this a priority and when you see the military side stepping up and saying that this is important and we wanna be able to development differently and integrate it that's a really important signal because frankly it can't all just come from the development and donor community a lot of this has got to come from our military partners as well in the field so that leadership from General McChrystal and our allies has been very important as well and finally the civilian surge the statistic that the State Department touts is that they will be tripling by early this year the number of civilians in the field to about 974 with a planned increase of 20 to 30% more civilians in the field by the end of this year so these are major shifts in strategy in terms of if you all remember where we were a year ago the positives of this I really do wanna credit again the team for fundamental rethink I do think there's a real emphasis now on a civilian strategy and what that means that's been missing for a long time there's a fundamental rethink in terms of resources and we in Congress have been very involved in that process you know the statistic that everyone likes the tout is that since fiscal year 2002 the United States has spent 51 billion dollars on reconstruction which sounds like a huge amount if you tease out that money about 52.4% of those costs were on security costs mostly building up the Afghan national security forces ESF money which is what the money that USAID gets has only been about 19% but that 19% is when you include 2009 and 2010 funding if you look back at 2002 numbers which I was digging up last night because I was curious it's fascinating because the bar doesn't even get above this it's so hard it's so little above the zero you can't even figure out what it is but it's about a couple hundred million dollars is where we started in 2002 in terms of reconstruction going towards development so we've come a long way when you think about the 2010 request and funds for about two billion dollars so there's a huge shift on actually funding a civilian strategy not just talking about a civilian strategy. Ambassador Holbrook's team has come up with a milestone that we hope that they meet because we're gonna hold them to this because it's a really important one which is that by the end of 2010 40% of US government assistance will be directed directly through Afghan institutions whether those are local NGOs or the Afghan government directly considering that the US is the largest donor by far in Afghanistan that's a really important shift in terms of building up basic capacity of the Afghan government and Afghan institutions they're gonna be decreasing overhead and related costs for programs a lot of concern on the whole Beltway Bandit approach has been documented well over the last few years lots of more USAID personnel actually going out into the field to do oversight of contracts which has been very missing because the fact that we basically haven't funded USAID in terms of personnel, basic issues like that and finally we're starting to see and I hope this is a shift that the State Department takes on a lot more robustly but we're starting to see new flexible funding authorities for civilians so for years we had CERC which is what the military had so they could do quick impact projects and others but civilians were very constrained in terms of having their own kind of resources well we're finally starting to see that with programs like the Performance Based Governors Fund but I wanna emphasize that I still think we have a long ways to go and one of the problems that I see is that more money is not gonna solve the problems and in some ways it's gonna exacerbate the issues and we need to be really, really careful and thoughtful about this I think we need to be very honest upfront about what our capacity and limitations are we cannot solve a lot of these problems and I think we need to be a lot more honest about areas where we know we have the capacity and resources to make a difference and where we're frankly just gonna make things worse especially in a lot of localized contexts one of the things that frustrates me is I think one of the issues that people don't talk about as much but I think are just so core to this when you talk about understanding the cultural local context is religion we are terrified to talk about religion and we're terrified within the government contest to talk about Islam well frankly you're not gonna do local development well if you cannot integrate local religious and cultural practices in a lot of these ways and I know in the tons of briefings we do every single day on the hill about talking to the administration about how it's gonna do messaging, strategic communications, local development work no one will talk about religion and every time I push them they say oh we can't do that and everyone gets really scared well you know what we're gonna have to think differently about when we talk about context how much religion matters and I think there's a long ways to go about rethinking that point for all of us in a lot of context but especially within the Afghanistan case. Another thing coming out of actually I was thinking about this out of this report is you talk a lot about state building well I'm not a development expert and so I'm a little intimidated being in a room full of development experts but you know we talk a lot about state building but if you hear all the speeches by Secretary Clinton, President Obama Ambassador Holbrook and yes from the hill as well from senators and representatives alike everyone on the Democratic side will say that we are not doing nation building in Afghanistan. Well I don't know what this is when you look at the program and I keep asking in my questions what's the definition of state building and nation building and then map that with what the United States is actually doing because I think there's a disconnect I think there's a political disconnect because there are many politically here who are terrified to say that we're doing nation building and getting involved in that and want to say you know that's not up so we're not there to do that we're there to kind of go in build Afghan capacity and get out. Well I'd be fascinated to know what a definition of state building and nation building is in this context and some really good thinking on how we can get the American political community to be much more comfortable with that because once you start owning that and taking responsibility for it I think you start massaging some of those gaps that you see in the political context which is really important. And finally my last point is I think you know one of the shifts I think we've seen in this administration in the Afghanistan and Pakistan context which may be the way this administration is going is that you see a lot of development being driven by the State Department. You see this in every context from Ambassador Holbrook's team. You see this in the field where you have in Afghanistan five ambassadors in the front office of the embassy that are one of them in charge of the development process in partnership with the USA. You've seen this increasingly in the Pakistan context. I'll tell you I used to work at the State Department and I do have a fear that as we keep outsourcing development to the State Department if that's direction that administration is comfortable going in that means we really need an infusion of top development experts in the State Department to make sure that foreign policy priorities aren't taking over the development context because you do see this practically from where I sit anyway where these decisions are being made to marry foreign policy national security goals and there's always a fear then that you are gonna short change practical long-term development needs in that process. So I do think we need to be a little bit more honest about the direction of where our policies are coming from and if that will be the direction then to think very thoughtfully about how we do that in the best way so that five years from now the State Department also isn't taking the slack for if some of those goals aren't reached at the same time. So thank you very much and I look forward to seeing you. Thank you so much, Tau. Thank you. Thank you.