 And I turn to Jeff with a view that what we expect from you is your own, I would say, experience and scientific research in the domain of political economy, of global economic, national and global economic and financial issues. And with populism being present now practically everywhere, including in the emerging world, which is new, you have a lot of things to tell us about. Please, Jeff. Okay, well, thank you, don't quote. You preempted me because I was going to start by saying I have plenty of opinions about the purely financial and economic issues that have been raised and others as well. But as a political economist, I figured it would make sense for me to focus on the political. Finance is always political, we know that. There's a direct connection between politics on both ends and monetary and fiscal policy. But it's more general than that. The financial system is in many ways a creature of public policy and heavily affected by public policies. International finance is even more politically fraught than finance domestically, as we know from longstanding, that is hundreds, maybe even many hundreds of years of conflicts over sovereign debts, currently exchange rates. We just had a fascinating panel with two of the four to my right and left, not geographical, right and left, on some of the political issues that international financial and monetary affairs raise. The situation we face now is, as we all know, and what Jean-Claude has just referred to, that there is now a global backlash against globalization. We've been talking about a backlash against globalization, those of us in the area, scholars and observers for 20 years, because everybody knows that even if, and when, and as much as we believe that globalization is good for every country, we all know that there are winners and losers. And what we have found out is that this is what the globalization backlash is going to look like. We've seen it now in country after country, around the world, and finance is directly or indirectly one of its central targets. I think we could focus on the narrowly construed problems of international finance, which are very interesting and very important. I think we will focus on them. That's fine, I'm interested in that. But I believe that the truly important challenges that international financial markets and national financial markets, and for that matter, international economy, more broadly, face are going to come from the evolving political circumstances, both domestic and international. Almost everywhere, among some substantial portion of the population, there is a very strong sense that globalization, including very prominently financial integration, has not helped them. And in fact, in many instances, this has worked against them. There are different forms in different countries, different targets in different countries, different sources in different countries, different political expressions in different countries, driven both by differences among countries, of course, and the different national institutions and the situations they face. But just to give you some examples, in the Eurozone, there is tremendous resentment in the former, in the debtor countries of the periphery about austerity. There's resentment in some of the creditor countries about transfers. There's resentment virtually everywhere about what has been seen as a series of bank bailouts, whether those were at the purely national level, as in some countries, or were implicated in or related to the Eurozone crisis. Or bank failures that threaten communities that those banks are found in. In a sense, Italy is the perfect storm here because the Lega is furious about transfers, Cinque Stelle is furious about austerity, and everybody in Italy is furious about the failure of Italian banks that threaten in one way or another directly or indirectly the savings of middle-class households. So the Eurozone is clear in the sense that finance faces some serious political threats there as well. And if those threats have not yet, as is the case in some countries, been made explicit, I believe they will, that finance is an easy target for those who resent austerity, resent bank bailouts, resent fiscal transfers, resent the attempt on the part of well-meaning bank regulators to close up banks that are insolvent. In the US, there is continued and growing resentment about job losses that are often related to the mobility of capital, both within the country and across borders. Donald Trump famously during the campaign in about half of his stump speeches blamed Wall Street and financial markets for the offshoring of American jobs. He also, in well more than half of his speeches, blamed the existing political elites for bank bailouts that as we all know, were a central part of the attempt to limit the effects of the crisis that began in December of 2007 and stretched out. Bank bailouts remain one of the least popular public policies in the last 30 years in the United States. In the emerging markets, Jean-Claude was just mentioning that we've seen the emergence of populism in the emerging markets. I should say that as Olivier mentioned last night, to some extent, the populism in the 20th century was large, I should say, populism in the 19th century was largely American. The Americans invented the term populist in the late, in the 1880s and 1890s in opposition to the gold standard, but in the 20th century, it was largely in the developing worlds in Latin America that the populists were particularly powerful, with their aim largely at the international economy seen as dominated by the advanced industrial countries. The new round of populism in the developing world, as represented by people like Duterte and the man who will almost certainly be the next president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro. In the emerging markets, there is continuing resentment about currency crises, about austerity, about debt crises, sovereign debt crises in many instances, about the role that elites have played in all of those things. So we know, I think, many of us, that to a large extent, some of this resentment may be misplaced, but that doesn't change its relevance, its political power, or its importance, all right? It's not just central banks, but the entire financial system, as I said, that is in many ways a creature of the political order. And I'll point out one example, which is that Donald Trump and his supporters, actually starting with the Tea Party in 2010, had as one of their heroes, Andrew Jackson. For those of you who don't know or remember their American politics, Andrew Jackson's principal claim to fame was his fundamental hostility to banks and central banks. He closed down the central bank in the United States, thereby causing a financial crisis, and he came close to closing down all the banks in the country. This was the hero of the Tea Party and of the supporters of Donald Trump in 2016. I have a poster on my office wall that is a picture of Andrew Jackson saying he was the first Tea Party. This is a poster issued by the Tea Party saying the first Tea Party president was Andrew Jackson. So I think that this is the principal challenge that faces international financial actors, both public and private, that is to address this resentment. Because resentment in politics turns into policies, turns into politicians and parties that win elections, turns into policies that could very well threaten the existence of an integrated financial system. I don't think that persuasion will work. I mean, my friends, the economists typically say if we just explained to people things like comparative advantage, then they would not worry about the fact that they've lost their job. People have legitimate concerns and legitimate complaints. They may have misplaced villains, but their complaints are legitimate and have to be taken seriously. The real challenge, I think, is that faced by our governments. How do you address these legitimate concerns? How do you provide support for those who have been hard done by the economic and financial developments of the last 20, 30, 40 years? How do you provide compensation for them? How do you provide them a sense that they're being represented in the political arena? So far, I have to say, being a little bit, well, I guess I'd say pessimistic, except pessimist is a well-informed optimist, so I don't see any particular willingness to engage directly, to take into serious consideration the need to deal with the concerns of those who are the base of the populist movements, to think about what kinds of benefits can be given to those who have been suffering and who are, in fact, now rebelling in the political order. What I see, not to put too fine a point on it if I wanna talk about the United States, is a great, what's the word, great appreciation for benefits that the winners from globalization have received, including things like tax cuts and deregulation, and leaving the politics to the politicians. That's not sustainable. Finance will come under sustained assault, an integrated international economy will come under sustained assault. The best defense is to work hard, in my view, to develop new models of social policies, of political representation that go beyond platitudes, and then actually work to try to satisfy the real needs of people whose suffering is not imagined, but real. If that's not done, I think that the axis that has been developing over the last five years, what we might call the Trump-Kaczynski Bolsonaro-Duterre de Salvini axis, will soon find finance to be a very attractive target, and the target will have no weapons. Thank you, thank you very, very much indeed. I think you'll have a lot of questions to be more, I would say, elaborating your new models of social policy because I guess that you very rightly are indicating what is the main, main political problem in practically all societies in the world, and certainly in all advanced economy. Thank you so much for this presentation.