 CHAPTER 16 One of the Offences, paragraph 3, General of Class 1, Part C. By what has been said, we are the better prepared for taking an account of the offences to which the condition in question stands exposed. Guardianship, being a private trust, is of course exposed to those offences and no others by which a private trust is liable to be affected. Some of them, however, on account of the special quality of the trust, will admit of some further particularity of description. In the first place, breach of this species of trust may be termed mismanagement of guardianship. In the second place, of whatever nature the duties are which are capable of being annexed to this condition, it must often happen that in order to fulfil them, it is necessary that the guardian should be at a certain particular place. Mismanagement of guardianship, when it consists in the not being on the occasion in question at the place in question, may be termed desertion of guardianship. Thirdly, it is manifest enough that the object which the guardian ought to propose to himself in the exercise of the powers to which those duties are annexed, is to procure for the ward the greatest quantity of happiness which can be procured for him, consistently with the regard which is due to the other interests that have been mentioned. For this is the object which the ward would have proposed to himself, and might and ought to have been allowed to propose to himself had he been capable of governing his own conduct. Now in order to procure this happiness it is necessary that he should possess a certain power over the objects on the use of which such happiness depends. These objects are either the person of the ward himself, or other objects that are extraneous to him. These other objects are either things or persons. As to things, then, objects of this class, insofar as a man's happiness depends upon the use of them, are styled his property. The case is the same with the services of any persons over whom he may happen to possess a beneficial power, or to whose services he may happen to possess a beneficial right. Now when property of any kind which is in trust suffers by the delinquency of him with whom it is in trust, such offence of whatever nature it is in other respects, may be styled dissipation in breach of trust, and if it be attended with a profit to the trustee it may be styled Peculation. Fourthly, for one person to exercise a power of any kind over another, it is necessary that the latter should either perform certain acts, upon being commanded so to do by the former, or at least should suffer certain acts to be exercised upon himself. In this respect a ward must stand upon the footing of a servant, and the condition of a ward must, in this respect, stand exposed to the same offenses to which that of a servant stands exposed. That is, on the part of a stranger, to disturbance, which in particular circumstances will amount to theft, on the part of the ward to breach of duty, which in particular circumstances may be affected by elopement. Fifthly, there does not seem to be any offence concerning guardianship that corresponds to abuse of trust. I mean in the sense to which the last mentioned denomination has been here confined. The reason is that guardianship, being a trust of a private nature, does not as such confer upon the trustee any power, either over the persons or over the property of any party, other than the beneficiary himself. If by accident it confers on the trustee a power over any persons whose services constitute a part of the property of the beneficiary, the trustee becomes thereby, in certain respects, the master of such servants. Sixthly, bribery also is a sort of offence to which, in this case, there is not commonly much temptation. It is an offence, however, which by possibility is capable of taking this direction, and must therefore be aggregated to the number of the offences to which the condition of a guardian stands exposed. And thus we have in all seventeen of these offences. Viz. 1. Wrongful non-investment of guardianship 2. Wrongful interception of guardianship 3. Wrongful divestment of guardianship 4. User-patient of guardianship 5. Wrongful investment of guardianship 6. Wrongful abdication of guardianship 7. Detractation of guardianship 8. Wrongful imposition of guardianship 9. Mismanagement of guardianship 10. Dissertion of guardianship 11. Discipation in prejudice of wardship 12. Peculation in prejudice of wardship 13. Disturbance of guardianship 14. Breach of duty to guardians 15. Elopement from guardians 16. Ward stealing 17. Bribery in prejudice of wardship Next, with regard to offences to which the condition of wardship is exposed, those which first affect the existence of the condition itself are as follows 1. Wrongful non-investment of the condition of a ward This, if it be the offence of one who should have been guardian, coincides with wrongful detractation of guardianship. If it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it non-investment of guardianship, which provided the guardianship is, in the eyes of him who should have been guardian, a desirable thing, is wrongful 2. Wrongful interception of wardship This, if it be the offence of him who should have been guardian, coincides with wrongful detractation of guardianship. If it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it interception of guardianship, which provided the guardianship is, in the eyes of him who should have been guardian, a desirable thing, is wrongful 3. Wrongful divestment of wardship This, if it be the offence of the guardian, but not otherwise, coincides with wrongful abdication of guardianship. If it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it divestment of guardianship, which, if the guardianship is, in the eyes of the guardian, a desirable thing, is wrongful 4. Usurpation of the condition of a ward An offence not very likely to be committed. This coincides at any rate with wrongful imposition of guardianship, and if the usurper were already under the guardianship of another guardian, it will involve in it wrongful divestment of such guardianship. 5. Wrongful investment of wardship The wardship being considered as a beneficial thing. This coincides with imposition of guardianship, which, if in the eyes of the pretended guardian, the guardianship should be a burden, will be wrongful. 6. Wrongful abdication of wardship This coincides with wrongful divestment of guardianship. 7. Wrongful detractation of wardship This coincides with wrongful interception of guardianship. 8. Wrongful imposition of wardship This, if the offender be the pretended guardian, coincides with usurpation of guardianship. If a stranger, it involves in it wrongful imposition of guardianship. As to such of the offenses relative to this condition as concern the consequences of it, while subsisting, they are of such a nature that, without any change of denomination, they belong equally to the condition of a guardian and that of a ward. We may therefore reckon seventeen sorts of offenses relative to the condition of a ward. 1. Wrongful non-investment of wardship 2. Wrongful interception of wardship 3. Wrongful divestment of wardship 4. Usurpation of wardship 5. Wrongful investment of wardship 6. Wrongful abdication of wardship 7. Wrongful detractation of wardship 8. Wrongful imposition of wardship 9. Mismanagement of guardianship 10. Desertion of guardianship 11. Prejudice of wardship 12. Peculation in prejudice of wardship 13. Disturbance of guardianship 14. Breach of duty to guardians 15. Elopement from guardians 16. Ward stealing 17. Bribery in prejudice of wardship. We come now to the offenses to which the condition of a parent stands exposed, and first with regard to those by which the very existence of the condition is affected. On this occasion, in order to see them more clearly into the subject, it will be necessary to distinguish between the natural relationship and the legal relationship, which is super-induced, as it were, upon the natural one. The natural one being constituted by a particular event, which either on account of its being already passed, or on some other account, is equally out of the power of the law, neither is nor can be made the subject of an offence. Is a man your father? It is not any offence of mine that can make you not his son. Is he not your father? It is not any offence of mine that can render him so. But although he does in fact bear that relation to you, I, by an offence of mine, may perhaps so manage matters that he shall not be thought to bear it, which with respect to any legal advantages which either he or you could derive from such relationship, will be the same thing as if he did not. In the capacity of a witness I may cause the judges to believe that he is not your father, and to decree accordingly, or in the capacity of a judge I may myself decree him not to be your father. Leaving then the purely natural relationship as an object equally out of the reach of justice and injustice, the legal condition, it is evident, will stand exposed to the same offences, neither more nor less, as every other condition that is capable of being either beneficial or burdensome, stands exposed to. Next, with regard to the exercise of the functions belonging to this condition, considered a still subsisting. In parentality there must be two persons concerned, the father and the mother. The condition of a parent includes therefore two conditions, that of a father and that of a mother, with respect to such or such a child. Now, it is evident that between these two parties, whatever beneficiary powers and other rights, as also whatever obligations are annexed to the condition of a parent, may be shared in any proportions that can be imagined. And if in these several objects of legal creation each of these two parties have severally a share, and if the interests of all these parties are in any degree provided for, it is evident that each of the parents will stand, with relation to the child, in two several capacities, that of a master and that of a guardian. The condition of a parent, then, in as far as it is the work of law, may be considered as a complex condition, compounded of that of a guardian and that of a master. To the parent, then, in quality of guardian, results a set of duties, involving, as necessary to the discharge of them, certain powers. To the child, in the character of a ward, a set of rights corresponding to the parent duties and a set of duties corresponding to his powers. To the parent again, in quality of master, a set of beneficiary powers, without any other necessary limitation, so long as they last, then what is annexed to them by the duties incumbent on him in quality of a guardian. To the child, in the character of a servant, a set of duties corresponding to the parent's beneficiary powers and without any other necessary limitation, so long as they last, then what is annexed to them by the rights which belong to the child in his capacity of ward. The condition of a parent will therefore be exposed to all the offenses to which either that of a guardian or that of a master are exposed, and as each of the parents will partake, more or less, of both those characters, the offenses to which the two conditions are exposed may be nominally, as they will be substantially, the same. Taking them, then, altogether, the offenses to which the condition of a parent is exposed will stand as follows. 1. Wrongful non-investment of parentality 2. Wrongful interception of parentality 3. Wrongful divestment of parentality 4. User-patient of parentality 5. Wrongful investment of parentality 6. Wrongful abdication of parentality 7. Wrongful detractation of parentality 8. Wrongful imposition of parentality 9. Mismanagement of parental guardianship 10. Desertion of parental guardianship 11. Dispation in prejudice of filial wardship 12. Peculation in prejudice of filial wardship 13. Abuse of parental powers 14. Disturbance of parental guardianship 15. Breach of duty to parents 16. Elopement from parents 17. Child stealing 18. Bribery in prejudice of filial wardship Next, with regard to the offenses to which the filial condition, the condition of a son or daughter, stands exposed. The principles to be pursued in the investigation of offenses of this description have already been sufficiently developed. It will be sufficient, therefore, to enumerate them without further discussion. The only peculiarities by which offenses relative to the condition in question stand distinguished from the offenses relative to all the preceding conditions depend upon this one circumstance. Viz, that it is certain every one must have had a father and a mother. At the same time, that it is not certain that every one must have had a master, a servant, a guardian, or a ward. It will be observed all along that where a person from whom if alive the benefit would be taken, or on whom the burden would be imposed, be dead, so much of the mischief is extinct along with the object of the offense. There still, however, remains so much of the mischief as depends upon the advantage or disadvantage which might accrue to persons related or supposed to be related in the several remota degrees to him in question. The catalogue, then, of these offenses stands as follows. 1. Wrongful non-investment affiliation. This, if it be the offense of him or her, who should have been recognized as the parent, coincides with wrongful detractation of parentality. If it be the offense of a third person, it involves in it non-investment of parentality, which, provided the parentality is in the eyes of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, a desirable thing is wrongful. 2. Wrongful interception affiliation. This, if it be the offense of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, coincides with wrongful detractation of parentality. If it be the offense of a third person, it involves in it interception of parentality, which, provided the parentality is in the eyes of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, a desirable thing is wrongful. 3. Wrongful divestment affiliation. This, if it be the offense of him or her who should be recognized as parent, coincides with wrongful abdication of parentality. If it be the offense of a third person, it involves in it divestment of parentality, to wit of paternity or of maternity or of both, which, if the parentality is in the eyes of him or her who should be recognized as parent, a desirable thing are respectively wrongful. 4. User-patient affiliation. This coincides with wrongful imposition of parentality, to wit either of paternity or of maternity or of both, and necessarily involves in it divestment of parentality, which, if the parentality thus divested were, in the eyes of him or her who are thus divested of it, a desirable thing is wrongful. 5. Wrongful investment affiliation. The affiliation being considered as a beneficial thing. This coincides with imposition of parentality, which, if in the eyes of the pretended father or mother the parentality should be an undesirable thing, will be wrongful. 6. Wrongful abdication affiliation. This necessarily coincides with wrongful divestment of parentality. It also is apt to involve in it wrongful imposition of parentality, though not necessarily either to the advantage or to the prejudice of any certain person. For if a man, supposed at first to be your son, appears afterwards not to be yours, it is certain indeed that he is the son of some other man, but it may not appear who that other man is. 7. Wrongful detractation affiliation. This coincides with wrongful non-investment or wrongful interception of parentality. 8. Wrongful imposition affiliation. This, if it be the offence of the pretended parent, coincides necessarily with usurpation of parentality. If it be the offence of a third person, it necessarily involves imposition of parentality, as also divestment of parentality, either or both of which, according to the circumstance above mentioned, may or may not be wrongful. 9. Mismanagement of parental guardianship. 10. Desertion of parental guardianship. 11. Dispation in prejudice-affilial wardship. 12. Peculation in prejudice-affilial wardship. 13. Abuse of parental power. 14. Disturbance of parental guardianship. 15. Breach of duty to parents. 16. Elopement from parents. 17. Child stealing. 18. Bribery in prejudice of parental guardianship. We shall now be able to apply ourselves with some advantage to the examination of the several offenses to which the marital condition or condition of a husband stands exposed. A husband is a man between whom and a certain woman, who in this case is called his wife, there subsists a legal obligation for the purpose of their living together, and in particular for the purpose of a sexual intercourse to be carried on between them. This obligation will naturally be considered in four points of view. 1. In respect of its commencement. 2. In respect of the placing of it. 3. In respect of the nature of it. 4. In respect of its duration. First, then, it is evident that in point of possibility, one method of commencement is as conceivable as another. The time of its commencement might have been marked by one sort of event, by one sort of signal, as it may here be called, as well as by another. But in practice the signal has usually been, as in point of utility it ought constantly to be, a contract entered into by the parties. That is, a set of signs, pitched upon by the law, as expressive of their mutual consent, to take upon them this condition. Secondly, and thirdly, with regard to the placing of the obligations which are the result of the contract, it is evident that they must rest either solely on one side or mutually on both. On the first supposition, the condition is not to be distinguished from pure slavery. In this case, either the wife must be the slave of the husband, or the husband of the wife. The first of these suppositions has perhaps never been exemplified, the opposing influence of physical causes being too universal to have ever been surmounted. The latter seems to have been exemplified, but too often, perhaps among the first Romans, at any rate in many barbarous nations. Thirdly, with regard to the nature of the obligations. If they are not suffered to rest all on one side, certain rights are thereby given to the other. There must therefore be rights on both sides. Now, whether are mutual rights possessed by two persons as against each other, either there are powers annexed to those rights or not. But the persons in question are, by the supposition, to live together, in which case we have shown that it is not only expedient, but in a manner necessary, that on one side there should be powers. Now, it is only on one side that powers can be, for suppose them on both sides, and they destroy one another. The question is, then, in which of the parties these powers shall be lodged. We have shown that on the principle of utility, they ought to be lodged in the husband. The powers, then, which subsist being lodged in the husband, the next question is, shall the interest of one party only, or of both, be consulted in the exercise of them? It is evident that on the principle of utility the interests of both ought alike to be consulted. Since in two persons taken together, more happiness is producible than in one. This being the case, it is manifest that the legal relation which the husband will bear to the wife will be a complex one, compounded of that of master and that of guardian. The offences, then, to which the condition of a husband will be exposed, will be the sum of those to which the two conditions of master and guardian are exposed. Thus far the condition of a husband, with respect to the general outlines of it, stands upon the same footing as that of a parent. But there are certain reciprocal services, which, being the main subject of the matrimonial contract, constitute the essence of the two matrimonial relations, and which neither a master nor guardian as such, nor a parent at any rate, have usually been permitted to receive. These must, of course, have been distinguished from the indiscriminate train of services at large, which the husband in his character of master is empowered to exact, and of those which in his character of guardian he is bound to render. Being thus distinguished, the offences relative to the two conditions have, in many instances, in as far as they have reference to these peculiar services, acquired particular denominations. In the first place, with regard to the contract, from the celebration of which the legal condition dates its existence. It is obvious that in point of possibility this contract might, on the part of either sex, subsist with respect to several persons of the other sex at the same time. The husband might have any number of wives. The wife might have any number of husbands. The husband might enter into the contract with a number of wives at the same time, or, if with only one at a time, he might reserve. After himself, a right of engaging in a similar contract with any number, or with only such or such a number of other women afterwards, during the continuance of each former contract. This latter, accordingly, is the footing upon which, as is well known, marriage is and has been established in many extensive countries, particularly in all those which profess the Muhammadan religion. In point of possibility, it is evident that the like liberty might be reserved on the part of the wife, though in point of practice no examples of such an arrangement seem ever to have occurred. Which of all these arrangements is, in point of utility, the most expedient, is a question which would require too much discussion to answer in the course of an analytical process like the present, and which belongs indeed to the civil branch of legislation, rather than to the penal. In Christian countries the solemnization of any such contract is made to exclude the solemnization of any subsequent one during the continuance of a former, and the solemnization of any such subsequent contract is accordingly treated as an offence under the name of polygamy. Polygamy, then, is, at any rate, on the part of the man, a particular modification of that offence which may be styled usurpation of the condition of a husband. As to its other effects they will be different, according as it was the man only, or the woman only, or both, that were in a state of matrimony at the time of the commission of the offence. If the man only, then his offence, involves in it pro tanto that of wrongful divestment of the condition of a wife, in prejudice of his prior wife. If the woman only, then it involves in it pro tanto that of wrongful divestment of the condition of a husband, in prejudice of her prior husband. If both were already married, it, of course, involves both the wrongful divestments which have just been mentioned. And on the other hand also, the converse of all this may be observed with regard to polygamy on the part of the woman. Secondly, as the engaging not to enter into any subsequent engagement of the like-kind during the continuance of the woman, is one of the conditions on which the law lends its sanction to the first. So another is the inserting as one of the articles of this engagement and undertaking not to render to, or accept from, any other person, the services which form the characteristic object of it. The rendering or acceptance of any such services is accordingly treated as an offence, under the name of adultery, under which name is also comprised the offence of the stranger, who, in the commission of the above offence, is the necessary accomplice. Thirdly, disturbing either of the parties to this engagement in the possession of these characteristic services may, in like manner, be distinguished from the offence of disturbing them in the enjoyment of the miscellaneous advantages derivable from the same condition. And on whichever side the blame rests, whether that of the party or that of a third person, may be termed wrongful withholding of connubial services. And thus we have one of the most significant thus we have one and twenty sorts of offences to which, as the law stands at present in Christian countries, the condition of a husband stands exposed. Viz. 1. Wrongful non-investment of the condition of a husband. 2. Wrongful interception of the condition of a husband. 3. Wrongful divestment of the condition of a husband. 4. User-patient of the condition of a husband. 5. Polygamy. 6. Wrongful investment of the condition of a husband. 7. Wrongful abdication of the condition of a husband. 8. Wrongful detractation of the condition of a husband. 9. Wrongful imposition of the condition of a husband. 10. Mismanagement of marital guardianship. 11. Desertion of marital guardianship. 12. Discipation in prejudice of matrimonial wardship. 13. Peculation in prejudice of matrimonial wardship. 14. Abuse of marital power. 15. Disturbance of marital guardianship. 16. Wrongful withholding of cannubial services. 17. Adultery. 18. Breach of duty to husbands. 19. Elopement from husbands. 20. Wife stealing. 21. Bribery in prejudice of marital guardianship. End of Chapter 6 Paragraph 3 Part C Section 25 of an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings own the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation by Jeremy Bentham. Chapter 16 Paragraph 3 Part D Next with regard to the offenses to which the condition of a wife stands exposed. From the patterns that have been exhibited already, the coincidence and associations that takes place between the offenses that concern the existence of this condition and those which concern the existence of the condition of a husband may easily enough be apprehended without further repetitions. The catalogue of those now under consideration will be precisely the same in every article as the catalogue last exhibited. Thus much for the several sorts of offenses relative to the several sorts of domestic conditions, those which are constituted by such natural relations as are contiguous being included. There remain those which are uncontiguous, of which after so much has been said of the others, it will naturally be expected that some notice should be taken. These however do not afford any of that matter which is necessary to constitute a condition. In point of fact no power seems ever to be annexed to any of them. A grandfather perhaps may be called by the law to take upon him the guardianship of his orphan grandson, but then the power he has belongs to him not as a grandfather but as a guardian. In point of possibility indeed power might be annexed to these relations just as it might to any other, but still no new sort of domestic condition would result from it, since it has been shown that there can be no others that being constituted by power shall be distinct from those which have been already mentioned. Such as they are however, they have this in common with the before mentioned relations, that they are capable of importing either benefit or burden. They therefore stand exposed to the several offenses whereby those or any other relations are liable to be affected in point of existence. It may be expected therefore that in virtue of these offenses they should be added to the list of relations which are liable to be objects of delinquency, but the fact is that they already stand included in it, and although not expressly named, that is effectually as if they were. On the one hand it is only by affecting such or such a contiguous relation that any offense affecting and contiguous relations can take place. On the other hand, neither can any offense affecting the existence of the contiguous relations be committed without affecting the existence of an indefinite multitude of such as are uncontiguous. A false witness comes and causes it to be believed that you are the son of a woman who in truth is not your mother. What follows, an endless tribe of other false persuasions, that you are the grandson of the father of the mother of this supposed mother, that you are the son of some husband of hers or at least of some man with whom she has cohabited, the grandson of his father and mother and so on, the brother of their other children if they have any, the brother-in-law of the husbands and wives of those children if married, the uncle of the children of those children and so on. On the other hand, that you are not the son of your real mother nor of your real father, that you are not the grandson of either of your real grandfathers or grandmothers and so on without end. All which persuasions result from are included in the one original false persuasion of your being the son of this your pretended mother. It should seem therefore at first sight that none of the offences against these incontiguous relations could ever come expressly into question. Fourth, by the same rule that one ought, so it might seem ought a thousand others. The offences against the incontiguous being merged as it were in those which affect the contiguous relations. So far however is this from being the case that in speaking of an offence of this stamp it is not uncommon to hear a great deal said of this or that incontiguous relationship which it affects. At the same time there's no notice at all shall be taken of any of those which are contiguous. How happens this? Because to the incontiguous relation are annexed perhaps certain remarkable advantages or disadvantages. While to all the intermediate relations none shall be annexed which are a comparison worth noticing. Suppose Anthony or Lepidus still have contested the relationship of Octavius after Augustus to chaos Julius Caesar. How could it have been none? It could only have been done by contesting either Octavius being the son of Atea or Atea being the daughter of Julia or Julia being the daughter of Lucius Julius Caesar or Lucius Julius Caesar being the father of chaos. But to have been the son of Atea or the grandson of Julia or the great grandson of Lucius Julius Caesar was in comparison of small importance. These intervening relationships were comparatively speaking of no other use to him than in virtue of there being so many necessary links in the genealogical claim which connected him with the sovereign of the emperor. As to the advantages and disadvantages which may happen to be annexed to any of these incontiguous relationships we have seen already that no powers over the correlative person nor any corresponding obligations are of the number. Of what nature then can they be? They are in truth no other than what are the resultals either of local and accidental institutions or of some centenuous bias that has been taken by the moral sanction. It would therefore be to little purpose to attempt tracing them out a priori by any exhaustive process. All that can be done is to pick up and lay together some of the principal articles in each catalog by way of specimen. The advantages which a given relationship is apt to impart seem to be referable chiefly to the following heads. One, chance of succession to the property or a part of the property of the correlative person. Two, chance of pecuniary support to be yielded by the correlative person either by appointment of law or by spontaneous donation. Three, a session of legal rank including any legal privileges which may happen to be annexed to it such as capacity of holding such and such beneficial officers. Exemption from such and such burdensome obligations for instance paying taxes serving burdensome officers etc etc. Four, accession of rank by courtesy including the sort of reputation which is customary and spontaneously annexed to distinguished birth and family alliance. Whereon may depend the chance of advancement in the way of marriage or in a thousand other ways less obvious. The disadvantages which a given relation is liable to impart seem to be referable chiefly to the following heads. One, chance of being obliged either by law or by force of the moral sanction to yield pecuniary support to the correlative party. Two, loss of legal rank including the legal disabilities as well as the burdensome obligations which the law is apt to annex sometimes with injustice enough to the lower stations. Three, loss of rank by courtesy including the loss of the advantages annexed by custom to such rank. Four, incapacity of contracting matrimony with the correlative person where the supposed consanguity or affinity lies within the prohibited degrees. We now come to civil conditions. These it may well be imagined may be infinitely various as various as the acts which a man may be either commanded or allowed whether for his own benefit or that of others to abstain from or to perform. As many different denominations as there are of persons distinguished with the views of such commands and allowances those denominations only accepted which relate to the conditions above spoken of under the names of domestic one so many civil conditions one might enumerate. Means however more or less explicit may be found out of circumscribing their infinitude. What the materials are if they so may be called of which conditions or any other kind of legal possession can be made up we have already seen. Beneficial powers, fiduciary powers, beneficial rights for fiduciary rights, relative duties, absolute duties but as many conditions as import a power or right of the fiduciary kind as possessed by the person whose conditions is in question belong to the head of trust. The catalog of the offenses to which these conditions are exposed coincides therefore exactly with the catalog of offenses against trust under which head they have been ascended in a general point of view under the head of offenses against trust and such of them as are of a domestic nature in a more particular manner in the character of offenses against the several domestic conditions. Conditions constituted by such duties of the relative kind has had for their counterpart trust constituted by fiduciary powers as well as rights on the side of the correlative party and those of a private nature have also been already discussed under the appellation of domestic conditions. The same observation may be applied to the conditions constituted by such powers of the beneficial kind over persons as of our a private nature as also to the subordinate correlative conditions constituted by the duties corresponding to those rights and powers. As to absolute duties there is no instance of a condition thus created of which the institution is upon the principle of utility to justify and that the several religious conditions of the monastic kind should be allowed of as examples. They remain as the only materials out of which the conditions which yet remain to be considered can be composed. Conditions constituted by beneficial powers over things. Conditions constituted by beneficial rights to things that is rights to power over things or by rights to those rights and so on. Conditions constituted by rights to service and conditions constituted by the duties corresponding to those respective rights. Out of these have to be taken those of which the materials are the ingredients of the several modifications of property the several conditions of proprietorship. These are the conditions if such for a moment they may be styled which having but here or there any specific names are not commonly considered on the footing of conditions so that the acts which of such conditions were recognised might be considered as offences against those conditions are not want to be considered in any other light than that of offences against property. Now the case is has been already intimated that of these several conditions those which are want to be considered under that name are not distinguished by any uniform and explicit line from those of which the materials are want to be carried to the head of property. A set of rights shall in one instant be considered as constituting an article of property rather than a condition while in another instance a set of rights of the same stamp is considered as constituting rather a condition than an article of property. This will probably be found to be the case in all languages and the usage is different again in one language from what it is in another. From these causes it seems to be impractical to subject the class of several conditions to any exhaustive method so that for making a complete collection of them it seems to be no other expedient than that of searching the language through for them and taking them as they come. To exemplify this observation it may be of use to lay open the structure as it were of two or three of the principal sorts or classes of conditions comparing them with two or three articles of property which appear to be nearly of the same complexion. By this means the nature and generation if one may so call it of both these classes of ideal objects may be the more clearly understood. The several sorts of civil conditions that are not fiduciary may all or at least the greater part of them be comprehended under the head of rank or that of profession. The latter word being taken in its most extensive sense so as to include not only what are called the liberal professions but those also which are exercised by the several sorts of traders, artists, manufacturers and other persons of whatsoever station who are in the way of making a profit by their labor. Among ranks then as well as professions let us for the sake of first peculiarity take for example such articles to stand the clearest from any mixture of either fiduciary or beneficial power. The rank of knighthood is constituted how by prohibiting all other persons from performing certain acts the performance of which is the symbol of the order at the same time that the knight in question and his companions are permitted for instance to wear a ribbon of a certain color in a certain manner call himself by a certain title to use a memorial seal with a certain mark on it. By laying all persons but the knight under this prohibition the law subjects them to a set of duties and since from the discharge of these duties a benefit results to the person in whose favor they are created to wit the benefit of enjoying such a share of extraordinary reputation as men I want to yield to a person thus distinguished. To discharge them is to render him a service and duty being a duty of the negative class a duty consisting in the performance of certain acts of the negative kind the service is what may be called a service of forbearance it appears then that to generate this condition there must be true sorts of services that which is the immediate cause of it a service of the negative kind to be rendered by the community at large that which is the cause again of this service of service of the positive kind to be rendered by the law the condition of a professional man stands upon a narrower footing to constitute this condition there needs nothing more than a permission given him on the part of the legislator to perform those acts in the performance of which consists the exercise of his profession to give or sell his advice or assistant in matters of law or visit to give or sell his services as employed in the executing or overseeing of a manufacturer or piece of work of such or such a kind to sell a commodity of such or such a sort here then we see there is but one sort of service requisite a service which may be merely of the negative kind to be rendered by the law the service of permitting him into exercise his profession a service which if there has been no prohibition laid on before is rendered by simply for bearing to prohibit him now the ideal objects which in the cases above specified are said to be conferred upon a man by the services that are respectively in question are in both cases not articles of property but conditions by such a behavior on the part of the law there shall be the reverse of that whereby they were respectively produced a man may be made to forfeit them and what he has then said to forfeit is in neither case his property but in one case his rank or dignity any other case his trade or his profession and in both cases his condition other cases there are again in which the law by a process of the same sort with that by which it constituted the former of the two above mentioned conditions confers on him an ideal object which the laws of language have placed under the head of property the law permits a man to sell books that is all sorts of books in general thus far all that he has done is to invest him with a condition and this condition he will equally possess although everyone else in the world would have sold book likewise let the law now take an active part in his favor and prohibit all other person from selling books of a certain description he remaining at liberty to sell them as before it therefore confers on him a sort of exclusive privilege or monopoly which is called a copyright but by investing him with this right it is not said to invest him with any new sort of condition what it invests him with is spoken of as an article of property to wit of that sort of property which is termed in lawful and so on in the case of an engraving a mechanical engine a medicine or in short of a saleable article of any other sort yet when it gave him an exclusive right of wearing a particular sort of ribbon the objects which it then was considered as conferring on him was not an article of property but a condition by forbearing to subject you to certain disadvantages to which it subjects an alien the law confers on you the condition of a natural born subject by subjecting him to them it imposes on him the condition of an alien by conferring on you certain privileges or rights which it denies to roturia the law confers on you the condition of a chanteon by forbearing to confer on him those privileges it imposes on him the condition of a roturia the rights out of which the two advantages conditions he exemplified are both of them as it were composed have for their counterpart a sort of service of forbearance rendered as we have seen not by private individuals but by the law itself as to the duties which it creates in rendering you these services they have to be considered as duties imposed by the legislator on the ministers of justice it may be observed with regard to the greater part of the conditions here comprised under the general appellation of civil that the relations corresponding to those by which they are respectively constituted are not provided with appellatives the relation which has a name is that which is born by the party favored to the party bound that which is born by the party bound to the party favored has not any this is a circumstance that may help to distinguish them from those conditions which we have termed domestic in the domestic conditions if on one side the party to whom the power is given is called a master on the other side the party over whom the power is given the party who is the object of that power is termed a servant in the civil conditions this is not the case on the one side a man in virtue of certain services of forbearance which the rest of the community are bound to render him this denominators a knight of such or such an order but on the other side these services do not bestow any particular denomination on the person for whom such services are due another man in virtue of the legislator's rendering that sort of negative service which consists in the not prohibiting him from exercising a trade invests him at his option with the condition of a trader it accordingly denominates him a farmer a baker a weaver and so on but the ministers of the law do not in virtue of their rendering this man this sort of negative service acquire for themselves any particular name suppose even that the trade you have the right of exercising happens to be the object of a monopoly and that the legislator beside rendering you himself those services which you derive from the permission he bestows on you obliges other persons to render you those further services which you received from their forbearing to follow the same trade yet neither do they in virtue of their being thus bound acquire any particular name after what has been said of the nature of the several sorts of several conditions that have names the offenses to which they are exposed may without much difficulty be imagined taken by itself every condition which is thus constituted by permission granted to the possessor is of course of a beneficial nature it is therefore exposed to all those offenses to which the possession of a benefit is exposed but either on account of a man's being obliged to persevere when once engaged in it or on account of such other obligations as may stand annexed to the possession of it or on account of the comparative degree of disrepute which may stand the next to it by the moral sanction it may by accident be a burden is on this account liable to stand exposed to the offenses to which as have been seen everything that partakes of the nature of a burden stands exposed as to any offenses which may concern the exercise of the functions belonging to it if it happens to have any duties annexed to it such as those for instance which are constituted by regulations touching the exercise of a trade it will stand exposed to so many breaches of duty and lastly whatsoever other functions belonging to it it will stand exposed at any rate to disturbance in the for me however of the catalog of these offenses exactnesses of less consequence in so much as an act if it should happen not to be comprised in this catalog and yet as in any respect of a pernicious nature we'll be sure to be found in some other division of the system of offenses if a baker sells bad bread for the price of good it is a kind of fraud upon the buyer and perhaps an injury of the simple corporal kind done to the health of an individual or a neighborhood if a cloning a sells bad cloth for good at home it is a fraud if the foreigners are bored it may over and above the fraud put upon the foreign purchaser have pernicious effects perhaps in the prosperity of the trade at home and become thereby an offense against the national wealth so again with regard to disturbance if a man be disturbed in the exercise of his trade the offense will probably be a wrongful interception of the profit he might be presumed to have been in the way to make by it and were it even to appear in any case that a man exercised a trade or what is less unlikely a liberal profession without having profit in his view the offense will still be reducible to the head of simple injurious restrainment or simple injurious compulsion end of chapter 16 chapter 16 paragraph four of an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anna Simon an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation by Jeremy Bentham chapter 16 division of offenses paragraph four advantages of the present method a few words for the purpose of giving a general view of the method of division here pursued and of the advantages which it possesses may have their use the whole system of offenses we may observe is branched out into five classes in the three first the subordinate divisions are taken from the same source that is from the consideration of the different points in respect whereof the interest of an individual is exposed to suffer by this uniformity a considerable degree of a light seems to be thrown upon the whole system particularly upon the offenses that come under the third class objects which have never hitherto been brought into any sort of order with regard to the fourth class in settling the president's between its several subordinate divisions it seemed most natural and satisfactory to place those first the connection whereof with the welfare of individuals seemed most obvious and immediate the mischief of effects of those offenses which tend in an immediate way to deprive individuals of the protection provided for them against the attacks of one another out of those which tend to bring down upon them the attacks of foreign assailants seem alike obvious and palpable the mischief of quality of such as tend to weaken the force that is provided to combat those attacks but particularly the latter though evident enough is one link farther off in the chain of causes and effects the ill effects of such offenses as are of disservice only by diminishing the particular fund from whence that force is to be extracted such effects I say though indisputable are still more distant and out of sight the same thing may be observed with regard to such as are mischievous only by affecting the universal fund offenses against the sovereignty in general would not be mischievous if offenses of the several descriptions preceding were not mischievous nor in a temporal view are offenses against religion mischievous except in as far as by removing or weakening or misapplying one of the three great incentives to virtue and Jack's device they tend to open the door to several mischiefs which it is the nature of all those other offenses to produce as to the fifth class this as had already been observed exhibits at first view an irregularity which however seems to be unavoidable but this irregularity is presently corrected when the analysis returns back as it does after a step or two into the path from which the tyranny of language had forced it a while to deviate it was necessary that it should have two purposes in view the one to exhibit upon a scale more or less minute a systematic enumeration of the several possible modifications of delinquency denominated or undenominated the other defined places in the list for such names of offenses as were in current use for the first purpose nature was to set the law for the other custom had the nature of the things themselves being the only guide every such difference in the manner of perpetration and such only should have served as a ground for a different denomination as was attended with a difference in point of effect this however of itself would never have been sufficient for as on one hand the new language which it would have been necessary to invent would have been uncouth and in a manner unintelligible so on the other hand the names which were before in current use and which in spite of all systems good or bad must have remained in current use would have continued unexplained to have adhered exclusively to the current language would have been as bad on the other side for in that case the catalog of offenses when compared to that of the mischiefs that are capable of being produced would have been altogether broken and incomplete to reconcile these two objects in as far as they seem to be reconcilable the following course has therefore been pursued the logical whole constituted by the sum total of possible offenses has been bisected in as many different directions as were necessary and the process in each direction carried down to that stage at which the particular ideas thus divided found names in current use in readiness to receive them at that period I have stopped leaving any minuter distinctions to be enumerated in the body of the work as so many species of the genus characterized by such or such a name if in the course of any such process I came to a mode of conduct which though it required to be taken notice of and perhaps had actually been taken notice of under all laws in the character of an offense had hitherto been expressed under different laws by different circumlocutions without ever having received any name capable of occupying the place of a substantive in a sentence I have frequently ventured so far as to fabricate a new name for it such a one as the idiom of the language and the acquaintance I happen to have with it would admit of these names consisting in most instances and that unavoidably of two or three words brought together in a language to which admits not like the German and the Greek of their being melted into one can never be upon a par in point of commodiousness with those univocal appetitives which make part of the established stock in the choice of names and current use care has been taken to avoid all such as have been grounded on local distinctions ill founded perhaps in the nation in which they received their birth and at any rate not applicable to the circumstances of other countries the analysis as far as it goes is as applicable to the legal concerns of one country as of another and where if it had descended into further details it would have ceased to be so there I've taken care always to stop and thence it is that it has come to be so much more particular in the class of offenses against individuals than in any of the other classes one use then of this arrangement if it should be found to have been properly conducted will be its serving to point out in what it is that the legal interests of all countries agree and in what it is that they are liable to differ how far a rule that is proper for one will serve and how far it will not serve for another that the legal interests of different ages and countries have nothing in common and that they have everything are suppositions equally distanced from the truth a natural method such as it has been here attempted to exhibit seems to possess four capital advantages not to mention others of inferior node in the first place it affords such assistance to the apprehension and to the memory as those faculties would in vain look for in any technical arrangement that arrangement of the objects of any signs may it should seem be termed a natural one which takes such properties to characterize them by as man in general are by the common constitution of man's nature independently of any accidental impressions they may have received from the influence of any local or other particular causes accustomed to attend to such in a word as naturally that is readily and at first sight engage and firmly fix the attention of anyone to whom they have once been pointed out now by what other means should an object engage or fix a man's attention unless by interesting him and what circumstance belonging to any action can be more interesting or rather what other circumstance belonging to it can be at all interesting to him than that of the influence it promises to have on its own happiness and the happiness of those who are about him by what other mark then should he more easily find the place which any offense occupies in the system or by what other clue should he more readily recall it in the next place it not only gives at first glance a general intimation of the nature of each division of offenses in as far as that nature is determined by some one characteristic property but it gives room for a number of general propositions to be formed concerning the particular offenses that come under that division in such manner as to exhibit a variety of other properties that may belong to them in common it gives room therefore for the framing of a number of propositions concerning them which though very general because predicated of a great number of articles shall be as generally true in the third place it is so contrived that the very place which any offenses made to occupy suggests the reason of its being put there it serves to indicate not only that such and such acts are made offenses but why they ought to be by this means while it addresses itself to the understanding it recommends itself in some measure to the affections by the intimation it gives of the nature and tendency of each obnoxious act it accounts for and in some measure vindicates the treatment which it may be thought proper to bestow upon that act in the way of punishment to the subject then it is a kind of perpetual apology showing the necessity of every defalcation which for the security and prosperity of each individual it is requisite to make from the liberty of every other to the legislator it is a kind of perpetual lesson serving at once as a corrective to his prejudices and as a check upon his passions is there a mischief which has escaped him in a natural arrangement if at the same time an exhaustive one he cannot fail to find it is he tempted ever to force innocence within the pale of guilt the difficulty of finding a place for it advertises him of his error such are the uses of a map of universal delinquency laid down upon the principle of utility such the advantages with the legislator as well as the subject may derive from it abide by it and everything that is arbitrary in legislation vanishes an evil intention or prejudice legislator there is not look it in the face he would prescribe it and with reason it would be a satire on his laws in the fourth place a natural arrangement governed as it is by a principle which is recognized by all men will serve a like for the jurisprudence of all nations in a system of proposed law framed in pursuance of such a method the language will serve as a glossary by which all systems of positive law might be explained while the matter serves as a standard by which they might be tried thus illustrated the practice of every nation might be a lesson to every other and mankind might carry on a mutual interchange of experiences and improvements as easily in this as in every other work of science if any one of these objects should in any degree be attained the labor of this analysis severe as it has been will not have been thrown away and of chapter 16 paragraph 4 chapter 16 of an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation this is LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by May Lowe an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation by Jeremy Bentham chapter 16 section 5 characters of the five classes it has been mentioned as an advantage possessed by this method and not possessed by any other that the objects comprised under it are cast into groups to which a variety of propositions may be applied in common a collection of these propositions as applied to the several classes may be considered as exhibiting the distinctive characters of each class so many of these propositions as can be applied to the offences belonging to any given class so many properties are they found to have in common so many of these common properties as may respectively be attributed to them so many properties may be set down to serve as characters of the class a collection of these characters it may here be proper to exhibit the more of them we can bring together the more clearly and fully will the nature of the several classes and of the offences they are composed of be understood characters of class one composed of private offences or offences against assignable individuals one when arrived at their last stage the stage of consummation they produce all of them a primary mischief as well as a secondary two the individuals whom they affect in the first instance are constantly assignable this extends to all to attempts and preparations as well as to such as have arrived at the stage of consummation three consequently they admit of compensation in which they differ from the offences of all the other classes as such four they admit also of retaliation in which they also differ from the offences of all the other classes five there is always some person who has a natural and peculiar interest to prosecute them in this they differ from self-regarding offences also from semi-public and public ones except in as far as the two latter may chance to involve a private mischief six the mischief they produce is obvious more so than that of semi-public offences and still more so than that of self-regarding ones or even public seven they are everywhere and must ever be obnoxious to the center of the world more so than semi-public offenses as such and still more so than public ones eight they are more constantly obnoxious to the center of the world than self-regarding offenses and would be so universally were it not for the influence of the two false principles the principle of asceticism and the principle of antipathy nine they are less apt than the semi-public and public offenses to require different descriptions in different states and countries in which respect they are much upon a par with self-regarding ones ten by certain circumstances of aggravation they are liable to be transformed into semi-public offenses and by certain others into public eleven they can be no ground for punishing them until they can be proved to have occasioned or to be about to occasion some particular mischief to some particular individual in this they differ from semi-public offenses and from public twelve in slight cases compensation given to the individual affected by them may be a sufficient ground for remitting punishment for if the primary mischief has not been sedicient to produce any alarm the whole of the mischief may be cured by compensation in this also they differ from semi-public offenses and from public ones characters of class two composed of semi-public offenses or offenses affecting a whole subordinate class of persons one as such they produce no primary mischief the mischief they produce consists of one or other or both branches of the secondary mischief produced by offenses against individuals without the primary two in as far as they are able to be considered as belonging to this class the persons whom they affect in the first instance are not individually assignable three they are apt however to involve or terminate in some primary mischief of the first order which when they do they advance into the first class and become private offenses four they admit not as such of compensation five nor of retaliation six as such there is never any one particular individual whose exclusive interest it is to prosecute them a circle of persons may however always be marked out within which may be found some who have a greater interest to prosecute than any who are out of that circle have seven the mischief they produce is in general pretty obvious not so much so indeed is that of private offenses but more so upon the whole than that of self-regarding and public ones eight they are rather less obnoxious to the center of the world than private offenses but they are more so than public ones they would also be more so than self-regarding ones were it not for the influence of the two false principles the principle of sympathy and antipathy and that of eschaticism nine they are more apt than private and self-regarding offenses to require different descriptions in different countries but less so than public ones ten there may be ground for punishing them before they have been proved to have occasioned or be about to occasion mischief to any particular individual which is not the case with private offenses eleven in no cases can satisfaction given to any particular individual affected by them be a sufficient ground for remitting punishment four by such satisfaction it is but a part of the mischief of them that is cured in this they differ from private offenses but agree with public characters of class three consisting of self-regarding offenses offenses against oneself one in individual instances it will often be questionable whether they are productive of any primary mischief at all secondary they produce none two they affect not any other individuals assignable or non-assignable except in as far as they affect the offender himself unless by possibility in particular cases and in a very slight and distant manner the whole state three they admit not therefore of compensation for nor of retaliation five no person has naturally any peculiar interest to prosecute them except in as far as in virtue of some connection he may have with the offender either in point of sympathy or of interest a mischief of the derivative kind may happen to devolve upon him six the mischief they produce is apt to be unobvious and in general more questionable than that of any of the other classes seven they are however apt many of them to be more obnoxious to the censure of the world than public offenses owing to the influence of the two false principles the principle of asceticism and the principle of antipathy some of them more even than semi-public or even than private offense eight they are less apt than offenses of any other class to require different descriptions in different states and countries nine among the inducements to punish them antipathy against the offender is apt to have a greater share than sympathy for the public ten the best plea for punishing them is founded on a faint probability there may be of there being productive of a mischief which if real will place them in the class of public ones chiefly in those divisions of it which are composed of offenses against population and offenses against national wealth characters of class four consisting of public offenses or offenses against the state in general one as such they produce not any primary mischief and the secondary mischief they produce which consists frequently of danger without alarm the great in value is in specie very indeterminate two the individuals whom they affect in the first instance are constantly unassignable except in as far as by accident they happen to involve or terminate in such or such offenses against individuals three consequently they admit not of compensation for nor of retaliation five nor is there any person who is naturally any particular interest to prosecute them except in as far as they appear to affect the power or in any other manner the private interest of some person in authority six the mischief they produce as such is comparatively unobvious much more so than that of private offenses and more so likewise than that of semi-public ones seven they are as such much less obnoxious to the center of the world than private offenses less even than semi-public or even than self-regarding offenses unless in particular cases through sympathy or to certain persons in authority whose private interests they may appear to affect eight they are more apt than any of the other classes to admit of different descriptions in different states and countries nine they are constituted in many cases by some circumstances of aggravation super-added to a private offense and therefore in these cases involve the mischief and exhibit the other characters belonging to both classes they are however even in such cases properly enough ranked in the fourth class in as much as the mischief they produce in virtue of the properties which aggregate them to that class eclipses and swallows up that which they produce in virtue of those properties which aggregate them to the first ten there may be sufficient ground for punishing them without there being proved to have occasioned or to be about to occasion any particular mischief to any particular individual in this they differ from private offenses but agree with semi-public ones here as in semi-public offenses the extent of the mischief makes up for the uncertainty of it 11 in no case can satisfaction given to any particular individual affected by them be a sufficient ground for remitting punishment in this they differ from private offenses but agree with semi-public characters of class five or appendix composed of multi-form or anomalous offenses and containing offenses by falsehood and offenses concerning trust one taken collectively in the parcels marked out by their popular appellations they are incapable of being aggregated to any systematical method of distribution grounded upon the mischief of the offense two they may however be thrown into subdivisions which may be aggregated to such a method of distribution three these subdivisions will naturally and readily rank under the divisions of the several preceding classes of this system four each of the two great divisions of this class spreads itself in that manner over all the preceding classes five in some acts of this class the distinguishing circumstance which constitutes the essential character of that offense will in some instances enter necessarily in the character of a criminative circumstance into the constitution of the offense in so much that without the intervention of this circumstance no offense at all of that denomination can be committed in other instances the offense may subsist without it and where it interferes it comes in as an accidental independent circumstance capable of constituting a ground of aggravation end of chapter 16