 Good morning and good evening everyone depending on your time zones. My name is Adnan Rafiq and the country director of US Institute of Peace. And I welcome you on behalf of the Institute to this discussion. United States Institute of Peace is a national non-partisan and independent institute founded by Congress that works on preventing and resolving violent conflict around the world. We have maintained an office in Pakistan since 2013 where we work with the government and the civil society to help prevent violent conflict, understand its drivers and also help formulate strategies to counteract it. This discussion is centered around a book that USIP sported. It is titled Pakistan Hair and Now Insights into Society, Culture, Identity and Diaspora. And today we have a very esteemed panel with us including the editor of the book, Mr. Haris Khalik. He is a noted poet and a civil society activist. He has been the key editor for this book. He's put together this book along with six other prominent authors who have contributed to the book through their chapters. We have two of them with us, Fatma Ehsan, who is an academic and a cultural critic. She teaches at the Kaili Azam University in Islamabad. And we also have with us Mr. Salman Asif, who is an author, playwright, documentary filmmaker and a cultural critic. So without further ado, we'll jump into the discussion. We'll be looking at some of the contemporary phenomena that Pakistan has dealt with in the shape of terrorism and extremism. And some of it has manifested in violent forms. The country has lost thousands of lives in the last two decades. And it's a problem that the country still grapples with. Also, the situation in the region is not too different. We've had the Taliban take over in Afghanistan late last year. And also on the other side of the border in India, we see extremist tendencies increasing. So in these circumstances, we'll try to look at the genesis of this problem in Pakistan by looking at the cultural and the historical and political factors and how they have shaped over the last many decades to culminate in its current form. And the recent incident in Texas where Malik Faisal was a British citizen but had, you know, was part of Pakistani diaspora just simply shows how relevant these issues are, even to the Western societies. And we'll try to understand how diaspora forms its sense of identity and how some of the contemporary cultural trends or political trends shape their worldview and their actions. So, let me first go to the editor of the world itself, Mr. Haris Khaliq and request him to provide an overview of the book with its key themes and ask him how it came about. Haris Khaliq. Thank you very much Adnan. And at the outset I must mention somebody you have not mentioned, my co editor Irfan Ahmad Khan, who is not present here, but he perhaps did as much as I did, if not more, to bring this collection together. And of course I'm thankful to the six contributors. I also have had the privilege to contribute one piece on diaspora, Pakistani diaspora in different categories of Pakistani or types of Pakistani diaspora across the world, not just in the west. But Irfan Ahmad Khan did a brilliant job in copy editing, in bringing, you know, in questioning some of the positions taken by the writers, although we tried to keep, I mean it was a very illustrious group of writers that we had. So, we tried to keep the content, I mean we did not change the content of each of the essays, but of course I mean there's a bit of two and fro at times with different writers. So I think the idea was to look at the Pakistani society, not from a security lens or a geo-strategic lens alone. Because unfortunately the issues of intolerance and the issues of rising religious extremism are seen through or observed through or understood through either the security lens by the western governments or even our government at times, or by a very sort of narrow geo-strategic geopolitical lens. So our idea was to look at the culture, not just the current affairs, and that is why the selection of these writers actually reflects that, reflects on that. It was not just the political affairs or the current affairs, the immediate urgent contemporary political affairs, but we tried to look at the Pakistani culture and Pakistani society and, you know, I mean it is a projection. The diaspora is actually a projection of the Pakistani society and culture back home. It is far behind us in many respects, I'll come to that later, but it is a reflection or a projection of what is happening within the country. So you know there was an identity question. So we wanted to look at it from a cultural lens and from a historic lens and seeing issues that we face in the continuum of history. I mean there's no one starting point as it were for what is happening now in Pakistan or in the region for that matter. So it was an attempt to look at that. The other thing which we tried to make this collection different from the larger body of work available on Pakistan or contemporary challenges faced by Pakistan, was to actually have people who are not simply academics. I mean there are a couple of academics in the mix, but those academics like Fatima, Isan present here, or Dr. Nazir Mahmood who has done a very good, insightful analytical piece on education and the education system in Pakistan and the issues or challenges with the education system in Pakistan in different years. So they are academics, but they are also cultural commentators, if not creative writers themselves. Fatima is very creative also I know, but Dr. Nazir Mahmood is more of a cultural commentator. And for instance, I mean the last book that he has done is about is a collection of film reviews that he has done and not just Pakistani films, I mean the world cinema that he speaks about. So we tried to, or Zaheda Hina who has written about the statecraft, the history of statecraft in Muslim societies, a very sort of, if not exhaustive, exhaustively indicative piece on how statecraft has taken shape over the last millennium or more. She is one of our most leading arch fiction writers and she writes in Urdu. So we got her original piece in Urdu and got it translated for the English edition. The rest of the essays were written in English and they were translated into Urdu for the Urdu edition because I think it was very important to reach out to as many people as we could because Urdu is the language of public discourse in Pakistan. Not English, but it was important to reach out to the policy makers or students or scholars globally and that is why it was written in English and an Urdu version was provided for local consumption so to speak. So I think Zaheda Hina is a leading fiction writer but she has a very formidable and solid view on history. So I think and Muslim history in particular, I mean she is a critic but of course she understands what she is talking about and she has traced the whole evolution of statecraft in Muslim majority societies including the caliphates or sultanates that we have had in the past. Then we have Naveed Shahzad. Now Professor Naveed Shahzad is not only an actor, a leading one of the leading actors that Pakistani film and television has seen but she was also but still she is contributing in different capacities with a professor of literature, English literature at the Punjab University and head of the English department for many, many years and she has been associated with private universities and school systems since. So Naveed has written besides contributing to this book where she speaks about resistance, poets and exile and how they are treated in their societies or Muslim majority societies. She has taken examples of Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Nazim Hikmat from Turkey both came from left wing socialist backgrounds both were shabbily treated by their state establishments in different ways they had to live in exile. So she has made a comparison of how a sort of a autocratic or a quasi autocratic Muslim society deals with creative descent. So that is what she speaks about and she compares the two, compares their works also because of course she has a background in literature and she has recently done the Aslan's role. One of the most authentic books one could come across on Turkish soap, Turkish drama that Turkey has been exporting to 140 countries and earning billions of dollars. So she has analyzed that and it's a compendium I mean it's not a simple book. So the, and then we have Fatima and Salman will of course speak about themselves and so I'm not going to get into what Fatima has spoken about you know Ragh and Russ and love and and the subwoof mysticism and how colonialism attacked the culture of pluralism in South Asia in, you know, the United India and so she'll speak about that of course and and Salman Asif Sahib has written about the otherization in Pakistan on celluloid on in Pakistani cinema and and and he has sort of he has digressed also in some ways and it's a very again I would stop here because he's here he's present here and and then we have another piece by Hassan Zadi who has been a filmmaker and currently the magazine editor of our premier English language daily dawn and he has done an essay on cultural confusions in Pakistan. So I think this is this is a this was our way of looking at the you know framing the problem and in the continuum of history as I said before, and this was an attempt to actually bring together ideas of those who can influence how people think and not from, you know, a news media perspective, not the opinion makers or the influences that you find on news media, but people who have ideas and people who can go beyond the immediate and try to understand the structural issues the cultural issues, the post colonial problems that we face or I would actually call it colonial problems post colonial is a borrowed category of analysis that we have learned from Western academia, because I see Pakistan as a colonial country as a continuation of colonialism in many ways. So you see so this was an attempt to understand Pakistan as as a part of the larger Muslim majority societies, but also focusing on some of the unique issues of subnationalism, ethnicity, linguistic diversity. That we see in Pakistan or cultural diversity, you know, if I sort of put a category on that. So this this this is an attempt and I think we've been successful at least. Nothing can be exhaustive, but we can be we've been successful at least in raising some pertinent questions, and also, you know, making people think and debate agree and disagree with us. Thank you. Thank you so much for this detailed overview and you've raised a number of key themes and we hope to discuss some of them during this session. So I'll go to Salman Asif with this question that underlying a number of these issues that Harissa mentioned, and you know extremism and all of all of this phenomenon is the process of otherization. It's the process of exclusion. So an exclusionary worldview that divides people into us versus them. And that is a common thread that we see around the world when, you know, these problems arise. So you have looked at the cinema and how ethnic and religious minorities have been portrayed in the cinema. And it's a fascinating chapter. But what do we learn about this process of otherization that took place, you know, over decades as as you show. And, you know, what does it tell us about how state and the society have evolved over this issue since independence, or even before that, perhaps you are mute. Thank you. Thank you very much for your question and thank you very much, Harris, for your, if you like, a summary or a synopsis of the various streams, thematic streams of this compendium. And all of these thematic streams, really, they synergize in a conscious stream, if you like, of certain key questions. And at the end of your question is an overarching question that the process of otherization. But let me just also say that why did I choose the cinema to look at this process. The essay itself, it charts the history of Pakistani cinema from 1947 from the time of the establishment of Pakistan as an independent country carved out of the Indian subcontinent. And it also compares the past just over seven decades of Pakistani cinema with nearly quarter of a century of cinematic journey or a trajectory prior to 1947. It attempts to look at how racial, ethnic, religious diversity was portrayed prior to 1947 or prior to the time when Pakistan came into being and what happened after 1947. Harris has hinted in his opening remarks with regards to the plurality and diversity of the Indian subcontinent. There's a continent of India, Pakistan, and if you like Bangladesh where religious, ethnic, racial diversities and pluralism had lived at times comfortably at times, not so comfortably at times at peace, but at no times in a state of continuous violent antimony or antagonism for centuries. So what happened after 1947 to the cinema or cinematic portrayal of this heterogeneity. How did this heterogeneity began to be seen. And that is the attempt that is the trajectory. What does it mean, in terms of looking at the question of otherization. So what I have looked, or if you like it's an attempt to, and it's also said in the prologue by Harris colleague of Pakistan here and now. He says it quite rightly that it's an attempt to problematize the question of identity of culture of history. So in my attempt has been to problematize the manifest facets of culture identity, tracing the rather lesser studied nexus of political agendas to totalitarianism and social engineering. What does it mean. That means that it's an epistemological trajectory. That is to say that the essay would like or the essay has tried to look at a body of knowledge body of depiction of history through cinema and cinema as we know is a composite form is a composite creative in terms of the South Asian cinema you have song lyrics music directors or composers of songs in addition to dialogue writer in addition to the screenplay writer in addition to the writer. And if a movie is an adaptation, then you take into account the original text. After that movie then you have acting so on and so forth I do I need not go into the details of various art forms that converge in order to have a production or a cinematic production. I would like to see that how has this been possible for so many various artistic expressions and art forms to converge and converge into, as you said, otherization of religious ethnic racial gender groups, which which is referred to as minority groups. So in that sense, I've tried to explore the declining value of truth of human values of tolerance social inclusion diversity difference descent, which have been seen prior to 1947, even within the cinema at the societal level, as a society's reserve currency, as opposed to the shift that we see in post 1947 cinema gradually taking shape to a systemic and rather infectious spread of pernicious relativism, which you often find disguised as either acceptable, or sometimes even as legitimate form of skepticism. So in that sense, the essay, or the process as you asked of otherization, it tries to track or reveal the complexity the new ones the paradox of presentation of society and lives through the cinema, as well as to set out the interplay of institutional complicity, the institutional complicity and undermining the value of societal heterogeneity and diversity. I also wanted to study something related to it but far more diabolical and disturbing. So I wanted to investigate how institutional malice towards ethnic, racial, religious gender pluralism heterogeneity generates intergenerational forms of bigotry, of intolerance, often completely delusional sense of entitlements. And ultimately smothers the societal historical rather practical and prevalent tried and tested standards of universal form, you know, ideas of decency of compassion equality tolerance nonviolent dispute resolution fair play injustice. The question is, do we live in a post truth here and this is what this is how I connect the, the, the past over seven decades of cinematic endeavor in Pakistan with her and now that I'll be living if you're living in a post truth era. Where do it's roots lie. As Harris pointed out, religious extremism, bigotry, so on and so forth intolerance readiness to violence. Where do the roots lie. What are its principle symptoms. It's a healthy aspiring or aspiring to be a healthy society. Sorry. Yeah, I think that if I may ask just a supplementary question on that. You also mentioned 1965 as another key year after which the portrayal of minorities deteriorate deteriorated further. And, you know, you mentioned the commercial aspects of it, but what's equally important is, you know, how the ideological make make up of the state evolved post 1965. And do you see all of this post 1947 and further deterioration since 1965, as, you know, just the societal evolution in terms of the bigotry and hate and extremism that you mentioned or, you know, there were, there were, there was encouragement and active sort of steer from the state as well. In terms of, you know, portraying these ideological underpinnings. So, thank you very much for asking this question. So, our participants and audiences know that they found that the famous Hollywood actor Sidney Pote who passed away recently. He symbolized and his life and his work is emblematic of a certain form of resistance certain form of cracking the glass ceiling as it were against prevalent or dominant views on race and society. But here what we have dealt with and I've talked about it the institutional or state complicity, the kind of belligerence that you begin to see slowly consuming the space and crowding out those voices or those endeavors that continue to resist the shift from plurality to homogeneity. The shift from diversity to a form of self styled entitlement. In 1965 is a threshold. In 64 we had campaigns in Pakistan amongst the cinema producers and directors, calling for the state of Pakistan to ban, to ban showing Indian cinema or Hindi cinema. And during that mind that Hindi cinema or what came to be known as Urdu or Pakistani cinema, they had the same roots. Prior to 1947 there were different cities, they were producing Hindi or Urdu movies, and the actors were constant there was a huge as Moses of work there was a huge as Moses of actors from one end of India going to another. The start of India or the film center there were several cities that were the film centers and working and writers and screenwriters and photographers and so on and so forth. That all changed. There was this campaign for further segregation and the successful campaign in 19 that started in 1964. So suddenly we saw that the Indian cinema was or Hindi cinema or movies produced in India were not to be screened in Pakistan. 1965 is also the year of conflict of armed conflict between India and Pakistan, and we suddenly see a an amplified form of very assiduous very belligerent form of patriotism or sense of domestic nationalism, seeping in into Pakistani cinema. And that's not only with regards to India but also with regards to religious racial ethnic minorities in Pakistan from minority groups. So we begin to see almost an institutionalized Cape goating of the familiar groups overnight being transformed into monstrous others or proverbial monstrous others. Now the question has been that while there's nothing new we all acknowledge in historical bias makes important and I've tried to point this out that from 1965 onwards, you see there's been an ushering of an age where the idea and practice of truthful presentation of history was abandoned systemically. One understands the pressures bearing down upon truthful presentation of live and history in cinema. But what one begins to see in post 1965, till here now, that the pressures bearing down upon truthful presentation of the plurality of society, diversity of society, heterogeneity of society of life and history, it has become more complex. It has become more dispersed. It has become more insidious. They've all become more unsettling because they do not necessarily emanate from any identifiable big brother or the state complicity anymore, or a proverbial gobble. In that sense, it seems that the journey is completely out of the proverbial bottle. It has acquired a life of its own, whether or not state complicity, whether the state tries to portray through its policies and actions a greater respect for racial ethnic religious or various forms of diversity, the damage that has been done to the civic structures of the society has deepened to a level where intolerance bigotry has become, have become an everyday experience. You would have read of that horrific clenching of a migrant worker in Pakistan, Christian migrant worker from Sri Lanka in Pakistan and their other lynchings also these were unheard of. So, thank you. Whether at the state level, there may be positive steps to heal or to mend what has been smothered over the decades. It seems that it will take, it has acquired, as it were, a dynamics of its own. It has acquired a trajectory of its own. Thank you. I think you have painted a rather grim but accurate picture of where the society stands in terms of such regression and the incidents of lynching and persecution. I would like to say that I'm hopeful. It is dark and dreary, but I think in spite of the psychological and sociological tricks that have been played upon the masses, people are ultimately hardwired to demand veracity to resist falsehood. And there are instances in the cinematic world or on television or in production where you do find attempts to resist falsehood, to demand veracity. So, there is a voice within, if you like, that resists fakery, falsehood and lies. Even though that voice may have been muted for a long time, and my last point is, the challenge is to turn that voice from a vis-à-tour role. The truth is out there, if you only demand it. So, I think this book itself represents one of those efforts which resist the bigotry and exclusion that you mentioned. Absolutely. Let me go to Fatima Hassan, and her chapter is such a contrast, because it talks about pluralism, it talks about gender fluidity and the sexual liberalism that existed in this society, and compared to what we see today. And at times, when these concepts are presented to a new generation of Pakistanis, you often hear them assume that these are Western concepts without necessarily realizing how pluralistic and liberal the society was. And I think through her chapter, Fatima highlights, you know, and through the metaphors that she uses as well, I'd like her to sort of construct it in the same manner as well. You know, the indigenous roots of pluralism in subcontinent and in Pakistan. So Fatima, would you please, you know, explain to the audience how you traced these roots, and what does it mean for bigotry society in Pakistan? Thank you very much, Adnan, and thank you for this opportunity to talk about the essay in the book. And well, you know, before we started, we were also talking about the process itself and how that went for all of us. So I can speak a little bit about that in terms of my own experience. I'm a practicing Sufi, so I follow the Shadiliya Dharkavi Sufi order, which originates from North Africa. So, because that was kind of the Sufi lens was what I was looking at. I mean, that's how I look at tend to look at things now. I come from a very political sort of Marxist communist background and this is quite a shift for me too. But so since I look at things from this lens now, I, when I was approached and I was asked to write an essay, I thought about how I want to do it. Now, what I'm really interested in is, and I also value a lot is intuition and intuitive ways of writing and intuitive knowledge, which is not something that is really valued generally in many well all over the world and many societies. So I wanted to, you know, write as a woman as with intuition and also what felt right to be so what happened for me was, since I was looking at the other thing is that language I feel is carries a bit of violence in itself because how we describe things is also how we limit things. So you use certain words, for instance, indigenous in your questions, you know, agency rebellion, those kinds of things are liberal sexual liberation and stuff like that. So I find that language actually defines a lot and there's a problem with labeling and naming, which is what happened also in the subcontinent with a lot of practices which weren't really talked about. I mean, you know, there was, I think there's a connection problem. I think we'll give it a few seconds and okay, I think Fatima may need to reconnect with us and we'll, you know, we'll go back to her once she reconnects. Let me go to Harissa in the meantime, and Harissa, you know, the plurality that existed in our society and still exists. Obviously, you know, there are always discourses within discourses and there are multiple streams of practice and communities of practice. I want to speak. How do you see this, you know, centuries and decades or wrangling between the pluralistic and the exclusionary or regressive streaks within the society and as it has played out and especially highlighting some of these pluralistic traditions that still exist within our cultural fabric. Would you like me to begin or since Fatima is back because she may lose a train of thought. I'm very sorry about my connection. It's not usually this erratic but you know, well, whatever. So I was talking about language and what I wanted to say in terms of language is also how we make certain narratives. So when we talk about terrorism or we talk about extremism, there's a particular narrative of, you know, that kind of we see in the context of Pakistan which is actually also internal produced internally but also produced externally. So I also wanted to stay away from that kind of naming and labeling and do something different. So what happened was that I wrote about I took the sort of the metaphor was music Indian classical music I took that style of writing and then I tried to merge it with my own thoughts and then also more importantly with the column and the work of Sufi poets and writers. Because I wanted to define and talk about the subwoof but in a relational concept or in a relational way through their column. So that's what I did. So in terms of when you talk about pluralism and all of that, I mean, you know, things, sexuality was not an issue transgender people were not an issue everything was okay till the British came and they started criminalizing certain things. And I think that naming and labeling kind of and making certain things public, you know, and starting sort of discussions around that started to actually cage things or change them. But I'm not going to solely say that it was because of colonization that all of this happened. You know, there are other factors too because when you talk about pluralism you also have to look at the conservative side of society and also when you're looking at the more sort of accepting side of society. So what I wanted to say about that is also that so that is not the sole idea is not to blame it on the British also because I think that would be giving them too much credit for the dialectical process that any society or culture goes through. I mean there are opposing voices and things and you know other things kind of are produced through it. So, I wanted to actually let me just talk a little bit about some of the concepts so for instance I'll just begin to talk from taking a definition or borrow definition from all on a roomie where he says that there's something called mana and there's something called, you know, see it there's something called mana meaning meaning there's something meaning called meaning and there's something called form. So he did makes a distinction between form and essence and form is. I'm putting it very simply so form is all of us in flesh and blood with all of our biographies and identities and essence is the meaning which is divine love that we all embody. So he pins it on divine love so if you go for the essence and divine love that each one each person embodies regardless of their biography regardless of their ethnicity regardless of their race and you know other intersectional, you know, and social markers. What's what remains is the essence that each person carries even the Quran says that wherever you look is the face of Allah. So you see people and you see essence. So what Sufis tend to do is to sort of look past gender, look past sexuality, look past, you know, all of these categories because these categories are don't really have any meaning. However, liberation and the idea of freedom is not attached to any particular sex, but it is something that any person can attain through the endeavor that they can put into their own excellence. So that is basically how I wrote the essay and talked about these various, you know, social markers about sexuality and so on. But having said this, I think there is a problem in terms of language and using words like indigenous because indigenous people never say we are indigenous. You know, Native Americans never said we are Native Americans, somebody else's labeling somebody else's naming, and I also wanted to challenge that a little bit. Thank you. Let me just also point to a beautiful paragraph in your chapter where you talk about how easy people were with the idea of femininity. And, you know, today what we see is hyper masculinity and, you know, across the world you see where there are higher degrees of violence in a society it is often linked with, you know, the concept of masculinity in that society. So how have we come, I mean if you can relate a little bit to how, especially in Sufi tradition and in the cultural tradition, how the idea of masculinity has evolved and the implications that we see as a result. So first let me talk a little bit about how the sub of actually sees these two things like femininity and masculinity. So how spirituality generally mysticism, spirituality and the sub of also sees masculinity and femininity is the posturing that one has in relation to the divine. So for instance, femininity is described as a submissive posturing, which I think a lot of feminists when they hear me say this will probably not like it, because women, when we say that women or feminine women are submissive, that's a total different thing. I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about a certain sort of posturing. So it's like even men can have femininity when they're submissive in their stance, when they surrender to the divine will, so to speak, submission, you know, Islam, that's what I'm talking about. So in a lot of literature also that explains Sufism and talks about femininity masculinity also talks about how the soul is also feminine. And also how that every child that is born in this world is in the first instance submissive and in that way it is Muslim, not from a religious perspective, but also by virtue of the posturing of the child as being submissive. So if everyone is born in their sort of, well, at least I believe that everyone is born in their ecstatic state, they're born in, they're just coming from a sort of a divine encounter. So they are pure and they form children or infant rather, they are sort of, you know, kind of, how should I say it, submitted. They don't really have an ego. Ego comes with a social conditioning, the layering that we kind of provide children. So in that way, all children who are born, all infants are Muslim because they are submitted, you know, they're submissive. So that's the posturing I'm talking about. So in spirituality, femininity is the submission in front of Allah and masculinity is how we look at God. But this is not a biological thing. This is not the body we're talking about. This is a posturing and we're talking about a different stream of consciousness. So in that way, any person, you know, whether the sex is male or female, everyone has both masculine and the actor and the person who is not the actor, you know, we carry both of these qualities within us. I'm talking about the qualities and not the biological sex. So in that sense, I think what's happened really is that, I mean, this is a very long discussion and it's a very complicated one as well. But a lot of the socialization that we receive when we're growing up, that is where all of this is engineered, where parents sort of make the boys hyper masculine because this is what it means to be accepted in society as a brave person, as an active person. And, you know, female children or girls are taught to be submissive. So, you know, these are the, what I'm trying to say is that it's a socialization process which actually constructs hyper masculinity and also the hyper femininity equally. And both I find are very out of balance and in many ways very toxic as well. I hope I've been able to answer your question. It's very complicated to explain in a short amount of time. That's great food for thought. And let me remind our audience that they can ask questions. Please use the chat box on the web page to ask any question that you would like. I'll ask one more question from each panelist and then I'll be reading some of your questions from the chat box and put them to our panelists. So please do write down your questions. I'll go back to Haris Khaliqsa and, you know, talk about another aspect that this book discusses and some of the recent events in Texas, as I mentioned earlier, also show how important it is to understand the Muslim or Pakistani diaspora, but also from, you know, two set of lenses. One is, you know, the identity crisis as many people have called it, or how, you know, various the experience of moving from their home country to the host country, and the whole cultural and social experience, how has it shaped their identity and created various contradictions that have been highlighted by Haris Khaliqsa in his chapter, but also at the other end how these communities have been received in the host countries and the rise of tendencies such as Islamophobia and the alienation and exclusion that some of these communities have faced, and especially since 9-11, how that has further added to, you know, the identity crisis or to speak among these communities, how it then in turn translates into the kind of tragic incidents that we see. So Haris, you know, your take on this piece. Thank you very much, Adnan. Thank you again. But let me, because you know when Fatima had disappeared because of a erratic internet connection, you had posed another question in the middle. So let me just very quickly respond to that as well because it is linked to what has been said just recently, you know, just right now by Fatima. I think it is not about blaming the British or, you know, they did not have all the agency to brought about the kind of changes that we see in South Asian societies, particularly Pakistani society or other colonial societies or post-colonial societies, so to speak. But there was certainly a brush with modernity and I can speak about India. When I say India, I mean the British India. There was a, if not colonialism also brought in this European modernity to South Asia and this brush with, and everything was not hunky-dory before the British came. Not everybody was, you know, comfortable with his, if it was a man with his feminine side, but there was a possibility of coexistence. There were different people, different types of people, different schools of thought, you know, coexisting before them. There was brush with modernity and there were tendencies, there were exclusivist groups, there were, you know, bigoted groups, you know, in our history. But the schools of thoughts that they had were also equally problematic and, you know, anti-exclusive, anti-plural, very sort of monolithic understanding of religion and faith, and it was, you know, among all, you know, among different sects. But this brush with modernity after the British brought structure to these schools of thought and that is why the current denominations that you find in mainstream, you know, Islamic tradition, both in Pakistan and in India and also in Bangladesh and perhaps to an extent in Nepal and Sri Lanka and Afghanistan also are all schools that were founded during the 19th century or early 20th century, whether they are the, you know, the Ali Hadith, the Diobandi school, the Barelvi school or the kind of Najafi Shias, that were Shias until the time, most of us were Najafi Shias in South Asia, before there was an evolution in Iran until, you know, like 40 years ago or so. So it's, it's, and then they became, I mean, I don't want to get into the detail of that, but then they started believing in Malayath and Faki, otherwise they were Najafi. So there was, all these were actually consolidated and there was a structure brought to them and there was a political expression brought to them after their brush with modernity. And then they were all manipulated and used by, first by imperial powers and then the post-imperial Pakistani state and Indian state. And that is what you see in India as well. I mean, all the Arya Samajis and Rashtriya Swayam Sivaksans and the Jan Sanghs and, you know, the mother party or mother parties rather of the current ruling BJP, they were all came about during the 19th or the early 20th century. So I think it is very important to look at, look critically at the role colonialism played and the kind of modernity they brought about or the brush with modernity that created these structures where modern education was also introduced in South Asia. I don't know what the word modern, I mean, but you know, using the dominant parlance as it were. So, you know, when a new education was also introduced in South Asia, but you know, the structure, as I said, was given to these, these voices, and they were, I mean, I must say, and there's a lot of evidence available to support this argument that they were supported. I mean, these right wing parties were supported or encouraged by the British rulers and that continued after Pakistan came into being and India became an independent nation. So that is one thing. The other thing about the diaspora. Now you see Pakistani diaspora. What I have tried to do is looking at categorizing the Pakistani diaspora. I mean, Pakistani diaspora again is not a, not a monolith. And so I've tried to look at them. I mean, there are four types. I mean, I've tried to look at them, look at the first type very sympathetically, which is the Pakistani workforce, which is in largely in the Middle East. 90% is in the Middle East, but I mean, but some are in Afghanistan, in East Asia, in East Africa, up to Japan, you know, in the Far East or China elsewhere. And these people will eventually return to Pakistan. And these are migrant labor. And their rights are usurped in the countries where they work, and their rights are not realized in their home country either. So this is one particular category of Pakistani migrant labor. I mean, there could be some white collar, you know, engineers and doctors or other chartered accountants or other professionals also working in the Middle East, but majority of them are either skilled or unskilled labor in working from the oil rigs to different, you know, to road construction industry to other industries. So that is, that is one chunk of a large chunk of our diaspora. So I do not particularly have any issue. I mean, I'm not, not anybody to actually put it like that. But in terms of, you know, towards them, I think the state should have a more sympathetic role and accept them as equal citizens and actually lobby for their rights because Pakistan exports labor because Pakistan has deindustrialized itself and not turned its agriculture into a modern mechanized agriculture. So there, and there is a huge, of course, population, you know, explosion in the country. So, so those people, I mean, there's a very different take on those people. But then there is another, and then there is another category of our diaspora who are living in exile because of their political views from the times of General Zia ul Haq in particular, because there was a large exodus of Pakistani political workers or political dissenters from in during the times of General Mohammed Zia ul Haq, the totalitarian regime of General Zia ul Haq between 1977 and 1988. And people who are flogged, they were put into prisons, they were tortured. So, so there are there are students and journalists and political workers and, and you know, other professionals who migrated from Pakistan, I mean, they were forced to migrate from Pakistan. And there's a large number of them and that continued afterwards as well because it hasn't really been that smooth politically in the country. So you know the political dissenters and also political dissenters from smaller provinces because Pakistan has a very sort of, you know, a centralized form of government. And since the country has been under dictatorships for 3540 years, and the military does not is not a representative military does the continuity of the of the British Indian Army. And so you don't find it a participatory sort of you won't find an equal number of proportionately equal numbers of people from all provinces in Pakistan. So there are you find political dissenters from smaller provinces migrating from Pakistan when there was a military rule during General Zia ul Haq or General Parvez Mushara for whoever was there. So, so there is this that is the second category. Now these people try to, or most of them the first or second generations, try to engage with the progressive and liberal forces or or democratic forces in the country, but they're so small in number that they are not influential at all. I mean in the larger scheme of things they're very influential in terms of contributing to consciousness to be sympathetic towards, you know, the causes that Pakistani Pakistanis who believe in the Constitution or Pakistanis who believe in the rule of law, or Pakistanis who believe in federalism or equal citizenship or democracy, they would they support them by by any means that is possible. They would pick it outside the embassy, they would pick it outside the High Commission of Pakistan, in whichever country they are they will try to financially support the cultural and literary groups which are producing progressive literature. So you know, or other campaigns or labor movements in the country, but they are very small in numbers. Now there are two other categories which which can be coupled together also. These are people who are economic migrants largely. And these are again, it is it is lopsided. They mostly come from one province followed by another two provinces now, after the Afghan war and the and the political turmoil that we have observed in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province for the in the last 30 years. So you will find there are two sort of from two particular regions in Pakistan northern Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa you would find them. Most of the people come from there, they're economic migrants. And there are some professionals, which are highly skilled, who are a part of those economic migrants. And these people enjoy all, you know, constitutional and democratic rights in the countries of choice, which is the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, a continental European countries, Australia and New Zealand. And you know, and I mean, these are these are all either Western countries, or, you know, the countries which are, you know, which is a region of the West on southeast of the world, which is Australia and New Zealand. So, so these, and you would find these people to be supportive of right wing populist political movements in Pakistan, they will be supportive of, you know, the madrasas in Pakistan, they will not when I say they I mean I'm not imposing a unity on all of them but the major trends that you find within these groups. And these people are mostly settled in the West and it is very interesting to analyze that even before 9 11. They were supporting the some of the right wing political parties or military dictatorships in the country. And but particularly after 9 11, as their population also increased in in Western countries, you find a, you know, their identity crisis within American societies because there certainly is Islamophobia and there is a lot of work available on Islamophobia. And I've quoted in my my essay, some of the work that is being done by the Western scholars, American one of them is an American scholar. Actually, two of them are American scholars that who have looked at what has happened in the US what has happened in Ireland in particular, and some other countries across UK, you know, across Europe, and the UK of course, and they've tried to see, you know, the kind of siege mentality that has developed among Muslims the kind of ghettoization that has happened continuously, and the insecurity that we see. The majority of them are very, you know, law abiding citizens in their own countries, I mean, they may be these, you know, outliers like the person in Texas, what's his name? Akram, some, yeah, or something. And there are so many other, there are so many other examples, I mean, I think five or six years ago, there was an, there was an incident in Saint Bernardino, and, and there were other incidents in the US or in, or in your in, you know, in London or in other parts of the of of Europe. So, so there is a sort of an identity crisis with there, but these people are outliers the majority of diaspora. When it comes to the country that they're adopted country, the country to which they have migrated or their parents had migrated or their grandparents in some cases that migrated, they're very law abiding in these countries. But back home, they want to fix the native country, and their idea of fixing the native country is a very bigoted version of religion, and a very sort of cultural, you know, the kind of culture that they promote and profess and actually work for support in their home countries is something that has actually, you know, is not in practice in any home countries anymore. I mean, they may be pockets, but it is not the mainstream culture here. So they find it very strange, and we find it very strange, they find it very strange that we are not the kind of Muslims that they wish us to be. And we find it very strange that while they enjoy all the democratic and civil liberties, they want us to live in a society, which is like Afghanistan, for instance. And they have these, you know, this this nostalgia about about a Muslim state which never was. So I think this is something that I've tried to to problematize and and also, I mean, you know, and in a bit of, you know, life writing, because I've quoted anecdotes and incidents, but you know, try to look at the psycho analytical aspects of why, why these people think like that and I have a, you know, most of my, you know, class fellows, my batch mates from my engineering college engineering university in Pakistan are abroad are in either in North America or in the UK, most of them are in North America, Canada and the US. And I continue to argue with them and I have quoted some incidents when I was visiting them a few years ago and actually I have visited them more than once. That you know why and how they could actually, they wish to have a country back home, and they think, you know, according to their idea of Islam and according to their idea of an Islamic society. And, and, and to meet that end, they support military dictatorships and the support populist political leaders like our incumbent Prime Minister. So I think and, you know, it's actually quite complicated. I mean, I've tried to, in 8000 words, how much can you delve into the details but but I think it needs further investigation. Thank you. I think, you know, we can, you know, safely say that pluralism and multiculturalism should cannot be taken as granted even even the West and it you know remains a project where you know a lot of more work is needed. You know, so, so that people can live with harmony and, you know, really adopt the kind of plurality we're talking about. I'll go to Salman South for brief comments. You know, he expressed, you know, the some resistance to the bigotry and hate and exclusion that we mentioned. And, you know, there are some analysts coming back to to Pakistani society who mentioned, you know, the examples such as the Kartharpur Corridor and, you know, the debate on the Hindu temple being built in Islamabad and, you know, also the newly approved and published National Security Policy which just came out last week, where, you know, some commitment is made on the concept of unity and diversity and according religious or ethnic minorities they are due rights in our society. So, do you see and you and your in your chapter mentioned new wave of cinema. So, do you see, you know, this kind of push towards greater acceptance of minorities, greater acceptance of plurality sort of depicted in this new wave of cinema or, you know, how do you see the current situation. And so we'll take brief comments from you, Salman Saab and then Fatima Saiba and then we have few questions contributed by the audience and we'll then go to that. You are muted. The measures that you highlighted with regards to reconstruction of a vandalized Hindu temple or maintenance and upkeep of a place of religious sanctity for the Sikh community. These are state efforts commendable for sure. But have they contributed in attitudinal shift and an attitudinal change amongst the masses that has been informed over decades and intergenerationally through all forms of various media exposure, which in its essence has remained one which is antagonistic to pluralism which is antagonistic to equity, equality, fair play and has been exposed to other measures by the same state that may not be as generous. For example, there's a whole discourse, a critical discourse on the newly introduced the single national curriculum and questions from various critics have been raised with regards to the national, the single national curriculum's depiction of religious ethnic and racial diversity. So I guess that there is that remains this form of tension that in spite of commendable or positive actions by the state from the government. There are more that needs to be done at societal level, if that kind of behavior change is to be ushered. Thank you. Sorry you asked about the new wave cinema would you like me to say a couple of lines. The new wave cinema has undertaken some very interesting experiments. The experiments, some of which are very bold, for example, the question of gender identity. The question of migration, the question of dissent, the question of youth empowerment, the question of, you know, resistance to forms of abuse of authority. Harassment and bullying. Many of these issues have come within the overview of the new wave cinema, but the new wave cinema remains exclusive. It remains the within the realm of extremely urban filmmakers, largely for urban cinema audiences. I think it needs to be translated into forms and into a language into addiction that is owned by the public. And I would hark back in my last sentence to what Fatima has been trying to say. Fatima has been saying that we have always had these firewalls. We have always had these antibodies within the society within the societal fabric it's been near. What has happened over the decades is the weakening and resultant almost collapse of these firewalls that would resist against bigotry that would resist against compartmentalization and resist against other. Thank you. Thank you, Salman. And now let me go to Fatima and perhaps ask the opposite question because Fatima's whole description of pluralism that existed in our society sort of premised on the Sufi thought, you know, that's what her chapter is all about. However, we've seen the recent developments within, you know, the braily school of thought, so to speak. And I think there has been a debate in policy, which has looked at the Sufi thought perhaps as a panacea for our issues with extremism and terrorism. However, you know, as we see the emergence of the likes of the Taliban, Pakistan, the TLP phenomenon within, you know, the, the, the, the subset which was considered to be more pluralistic and, you know, tolerant and so on. So Fatima, how do you see the evolution of Sufi thought in contemporary Pakistan, and especially this violent streak, so to speak, how do you see it? And yeah, if you can, you can share some. So my view on that is, so if you look at the suburb, it's an inner tradition. It's an esoteric inner tradition. And if you talk about change within that tradition, the change is what happens with the self. So the change is not something like it's not supposed to be a political sort of act or a movement. You know, foremost, I think the suburb is an engagement with the self, and it is actually looking at the self as a site of knowledge production. How does that help you? How does that make you into a better human being? How do you actually excel? And try to reach the level of insan, which is talked about in Islam. It is not supposed to be some sort of an outward external social movement. And when it becomes that, it takes on a very, very, I think, hideous face. I don't like to look at, you know, Sufism or the suburb as a very communal kind of a thing. It's actually, I mean, look at the practices that happen in the suburb. There have been people who have been in Halwa for 40 years. There have been people who do that now for 40 days or however long. It's a very lonely kind of a journey. This is not about actually changing others. It's about changing the self. So that's the way I see it. When you actually take... Okay. I think we've again lost Fatma. Yeah, we'll see. She can continue when she's back online. In the meantime, let's go to some of the questions posed by the members of audience. And if I can take a brief comment from you, Salman Saab, or is Fatma back with us? I am back again. I'm really sorry. You can complete your thought. Yeah, I seem to be buffering more than talking. So, like I was saying, for me, this is a very inner tradition and when you try to... And the change actually, basically the idea and the server for Sufism is that if you change the self and if you come into interaction with other people, that sort of change will just reflect and carry on. And it's not something that can be seen also. You know, that kind of knowledge is from the heart to the heart. It's not something that's actually displayed or acted out in the external realm. So I think when you try to impose that kind of externality on Sufism, that this is the face that you see of it, which is GLP and so on. So that's my sort of take on it. Thank you. And yeah, we'll take some questions from the members of audience. And if I can put this question from Peter to Salman Saab, Peter raises the issue of caste while we've looked at the depiction of religious minorities and maybe ethnic minorities. But caste has been another sort of other rising sort of alt-line within subcontinent and even in Pakistan with Muslim identity, it also still kind of plays out underlying various other identities that we acquire. So yeah, your quick comments on how caste kind of plays a role in contemporary Pakistan society, if at all. You are mute Salman Saab. Well, thank you for this question. Caste plays a very interesting role in a predominantly Muslim Pakistani society as opposed to South Asian societies where Muslims are a statistical minority. So for example, while in other religions in South Asian countries, the caste would create different kinds of hierarchies and would disaggregate certain groups from other groups. What we have seen increasingly in Pakistan, the caste has been played out with another form of group identity, which is Baradri. So Baradri is the brotherhood or the fraternity as it were. So sometimes a fraternity is a certain caste. And sometimes it's not quite a caste, but it's a fraternity which is, which identifies itself rooted to a certain geofocus of the country. So what we find is an intergenerational play of certain fraternities or certain groups based on a Baradri or identity or fraternity, supporting a betting, promoting, protecting each other for various opportunities. And going up the ladder sometimes to the level of possession making. So you would find certain groups which are either cast of fraternities or Baradris or both. For example, predominantly in electoral realm or the electoral politics, you would find amongst the law enforcing agencies, you'd find in judiciary, you'd find amongst the lawyers. So it has become as identifiable as that. So in that sense, there's often this kind of interplay between power brokers belonging to certain castes and supporting, as I said, a betting and protecting members of their Baradri or caste. It doesn't necessarily, it sometimes even cuts across social markers. It cuts across the, you know, the socioeconomic background of an individual. Sometimes it is quite enough to be belonging to a certain caste or to a certain Baradri. Thank you. Thanks, Salman. I'll go to Fatima next with a question from Thomas, who's asked that we've talked about blaming or not blaming the British. But no one has mentioned Zahal Haq and his Islamization program. What responsibility do we put on that? So, you know, your discussion on pluralism and all that, you know, what would be your response to this? I think since we have lost Fatima again. Yes, I think Haris talked about it and Haris, you can share about it. Let me take that question. I think I did speak about Zahal Haq and the role Zahal Haq played, but perhaps not in as much detail as I should have. I think what General Zahal Haq did, he institutionalized the process of Islamizing laws in Pakistan, but the tendency was there even before him. So I think we must understand that General Zahal Haq used Islam to consolidate his power of one and to further a certain brand of right-wing Islam, which was needed, unfortunately, at that point in time by the US establishment as well to fight the Cold War in Afghanistan. So a certain brand of Islam was promoted and we were from our curriculum to our, you know, cultural expression. Everything took the brunt of that Islamization and not just that, he fragmented society or the policies that he pursued, fragmented Pakistani society on sectarian and ethnic lines. And the book does talk about that across different essays. Thank you. And so I'll go to Salman Saab with the next question, where Farhan asks that democracy as a majoritarian system does not sit well for, I suppose he means diverse nations like Pakistan, which is why Sindhi and Buloch are very skeptical of it. So how do you see, perhaps this is the question about the kind of federation that Pakistan has, the struggles that Pakistan has had with federation, and the majoritarianism, the majoritarian streak within democracy, so to speak. So your comments, Salman Saab. Well, I know that Harris will have a lot to say on this, but let me just say that Pakistan is a very decentralized country and they're federating units. And I'm a little surprised at this question, because those of us, and I don't know where the colleague, part of the question is, Farhan is the name. So I wonder if he lives in Pakistan, and if you lived in Pakistan, and if you lived, for example, in Balochistan and Sindh, as he has pointed out, and I'd be happy to point out, and I'd be happy to point out the newly merged areas, the former father, and I'd be equally happy to point out the former East Pakistan and now Balochist, now Bangladesh. So my sense is that from all these streams, there's always been a demand for more democratization rather than lesser of democratization. And I think if his drift is towards anti-democratic forces or if his drift is, if you like, statistical majority of persons living in a certain province of Pakistan, I think that's a different debate. But what we have seen is that in Pakistan's history, you've had the most popular Prime Minister of Pakistan from Sindh. You've had elections being decisively won or lost, not always in Punjab, but in other provinces also. And then you have, again, the big example of former East Pakistan and now Bangladesh, whereas the former East Pakistani population was larger than that in West Pakistan. But here you have an example of the majority of the people having to flee for their identity, for their rights rather than staying with the whole, pushing themselves to the margin and then carving out a nation of their own, a country of their own, out of a long grievance discourse, along the lines of non-democratic, non-inclusive policies and actions. So I'm a little sort of, I don't know how to address this question, but as far as I have understood, I don't think that the provinces that have been pointed out here, Balochistan, and Sindh and I have added others, they have fear of majoritarianism, I think they have fear of lack of self representation, they have fear of lack of transparency, they have fear of lack of fair play and non-democratic forces occupying the space and being sort of determining the agenda as it were. Thank you, Salman Sahib. I'll go to Harisabh for his take on this question, if you'd like to add Harisabh, but let me pose the last question of this session as well to you. Johannes asks that to which extent have strained relations with neighbors, in particular India, Afghanistan, Iran and even China, he mentions, reinforced the predominance of the military and prevented a focus on internal development. So the civil military question, which is quite customary I think on all debates on Pakistan, but first your take on the previous question and then your final comments on this. Thank you, Adnan. I think Farhan has posed a very interesting question and let me remind Farhan Sahib that it is not the numeric strength of Punjab which bothers people. It is the unconstitutional role played by certain institutions where Punjab dominates which bothers people in smaller provinces. So there's a difference. And I would just reiterate what Salman Asif Sahib has said that it is democracy actually which the smaller provinces have been asking for and demanding since ever. And particularly after 1971, when the Pakistani establishment refused to accept the people's mandate of the 1970 elections and did not let the Awami League which had swept across East Pakistan then to form the government in Islamabad. So I think it is important to remind us that all the provinces in Pakistan have been asking for more democracy and they have the ability their political leadership always has had always had had the ability to differentiate between majoritarianism and democracy. And that is why even today, if you look at different movements like the PTM for instance, or if you look at I mean there are certainly I mean there are insurgents or separatists in different parts of Pakistan as well. But majority of political descent that we see in Pakistan interestingly asks for the rule of law and constitutional rule. So it is interesting that we act all of us the Democrats in Pakistan whether they are in Punjab or they are in other smaller provinces in today's Pakistan. They actually ask for democracy more democracy in Pakistan rather than seeing Punjab as dominating when there is democracy because the process of negotiation only happens when political leaders of different provinces of different regions of different cities come together and reach consensus and our political history is full of such examples from passing the 1973 Constitution. And then unanimously or maybe there were a couple of people who actually dissented but it was almost a unanimous decision to pass the Constitution in 1973 adopt the Constitution proclaimed and then we have this different amendments which have come through after a very involved participatory democratic process involving all stakeholders. So I think democracy and federalism are the only solutions to the political malaise that we see in Pakistan. More democracy and you know in our belief in federalism. The other question about the civil you see the whole point of this book and I'm putting it on you know you know in light of note in light of rain the whole point of this book is actually to take us beyond the immediate and speak about the immediate in the historic context and look at the future because the ability if you have the ability as much as you know as as as much ability as you have to look into the past actually helps you look into the future as well and and understand the present as well. So of course there's been a civil military tension in Pakistan and there's not been an again because the Constitution was was either held in advance or or suspended during different martial rules but the relationship with the countries in the region. It's a chicken and egg situation. If you have less of military involvement in politics and more of you know politicians determining how it should look like the tensions will be eased and if you have but but at the same time if you look at the region. I mean the kind of government that we see in India for the last seven years is not helpful to this cause either because India if Pakistan has. If you look at the human rights watch report recently Pakistan has a very poor performance when it comes to freedom to free speech freedom of expression but India has a very you know an equally poor performance if not more when it comes to minority rights particularly the treatment needed out to Muslims in India over the last few years. So I think it is important to understand that it is it is important that military retreats from the political role it plays but that is not the only factor. I mean there are it is much more complicated than that when it comes to Iran and when it comes to Afghanistan the tensions that we see if there is a desire in Pakistan to see a compliant of Afghanistan and there's a desire in India to see a compliant Pakistan. So I think it has to be regionally resolved and I'm a I'm a very you know staunch believer in in regionalization and regional solutions to the problems rather than looking to international bodies or to western powers to come and resolve our issues. Thank you so much Harris and Salman Sir and Fatima for joining us and sharing with your very insightful views. We've run out of time but I encourage the audience to please go through and read this book Pakistan here and now and what you have heard today are just few glimpses of various themes that have been discussed in the book but it is it has a very rich discussion on what shapes contemporary Pakistan and what implications does it have on our on our daily lives. So thank you so much for joining us and please do tune in to our future discussions as well on issues like these and we look forward to your feedback. Please feel free to email us and have a great day. Thank you so much everyone. Thank you. Thank you at non and thank you United States Institute of Peace for helping us bring out this book and for having this webinar. Thank you.