 This panel is going to talk about U.S. policy toward the South China Sea. We have experts from several different countries, and so it should be an interesting discussion. The first panelist is our colleague from CSIS, Bonnie Glazer, who is a senior advisor for Asia and the Freeman Chair in Asia Studies. Bonnie. Good morning. This is a short panel, and we've only been given 10 minutes, so all of what I'll be saying today will obviously be brief, but if you are interested in reading more of the details, you can read my paper, which is essentially not so much about U.S. policy as it is U.S. strategy. I think we've heard quite a bit about U.S. policy this morning and yesterday. I think what the United States is trying to do is to lower tensions over these territorial disputes and create an environment in which the disputes can be managed peacefully and potentially be resolved over the course of time. Increasingly, there is concern about Chinese behavior, which is seen as undermining these objectives. And so I see the United States as designing a strategy that is seeking to change China's cost-benefit calculus, basically to persuade Beijing that using intimidation and coercion against its neighbors has a very high cost. This is not an easy thing to do, and it remains to be seen whether the United States is going to be successful. But what I have done in my papers essentially outline several components of this strategy, and I will just go into a few of the elements that I think are especially notable. First I would begin with a change in rhetoric, which we have seen from the United States this year. Much more clearly calling out China for its behavior. I would really trace this to, even after the implementation of the ADIZ in the East China Sea last November. But you can see this quite clearly in the Assistant Secretary Danny Russell's testimony that he gave in February in which he voiced firm opposition to the use of intimidation, coercion, or force to assert a territorial claim. And then we saw more recently, again in Assistant Secretary Russell's remarks to Congress on U.S.-China relations, where he maintained that China's actions are raising tensions and damaging China's international standing, and talked about the nine-dash line being inconsistent with international law. So we increasingly are hearing some sharp remarks pointing a finger more so than in the past at Chinese behavior. The second element that I want to highlight is the U.S. effort to mobilize support for the right of nations to use international legal dispute mechanisms that we have been hearing about as the Philippines has with this recent case. So not only has the United States itself not taken side, but strongly endorsed the right of Manila to avail itself of the mechanisms that exist under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. But the United States has encouraged other countries to do that as well. So you can see when President Obama was in Malaysia in the joint statement that was signed there was an endorsement of countries' rights to use international arbitration. At the Shangri-La Dialogue there was a trilateral statement signed by the U.S., Japan, and Australia. So actually, the first time that Australia in writing had endorsed the right of nations to use international arbitration, the G7 leader statement is yet another example, Japan and Germany have separately supported the Philippines' right to launch this case as well as the European Parliament. A third element is bolstering U.S. military presence and capabilities in the region, and there is obviously a great deal the U.S. has been doing. Now the signing of the 10-year enhanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines, there are steps the U.S. is taking unilaterally to bolster its presence. But one thing that is really worth highlighting here is the growing willingness of the U.S. to deploy some assets when tensions rise over a specific area. So we saw in the case of the Second Thomas Shoal, where there was a Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft that was deployed. And then recently in the case of the Chinese oil rig deployed off the power cells, there are also, there is also evidence that the U.S. was flying P-3 surveillance aircraft. So I think this is signaling U.S. desire to have a peaceful resolution of disputes and to try to deter coercion. A fourth element is supporting enhancing defensive capabilities of allies and partners. This is mostly the Philippines and Vietnam, and I think we have heard a good deal about this yesterday. U.S. maritime security assistance to Southeast Asia overall will exceed 156 million in the 2014-2015 timeframe. And Secretary of Defense Hegel talked about this at length in his speech to the Shangri-La dialogue. A fifth element is backing multilateral frameworks for cooperation, risk reduction, and dispute resolution, the code of conduct, of course, being a central part of that. Encouraging Southeast Asian claimants to work together is also, I think, an increasingly important element of this strategy. So to the extent that the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, which have already gotten together once and may get together again to coordinate some of their actions, this is something that is seen by the United States as helpful. The U.S. is also, of course, supporting models of management of disputes, such as the decision by Indonesia and the Philippines to delimitate their exclusive economic zone, and that just took place recently. So promoting examples of good behavior, good management, or even resolutions of disputes. And then, as we heard from Michael Fuchs this morning, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, this is, I see, is increasingly a new component of this U.S. strategy, putting forward very specific suggestions of confidence-building measures or conflict-avoidance measures. And this idea of freezing construction for having all the states identify what are the provocations that they don't want to be taken against them and put together a list and then all agree on them, this is essentially, I think, what Danny Russell described when he was at the ASEAN senior officials meeting in Yangon. This is something that I think is an outgrowth of growing U.S. frustration about the slow pace of China-ASEAN discussions over the Code of Conduct. So what we see is the U.S. taking a more proactive role, putting forward proposals, even though I know that Danny Russell called it informal. It's not an official proposal, and of course the United States is not a party to this dispute, but we are looking, I think, to put forward ideas that might be helpful in lower intentions. So there are a few others that I will not go into because of time, but I will close by saying that U.S. strategy towards the South China Sea and managing these disputes is continuing to evolve in response to rising tensions in these territorial disputes and particularly, as I mentioned, what is seen as unhelpful and destabilizing Chinese actions. The real goal of the strategy is to persuade China that its salami-slicing tactics, its intimidation against its neighbors, its efforts to change the status quo in the South China Sea and in its favor, are really counterproductive and self-defeating, and that they really don't serve Chinese interests over the long run. The U.S. is seeking to shape China's policy choices by increasing the cost to Beijing of using coercion against its neighbors and potentially even flouting international law. What are the possible costs for China? They include deteriorating relations with its neighbors, a tarnished image as a nation that violates international law, closer ties, including of course military cooperation between the United States and China's neighbors, and increased U.S. diplomatic, military, and security involvement in the South China Sea dispute, which I think that the U.S. hopes, which China hopes to not see. Nevertheless, changing Beijing's calculus of the cost and benefits of its strategy to advance its interest in the South China Sea is not going to be easy. Asserting Chinese claims I think is very, very popular domestically in China, and it is bolstering Chinese Communist Party legitimacy. So as my Chinese friends tell me, it may not be supported outside of Chinese borders, but it's very much supported by the Chinese people. There is a narrative in China that all other claimants have advanced their interests, they're all drilling for oil, and China is the country that was moderate, conciliatory, tried to shelve disputes and promote joint development while everybody else took advantage of that moderation. Xi Jinping I think places great emphasis on building China's maritime power. We heard this discussed yesterday, and he has repeatedly said that he will not compromise or make concessions on disputes over sovereignty and territorial integrity. And I think that the Chinese are betting that U.S. willingness to intervene in South China Sea territorial disputes will be limited, and that their neighbors will eventually accommodate to Chinese interests. So this is a strategy that the U.S. is pursuing that is not going to certainly see results overnight. It's going to take some time, and the jury is still out as to whether or not it will be successful. Thank you. Thank you very much, Bonnie. Our next speaker is Dr. Zhu Shulong, who is a professor of political science and international relations at the School of Public Policy and Management at Jinyuan University. He's also the deputy director of the Institute of International Strategic Development Studies at the same school. Okay, thank you, chair. My topic is also talking about the Chinese will, about the U.S. policy in South China Sea. Certainly I should see a lot of Chinese wills, because there are a lot of people in China. But I'll try to see the mainstream will, official will, and the mainstream academic will. And we see that U.S. policy or strategic opposition to South China Sea is not limited to the South China Sea issue. It's coming from a larger strategic thinking. Certainly a bigger country, excellent as a foreign strategic framework. And we see that U.S. strategy in South China Sea has a lot to do with the rebalancing strategy since 2010. And we see the cultural or effective release of the South China Sea situation. And the U.S. paper strategy has been a joint force. And in other words, U.S. has caused the tensions higher growing in China Sea in recent years, intentionally or not intentionally. The single factor is that tensions over South China Sea certainly become much higher in the last three or four years, since U.S. adopt paper with the strategy. Specifically, since Secretary Clinton's Hanoi speech, July 10, 2010 led the cause. So a lot of Chinese see that U.S. intended to trigger troubles in South China Sea by the paper with the strategy. And the big background of this led that I have with the bondage laser others, I have working to understand U.S. foreign policy for three decades. So I always try to compare this administration Asian policy with the previous democratic administration with Clinton, President Clinton. I remember well at the time, which is 30 or 40 years ago, American Asian strategy based on three payrolls, economic interest, democracy and human rights, and the security. But from period of the strategy of the last couple of years, we hear too much talking about security. We don't hear too much talking about democracy and human rights in Asia. Or economic development cooperation. TPP is just two years new. And to my observation, there has been little progress. So U.S. rebalancing strategy in Asia Pacific in the last three or four years, focusing too much heavily dependent on security issues. Or in other words, dependent on the troubles, problems, disputes among Asian countries. And we see that U.S. use that to maintain its leading or dominated role in Asia to maintain its alliance. So this is intentionally strategic to increase tensions, to trigger tensions in South China Sea. So U.S. is behind those disputes. It's intended to do it. Second, the Chinese view that U.S. strategy in South China Sea is unbalanced. Unbalanced is not reasonable. It's not objective. And it's a great bias. The reason we said that there is that we hear these two days. I didn't know here yesterday, today, that any American official as per the KSA anything wrong over other countries. We hear all the days, two days. Everything wrong is by Chinese. So there's only by the guy in Asia. That is China. All other good guys. So this has been years practice American Asian policy, including South China Sea policy, that when any other data something wrong or Philippines send the largest military ships to Huangyang Island, April 2012, and U.S. capital science or Vietnam policy, you know, you know, in a letter of law, China State School, or any others. We didn't know here American government to say anything. All the constructions by others on the rocks or reefs controlled by the U.N.A. or by Malaysia, by the Philippines. We do not see pictures. So here on the picture we saw that construction are Chinese. We never see here or U.S. that construction by others. So this is a great bias unreasonable, unfair treatment that China cannot accept. And here there are a lot of talking about international law. Yes, as a professor political science, I must say China is still far away from our lower country, both internal and external. So China should make a greater effort. But also think U.S. is no, is in no position to talking about international law. It's not in position to lecture others because U.S. has not a participant. A lot of international law. We said about the like the CDPT treaty, not approved like we said about international crime court. U.S. is not a part of that. We talk about the UNC convention or even some human rights international convention. U.S. is not a part of that. So U.S. is just talking about the international law to require others when it's needed and feel free when it does not need international law for itself, including Iraq war. And Bonnie talked a lot about against opposing Chinese using force or coercion. But I think U.S. did the most, including yesterday afternoon talking and the minutes ago Bonnie talking about U.S. going to deploy, already deployed a greater military force in China Sea to threaten China. So what we should call this? It's also a use of force, threaten use of force. It's also coercion. So in the past 20 years I should say that U.S. is the country used military make a most war in the world. I think U.S. used most coercion in the world, including Iraq, including a lot of other countries. Last point, I think a part of U.S. strategy Bonnie calls use of the term on South China Sea whole age about China. It's based on the misassessment about China and about Xi Jinping himself. We hear the talking yesterday, today. And I think now it's a problem for Americans, officials, and academics to see that China is increasingly become assertive, provocative, aggressive, and because of rising China, including rising China's military power spending or maritime strategy to become a maritime power. So I think China is rising, there's no doubt. And China has become a bigger maritime power because China is also a maritime country, right? China is not just a continental country. But I'll carefully follow every speech that the President Xi Jinping gave me since he took power as a top leader of China. I found that there's nothing major new from his internal and external policies in the past half and one year, one year and a half. It's basically a continuation of previous leadership of 18-party congress, 17-party congress, those policy lines, strategic line. And the only new, something major new from him is anti-corruption efforts in China. Economic reform, external policy are basically a continuation. I think this is a matter of assessment, a matter of vision of study. As a scholar in China, watching Chinese politics from policy and reading seven Chinese newspapers every day in 20 years, they did not find major things new from Xi Jinping, from this leadership. So I think this overstatement eages a reason in the U.S. both in government and academic circle about the assessment about Chinese trends, Chinese intention. That's the reason Xi Jinping last week, and a matter of sexual career and sexual work, emphasized that understanding each other between U.S. and China is very much fundamental to have objective real understanding. Certainly, there are a lot of misunderstanding in China about U.S. internal and external policy. But here, from these days, last time today, and from reading American's speech, new speech, I see they are strong eages a reason about China that we do not see, like China in South China. And this is partly, I should say, as my last words, I used to talk with Brookings friends nearby and others. This is very much because that most Americans, even American experts on Chinese studies, use little Chinese to read Chinese, to understand Chinese. You basically use English. I'm not about that. Just as in China, how Chinese can really understand American society, people, culture, history, politics without using English, just using Chinese. So I think this is one of the sources of misunderstanding as a reason, bias, and others are dancing to political interests from policy interests. Let me stop here. Thank you. Great. Thank you very much, Professor Chu Shulong. Our next speaker is Vice Admiral Yoji Koda. He's a retired Vice Admiral from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces. Vice Admiral? Thank you, Chair. I'm not a professor. I'm not a PhD holder. I was just a lazy, sloppy sailor. So what I'm going to tell you now is just the simple sailor's view on South China Sea. But the important thing is many of you overlooked my point. So this is a kind of the indication and warning to you, especially the leadership in Washington, DC. You are familiar with, so this is the real complication of the South China Sea. And just the quick history, the northern part, the Paracels, the medium-sized skirmish in 1974. Since then, China has been exercising its practical control over the islands. Sorry for that mis, but this is the reality. And the southern part spread east. Before 1988, China has no footprint. But one day skirmish in 1988, China started spreading its footprint. This is the reality, or at least what we understand. So the point is 1988. And then, since the China exercise is the northern part of its practical control, I'd like to focus mainly on the southern part. There are about 40 islands to rocks and sea mountains. And among them, only 13 is good for human activities. How many? Six belongs to the Philippines. Five belongs to Vietnamese, Taiwan one and Malaysia one. The circled islands is the larger one. Larger than four football fields. Those are the only 13 islands in the area. And China exercise no practical control over all 13. And this is a breakdown. China claims all the islands, except one Vietnamese claims 12. And this is the complication. And four of them, there are small airstrips, spread east, under Vietnam, five meters, and the Philippines, a pretty long 1800 meters. And the Taiwan 1200 meters. And the swirl islands, about 1300 meters. These are the real strategic spot in the southern part. Please remember this. And one more. In the northern part, or what we call the eastern approach of the South China Sea, closer to Bashi and Luzon Strait, there are Taiwanese-controlled Platas Islands. And there are three larger reefs. But only one larger leaf under Taiwanese control, that's the Platas Islands. And there are about 1500 meters of runway. So those are the five larger islands with airstrips, good for military use. So in my definition, these are the strategic strongholds. And which China does not have any practical control. Please remember this. And then recent event, I don't cover. The Chinese Wild Attempt in May, or the Second Thomas, we've discussed a lot. And James Scholl, that harassed Malaysia, we also discussed. Please forget about that. This is really what happened. But one thing we overlooked was the Johnson South and Scarborough Scholl. We know that. But why do I say we overlooked? This is the point. Johnson South used to be under this Vietnamese control. And 1988 skirmish, this is the island where China fought against Vietnamese and seized the island, or actually the reef. And just in the end of last year, the Filipino government released the news that reclamation of the Johnson South island is ongoing. So please take some time and think about the real meaning. In the southern part, as I mentioned, I'm repeatedly mentioning that China exercised no practical control over the larger island. In the northern part, parcels, the story is different. There is larger or largest Hainan island and Udi island, famous Udi island, under the Chinese control. Very good for the strategic use. And southern part, just the Johnson reef under Chinese control, and Scarborough Scholl, that China started exercising the practical control from 2012. So this is the Udi island. In the parcels, there are 2,500 meters runway and huge area, good for the military use. This is northern part. And the Johnson South location is there. This is the tiny reef, not tiny, 4.5 kilometers north to south, 2 kilometers east to west, large. This is what happened. You know that. I'll skip. And this is the peak, okay. Pretty weak, but you see some red line on the right picture, right? That's the potential area for the reclamation of China. If this is completed, this is the Chinese conceptual art, but this is the island after completion of the reclamation. There will be another 2,500 meter long runway with parallel taxiway and several port facilities. Okay. This is the Johnson and please think about the position. That's in the middle of the splatteries, where China has no control. Then why China took the Scarborough Scholl in 2012? What was the real reason? Is it for the seabed resources? No, sea is too deep, 4,000 meters. For fishery resources, not so. The simple adventurism to expand its territory? No. Location will be the key. And the size of the show is the key. Northwest to southeast, about 15 kilometers. And the yellow part is my concept. If I were the Beijing planner, I would landfill that area and construct the 3 kilometers runway with the deep waters 10 to 20 meters depth. That accommodates all the warships. And think about the location. That's only several hundred kilometers west of Manila or the eastern part of the South China Sea. Okay. This is what I said. So the land filling after the Johnson South in this island would be the game changer for the overall strategies. Okay. And this is my last picture, but yeah. Think about the distance. Okay. Sanya to Udi Island, 700 kilometers. Udi Island to Scarborough show 650. Johnson South 900. This means if China uses those 3 islands as a stepping stone, China will be able to exercise its military control, strategic control, and economic control in this South China Sea. This is my estimate. And China is already doing the reclamation in Johnson South. And if this is successful, China will surely go to the Scarborough. This is the real reason of the Chinese strong appetite for the Scarborough. This is the strategic meaning or simple sailor's thought. But I think this is convincing. And what should we do? We should stop. There are many things, but I'd like to emphasize only one thing. This is a huge distraction of the nature, great nature. Okay. This will kill the treasure of the human being, the coral reef by dredging and by land filling. Do we overlook? Perhaps not. What the Greenpeace is doing, they do nothing. We are ready. Thanks. Thank you very much, Vice Admiral Koda. Our next speaker is Dr. Charmaine Misaulucha, who is an assistant professor and international studies department at DeSalle University in the Philippines. She's currently a visiting research fellow at the Osaka School of International Public Policy in Osaka, Japan. Thank you very much and good morning to everybody. I'm very honored and privileged to be here today and I thank CSIS for inviting me to be part of this annual event. My task, the task that has been given to me is to identify Southeast Asian responses to U.S. policy in the South China Sea. What I do is that I put the situation into context and argue that our responses and therefore the future trajectories of the dispute are based on particular ways of understanding regional and international dynamics. As a consequence, focus is placed on great power politics at the expense of the small states of Southeast Asia. Indeed, in most of the literature, Southeast Asia is seen simply as an adjunct to great power calculations or just the sight of a likely confrontation. In this case, Southeast Asian views become nothing more but knee-jerk reactions to policies of extra-regional actors. Against this backdrop, I identify two things that are required for Southeast Asia to play a more active role in improving regional dynamics. First, we need to acknowledge that current projections, while valid, rely on assumptions that are biased towards the interactions of the United States and China. Without the active involvement of Southeast Asia, existing policies and conflict management strategies will be less effective. Second, we also need to acknowledge that the engagement policies that are in place today need adjustment. The motivations for engagement need to shift from protecting strict strategic interests, such as promoting sovereignty over islands, to protecting the global commons, such as ensuring the sustainability of the ecology and marine biosphere. In line with this, the analysis that I present here proceeds as follows. I present two scenarios that are based on current understandings of the South China Sea issue. And second, I present an alternative scenario, which is centered on a more active Southeast Asian role. So the first scenario revolves around the idea that increased tensions also means a reduction of security. In academia, this is a basic formula for the security dilemma, where the drive to security generates insecurity from other states due to uncertainty about others' motivations and the availability of imperfect information. This engenders mistrust and misperception. And in line with this logic, we seem to see that China and Southeast Asia are seeking to maximize their security. And in a situation where motivations are unclear, each side takes measures that are misperceived as offensive and that ironically generate insecurity. The mitigation of the security dilemma depends on an outside arbiter, in this case, the United States. The region supports U.S. commitment, and this is seen in a very positive light. It, after all, the presence of the U.S., after all, shifts the balance of power in the region. But at the same time, we also realize that this is costly and unsustainable. The cyclical nature of the action-reaction spiral necessitates extensive and prolonged commitments by outside powers to ensure regional security. This can prove to be too heavy a burden and can lead to overstretch. The second scenario that I present centers on the idea that the more powers there are, the more likely conflict will occur. And those of us in academia will realize that this is the embodiment or the epitome of the power transition theory, where calculations are made about the existence of a hegemon and a dissatisfied rising power that challenges the status quo. China's growth is seen as an indicator of how it will soon surpass the U.S. The mitigation of the effects of power transition include the following options, balancing, containment, or engagement, which is my focus here. The objectives of engagement include discovering preferences of the targeted state, shaping those preferences in certain directions, and creating international institutions that can benefit the parties involved. There are reasons, however, why the current engagement policies we have towards China are less than optimal. The first reason is that we often see engagement as being an end in itself. Moreover, we also see engagement more often than not as a one-way street. We seem to assume that the targeted state, in this case China, is unaware of the behavior modification strategies aimed against it. In sum, the two scenarios that I presented here are generalized versions of current understandings about China's role in the South China Sea dispute. Clearly, Southeast Asia needs to figure more prominently and be an active stakeholder in the maintenance of the regional security architecture. This therefore calls for an alternative scenario. The alternative scenario that I put forth is by no means radical. It builds on what are currently in place. I only mean to draw attention and shift attention, I mean, to the motives behind engagement instead of focusing strictly on strategic gains. This modified variant of socialization is oftentimes referred to as communicative or complex engagement. This revolves around the idea that behavior modification is a two-way process, not necessarily one-way. Recognizing this possibility allows for a more central role for Southeast Asia. Now, the question is, how do we do this? We can do this by first identifying the current sentiments of Southeast Asia. For the Philippines, we welcome the U.S. rebalance, but we hope to make the relationship with our treaty ally less one-sided. The currently signed enhanced EDCA is seen as a progress, a step in the right direction, because this features the development of the Philippines' minimum credible defense posture. Vietnam hopes to transform its relationship with the U.S. to a strategic partnership instead of only a comprehensive partnership. Malaysia and Brunei are quieter claimants in the dispute as they are more reluctant to draw attention to their own disputes. Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand are described as anxious claimants as they are all dependent on the flow of shipping through the Malacca Straits. Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos are seen to be disinterested parties, primarily because they have no direct claims, but also they are seen as, they are very close Chinese allies. ASEAN as an organization wants the U.S. involved primarily as a balancer. So in this sense, the U.S. is seen as in a positive light across the region, but, and this is the caveat, extensive prolonged and indefinite commitment on the part of the U.S. is not in the best interest of any of the parties. Also, the involvement of non-claimant extra-regional actors endangers the fragile stability in the region. Also, this defeats the empowerment of small states to manage regional powers and crises. So it is therefore imperative to infuse agency to Southeast Asia. A proactive region is needed. This is achievable by deepening the links, Southeast Asian links with each other, increasing interoperability, and being more involved in multilateral forms. This is the heart of communicative engagement. It generates common interpretations and mutual expectations and is at bottom, really, an exercise in confidence building. And I argue in my paper that forms like this help a lot in building relationships. So in conclusion, there is value in reexamining our current understandings about the South China Sea. A careful review of the foundations of states' policies reveals that the ways in which we address the crisis are biased towards the continued role of the U.S. in the region. This is costly and impractical. Hence, an alternative solution lies in a more active role by Southeast Asia. This can be achieved by modifying pre-existing policies from strategic or self-interested engagement to communicative or complex engagement. The adjusted variant values dialogue and confidence building measures more than short-term bargains. In this regard, forms such as this are critical to the creation and fostering of relationships where the exchange of ideas outside and beyond the walls of the states can flourish. Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Misalucha. So we have a few minutes for questions. So please raise your hand, wait for a mic, you know, the drill, identify yourself. Please, Andre. Thank you. I'm Andre Silverjell and I am the Chief Representative in Vietnam for the Interstate Traveller Company, businessman in other words. But wonderful discussion. I guess my question is really directed to Dr. Chulam to better answer my question and that is this. Out of there a couple days of really sophisticated discussion by lawyers and it's been brought out that China has a great sophistication and understanding of some international law such as the flexibility that China showed in entering the World Trade Organization. So my question is why doesn't China display a similar flexibility and sophistication in the South China Sea? And until I hear your answer, sir, my own inductive leap, my conclusion would be that actually Admiral Kota actually gave the answer when he described this of the game changer in just simply the physical geopolitical power that China can exert over other countries. And so that's the reason that I can conclude. But what is your answer, sir? Thank you for the question. I think that most of the Chinese do not trust the international law including UNC Convention can be helpful to resolve the disputes. It's because the conventional Chinese believe that those disputes, territory or territorial waters formed in 100,000 years in history, they were not formed by law, by trade, by contracts, by agreement in modern time. So today's law might not be good to apply the issues that developed long time in the past. So let us do the general will that this law might not be helpful. Because most of the territory disputes formed involved by history, not by trade, by agreement, by contract in the past, even region country between villages. So that is the fact. And you mentioned about the animal collars, the map, and mentioned those locations that emphasize. So you mentioned how I would react to. I think it's full of imagination whether it's going to be true to China or not, I think nobody can predict. But as scientific research, we should depend on the facts on empirical. I think the empirical fact that China has been major power country in Asia for thousands of years. But China never controlled in weight most of the part of Asia. There's only one country, it's your country, in weight control, most of the part of Asia. Thank you. Please back there. Hi, I'm Ian Henry from the Australian National University. Bonnie, you mentioned that the US has used PA Poseidon aircraft to assist the Philippines. I'm just wondering if you can expand upon that a little bit more. I don't think that's ever been publicly confirmed. And also for the panel, is there a sense that perhaps Japan has drawn any conclusions from the US response to the Scarborough Shoal? Some might characterize it as a fairly tepid response in 2012. And is there a sense perhaps in the Philippines that they're being treated differently under their alliance to Japanies, where Japan's received strong statements of support affirming that disputed territories fall under Article 5 of the US Japan Mutual Defense Treaty? Thank you. I don't know if there have been any confirmations by the US of its operations. But we have certainly seen many news reports, and in fact, photographs. I know I've seen some photographs taken by Vietnamese media of US surveillance aircraft that have been flying over the rig. And also in the case of Second Thomas Shoal, I've talked with Chinese Foreign Ministry officials who have told me that US assets are being deployed in these instances. So to the best of my knowledge, there's been no Navy assets that have been deployed close. I would think that they would be fairly far over the horizon, but I would guess that they are there as well. So anybody else want to answer the second part of this question? What Japan might have concluded from the US response to Scarborough Shoal? The year 2012, still Japan and the US didn't have enough information to estimate the Chinese intent. The first time, at least based on the open sources, the reclamation of the island was well known in late last year. So then that gave some hint about Chinese intent on Scarborough Shoal. So in this context, perhaps both US and Japan lost the first opportunity to really oppose the Chinese intent or wild attempt over the Scarborough Shoal too late. But the key question is how well should we regain our naval advantage over the Chinese wild attempt in this area? Because this is once lost show with the great potential of strategic use. So if we keep on accepting, practically accepting the Chinese control over the Scarborough Shoal, the situation will get worsen and worsen for Japan and the US side. So there is the huge area for both in Japan jointly develop the new strategy how to cope with this, you know, the Chinese attempt. And this is what I think we need at the urgent level. Thank you. Richard? Thank you. I'm Richard Cronin. I direct Southeast Asia program at the Stimson Center. I have a question primarily for Dr. Misalucha, but also secondarily for Bonnie Glaser. And that is that many of us in the room and certainly US policymakers and others are very frustrated that the Senate has never ratified on clause. And it's a real sore point and it's an advantage obviously for China in any debate to point that out. And so my question is really about, I know that you're trying, Dr. Misalucha, you're trying to focus on what ASEAN should do with itself. But I'm still wondering whether it couldn't be effective for ASEAN embassies and governments to, if you will, lobby with the United States, and particularly with the Senate on ratification of one clause. And because it's something, it's not neither right nor smart for the Obama administration to be going to the Senate and saying to a relative handful of senators on the conservative Republican side who oppose this on grounds of their feelings about the United Nations, et cetera. It wouldn't be smart or I think right for the Obama administration to be emphasizing the China factor as a reason for ratification. But the other countries in the region do subscribe to the same ideas of, share the same ideas of international law and international norms. And so I wonder how effective that might be. Thank you. Thank you for that question and anything. I personally think that that's a great idea. But we should also consider that the ASEAN states are still thinking as individual states, not as a monolithic entity. And that, I think, is one hurdle for the region. As long as they still keep on thinking as individual states rather than as a region, there won't be any unified lobby to convince the United States to ratify one clause. I would just add that it was heartening to hear early on in the Obama administration when Secretary Clinton said that she was going to get this done. And now, of course, President Obama said it in the West Point speech, but I don't see any strategy to really get this done in Congress either, as I think Mr. Reichler talked about. But nevertheless, I do think that we need to recognize that even though it is important for the United States to ratify unclose, that the United States nevertheless abides by it. And so I believe that even if we ratified it today, that U.S. behavior would in no way change. And so the U.S. activities, the way that we conduct our policy is very much consistent with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. I regret that our time is up for this panel. I know there's a lot of questions on the floor. I feel really bad about that. But please join me in thanking the panelists.