 section 61 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Kerner Commission Report. Supplement on Control of Disorder, Fire Departments. Fire Departments and Civil Disorders. Of the 23 cities studied by the Commission, most reported arson and fires accompanying the disorders ranging from the burning of police barricades in Jackson, Mississippi to the 682 riot-connected building fires listed by the Detroit Fire Department. Fire Departments face problems equal in difficulty to the control problems of law enforcement agencies. Major fire department problems in civil disorders. Abnormal number of fires. The basic problem for fire departments during a civil disorder is lack of resources to cope with an abnormal number of fires in one area while maintaining some coverage for other areas. Detroit had as many fires in the five days of disorder as it usually has in a month. No other city approached this number of fires during a civil disorder, but fire problems were still critical. For example, during the four days of disorder and new work, the fire department responded to 250 fire calls plus 64 false alarms and 50 emergencies where no fire existed. Of these 364 calls, 166 took place on the first day of the disorder. Fire departments are not organized or equipped to cope with an abnormal number of fires on a sustained basis. There are more than 23,500 public fire departments in the United States and only 285 have 100 or more employees. Only 19 cities have more than 1,000 paid employees ranging from 13,917 in New York City to 1,061 in New Orleans. But total strength is far from the number of men available to fight a fire. Regular hours of duty mean that only 20 to 35% of personnel are on duty at any one time. The situation is even more critical in the suburban communities surrounding the core city of a metric pollutant area. For many of these departments depend to a very large extent on volunteer firemen, even for routine fires if you have as many as 25 men normally on duty. Shortages of equipment, particularly reserve equipment necessary for a full utilization of all available manpower, also inhibit efforts to combat widespread fires during the Detroit disorder. 41 suburban communities furnished men in about 49 pieces of equipment to augment the 97 pieces of equipment in the city department. The danger and rely on mutual aid agreements comes from the possibility that adjoining communities may be simultaneously involved in a disorder and unable to release men or equipment. Malicious or nuisance false alarms. False alarms have often plagued fire departments during disorders. These alarms overload incoming communication systems and deplete manpower and equipment needed for actual fires. Attacks on and harassment of firemen. In many of the cities experiencing civil disorders, firemen have been harassed and even attacked primarily by thrown objects. These plus fear of attack have seriously interfered with the work of firemen. Firemen can no longer depend upon community assistance, but must be ready for open hostility. Overtax communication facilities. Fire department communication capabilities have been severely taxed during disorders. At headquarters increased numbers of alarms overload incoming telephone lines and impose heavy burdens on dispatchers. In the field frequencies have been overloaded while the use of different frequencies by fire units, law enforcement agencies and national guard forces has prompted confusion. The commission has requested that the Federal Communications Commission provide sufficient frequencies to permit communications during disorders among all agencies of government involved in control. Identification of a civil disorder fire problem. The fire problem in a civil disorder has usually developed after the initial disturbance. The time interval may be a matter of hours as in Detroit or a matter of days as in Los Angeles in 1965. In order to ensure efficient response, fire chiefs must identify the start of a problem as early as possible, both to activate emergency plans and to avoid an initial overcommitment of resources. Water supply problems. Numerous fires reduce water pressure and malicious openings of hydrants deplete water supplies. Logistical support. Extended firefighting operations by large numbers of personnel and equipment have created serious logistical problems. Sufficient manpower and equipment must be on hand not only to combat the fires, but also to avert long hours of duty leading to exhaustion. Special feeding and rest facilities near the center of operations should be provided. The availability and state of repair of reserve equipment creates additional difficulties when this equipment is pressed into service during an emergency. Large scale glass breakage during disorders has damaged tires of fire trucks, hose problems have been acute. Most fire departments lack the heavy stream equipment that is most efficient in handling riot caused fires. Forced withdrawals because of attack on firemen and rapid reassignment to new threatened areas and prevented recovery of hose damage from large scale operations as well as from sabotage has further reduced hose inventories. Recommendations for improving fire department response. The commission recommends that fire departments evaluate all existing resources, develop and test plans of response and make every effort to strengthen the firefighting workforce within the limits of the community's financial base. Beyond this detailed plans must be prepared to identify areas where disorders and fires are likely to occur. Compute the units needed to serve as critical areas while maintaining minimal protection for the remainder of the community. Evaluate jointly total needs with cooperative agencies and schedule require assignments in advance. Select command post sites, providing for a command room, adequate parking of apparatus, sufficient access and maneuver, communication facilities in space for personnel for extended periods of time. Provide for coded signals to implement responses to activate command posts and to recall off duty personnel. Choose special teams of men and equipment for commitment, including normally one or two pumpers, the latter truck, the chief officer, necessary heavy equipment and communication facilities. Review the adequacy of the water supply and solve foreseeable problems in advance. Develop plans for actual operations at the scene of fires. Provide a way to screen incoming alarms to avoid duplication of response and depletion of resources. Coordination and liaison with other units. Fire departments must be an integral part of the planning to coordinate all government agencies and private groups involved in control operations, in particular with law enforcement agencies in the National Guard. Effective liaison must be established well in advance of emergencies. In lines of communication to the police will provide both information for the prompt recognition of special fire problems and police protection. Tests of all agreements are a necessity. Protection of firemen. A fireman is neither trained nor equipped to control rioters. To be effective, he must be able to devote his entire attention to fire control activities. Since firemen have a professional responsibility and duty to respond to all fires, protection furnished by outside sources must be necessary for the personal well-being of firemen and for effective firefighting operations. Thus, if firemen are attacked or are severely harassed or interfered with in their operations, either police or national guardsmen should be assigned to fire units to furnish effective protection. In order to ensure that proper protection will be immediately available if needed, advance commitments and assignments are necessary. Firemen must establish and maintain liaison with top police officials and National Guard officers. Personal protective equipment for firemen and apparatus may also be necessary. Covered cabs, eye shields and crash helmets, as well as covering material for fire engines. Adequate communication equipment. Adequate communications between headquarters and field operations are essential. Additional telephones to receive alarms, direct line telephones to command posts and key officials, portable two-way radios, radio links to other agencies and cooperating fire departments, equipment for reserve units, and reliable means to direct firefighters to fire scenes. Periodic exercises and tests are necessary. Logistical support. To ensure inadequate logistical support, fire departments must take an inventory of all equipment and supplies, repair or replace an operative or defective equipment and ensure adequate repair and maintenance facilities. Sufficient quantities of hose, particularly heavy stream and large diameter hose, are required. Training. Because operations during civil disorders differ substantially from normal operating procedures, training must be carried out at operation-aligned command levels. Command level training is of special importance for many fire department officials lack experience in wide-scale operations. Tactical exercises will help train senior staff officers and test communications and command capabilities. Training and planning conferences. The Commission recommends training conferences for the nation's fire departments nationwide for area-wide conferences among top fire department officials will promote exchanges of information relating to basic plans for responding to disorders and the preparation of training programs and materials for both operational and command levels. The federal government should assume the responsibility for instituting and funding such conferences. Improved community relations. Fire departments like police departments must improve their relations with the communities they serve in order to gain the community cooperation and assistance that are essential for effective fire fighting. This requires getting out of the firehouse and becoming acquainted with the people in the neighborhood. Fire department officials have an obligation to develop programs to achieve these goals. End of Section 61. Section 62 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Kerner Commission Report. Section 62, Supplement on Control of Disorder, State Response. A major civil disorder may require control forces beyond the personnel and equipment of a single city. When this occurs in an American city, the response will necessarily be far different than it would be in many foreign countries. Most Asian and European countries have national police forces under centralized control, and in the event of a disorder, thousands of additional specially trained and equipped control personnel can be rapidly deployed to the scene. Because a national police force is anathema to American tradition, because the use of federal forces in domestic violence is limited by the Constitution governing statutes and precedent, state forces alone will be available in the great majority of civil disorders in this country. The state forces presently available to assist local law enforcement agencies are the state police and the National Guard. State Police Forces. All states except Hawaii have a state police department, Highway Patrol or Department of Public Safety. Together they number approximately 32,500 sworn personnel, all but seven states have under 1,000 men. In most states these officers are responsible for policing the entire highway system and must be generally dispersed over the entire state. Thus state police departments find it difficult to mobilize sufficient numbers of men to be of appreciable help in assisting local police control a civil disorder. In fact, traffic supervision rather than law enforcement is the chief function in more than half of the states. Twelve of the 49 departments lack full police powers. Only five spend less than one half time on traffic. 27 spend three quarters or more time on traffic. Only eight spend over 15 percent of their time on control of criminal activities. In the comparatively few states where the department spend appreciable time on crime control, they may be the principal law enforcement agency for many rural areas. To divert these forces to riot control activities would strip rural areas of police protection. Although state police recruits in 44 states receive training in crowd and riot control tactics, the average number of hours for such training is approximately 10 as compared to 39 for the state traffic code and 38 for accident investigation. Thus despite real variations most state police forces lack the necessary manpower experience and training to assist local police effectively in controlling civil disorders. In the great majority of states only the National Guard can furnish effective assistance. National Guard Since World War II the National Guard has been summoned to aid in controlling disorders a total of 72 times in 28 states. Thirteen took place during the summer of 1967. The performance of guard forces in certain disorders, particularly in Newark and Detroit, raised doubts regarding their capabilities for this type of mission. Their performance also poses a serious challenge to the nation because of the limitations of state police and the restrictions on the use of federal forces. The National Guard in state status is the only organization with sufficient manpower and appropriate organization and equipment to assist local police departments in riot control operations. After hearing testimony and reviewing evidence of the Guard's performance in riot control operations in several cities this commission recommended immediate action to improve the Guard's effectiveness. These recommendations included one increased riot control training, two review of the standards for National Guard officers, three a substantial increase in Negro personnel and both army and air national guard. These recommendations provoke changes in the Guard and they will hereby evaluate it. Background information on the Guard. Certain difficulties experienced by the Guard in responding to civil disorders result from the dual nature of its organization and mission. On one hand it is a state militia organized trained and equipped to protect life and property and preserve order and public safety within the state it serves. On the other hand it has a federal mission to provide organized units of trained personnel with sufficient and suitable equipment to augment the national and active army and air force in time of war or national emergency. National Guard officials maintain that their primary duty is to be ready to respond to the federal mission for the Guard's force structure is tailored by the joint chiefs of staff to enable its immediate integration into the active army and air force. The army prescribes standards for enlistment and for the appointment and promotion of officers. The army directs training. A federal order to duty has priority over a state call. The federal government pays for 90 percent of the operating cost virtually all of the equipment and nearly half the cost of physical installations and facilities. Yet members of the Guard take an oath of allegiance to the state. Let's call it into federal service and accept one on annual two weeks tour of active duty. The Guard is under the control of the governor who appoints officers. When on state duty the Guard is paid by the state and is subject to state or local control. The concept of a state militia is enhanced by the hometown makeup and traditions of Guard units. The dual nature of Guard makeup and mission must be taken into account when Guard capabilities for use in riot control operations are assessed and when responsibility for improvements is fixed. Here we consider the Guard's control capabilities in terms of personnel, organization, planning, training, and equipment as presently in being. Personnel resources. Sufficiency of manpower. The total strength of the National Guard is determined by Congress in response to requirements set by the Department of Defense. The manpower level has varied little over the past several years. Although the National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General of the states participate in the process, establishing Guard strength in any state and allocating Guard units to a particular state are primarily federal functions based upon the needs of the active army in the event of a national emergency. A governor can refuse the total Guard manpower allocated to his state, in which case the excess manpower is assigned to other states. The governor can also increase the total manpower assigned, but there would be no federal recognition or support of the additional units. In the recent past, no state has called its total Guard force to active duty to deal with civil disorders. Since 1957, the average proportion of the force employed has been nine percent and only two instances as a state employed more than 50% of Guard strength. California called out 60% for the Watts riot in 1965. Michigan called 85% for the Detroit disorder in 1967, but held 20 to 25% in reserve near Detroit. New Jersey employed 31% of its Guard in Newark. Wisconsin about 43% for Milwaukee. Even if civil disorders increase somewhat in frequency and magnitude, Guard strength appears adequate to assist local law enforcement units. Other factors must however be considered. First without the pressure of the accelerated draft in times of international crisis, the Guard usually has difficulty maintaining its strength. Second, no state has yet experienced more than one major civil disorder at any one time. Two or more major disturbances would probably necessitate outside help. Third, control of an extremely severe or prolonged disorder would undoubtedly be beyond the present capabilities of any state. And fourth, repeated disorders in the state would create manpower problems since calling the same units to duty several times in a short period would cause severe dislocations for the men involved. In summary, no state alone has the resources to support a Guard force capable of controlling all potential disorders, but no state can be expected to maintain a force of that strength. Elsewhere in this report the Commission will consider the problem of obtaining outside aid. Two, quality of Guard officers. Total manpower is not the only determining factor in an evaluation of Guard capabilities for control purposes. Proper leadership at all levels is vital to prevent the indiscriminate riot control measures utilized by some Guard units in recent disorders. Evidence presented to the Commission concerning Guard performance in recent control operations brought into question the caliber and competence of certain Guard officers. Some displayed inferior leadership below the level needed to handle the extremely sensitive operations of controlling disorder in an American city. As a result the Commission recommended that the qualifications and performance of all Guard officers be reviewed. This recommendation was intended not as a reflection on the entire officer core of the Guard, but rather to suggest that objective tests be used to replace or retrain officers who failed to meet minimum standards of leadership. Prompt action was taken on the Commission's recommendations. A special board was formed to make a general assessment of the qualifications and performance of all reserve component officers. The Commission assumes that the Department of the Army will continue these efforts and will work with the states to upgrade or eliminate officers who lack the necessary leadership attributes. The responsibility to improve Guard leadership does not rest solely with the federal government. Governors appoint Guard officers and they too must exercise responsibility to improve Guard leadership by selecting only the well qualified. 3. Negro personnel and Guard units. Evidence from Detroit indicates that active Army troops were more effective than National Guard units in controlling the disorder. According to many observers, the higher percentage of Negroes in the active Army was a significant contributing factor. After reviewing this evidence and examining the percentage of Negroes in Guard units, this Commission recommended immediate efforts to increase substantially the number of Negroes in Army and Air National Guard units throughout the country. The Department of Defense responded in two ways. A, on August 31st 1967, a special board was convened to study the extent of Negro participation in the Army National Guard and Reserve. To explore the reasons why Negroes were not fully participating in the National Guard and Reserve and to suggest a program to increase their participation substantially. On October 16, 1967, the board issued its report and recommended steps to recruit and retain additional Negro personnel. B, the New Jersey National Guard was authorized a temporary 5% over strength, 865 additional spaces in its paid drill strength. The purpose was to test methods of increasing Negro participation in the Army and Air National Guard. An intensive recruiting program was immediately instituted to obtain qualified Negroes for the additional positions. By the end of December 1967, approximately 1,300 Negroes had expressed interest in the Guard. Of 723 whose applications were fully processed, 397 were actually enlisted into the Army and National Guard. Thus approximately 46 of the over strength positions had been filled, amounting to an increase of Negro participation in the New Jersey Guard from 1.7% on December 31st, 1966 to 3.97% at the end of December 1967. The program is continuing. The Commission commends these efforts, although it is too early to determine whether the New Jersey program will be a complete success. Preliminary results indicate that Negro participation in the Guard can be increased. The Commission recommends that the findings of the special board and the results of the New Jersey experiment be fully utilized to stimulate additional Negro participation. If necessary, over strength should be authorized. Every effort must be made to ensure fair assignments and promotions for Negroes. Increased Negro participation in the Guard will have meaning only if there is a fair proportion of Negro officers in command of integrated units. Organization. Unit organization in the Guard is identical to active Army organization. Command and control arrangements are also identical, ensuring close supervision of troops and quick and flexible reaction to changing situations. Command organization of the Guard is currently undergoing a modification, which brings into sharp focus potential conflicts between the state and federal missions of the National Guard. In the opinion of experienced consultants, the basic military element that lends itself most effectively to riot control is the battalion. However, the current plan splits support type battalions between various states with the resulting loss of at least one unified battalion in each state where divisions are split. The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense reconsider alignment of units between the states in order to ensure that state needs for unified command and control and riot operation are fully taken into account. Planning. The importance of planning and effective control operations cannot be over-emphasized. Planning is particularly important for the National Guard because it needs to mobilize a large number of men from a variety of locations and occupations. Be sure they are properly equipped, deploy them rapidly in effective units to the scene of the disorder, and provide adequate logistical support for expanded operations. The Department of the Army in August 1967 instructed all National Guard commands to develop riot control plans. A revised training schedule issued at the same time required an eight-hour command post exercise to develop plans or exercise previously developed plans. All National Guard units have now met this requirement. The commanding general of the United States Continental Army Command has dispatched liaison teams to review all state National Guard riot control plans and to assure that they are coordinated with plans drawn by state and local civil officials. The Army has also developed planning packets for certain cities. These include maps and other information necessary for control operations. The Department of the Army and the National Guard Bureau have provided a basic framework which helps the states construct appropriate riot control plans. The states now have a clear responsibility to develop them. In order to aid appropriate federal and state officials fulfill their planning responsibilities, the commission makes the following recommendations. One, the eight-hour command post exercise mentioned above is inadequate for proper drafting of control plans. The commission believes that riot control plans should be developed by the state adjutant general working together with his full-time duty staff rather than during a training exercise. The commission also suggests that the military support of civil defense section be utilized to assist in the planning process. Only if the planning is carried out in this fashion by full-time personnel will there be adequate opportunity to develop a workable and comprehensive plan and also to exploit fully the training exercises devoted to testing and revision of the plans. We are informed that the Department of the Army is presently taking steps that would substantially carry out this recommendation. Two, the planning process must involve all state and local officials who will be involved in the control operations. It cannot be left solely to the Army and National Guard nor to the National Guard and police departments. Three, the lack of adequate communication between the Guard and local agencies has been a problem in nearly all instances where National Guard troops have been utilized to assist in controlling a disorder. Proper planning must ensure effective communications among all Guard units involved as well as among the Guard and appropriate local agencies particularly the police and fire departments. Four, planning should take into account those National Guardsmen who are policemen, firemen and other emergency workers. They must be released from active military duty if they are needed in their civilian capacities. Five, plans must be constantly reviewed to ensure their applicability to changing additions and new techniques and equipment. Six, an officer should be on duty at the State Guard headquarters on a 24-hour basis to ensure proper contact with state and local civil officials and law enforcement agencies. Guard headquarters should maintain regular contacts with all major state and local law enforcement agencies in order to provide for in exchange of information particularly intelligence. Seven, all states should plan to have Guard cadres, key personnel and even some units available for rapid call up during the crucial warm weather months. This will provide a minimum force for immediate aid to local law enforcement agencies and will facilitate full mobilization and deployment if necessary. The force of this nature can be created by placing personnel on an alert status subject to recall on short notice on a rotating basis or by scheduling weekend training for various Guard units. It is useful to recall that in 18 of the 23 cities studied by the Commission the disorders began during a weekend or on a Friday or Monday. Weapons, equipment and logistical support. The Guard is armed and equipped by federal funds in order to fulfill its federal role as a combat force. Experiences of this last summer reveal that much of this equipment is inappropriate for dealing with civil disorders in American cities. The Guard and other military units lack an adequate middle ground between a display of force and use of lethal or indiscriminate force. The Commission has recommended federally sponsored and financed research for developing non-lethal weapons. The Commission further recommends that the Department of Defense participate fully in such efforts to bring about full utilization of available resources. Suitable products of research and development should be used to the fullest extent possible by the National Guard and other military forces as well as by local and state police. In the foreseeable future, however, the National Guard has no alternative but to use existing equipment in control operations. One, control weapons and equipment. The rifle is the soldier's basic weapon. He has been trained with it and has developed a degree of confidence in it. This weapon has a psychological effect for a show of force that distinguishes military units from police. Unfortunately, actual use of the rifle and riot control operations is generally inappropriate. It is a lethal weapon with ammunition designed to kill at great distances. Rifle bullets ricochet. They may kill or remain innocent people blocks away from the actual target. Unless or until an effective non-lethal replacement for the rifle is developed, it will have necessity continue to be the basic arm for the individual guardsmen assigned to civil disorder duty. The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense immediately institute a research program that seeks to develop a new type of ammunition for use in civil disorders should be capable of striking with deterrent but not lethal force at reasonable range. British units in Hong Kong, for example, fire a wooden peg that incorporates these basic features and is reportedly highly effective. Two, bayonets. Considerable controversy developed around the use of bayonets by National Guard and Army units in controlling riots. Proponents of this weapon argued that it has the strong psychological impact necessary for an effective show of force and provides a means of self-defense for the individual guardsmen. Opponents point out that bayonets are likely to cause death or severe wounds and may inflame a crowd to greater disorder. One commentator after pointing out that successful modern armies have train men to perform effectively in combat without bayonets concludes, in any case the bayonet is completely useless as an instrument of riot control and the management of civil disorder. As a device for separating hostile groups or controlling mobs it has some of the impact of a police dog in that it produces counter effects that are not desired. It is not a weapon which reassures soldiers, especially National Guardsmen, federal troops tend to avoid its use. Even in most difficult riot control situations which faced British forces as for example in Hong Kong the bayonet was absent. The commission recommends that the Department of the Army and the National Guard Bureau re-examine their policy, underline the use of the bayonet for riot control operations. At the very minimum the commission believes that non-lethal chemical agents should be utilized before bayonets are fixed. Three, chemical agents. The National Guard is equipped with CS the standard army chemical agent for riot control. The army has recently developed a variety of dispensers that include small hand-thrown rubber grenades. Grenade launchers accurate to a range of 200 meters and useful. For example against a sniper firing through a window and large devices that can be mounted on helicopters and disperse effective amounts of the agent over relatively large areas these should be made available to guard units as soon as possible. Despite the existence of some problems previously discussed in the control chapter the only present alternative to use of CS is the application of potentially lethal force. New delivery projectiles now enable CS to be used in a highly discriminating manner against individuals or small groups and they can provide more flexibility in the present range of course of force. The commission therefore believes that until more selective non-lethal weapons are available CS should be utilized before rifles and bayonets. The commission urges the Department of Defense to expedite the development and production of advanced delivery systems which should also be made available to police departments. It is important to avoid the indiscriminate use of chemical agents there you should be announced to all who may be affected and adequate escape routes should be open to allow crowd to disperse upon being so ordered. All National Guard units should have on hand a sufficient number of gas masks to equip all guardsmen who may be used in riot control operations. Furthermore each participating unit should have a supply of a additional gas mask for police and other officials who may be attached to or involved with the National Guard in control operations. Utilization of chemical agents presents sufficiently difficult problems of judgment for a commander. The difficulty should not be enhanced by a lack of protective equipment. For automatic and other weapons the commission has heard from witnesses and its own investigators disturbing accounts of indiscriminate firing of machine guns during certain of the recent disorders. Controlling a civil disorder is not warfare. The fundamental objective of National Guard forces in a civil disorder is to control the rioters not to destroy them or any innocent bystanders who may be present. Brigadier General Harris W. Hollis, director of operations office of the deputy chief of staff for military operations U.S. Army testified before the commission. Commanders and their personnel should do whatever is possible to avoid appearing as an alien invading force rather than as a force which has the purpose of restoring order with minimum loss of life and property and with due respect for the great number of citizens whose involvement in the area is purely coincidental. A military machine gun as well as similar types of automatic weapons is constructed to fire bursts or continuous streams of deadly ammunition a great distance and over a relatively large area. A machine gun unlike a standard rifle cannot be fired at individuals with selectivity or accuracy. By design it is a weapon of mass fire except in an extraordinary situation where the guard of the local community is endangered by the use of lethal weapons that can be neutralized only by mass fire and only if there is no disproportionate danger to innocent persons. The commission recommends that the use of machine guns be prohibited for National Guard forces assigned to riot control. Other mass destruction weapons of modern warfare flamethrowers, recoilless rifles and artillery have no conceivable place in riot control operations in densely populated American cities. Five, communication equipment. The commission has previously emphasized that proper planning must include facilities for adequate communication between the guard and other agencies involved in control operations both the federal government and the states should take appropriate steps to ensure that adequate equipment is immediately available to guard units involved in control operations. The commission has been informed that the Department of Defense is now equipping National Guard forces with tactical communications equipment and that the army is developing prepackaged communication systems prescribed for use in major civil disturbances. Systems that can be moved to an effective area in a minimal amount of time. The commission appreciates the importance of these preparations and recommends that these plans be fully executed immediately. Six, miscellaneous equipment. Several other items of equipment have proved useful in riot control activities. Some are available from civilian sources others only through military supply channels in either case these items should be immediately available if the need arises. A. Armored vehicles. Both army and national guard units have found that armored personnel carriers are effective for moving troops through areas which may be subject to sniper fire or to approach buildings from which snipers may be firing. For national guard units in states where such equipment is not available armored trucks such as the type used by banks have been found effective. They have the added advantage of being less conspicuous than military armed vehicles. The use of tanks however is clearly inappropriate because of their potential for mass destruction. B. Illumination equipment. The Detroit experience demonstrated that it may be highly desirable to illuminate large areas. Powerful portable light sources have been developed and are available for mounting on helicopters or vehicles. Army searchlights are appropriate advertising and display companies in most major cities have lights often obtained from army surplus that can be useful. C. Public address systems. Loudspeaker systems both hand carried and larger are essential for warning and directing crowds. D. Material for constructing roadblocks. In the Watts riot the guard experienced major difficulties in constructing effective roadblocks. In many instances when the troops lacked adequate materials they resorted to gunfire to stop vehicles. Damage and loss of life resulted. All guard units should make arrangements to obtain suitable materials for constructing effective roadblocks which should be marked by signs to warrant civilians. 7. Logistical support. If logistical planning has been adequate no serious deficiencies in equipment and supplies should hamper guard units engaged in riot controlled duty. Training. Before August 1967 army regulations required national guard units to conduct riot control training but specified no particular number of hours. Instruction consequently varied from a minimum of six hours in one state to a maximum of 32 hours in another. In addition the general military training received by national guard units during their six months of active duty and ongoing drills was also applicable to riot control. In August 1967 the army increased mandatory riot control training to 32 hours of unit training 16 hours of command and staff training and an eight hour command post exercise for all army national guard units and certain designated air national guard units. By the end of October 1967 all state forces had completed this required training. The commission commenced the department of defense the department of the army and the national guard bureau for their prompt action increasing the riot control training of the national guard but in view of the reliance upon the national guard as the main source of support for local police and controlling disorders the commission recommends that further steps be taken to improve training. One the 16 hours allotted to command training is insufficient to complete the designated review of applicable military subjects and also the preparation and review of operational and mobilization plans. Therefore the commission earlier recommended that actual preparation of plans be left to the full time staff. The eight hours allocated to the command post exercise should be devoted fully to testing plans to determine their general adequacy. If such testing reveals defects revisions should be made and further training time made available to test the revised plans. Two riot control training for national guard troops should be a continuing part of the regular training program to ensure familiarity with established procedures and to train incoming recruits. Three riot control training and all training materials should be subject to periodic review in order to ensure that they fully incorporate the latest techniques developed by the army the national guard and the state and local law enforcement units. A special subcommittee of the house committee on armed services special subcommittee to inquire into the capability of the national guard to cope with civil disturbances has recommended that the department of the army establish a permanent board of officers to supervise the development and testing of civil disturbance control measures and equipment and to develop and periodically publish revised training directives. We believe that this recommendation is sound and we endorse it. Such a board could carry out our recommendation for a periodic review of training materials. Four all guard units should cooperate fully with efforts to integrate national guard training with that of state and local police. If necessary guard commanders should take the initiative in proposing such training. Five guard training for control activities should include provisions to ensure that guard officers and men are fully aware of the organization procedures and capability of other law enforcement and government agencies that may also be involved in control activities. Six guard training should include increased emphasis on the community relations aspects of control operations. Seven until all national guard officers have received thorough training and riot control activities each state should designate appropriate senior officers for command of riot control operations. The department of the army should establish a school to train these officers for command during riot situations with special emphasis on the political sociological and legal problems that are involved in control operations. We have been informed that planning for such a course is currently underway. Eight top federal state and guard officials must make every effort to ensure that training directives are fully carried out and that every guardsman is made aware of the importance of all aspects of riot control training. In particular emphasis should be placed on the importance of using only the minimum force necessary to achieve control. And section 62 section 63 of the Kerner commission report. This is a LibriVox recording. While LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the national advisory commission on civil disorders Kerner commission report. Supplement on control of disorder army response. The commitment of federal troops aid state and local forces in controlling a disorder is an extraordinary act. Only twice in the last 45 years have governors requested federal troops to help quell civil disorders. As pointed out elsewhere in this report however it is imperative that states have backup forces for controlling major disorders. This section considers the capabilities and preparedness of the active army to perform the backup function. An army staff task force as recently examined and reviewed a wide range of topics relating to military operations to control urban disorders. Command and control logistics, training, planning, doctrine, personnel, public information, intelligence and legal aspects. The study also extracted lessons from recent disorders and sought to make them applicable to any possible future disturbances. The commission in preparing this portion of the report has relied heavily upon information developed by the army task force group and commends the army for undertaking this overall review of the army function. It recommends at each state consider a similar review of its own control capabilities. Further recommends that the result of the army review be made known to the National Guard and to top state and local civil and law enforcement officials in order to stimulate review at the state and local level. Band power. The active army has designated seven task force each of brigade size approximately 2,000 men to be immediately available for assignment to control civil disorders in the event federal troops are needed. Additional army as well as Marine Corps forces can be furnished if necessary. In the opinion of the army these forces are an adequate supplement to the National Guard. The commission concurs planning. For some years the army has conducted the military planning and coordination necessary to control civil disorders including the preparation of a family of plans which have been coordinated with appropriate headquarters and agencies. It is continuing this work to be certain that adequate federal units can be rapidly and effectively deployed and redeployed. Planning steps undertaken by the army appear sufficient for the affected deployment of active army troops to the scene of a disorder. The commission believes it imperative that army plans be fully coordinated with those of state and local governments. In particular the commission recommends that the department of justice in cooperation with the department of the army inform state and local officials and National Guard officers of the exact procedures that must be used to obtain federal troops. The number of federal troops that would be available the response times for such troops and the relationships to be established among federal state and the local forces particularly in the matter of command responsibilities. The commission further recommends that federal state planning should ensure that federal troops are prepared to provide aid to cities not presently covered by the army's planning packet effort. Training The effectiveness of the active army units committed in Detroit was due in part to the broad spectrum of training at individual and unit levels. Basic training produces well conditioned and disciplined soldiers. Unit training molds them into teams and units and develops further proficiency. Operational training for contingency missions stresses tactical techniques as well as technical support to sustain large numbers of men in the field on extended duties. In some army training in its totality produces the type of well disciplined and self-supporting force essential for the control of a major disorder. Under present plans units assigned to riot control contingency missions conduct specialized training in accordance with the doctrine and techniques set out in the army field manual on civil disturbances and disasters. Special army directives and the subject schedule recently prepared for National Guard units are also used to guide active army training. Administrative and logistical units undergo specialized training in support of forces utilized for riot control. Because riot control duties are sometimes assigned to military police units these units receive continual training in riot control including apprehension detention and crowd control measures. Selected army officers and non-commission officers receive riot control training at the military police school. The army is making an overall review of riot control training including expansion and revision of field manuals and subject schedules in examination of the feasibility of integrating National Guard and civilian authorities in command post and field training exercises. A revision of the course content of the military police school and updating of riot control training films by addition of recent film footage. A revision of equipment allowances for training and distribution to various army commands of lessons learned in recent disorders. The commission commends the army for the advanced status of its training and for its current steps to strengthen that training. As suggestions for further improvement the commission recommends 1. All officers and selected non- commissioned officers of army units designated for use in civil disorders should receive advanced command and staff training in riot control. 2. Selected military police core officers should be given additional staff and command training in riot control and should be assigned as staff advisors to commanders of all army units to be deployed to civil disorders. Training of such officers should include emphasis on close coordination with police departments in the major cities and the areas to which units are assigned. The training should familiarize them with the plans and operational procedures as well as the command personnel of these departments. 3. The army should investigate the possibility of utilizing psychological techniques to ventilate hostility and less intention in riot control and incorporate feasible techniques into training for army and National Guard units. The Hong Kong Police Department has successfully used a number of such techniques in controlling disorders. For example, when confronted by a mob of screening rioters, a detachment of Hong Kong police used microphones and amplifiers to make louder and play back the mob noise on the mob itself. The noise confused and ultimately broke up the mob. The Seng Chicken episode described in the profile in chapter one of the Elizabeth, New Jersey disorder is an example, although not a planned one, on how humor can break tensions and dissipate a crowd. 4. All pertinent information and recommendations resulting from the review of training matters should be made available to the National Guard and to public safety and other officials of states and local communities. 5. Equipment and logistical support The equipment and supplies normally issued in stock for army units equip them basically to perform in a civil disorder operation. Moreover, special equipment for riot control operations has been identified and will be made available to appropriate army and National Guard units. In the section on the National Guard, the commission makes recommendations regarding the equipment and logistical support of National Guard units engaged in control operation. The commission believes these recommendations are fully applicable to the army. The commission further recommends that one, the army should put particular emphasis on having available adequate supplies of communication equipment that will permit effective communications with such National Guard units in state and local law enforcement agencies as may be involved in control operations. Two, the department of the army should participate fully in efforts to develop non-lethal weapons and personal protective equipment appropriate for use in civil disorders. And section 63, section 64 of the Kerner Commission report this is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders Kerner Commission report. Supplement on control of disorder, coordinating the control response, part one. Prompt and efficient response to a civil disorder requires full cooperation and coordination of all groups public and private that may be involved in overall control activities only proper planning can ensure this response. The degree of coordination necessary and obtainable will vary with the type of agency or group involved particularly private groups but a basic requirement is an allocation of duties and responsibilities plus an effective command structure. The necessary planning is both vertical and horizontal in nature. Horizontal planning involves coordination among government agencies and private groups within a city or community intra-city planning among neighboring jurisdictions including city and counties intra-city planning and among states interstate planning. Vertical planning involves coordination at the state local and federal state levels. The primary responsibility for coordinated planning rests with state and local government. This portion of the report considers areas where coordinated planning is necessary and suggests guidelines for solutions. Horizontal coordination and planning intra-city coordinated planning for effective control of civil disorder planning must include at least the basic city agencies police fire courts involved in control activities enlightened planning will also use the personnel and resources of all government agencies together with groups of private citizens that may be helpful in restoring and maintaining order. 1. Government agencies and private groups Commission studies reveal that most of the police department surveyed have made some arrangements with other government agencies for a working relationship during a period of civil disorder. Nearly all of the departments have made arrangements with fire departments. Fewer but still a clear majority have made agreements with public transportation agencies. Courts detention personnel probation and parole officers human relations commissions and departments controlling streets lights signs and signals. Although these percentages indicate a degree of planning by most cities there is little excuse for a lack of coordinated planning among these basic agencies in any city. More important the true degree of coordination cannot be determined without evaluating the precise type of arrangements in use. Certain responses indicated cooperative arrangements but to be effective planning must involve firm coordination not merely vague cooperation. Our survey indicates that cities and police departments have not planned to make full use of the resources of various private groups and agencies that can contribute to both prevention and control of disorders. Of the 26 police departments reporting information in this area 11 plan to use church groups 7 plan to use youth service agencies or groups 10 have arrangements to obtain food and shelter from private sources 3 plan to use personnel resources of watch services and private guard services 12 plan to utilize the services of social service agencies and 15 contemplate the use of personnel resources of police community relations councils. The commission recommends that all cities that have not already done so should devise plans that coordinate all government agencies involved in control activities. It is the responsibility of mayors and other elected officials to assume the initiative in instituting such planning and carrying it to a satisfactory conclusion. Such plans should also include to the fullest extent possible all private groups and agencies that may be directly affected by the disorder or that can make a positive contribution to control. Naturally such planning will be less formal and it should be sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing leadership of these groups. The government agencies and private groups to be covered by the planning include police departments including police community relations units fire departments ambulance services detention facilities courts legal aid services probation and parole services city or county human relations commissions public and private transportation systems public and private utilities public health departments hospital sanitation departments telephone companies news media municipal works civil defense agencies private guard services youth service groups service agencies churches social workers community action agencies poverty program workers and others coordinated planning should take into account the organization manpower and resources made available to state and local government for civil defense purposes under the federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as amended. Those resources include emergency control centers communications equipment emergency power sources special rescue equipment and various trained reserve personnel. The office of civil defense OCD reports that more than 184,000 volunteer reserve police 172,000 reserve firemen and 176,000 rescue personnel have been trained through the civil defense program. Furthermore at least 2076 political jurisdictions have established emergency operating centers with an additional 547 in the process of construction or completion. Although the federal government provides equipment and funds to develop these resources they belong to the states and local jurisdictions. They must be integrated into planning on a state or local level. Office of civil defense regulations authorized state and local governments to use such resources in time of an emergency whether caused by attack a natural disaster or a civil disorder. However because of the need for police forces specially trained for riot control operations local officials should carefully evaluate the state of training of any civil defense trained personnel to be used as police. If such training is inadequate for actual control operations the men could be assigned to guard vital installations or other positions in order to release active duty police for control operations. In the past it has not been clear whether equipment marked with civil defense insignia is available for use during a civil disorder. The commission understands that the OCD is reviewing its regulations and if necessary will revise them to ensure that this equipment will be fully available. We recommend that the OCD ensure that the applicable rules and regulations are disseminated to all responsible state and local officials. The commission further recommends that not only should all concern agencies and groups be integrated into disorder controlled plans but they should be involved also to the fullest extent possible in the planning process itself as Brigadier General Harris W. Hollis director of operations office of the deputy chief of staff for military operations testified. The very process of involving all responsible officials in this planning process creates an awareness of common problems and assures that principal officials will know their counterparts in other government agencies and permits major policy questions to be addressed and resolve without the air of crisis which prevails after a riot brings out. Effective control operations require a specific and well-defined chain of command. Planning must clearly set out this command structure and provide adequate mechanism for communication of orders. In accordance with traditional concepts of government the mayor or other top city official must be an overall command because of the need for a clear command authority existing organizations and procedures of participating agencies should be reviewed to identify command weakness and to pinpoint any defects and routine operations that could be disastrous during emergency conditions. All plans should be tested in training exercises at a minimum exercises should include checks of the command structure and communications. Finally provision should be made to upgrade the plans periodically in order to take into account changed conditions or to incorporate new control equipment and techniques into the procedures. After a plan has been formulated and implemented steps must be taken to assure that all participating units are aware of their responsibilities under the plan. The plan should be set out manual form and made available to all participating agencies except for strictly confidential portions. The plan should also be made public. The public has a right to know what to expect from government during a disorder as well as what the government expects from the public. Major or prolonged disorders may cause severe shortages of food medical supplies and even housing in the areas directly affected. Local and state planning must include means to supply on an emergency basis these basic human needs. 2. Selected community and youth groups 2 groups may be extremely useful in control activities and in the prevention of civil disorders. A. Community groups already involved in government or police department activities through various police community relations programs as for example the police community relations councils set up in many cities. The value of these groups was cited by one police chief who reported that during a disorder members of a neighborhood improvement group that had previously been meeting with police community relations people took to the streets and successfully persuaded parents to keep youths off the streets and in their homes. Improper planning led to an instance where an agency issued passes to certain individuals who were to attempt to cool the situation and who were themselves arrested by the police for apparent involvement in the disorder. All groups with the potential to help should be included in the planning process to ensure that their views and judgments are respected and used by the planning agencies to the fullest extent possible. They cannot be expected to participate effectively in control activities if they are called upon for help only after trouble has broken out. B. Youth groups Evidence developed to date shows that youths are the main participants in a typical disorder especially in the early stages and are the principal source of energy for many of the disorders. In Detroit for example preliminary evidence shows that 50 to 60 percent of the persons arrested during the riot were under 25 years of age. In the 1965 Watts riot final records of all arrests reveal that 45 percent of those arrested were under 25. Several cities have urged groups of Negro youths to assist police and others in the control of civil disorders. In Tampa, Florida and Dayton, Ohio they were called white hats. Their use has generated widespread publicity as well as debate on their effectiveness. The Tampa white hats were organized during the Tampa disorder by three Negro adults a doctor, a policeman and the head of the Tampa Human Relations Commission. The county sheriff gave the youths permission to patrol the riot area and later furnished them with white helmets for identification. The youths who were recruited from active participants in the riot patrol the riot area particularly during a period when law enforcement officers were pulled out. This group has since been disbanded. In Dayton, Ohio the youth Dayton police also referred to as the white hat patrol was organized by a Negro state legislator. Many of the youths involved had criminal records and once again were potential rioters. In the June 1967 disorder in Dayton white hat patrol helped persuade other youths to stop disorderly behavior and was influential in getting them off the streets. There are however conflicting reports on the effectiveness of these groups. The director of the Tampa Commission on Community Relations an organizer of the Tampa white hats claims that they were very effective in restoring law and order in Tampa. Extensive publicity in national media echoed this assessment. On the other hand certain police officials have minimized the importance of the Tampa white hats. They claim that the youths were used only after the disorder had peaked and the riot was waning or after police measures had taken effect. The same officials have said that they would be reluctant to utilize such groups primarily because of the vigilante aspect of their activities. The commission still lacks conclusive evidence on whether youth groups like the white hats can be effectively utilized in all instances to help control disorders. Types of disorders and youths as well as the quality of leadership are hardly standardized but the fact is they have been used with at least some degree of effectiveness. The commission therefore recommends that intra city planning give attention to the possibility of using youth groups in control activities. This planning must be highly flexible to cope with the changing leadership of these groups. The delicate balance must be struck between working with and against youth groups. Both courses carry implicit dangers. Working too closely with them can ultimately reduce their effectiveness since they may become too closely identified with the establishment but placing the establishment in direct opposition to them may itself contribute to a disorder or at least galvanize hostility during a disorder. Intercity planning Control of a major civil disorder will generally require resources beyond the capabilities of local government. One response to this problem is to seek state aid. The other is to obtain the additional manpower, equipment and services from neighboring communities by means of pre-existing plans or agreements, often referred to as mutual aid packs. We here explore the latter alternative. A variety of mutual assistance packs are already in existence, primarily in the fields of fire protection, water supply and sewage disposal. The agreements range from the simple exchange of information to elaborate procedures covering all municipal services. Mutual assistance agreements for police services in emergency situations are less common and are generally on an informal basis. A study of 26 major police departments revealed that 10 had no written mutual aid agreements for control of civil disorders. 12 had informal agreements and only 4 had formal agreements. Some departments also said that they had made arrangements to borrow various items of equipment from neighboring jurisdictions. If these figures are typical of the entire country, it is plain that many cities are either overlooking or rejecting a potentially useful source of additional manpower and resources for the control of disorders. Mutual assistance packs have these advantages over obtaining help from the state. Help may arrive much more rapidly. Repeated use of state police or National Guard forces may reduce or eliminate their psychological value. Police officers from nearby communities may be more effective because they are familiar with local geographic and sociological patterns. Agreements may lead to increased cooperation and coordination of activities in other fields. And the additional funds, personnel and equipment for riot control can be utilized by local police departments in both emergency and ordinary operations rather than diverting these resources to state forces established solely or primarily for the control of disorders. There are also certain disadvantages in mutual assistance agreements. Riot control requires unit operations much like those used by the military, not the individual approach characteristic of normal police work. Police community relations may be so bad in an area that only outsiders, not neighbors, can cool the situation. Units may have an important psychological effect on rioters and may be more effective because of their training. Police departments in adjoining communities may differ widely in quality of personnel and the lower quality departments tend to dilute the effectiveness of the better ones. In times of emergency, a police department in a neighboring city not experiencing a disorder may be reluctant to release its forces because of the possibility that trouble may spread. Although the commission lacks sufficient data to weigh these conflicting factors, we believe for several reasons that mutual assistance agreements frequently offer a useful alternative to state aid. First, leading police officials have recommended them, particularly for supplying stop-gap aid until needed state forces can be mobilized. Second, there is evidence that these agreements work. Even in the aftermath of a major disorder in a nearby city, a community with a police department of 65 was able through a mutual assistance agreement to augment its own department and produce a total force of some 300 men drawn from the county and from 31 neighboring communities. Third, we believe basically that a community which demonstrates that it can maintain public order by means of its own resources plus resources from neighboring communities can, in the long run, more effectively earn the necessary respect from all elements of the community. End of Section 64. Section 65 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. While LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Kerner Commission Report. Supplement on control of disorder. Coordinating the control response. Part two. Although local considerations are paramount in formulating mutual aid agreements, certain basic factors must be taken into account. Proper planning. Any effective response to a disorder demands full coordination and planning of all agencies that may be involved in control activities. In the preceding section of this report, we outline the necessary intra-jurisdictional planning and coordination to deal with civil disorders. The same factors must be considered in drafting intercity agreements. Without proper planning and objective evaluation of the community resources available, mutual agreements are largely worthless. Legal problems. Although we believe there are no insurmountable legal problems for putting into effect mutual aid agreements with the possible exception of home rule cities, state legislation may present unnecessary obstacles. For example, by restricting such agreements in adjoining communities. The commission recommends that each state not only undertake a review of existing legislation regarding mutual aid agreements for emergency services, but also provide any necessary legislation to permit these agreements to be fully implemented. Such legislation should assure that police officers serving in other jurisdictions have adequate authority to do their jobs and that police firemen and other government personnel are given protection against damage suits, loss of personal pension rights and loss of disability benefits. In accord with the Supreme Court case of Virginia versus Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 1893. Intercity mutual aid agreements cross state lines require statutory authorization of both states. They do not require congressional approval. Financial arrangements. Since the control of civil disorders may be extremely expensive, mutual assistance agreements must provide for payment, of course, in a manner that will encourage rather than inhibit prompt and immediate response in time of emergency. Various methods of allocating costs include a portion of the cost of control activities among participating jurisdictions by a formula based upon either the location of the disorder or the relative size of the contracting cities. Each jurisdiction bearing its own cost with the mutual advantages of the agreement considered adequate compensation or one jurisdiction offering its services to another jurisdiction on a free basis. Basic operating procedures. Any workable agreement must specifically delineate operational procedures including methods by which the agreement can be invoked or activated, command arrangements for integrating the services of the calling and responding forces, the conditions under which a jurisdiction may decline to respond to a request for assistance, e.g. if it has a major fire or disorder within its own borders, a method for terminating the agreement, supporting steps to be taken by participating jurisdictions as e.g. imposition of curfews in ordinances and neighboring cities, a basis for allocating liability for compensation of injured personnel, arrangements for cooperative training and riot control techniques and training and joint operations pursuant to the agreement. Although responsibility for implementating intercity mutual aid packs rests primarily with the cities involved, state government has a corresponding duty to aid the cities in formulating these agreements and, furthermore, to integrate the agreements into state plans for controlling disorders. California, for example, has a master law enforcement mutual aid plan providing for extensive inter-jurisdictional support during a natural disaster or a riot. The community's request for help in controlling a disorder is first referred to the county. If the county is unable to supply the necessary resources, application is then made to a regional coordinator who draws manpower from local governments within a particular geographical area under his control. If this aid is still inadequate, a request is made to the director of the state disaster office who can then transfer to the riot area resources from any jurisdiction in the state, other ways in which a state may promote inter-city mutual aid agreements include legislative reforms to remove legal impediments to mutual agreements, counseling local jurisdictions concerning such agreements, determining the appropriate role of state police or national guard when mutual aid agreements are enforced, and providing specialized resources and equipment to participating jurisdictions. Whether or not a joining jurisdictions implement formal mutual assistance agreements, they should at the very minimum coordinate operations in areas where there is a joining or concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction. Failure to do so may have tragic consequences as, for example, when the county police broke up a meeting for lack of a park permit after a city police department authorized a grievance meeting with rioters in a public park. Interstate mutual assistance agreements A major disturbance within a single city or a series of disturbances in a number of cities may require control resources beyond city and state capabilities. For example, the Watts Riot in August 1965 required a commitment over 13,400 national guard troops 62% of total strength Newark needed over 4,000 national guard troops over 30% of total strength In Detroit 8,262 national guardsmen 85% of total strength plus 2,137 air national guard troops together with more than 4500 federal troops were deployed or in reserve nearby. If simultaneous major disturbances had broken out elsewhere in these states resources far beyond state capabilities would have been necessary. There are two major sources for additional aid one federal forces as in Detroit of July 1967 or two state forces from adjoining or nearby states pursuant to interstate mutual assistance agreements Interstate agreements for the commitment of national guard forces of more than one state besides requiring congressional approval present delicate and complex problems of federal state relations Furthermore, utilization of federally financed and trained national guard troops pursuant to such agreements also raises problems relating to the primary purpose and mission of the Guard Policy arguments against the use of such agreements focus on the established principle that military forces should not be used against civilian population except in circumstances of extreme necessity and then only in the degree for such duration as may be necessary to restore order the use of federal forces to assist a state in controlling a civil disorder is restricted by a system of checks and balances that divides both power and responsibility between an individual state and the federal government This carefully balanced allocation of functions provides protection against premature or excessive use of military force to control civil disorder Under interstate agreement the governor would be able to call upon one or more other states for military assistance and would thus be able to concentrate military power without the restraints imposed by the federal state relationship such power could potentially lead to excessive or indiscriminate use of military force against the civil population On more practical grounds we have already noted that the dual federal state function and mission of the national guard create difficulties in the use of the guard for riot control purposes even within a single state We also noted that difficulties and burdens imposed upon individual guardsmen when one guard unit is pressed into duty two or more times within a limited period of time These difficulties would be greatly enlarged if guard units were subjected to call up in more than one state pursuant to interstate agreements Furthermore, because special army units are immediately available for riot control duty because the army and air force can rapidly transport large number of troops Federal troops could be dispatched to the scene of disorder and considerably less time than would be required for mobilizing and deploying guard forces from adjoining or nearby states pursuant to interstate agreements Finally, the disciplined military experience and intensive training received by active federal troops make them generally more effective than national guard troops in putting down violence with minimum force under the adverse conditions of working in a strange city and state Interstate mutual assistance agreements for non-military aid firemen and firefighting equipment food emergency equipment medical supplies and services would not be subjected to the difficulties summarized above and could play a valuable role in augmenting state resources vertical planning coordinated state local planning we've previously noted that for most states the national guard is the primary control force available to supplement police forces in a single city coordinated planning for state assistance must therefore center about the national guard to the extent that state police are available in sufficient numbers and with adequate training for patrol operations planning should also encompass their use most of the police department surveyed have some plan or arrangements for obtaining state help the department of the army has also established liaison with the agitance general of all state national guards in order to review or prepare riot control plans for major cities within each state and coordinate federal state and local plans the commission commends these actions it strongly recommends that the appropriate state civil officials heads of the state police departments and top local civil and police officials of these cities be involved in the planning process state officials must also assume the responsibility for establishing liaison with local officials in any city within the state that may experience a disorder in order to review or prepare riot control plans the commission cannot deal with all aspects of state local planning but if all participating agencies are involved in the planning process and if plans are tested and training exercises most problem areas will be identified and suitable solutions found however evidence available to the commission has demonstrated that three major problems must be resolved in order to formulate ineffective state local plan these problems and some suggested guidelines for a solution are as follows one authority to request and order call up of state forces in the early stages of one of last summer's major disorders the initial call for state police assistants came from an inspector of the local police department and was directed to the head of the state police however under state law only the mayor could ask for and only the governor could provide this assistance time was lost because of the failure to use proper channels since most states have specific laws setting out who can call the national guard or the state police any plan must necessarily take into account the statutory procedures many states do not have laws specifying who has the authority to request state assistance and some laws do not specify the conditions under which state assistants will be authorized whether or not requested these points should be covered in an effective plan which should also provide for a proper delegation of authority if the primary official is unavailable as with all aspects of planning it is imperative that the provisions for requesting and ordering state assistants be made known to all officials including operating levels 2. Command and communication between state and local forces although most police departments surveyed understood how to request national guard help the question of command if the guard or state police was called in was largely unanswered in some states command responsibilities are spelled out in the state statutes and others it is left to agreements formal or otherwise or to executive directives an effective state local plan must specifically resolve this question the commission heard conflicting testimony from national guard officers and police officials on which agency should be in command it is unnecessary for the commission to make recommendations on this point since a specific answer is less important than making certain that the question is resolved that it is resolved in advance of the emergency and that to the fullest extent possible it is resolved in favor of a single commander adequate planning for coordinated acts as well as physical proximity of command posts should eliminate most command problems regardless of who is in overall command such planning should also eliminate possibilities of different degrees of force by different law enforcement groups as for example when one group increases aggressive action while another is unloading weapons and attempting to reduce tensions commitment of national guard troops as individuals or impairs destroys the basic value of the guard as a disciplined force to be deployed as units and in strength appropriate to the emergency merely adding guardsmen to police patrols as was done in some cities that experience disorders is not effective for the unit commander loses control and cannot readily assemble his unit to respond in force except for the desirability of having some police officers with a national guard unit to serve in a liaison role or to make any necessary arrests and write charges military and police units should not be deployed together thus regardless of overall command any plan must ensure that guard units are utilized as such and under control of a guard officer adequate command procedures require that the state and local forces be able to communicate with each other officials from two major cities pointed out the extreme difficulties encountered in communication between local police and national guard in one case there was no direct communication between the national guard troops on the street and the local police unless police officers were riding with the national guard troops or utilizing the police walkie talkie system in the other instance the state police radios were on a frequency different from that of the local police department and according to one state official the local police did many things that the state did not know about till much later effective state local planning must also take into account that state police and national guard forces may be working with local agencies other than the police particularly fire departments adequate command provisions including communications must take these additional agencies into account moreover state local planning should not neglect other state resources such as state community relations departments three training planning is not enough there must be some provision for testing any plan to discover weaknesses before a disorder preferably by a command post exercise many police chiefs have also suggested that in order for state and local forces to coordinate their activities correctly each must have full awareness of the organization function and capabilities of the other organizations both national guard and police officials emphasize the desirability of joint training between national guard troops and state and local law enforcement officers the commission recommends that each state thoroughly explore the possibility of undertaking such training especially at the command level these exercises not only enhance the capabilities of both the national guard and the local police but also provide the necessary testing of state local and state local planning federal state coordination article four section four the constitution provides that the federal government shall protect each of the states against invasion and on the application of the legislature or of the executive when the legislature cannot be convened against domestic violence to carry out this provision as well as its authority with respect to the militia the congress in 1792 enacted the statutory provisions that now appear with minor amendments as section 331 and 334 of title 10 of the united states code these sections authorized the president after a request of a state after issuing an appropriate proclamation to use such of the federal armed forces as he considers necessary to suppress insurrection or domestic violence in that state however in accordance with both constitutional policy and the legislative history of these statutes no president since these provisions were invoked in 1838 as ordered federal troops into action until one the actual request for federal troops had been received from the state and two it had become clear that the disorder was beyond the control capacities of state and local authorities as a result since 1932 federal troops have been dispatched at state request to quell domestic violence only in 1943 and 1967 both times in Detroit the most recent experience in Detroit demonstrated the kinds of problems which can develop in the use of federal troops to control civil disorders we firmly believe that primary responsibility for the control of civil disorders rests with the cities in that the state should provide the necessary reserve manpower and resources we recognize however that in some instances no state will have adequate manpower or resources to deal with a major disorder or to deal with disorders in a number of cities because of the problems that would be created by use of interstate agreements the federal government will be the only source of the necessary additional assistance the adequacy of the existing statutory authority and administrative mechanism for call-up of federal troops has been questioned as a result of the Detroit experience a particular concern are the implications of the use of the word insurrection in section 331 and the requirement that federal troops can be dispatched only if the violence cannot be brought under control by state and local resources the word insurrection creates fears because of the possibility of nullifying insurance policies which generally do not protect against damages caused by insurrection however the constitution speaks only of domestic violence not insurrection and federal troops have been dispatched at state requests in various situations other than political uprisings as a result existing instructions to states for obtaining federal troops require only a request based upon the existence of serious domestic violence the second point requiring exhaustion of state resources presents a more serious question since it limits use of federal troops to the most extreme situations here the requirement is based not upon specific constitutional or statutory language but instead upon constitutional policy legislative history and the precedent established by a number of presidents some claim this requirement should and could be eased by amendment of section 331 others point to the wisdom of severe restrictions on use of federal military forces against civilians a concept that is inherent in the constitutional separation of power and responsibility between the states and the federal government although we express no opinion on the constitutional aspects of the latter argument we are in accord that it represents sound policy and believe that the existing conditions for obtaining such help should be retained we suggest however that in determining whether to commit federal forces the state of preparedness training and availability of the state's national guard troops be taken into consideration although we agree with the policy underline the use of troops pursuant to section 331 we suggest that the section be amended to update it and ensure that the language reflects existing presidential precedents the amendments should a change the word insurrection to domestic violence to eliminate any possible difficulties b make clear that the president will honor a request from a governor not only when the state legislature cannot be convened but also when the legislature cannot act in time to meet in an emergency situation c make clear that the president will honor a request from a governor only when the state is unable to control the violence with its own resources including its own national guard d correct the apparently unintended restriction that only the national guard of other states not the state requesting help can be called into federal service e generally modernize the language e.g. change militia to national guard certain difficulties in obtaining federal troops can be ameliorated if state and local officials are fully aware of the means by which federal assistance may be granted and the conditions that must be met to this end attorney general ramsey clark wrote the governor of each state in august 1967 and outlawed the legal requirements for using federal troops to quell domestic violence and the means by which federal assistance can be obtained copy annexed as exhibit a to this supplement to avoid any possible misunderstanding on the use of federal troops the commission recommends that each state take the appropriate steps to have the information in this letter disseminated to all state and local officials to the adjutant general for dissemination to the national guard and all heads of local law enforcement agencies conclusion the fully coordinated planning recommended in this portion of the report will require the time effort and active support of government officials and community leaders it would be tragic indeed if this time and effort were expended solely in planning for a paramilitary response to civil disorders the commission therefore recommends that the government and community leaders involved in the planning should use the planning process as an opportunity to deal with other vital problems to assure that the resulting plans can serve additional valuable purposes the same planning and resources needed to control the serious civil disorder are also essentially applicable to any major local disaster or emergency which requires a total community effort as well as outside help such emergencies and disasters include for example floods, hurricanes, explosions and major fires even for individual agencies portions of the civil disorder control plans can often prove useful in dealing with a variety of common and recurring problems for example local police departments plus state police are often required to work together and coordinate operations in order to control and regulate large groups of people who assemble for parades visiting dignitaries and sporting events if these other purposes and uses are considered and acted upon during the planning process the resulting plans will have utility far beyond riot control more important the effort spent in planning for control of disorders provide government and community leaders an important starting point for efforts toward the ultimate and responsible solution to the problem of civil disorder a fully coordinated government and private attack on the conditions that give rise to the disorders and section 65