 My topic is whether de-globalisation is on the way, not a totally unrelated topic to Brexit, I must say, but still a much wider angle, which will be the substance of these few remarks before we go to Q&A. And I have no doubt that when we are back to Q&A Brexit, we'll come back to haunt us. Now my starting point is that there are symptoms of de-globalisation. My second observation will be that yet I do not believe de-globalisation will happen. And my third and last point would be that even if globalisation goes forward, which I think it will, this does not mean that it is without serious challenges. We have a few symptoms of de-globalisation, both on the economic side and on the side of politics. On the economics, we know that the trade-to-GNP ratio, which had been growing for the last decade, has been reduced from 1 to 2, 1 to 3, even 1 to 3.5 in some periods to something which is more 1 to 1.5. We know that the financial crisis has led to a de-globalisation of finance and of the finance industry as risks is more properly weighted. Third, financial institutions take less risks and when they take less risks, they interact with people, systems, companies. They know more and you always know more about your proximity than at distance. So this has led to a shrinking of trade flows to some extent to invest in flows and certainly to trade finance flows, which for obscure reasons had been considered as risky by the Basel Committee and it took me a few years when I was DG of WTO to convince these people that trade finance was reasonably safe activity. There are also views or signals that with 3D printing, with artificial intelligence, you could relocalise, repatriate production processes which had been sent away. So there's a series of signals of this kind. And of course, we also have these political signals, which are in some cases loud and clear, that enough with globalization, maybe this benefits others but not me, all the people whom I live, hence this sort of protectionist, isolationist identity-based potions and surges, the election of Trump, movements in Europe and the US who are now pushing for America first or my country first and to some extent Brexit is probably a part of that although, and I'll come back to that in a minute, the answer Brexit being that Britain wants to be global is something of a paradox in this situation. So we have symptoms of either some reality of globalization or some desire of deglobalization, which finds a political expression. And by the way, not only in US or EU, Turkey, Philippines, Russia are also good examples of that. Now, does this mean deglobalization is underway? No. I don't believe it will happen. I don't believe it will happen, A, because economics are now organized in such a way that the cost of deglobalization are higher than ever and probably too high in my view for deglobalization to happen. And second, because in the politics, because of this resistance of economics to politics, in most circumstances, the political appeal to deglobalization will remain more barred than bite. On the economic side, and I've seen that for a few decades, the numbers that appear and which point in the direction of deglobalization are doubtful. And notably this famous trade to GNP ratio, which is a ratio between peers and appers, trade measured in volumes and GNP's measured in value addition, which serious economists would say makes no sense. The more globalization expands, the more the multi-localization of production processes leading to an intensification of the volume of trade happens. The more this ratio between volumes of trade and GNP increases. And it sometimes increases rapidly, sometimes more slowly. What matters if you want to look at the reality of globalization is not to measure trade in volumes, but to measure trade in value addition, the same way as you do it with GNP. And there are statistical methods to do that simply. They're not the same as the ones that you use to filter production statistics into GNP. And if you look at trade measured in added value, then the picture, the evolution of trade globalization is very different. And this is correlated by the fact that the import content of exports keeps going, but for a very specific case, which is China. So if you look at serious economics, serious numbers, nothing like a prospect or even a reality you could measure of the globalization, the only thing that appears is some slowdown of the speed of globalization. Because in some areas, the expansion of value chains is not eternally yielding positive results. At some stage, you reach the efficiencies which you wanted to reach, and you have to wait for a change of relative prices to move to another set of efficiencies. If you look at an area which we don't measure well, but which is getting more and more important in globalization, which is data, the flow of data, which is circulating worldwide and international, is rising exponentially. The data globalization offsets in terms of its importance from far the bit of financial deglobalization, which I mentioned before. The reality being that these global value chains, which is the way the economy, the modern economy now works, whether goods or services, are there to stay and even progress further as technology keeps cutting the cost of distance, which is the only factor, the evolution of which both Mr. Ricardo and Mr. Schumpeter could not dream of. They produced their theories, and I'll come back to that in a minute, in a technological context where the main obstacle to trade will always remain distance. And they explain why other factors like comparative advantage, like competitive shocks, destructive creation and so on, would overhaul production systems, but their view was that this was within a situation where distance would remain a big obstacle to international division of labor. Now, this has totally changed. Every day brings something that crushes a bit more the cost of distance, whether for goods, which have to be transported, or for services, which have to be transported, which is informations. And I'll take not to be too abstract, not to be too cartesian, I'll take two examples of that. In last week's news, in France, which remains my main country of residence, although I spend most of my time elsewhere, we have a problem, we've had a problem last week, which is that butter has disappeared from a number of supermarket shelves. No butter. Big thing in the press, a bit more in the north and in the south. No butter on supermarket shelves. What's going on? We have a globalized market, capitalist society, and these guys are not even able to provide butter. And of course, the moment the rumor that there won't be, oops, everybody jumps on butter, and of course, there is less butter the next day. The reality is that the butter production, which you in Ireland know very well, is not just producing butter. It's very complex. You have a need of cow, you need milk. You need to feed the cow in such a way that it produces milk, which is more or less fat content, and sometimes you need a cow that produces a lot of fat milk, but sometimes less fat, so you change a bit of the genetics of the cow, but also the feeding of the cow. And then the Chinese suddenly decide there a bit of regulation, and the next week New Zealand butter and milk goes to China, and if it goes to China, it doesn't go to Europe. And if you dig in the reasons why there suddenly is a lack of butter in supermarkets in France, it has to do with global supply chains. Somebody has done something that has disrupted the rationality of the system, that has changed relative prices, and I better send my milk to China rather than next door. Another example of this kind, which I think is also telling, is this, and you know that in Ireland because it's a sensitive issue here, this famous anti-substitute tariff, which Bombardier, which Trump, who, I want tariffs, I want tariffs, I want tariffs, he got a tariff, they brought him a dead animal, which is what he wants, which is a tariff. He got it, and then he put an anti-dumping tariff on Bombardier. The problem being, according to him, that Bombardier benefits from subsidies. I don't know any airplane producing system in the planet that doesn't benefit from subsidies, including Boeing and Airbus, and I've had some reason to be acquainted with this story for a long time. So, anti-substitute on Bombardier, and a fortnight after, Bombardier sells its mid-range body production to Airbus, which I'm convinced is not exactly what Boeing was after in pushing for an anti-dumping duty on Bombardier, nor did probably Trump know that in putting his tariff he would create this chain reaction, which lead to a sort of big bonus coming from the sky, which I think the people in Airbus would never have imagined this would happen. But it happens because there are value chains, there are relative prices, all this is totally interconnected. So that's the way it works, which is why I believe that the economics of globalization will resist attempts to de-globalize, probably, and to put it simply, and maybe too simply, because we've reached a stage of globalization which makes de-globalization too costly. Now, does this mean that there will be no bombs? Of course not. It simply is a recognition that the costs of de-globalization are a limiting factor to other elements which may push in this direction, which brings me to my third and last point. Of course, this doesn't mean that globalization will keep moving forward nicely, freely, like the Rhine, according to Helmut Kohl, who used to say when he was sitting in his office in Bonn, with the Rhine, the Rhine is flowing and that's the European history flowing. No, there will be bombs, there will be double answers. For one simple reason, which we know already, which we have to know will not be suddenly offset in the time to come, which is that globalization works because it's painful and it's painful because it works. And this is, by the way, what Mr Ricardo and Mr Schumpeter told us at the time when they wrote their theories. If you take them hand in hand together, not separately, they explain together why it works and why it is painful and why it works because it's painful and it's painful because it works. It creates efficiencies, which is what economic growth is about. Economic growth is a sum of increased efficiencies plus some movements in factors of production to the cost of reshuffling production systems which become more efficient because the allocation of production factors becomes more efficient. Nothing more to say about this. I recognize this a bit in global theory but that's roughly how it works. And of course this pain gain equation, which is there, has political, human, social consequences. It raises understandably and if anybody thought it wasn't the case, they were wrong. I wrote that in a book which I published when I left WTO. The day I recovered my freedom of speech, which is called the Geneva Consensus, which is the explanation of why trade works for the benefit of all under a series of conditions and negating these conditions or pretending globalization, the intensification of international exchange brings benefits to everybody is just nonsense. And I must recognize that some of them, not of us, but some of them sometimes are in this direction. The reality is that, yes, it is globally efficient, but it is locally uneven and that this distribution, the pain gain distribution, remains a huge problem. Globalization is not per se a fair process. It is an unfair process because the distribution of pain and gains is, as could be expected by good sense, better for the big, the rich than for the small and the tall, even if, even if we've seen formidable reduction in poverty thanks to the expansion of international exchange. We've also seen, and that has to be recognized, a very important increase of inequalities. Now, what's the way forward? And that's my final point, recognizing these unevenness, this intrinsically unfair nature of the system and address or try to address the unfairness issues both globally and locally. Addressing them globally is about roughly rules, rules on trade, rules on environment, rules on health, rules on social, rules on whatever animal welfare if this can be done, which creates a more level playing field so that this notion that between countries the game is unfair is addressed. We know what to do. We also know that diplomats sometimes have a problem doing it, which is why the solution is to get rid of diplomats as much as possible and do it in a way that works, although states would not agree. And this is the road to what I call the polygovernance as opposed to multi-governance, which is engaging in this global harnessing of globalization, not only states, but non-sovereign entities like cities, for instance, if you look at environment or HIV AIDS, mega cities on the planet have probably been playing a bigger role in addressing more of this problem than many sovereigns. Engaging civil society organizations, many of these organizations are globally powerful and much more powerful than many members of the UN General Assembly and of course business, because we know for sure that a number of multinationals have a bigger say on where the world is going than again many diplomats from many countries. And this is probably the way to go, although it's a bit more messy than the notion that you have a temple with chapel for everybody and a clear geometry. And of course the main issue about addressing this fairness issue is not the global one, there is a global dimension and organizations like the WTO, the ILO, the WHO, the IUT have their role to play and more to come hopefully. But the real way to address this fairness issue has a name which we know in politics which is called Solidarity, which is a redistribution of wealth, of money, whether taxation, whether through primary revenues or secondary revenues. And it has a name which is welfare, the prime being, of course, welfare being about solidarity is inevitably local because solidarity only works if there is a sort of feeling of belonging that it's your interest to have a better distribution, otherwise your own situation will be harmed. And this is only doable within a mental universe which is my proximity. And this is the way we have to go to address this Ricardo Schumpeterian equation and we know that the way we've done it, at least in the western world since the 19th century, which probably was the first big shock of globalization that led to a political reaction that led to the creation of welfare states, either by Beverage-like or Bismarck-like. Beverage-like because for moral reasons, Bismarck-like because for cynical reasons. I thought that some said that if Ricardo Schumpeter were too powerful, he would be ousted or hung at the street lamp, so we decided we'd better look at that. And this is what led to this welfare question, which historically is the interpretation of how modern capitalism expanded while not creating a revolution, which in theory should have created given the pain impact of the system. Now, we have to understand that, understand that the way we've done it until now needs to change for a variety of reasons, notably digitalization, the future work, artificial intelligence, the impact on qualification, the impact on mobility, the impact on the whole net system of economic, social, and cultural insecurity, which needs to be addressed. Social security in a global sense was about reducing social insecurity. The problem we have with the globalization, which we'll keep going on, is the force and the speed of this process necessitates better ways of reducing the economic, social, and cultural insecurity that come from that. And this is one more true everywhere. Of course, it's more sensitive in Europe, in the US. This is why Donald Trump was elected. What's exactly the proportion of economic, social, and cultural insecurity is a matter of huge debate in the US. Some say one-third, two-thirds, others say half-half, others say three-quarters, one-quarter. It's a fascinating debate in intellectual terms, but this is the thing we have to do. And we Europeans, which, I mean, if you look at your scene from the moon, the difference between us and others is that we spend half of the world-wide expenditure on social security. Now, the identity of Europe, as compared to the rest of the world, is less tolerance to inequalities than elsewhere, a higher disposition to address the sooner losers, although obviously not enough for movements like the ones we've seen going in recent times, whether on the extreme right, and that's where the big rise was, or on the extreme left, which is still there, but not with the sort of rise which we felt on the extreme right. We have to address this problem. And that's, in my view, the next question. And this is where we go back to Europe, which we do and we should do at the end of all these discussions. Thanks for your attention.