 to hear Dr. Brzezinski's many insights over the last several years. As many of you know, Dr. Brzezinski served as National Security Advisor to President Carter from 1977 to 1981, and in 1981 he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in the normalization of U.S.-China relations and his many contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the United States. As author of Strategic Visions, Dr. Brzezinski had set out a vision of integrating Russia into the transatlantic community. That book was published, I believe, two years ago, and so we need additional strategic vision now as we confront a very different Russia. So with that, please join me in welcoming Dr. Brzezinski. The fulfillment of that vision will be a few years delayed, but it will happen simply because most Russians are not suicidal and the path on which they're embarking doesn't lead to stability or progress. The alternative, becoming a vassal of China, is not very attractive. So if you eliminate these alternatives, what's left? So be patient, but be confident. This was not a prepared or a synchronized exchange of views. It was a spontaneous. I was given the task of talking, in fact, about Russia and the international system, and that's, of course, a very large subject. I deliberately did not peek into the television sets to listen to what was being said this morning because I was tied up by appointments, but also in the intervening moments, I didn't want just to listen to one presentation. I wanted to get an overview. I could be here all the time. So in a sense, I have the disadvantage of not having benefited from what was being said this morning, but also the advantage of being able to say what I thought about last night when I was reflecting on what I should say. Well, if we speak about Russia and the international system, we have a phenomenon of rather defiant a view of that relationship. It is a view in which Russia is seeking self-assertion on a somewhat dramatic scale, and an examination of that phenomenon calls for some comments regarding the role of ideology, the role of strategy, and the role of tactics. And I'll say a few words about each of these three. The ideology has now become really full blown. There is an ideology associated with the Putin regime. That is something that was not the case from the very start. It's something that hasn't been present in the Russian worldview since the 90s, early 90s, and the preceding ideology by then was increasingly relevant. But now there is an ideology, and it is an ambitious ideology. Those of you who follow it closely are already familiar with this contents because it has been spelled out by its author very fully in his speeches in February and in March after the seizure by force unilaterally of Crimea and in the Valdai annual meeting in which he chose to use a large segment of his rather lengthy speech to address his view of contemporary America. What emerges from it is a kind of curious combination of historicism, historical determinism, idealism, but above all national chauvinism. And that rhymes with another version of nationalism which we have known in the past. And that's rather disturbing. It is also reinforced by occasional casual observations about the state of world affairs which are revealing in terms of their inner content. For example, his recent partial defense, but defense nonetheless of the Hitler Stalin pact of 1939. That's not a trivial issue. That's not a trivial issue. That is a pact that led to an extraordinarily costly and bloody war onto the destruction, the factor of several societies in the process and millions of casualties. So we know a little bit about what this ideology is becoming. It is becoming an ideology which is characterized by great delusions regarding Russia's own potential because it views Russia really as one of the preeminent players in the world seen with a message of relevance to that very diverse and aspiring entity which we call the world. It is based on an integral nationalism which is very narrow in its conception and identification. It's also based on the claim that the government in Moscow speaks on behalf of all Russians who are the resident in Russia or not. That of course has an ominous ring for those who have Russians and are located next door to Russia. I have obviously in mind Estonia and Latvia which have large groups of Russians living in these democratic countries. It even includes the Russians on Brighton Beach, Long Island. So we are facing here in this country with a sudden realization that hundreds of thousands of either former citizens or future citizens irrespective of their citizenship have a prior obligation to a country distant from here and a country which has an extremely negative view of America as a society. What was interesting to me in reading that speech was how critical indeed how hostile its presentation of America was and that ideology aspires ultimately to the position of the preeminence in world affairs which the Soviet Union was seeking and partially obtained. So it is a program which has significant ramifications not only for domestic policy of Russia but for Russian role in the world either as a contributor to greater stability or to greater instability and that has to be assessed carefully but I do recommend to those who follow Russian affairs to read this speech carefully. I could go on on the subject for a long time because there's a great deal to this speech it has a specific definition of the Russian identity it has territorial implications and it provides the basis also of saying to those who may be having second thoughts about joining the Eurasian Union to be a little worried as in the case of Kazakhstan which is willing to be a member under certain conditions but wasn't terribly delighted to learn that people in the Kremlin are aware of the fact that western Kazakhstan as it was stated is inhabited mostly by Russians I think that had a lot to do with Nazarbayev's insistence that this whole enterprise be renamed no longer the Eurasian Union presumably with a capital in the Kremlin it's now the Eurasian Economic Union because of the insistence of earthly by Nazarbayev but also supported by the Belarusians who are now increasingly worried about their independence the Kazakhs who have always been very those Uzbeks sorry those Uzbeks who have always been very determined about their independence and so forth so the ideology is full blown it's a competitive assertive belligerent ideology and very much associated and that it's good part with one individuality because it is not likely to last too long it doesn't have the breadth and the sweep of ideologies that endure and that can be offered as alternatives to the ideologies of others whom one dislikes communism for what it was worth was a serious ideology an alternative view of life the Chinese have an ideology but no ideology of self-containment and one which avoids messages for others as to how they should transform themselves and on that basis they can associate with the United States relying on the shared foundation of mutual economic and financial success and it is derived also for the realization that in fact a massive economic financial world crisis would hurt both countries and the leaders of both countries know that so it is also a strangely self-isolating ideology now that leads me then to the second issue which I want to touch quickly and that is in the question of strategy and here I think there is a number of things are going to be noted some casual and some more explicit casual just as the reference to Hitler's talent pact involves in my judgment the sudden passion for aerial expeditions of Russian war planes flying to nowhere and coming home but just appearing near enough the territories not only of Russia's immediate neighbors who are already somewhat familiar with the problem that this kind of Russia is not very reassuring it involves some countries rather remote from Russia in the European context Portugal for example and why are Russian military aircraft approaching Portugal if one looks at the map it's destiny to nowhere where are the planes supposed to go except home or if they miscalculate their trajectories get shut down so it's a kind of a curious strategy but its fundamental essence pertains in my judgment first to intimidate Europe and I think this is what's very much involved in the strategic calculus here exploit or take advantage of the situation to see if Europe can be intimidated and it's based on the premise that Europe is not so integrated it doesn't share its shared strategic destiny with such intimacy as one would wish that at least portions of it can be intimidated and I think we can all identify the countries that I have in mind so intimidation of Europe is one important aspect of it beyond that and connected with it of course is the interest thereby to divide Europe because if some portions of Europe become more intimidated and some are less or not at all as in the case of some countries that I could also name who are not intimidated at all even though by themselves they would not survive and then it's totally different game but in any case division of Europe through intimidation and division is obviously a strategic objective that is being consciously propagated and some of what is said and some of what is being done even if it's symbolic obviously it's part of a larger design secondly or thirdly actually it aims at the separation of Europe from America and that is of course connected with the previous aspiration strategic aspiration and that would certainly undermine the whole notion of the Atlantic Alliance being a player a long-term strategic player it's not a goal that anyone can expect to achieve quickly even if one is as ambitious as the architect of this strategy in Russia but it certainly is an objective not unrelated to political complexities fatigue and disinterest in the United States perhaps also a great deal of ignorance in the United States about the current problems in Europe which unfortunately is a fact of life and of course it applies even more so to those closer to Russia in particular who border on Russia in effect create a kind of self paralysis in the Alliance that's an important objective and one which cannot be disregarded and it certainly reinforces the objective of dividing Europe in terms of its common political stand as exemplified by the European Union and that brings me to my third point oh before I make it I should have added one point here which I noticed on my notes scratch scratch on the margin revive that's part not part two the strategy revive fears of nuclear war yeah why is all of a sudden put in dropping all these references to the fact that Russia has an enormous nuclear arsenal we all know that's the fact but if he drops it often enough in this context it does give rise to the question my goodness maybe we're edging to nuclear war and in that case in that case of course it is a monumental disaster therefore one shouldn't do anything to precipitate it and one shouldn't get engaged in lesser issues that could conceivably contribute to the greater probability of nuclear war that is rather risky undertaking especially if one realizes that other powers particularly the United States have nuclear weapons but over the last several decades we have become accustomed to the thought that the nuclear suicide is no one's interest and playing with it it's like a Russian roulette with a revolver is not very smart strategy so there are these kind of highly personal risk elements in all of this and I think the combination of the new ideology in its contents and these strategic manifestations do give some rise for careful thinking about the personality and character of the principal leader involved here I don't want to go much too far on this issue but certainly a dominant leader who increasingly dominates the political scene imposes his own personality not just in form but in substance and what is being pursued or defined ideologically or strategically and I think there are some aspects to put in which suggests considerable self-esteem to a very high degree and perhaps megalomania is the right word somewhat exact somewhat unusual form of behavior and self-gratification in terms of various stunts that have been pulled by him obviously a feeling of some sort of special mission one doesn't know how to measure that one doesn't know where to define it or how to define it but it certainly gives food for thought so we have the ideology and the strategy reinforcing themselves in these ways and then thirdly there is a question of tactics and tactics pertain in this instance to Ukraine that is a test that is a test and I think the tactic on which Russia under the present circumstances has settled on is the tactic of the deliberate attrition the deliberate attrition of Ukraine attrition politically attrition financially that is to say impose pressures on Ukraine which over time have the effect of undermining the cohesion of the country and perhaps the questioning of its aspirations that seem to be currently widely shared the electoral process does illustrate that there is a real affirmation of Ukrainian identity a real affirmation of its aspirations to be both independent and European at the same time without initially any hatred towards Russia but with that aspect changing because of the sudden unilateral seizure of Crimea as well as the stoking of the fires in the Donbas and hence Ukraine in the process is becoming more hostile in its popular attitudes towards Russia I think the Russian objective here therefore is to create a situation in which the internal conditions in Ukraine precipitate increasingly unmanageable costs for sustaining independence obviously if the economy is disrupted if significant segments of its economy those which are oriented towards exports to the east become the objects of local conflicts and instability all of that has a total effect on the cohesion and functioning of the state and on the well-being of its citizens and if independence after a while becomes increasingly associated with with social disruptions personal discomfort spreading social poverty there will be questions about the viability and desirability of such independence despite the sincerity and intensity of the original commitment among some it may also produce more intensively negative feelings towards Russia but that may not be enough to sustain it especially if the country is so weakened that it cannot make even credible resistance feasible not a victorious resistance in an all-out war because the disproportion of power is such but such resistance as to make anything less than an all-out war not worthy even for the stronger party and this is why a war of attrition semi by force semi by disruption is the calculus that I think but in has increasingly embarked upon and that means that the west and this case I particularly have in mind Europe is going to be increasingly faced with growing costs of sustaining emergency measures to help Ukraine emergency measures which in terms of our calculus of our sense of responsibility Ukraine is entitled to have in order to survive develop and move forward in the process of entering Europe which is meant to be a prolonged one not a hasty one but a process which at the same time will impose increasingly costly consequences on Europe itself now in that setting the objective of splitting Europe becomes more achievable and therefore this strategy seems to me to be dangerous of course there could arise circumstances in which the whole process would lead to a complete collision and put in in his casual conversation with Barossa already hinted that in his view that would have on the one outcome a rapid military victory for the Russian armed forces thereby resolving this by force although with the risk and he realizes it that it would undo all of the progress made by the strategy in dividing Europe from America because an all-out attack would certainly bring the Europeans and Americans together although perhaps too late to do much good for the Ukrainians and that is the dilemma that we face and this is why it seems to me that it is absolutely essential and that has been said by everyone almost that we maintain close ties with the Europeans and that we are backed by a leadership in Europe which is capable of exercising influence on its neighbors in ways that are in some respects even more significant than our own direct influence and this is why I so welcome and respect the leadership that Mrs. Merkel Chancellor Merkel has been providing that's a very significant aspect of the present coalition that seeks a positive and constructive outcome to a problem that has been made in the object of rather one-sided unilateral measures that violate the European international system now that has of course its consequences that are tangible one of them is the question of sanctions I think sexual sanctions if the present disruptions continue and escalate will be absolutely necessary and that fight will have to be fought with all of the influence that those who wish to take a stand can jointly command here this also means addressing the issue of Ukraine capability to discourage the escalation of the war from nitpicking to more significant encounters to an all-out attack and that means enhancement gradually of the Ukrainian capacity for self-defense I have favored from the very beginning the provision of defensive weapons to the Ukrainians weapons that are literally defensive in the sense that you cannot wage an active offense with them and that means particularly weapons suitable for urban defense to prevail politically by military means in Ukraine doesn't mean that hundreds of tanks can roll over wheat fields and occupy them it means that cities the major cities are occupied and new political authorities are installed defending a city against an external assault and defending it on the ground without the city being erased by an atomic bomb is a very difficult object for the attacker to overcome and it is a city it is in a sense a set of fortifications that can be effectively used for self-defense and self-defensive weapons gain advantage in that context over the attacker when the Russians attacked in Chechnya the commander in chief of the Russian Armed Forces at times said that they'll take three days to end the war they attacked the capital almost from the very beginning it took them three months to crush the urban resistance during world war two there was the war so uprising which lasted 63 days in which the poles with minimal hand weapons were able to hold off the Nazis for 63 days actually to be precise two and two months and it means you have to take each fortification one by one and every house can be a fortification and with advanced modern weaponry it could be extremely difficult to accomplish trying to use tanks artillery and so forth and you don't liberate and subdue a country politically you simply raise it to the ground in that case you might as well use an atomic bomb so this is not something to be dismissed I would think at the present time since the west has decided not to inflame the conflict by providing overtly defensive weaponry to Ukraine a proper attitude by the west would be in my judgment to simply say that if there is a significant and overt breakdown of the ceasefire then the west will have no choice to provide defensive weaponry and especially if it can be documented that that has occurred on a large scale with direct Russian involvement I think that would be in any case a deterrent and while Putin is in charge of this entire enterprise in many respects its architect he's not alone he has a leadership group around him he has a number of intelligent economists and others and they can also assess the consequences for Russia of something that becomes prolonged and costly and dangerous and the calculus would not be very promising for Russia so there are things we can do and beyond that we can do one more thing which I suggested as early as February when speaking on this issue at Verkunda in Munich when the whole crisis broke out namely I wish you'd be willing to say publicly on overtly and I know this is controversial that in our view while we fully support Ukraine's long road to full European membership we do not envisage it to lead in to Ukrainian membership in NATO if one looks at a map one can understand why that indeed from the standpoint of the Russian perspective of the world would be a serious challenge the Russian sense of security and integrity and I think there's no particular gain to insist on that in effect a formula which is known publicly is that of Finlandization which makes Finns very angry I got many letters on the subject pointing out to me that Ukraine is not Finland and so how can I be suggesting Finlandization and I wrote them back and I said I know there is a Finland but I also know that there's Finlandization and all I'm talking about is Finlandization but not Finland but that's that's sophistry in a way and this is certainly doable and I think we should have done it from the very beginning if it becomes clear to the Russians that the negotiating process has to accompany their operational efforts to increase the costs and that these costs are giving rise to greater danger of spreading the conflict I think some reassurance on the score would be desirable let me add one point also which is marginal but not entirely outside of the subject in all of this Putin and his associates are counting very heavily on Chinese support and they're going out of their way to demonstrate that there is a strategic relationship a strategic partnership between China and Russia and indeed they're right in saying so that joint reference reference has been made to such an arrangement strategic partnership the problem is that there's no definition of what that strategic partnership entails and certainly there is no indication that the Chinese are inclined to infuse it with any substantive content in the UN they did not support Russia when the UN divided on the issue of its military action involving the seizure of Ukrainian territory and privately in conversations with us by some high officials even when we they make no effort to avoid saying what they think about the use of force by the Russians they're totally against it and I mean it totally but they're not above signing good deals with the Russians and when the Russians talk about the new relationship it involves some new deals on terms much more favorable than ever before to the Chinese so there's even some cost in this effort to insinuate that China is really backing Russia in its current ideologically driven strategically ambitious undertakings so all in all I end on a cautiously optimistic note namely that if we are set fast if our European friends and particular key allies stand with us if we are willing to do something more for the Ukrainians and if the Ukrainians hold together and are serious about transforming their country and also defending it up to the point of their capability then I think the inclination of the Kremlin to find some sort of intermediate solution will be greatly increased I don't anticipate an outcome looking at it more optimistically in which Russia gets on its knees and retains returns Crimea to Ukraine I think the most going to be expected is some in effect de facto but not explicit arrangement whereby living with Russian occupation of Crimea Russia and living with Russia accepting the existing borders of Ukraine with some special status for the areas that are being contested today would be from my point of view a positive outcome what I'm not going to say is going to outrage my Ukrainian friends and I have been a friend of Ukraine ever since my childhood and certainly since their independence and I don't see that we have any real obligation to pursue the recovery of Crimea at least until circumstances change in general and there is some sort of return of Russia to the European community and there are other benefits perhaps in some form of condominium between Ukraine and Russia regarding Crimea but the fact of the matter is that when the Russian stage they they're cool in Crimea there were approximately 12,000 or so give or take more there are different figures cited Ukrainian soldiers armed with weapons in Crimea not a single one of them fired that anybody else and when gradually people without designated uniforms but with masks on their faces supported by some aroused mobs were taking power not a single one fired a shot I find that very difficult to understand maybe because of my ethnic origins in that the fact is there was no resistance I don't think the international community has an obligation of running high risks or very high costs to force a solution to that problem but if there is accommodation over time it may be in Russia's own interest to have some reasonable accommodation especially if the present ideology and internal policy of Russia is unproductive and if its relationship with China doesn't produce what the Russians would like to have which is a kind of de facto alliance against America then Russia faced by internal difficulties a rising China next door increasingly influential in Central Asia will want to move towards Europe and will have to do so through Ukraine so to speak symbolically and that will be the moment at which perhaps next stage in a constructive resolution of this problem will be reached thank you very much Dr. Brzezinski that was uh unbelievable thank you so much for sharing your insights uh Dr. Brzezinski has very graciously offered uh to take a question I'm going to say singular because we're a little over time so if there's someone who has a question please raise your hand ma'am I saw you first let me hand the microphone to you if you could please identify yourself and please keep the question very short Dr. Brzezinski I'm Laura Sarekowski from the Finnish newspaper Helsinki Insane published in Finland I'm not going to ask you about Finlandization what I'm asking you is I don't understand the Russian strategy of harassing Finnish and Finnish airspace or sending a service to harassing what including Finnish airspace sorry I can't I can't yeah what about it it's hard to yeah I'm it's hard for me to understand that if Russia aims to keep Finland and Sweden out of NATO why do they then continuously intrude into Finnish airspace and send submarines to Stockholm's archipelago because that only drives the support for NATO up in Finland and Sweden so I was wondering if you could explain that because their psychology and the psychology of the Finns and the Swedes is different defense and the Swedes are rational people and calculating carefully the Russians when sort of aroused and Putin likes to draw analogies with lepers or with some other animals that live in the taiga and he says we are the taiga they feel that kind of demonstration is more persuasive I agree with you I don't think it's very smart I don't consider Putin to be necessarily brilliant but so far he's been successful within limits the question is is he going to go so far that will become a failure and it will be viewed as such by his own country and I think that's the risk he's running. Dr Przensky thank you so much please join me and thank you colleagues I'd like to invite our third panel