 Definitely informal. Shenzhen is all about informality. We'll try to keep it at that. Thank you, Laila. Thank you very much. Thanks to Joshua and Owning and Adam Frampton and all of you for coming out to this presentation of Joshua's book and of the book that I co-edited and helped co-author. I'm the only one of the three co-editors here because one of them lives in Shenzhen and one of them lives in California. So I humbly want to acknowledge that and to thank them, Marianne O'Donnell and Winnie Wong and all the contributors to the book. So I'm just going to talk in general about the book briefly and then give you a bit of an overview of it and we'll move to Joshua and then Owning and Adam and then we'll open up for discussion. I think there are actually some images here, but I didn't... Is that... Thanks. Here they are down here, I think. Yeah, actually... Play from start. Okay. Well, these are just supposed to... These are just going to be rotating in the background every 10 seconds or so. So a long time ago now, two famous models in China under Mao Zedong, the agricultural and industrial collectives known as Dajai and Daxing Communes, were supposed to showcase the collective spirit necessary to surpass England and catch up with the United States. At the end of the cultural revolution in the 1970s, this rallying call to surpass England and catch up with the United States sounded entirely hollow. But in the 30 years following, the People's Republic of China has thoroughly reversed that history of economic failure under a continued rule of the Communist Party and it offers a startling proof of this, the city of Shenzhen. The authors of this volume, some of whom live in Shenzhen, others who are drawn to the city, share a fascination with this Potemkin village made real. What, we wonder, may possible this statistical wonder that inverts earlier models. How did Shenzhen come to play a central role in cementing the legitimacy of the post-Mao Chinese Party State? With Shenzhen, the Party State has arguably achieved an economic liberalization far beyond what western-led, neoliberal global institutions have managed in the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe. How should we understand this phenomenon? The authors in this volume and the editors myself are acutely aware that those who emphasize the achievements of China's post-Mao economic reinvention tend to see Shenzhen through rose-colored glasses and see it as a site of veritable successes. Conversely, those who focus on the thorny problems of global capitalism in an authoritarian political system focus tend to regard Shenzhen as a site of its worst abuses. And in Chinese political discourse, by the 30-year anniversary of Shenzhen, Shenzhen had become the poster city for the success of official planning and policies. Model leaders, model workers, model villages, model industries, model institutions, and model governance are evident everywhere, rhetorically, in Shenzhen today. So what this volume tries to do is to seek to untangle the utopian and dystopian strains running through the representations of the city, the city of more than 20 million people. We broadly concur with the idea that it is an amazing achievement, that Shenzhen serves as a pivotal case study from which important lessons can be learned. Yet our analysis differs from the official story of the Shenzhen Miracle because that narrative tends to elide the actual factors and the agents of reform in that miracle, which we seek to bring back into the story. So while the official perspective logs the model as the logical result of coherent policies and plans, we argue that nothing of that sort took place. In fact, the model emerged out of a period of illicit and sometimes outright politically unapproved experimentation, which itself allowed for a series of exceptions to the model's own policies. These results were later canily reinscribed after the fact into the officially sanctioned and newly invented narratives about the city and then extended to other places. So in the book, we aim to highlight the shifting elements of socialism and capitalism that constantly recombine Shenzhen's history. Rather than privileging party state-led policies or the raw hand of the global market, our book focuses instead on the processes by which the construction of the Shenzhen zone and then model emerged. How, we ask, were the agents of reform transformed into model subjects of the Mew Order? How did the post-Mao appropriation of capitalist logics lead to a dramatic remodeling of the dominant institutions and discourses of the socialist planning era? Oops, I think that thing just stopped. I'll just keep it running back. So Shenzhen, as most of you probably know, was founded as a special economic zone, SEZ, in 1979. Not long after the American architectural theorists had promoted Las Vegas as a new model for architectural design and urban development. When Beijing sought to loosen central planning policies inside the newly created SEZ, this also unintentionally echoed the American's call in learning from Las Vegas for an architecture without architects. A city in which the withdrawal of social planning, design, and control could allow the emergent and chaotic features of capitalist environments and small-scale everyday heroism to take shape. Shenzhen is thus in some ways a supreme paradox of planning. It's held up as a pinnacle of planning, but its success lies in those spaces where planning for all intents and purposes fails. These spaces are the borders that are the preconditions for Shenzhen. The borders between Shenzhen and Hong Kong. The border between Shenzhen and the mainland, often known as the second line. The borders between legally urban and legally rural spaces. Borders between class, borders between people from the inside and from the outside. People with Hukou versus people without Hukou. All kinds of visible and invisible borders. And Shenzhen's spatial politics center on facilitating and controlling movement across these various kinds of borders. And the people of Shenzhen have developed extraordinarily complex socio-technical machineries, if you will, to regulate, evade, evoke, and provoke the movement across its very bordered spaces. Whether the movement of money, a product, of people, of labor, or of ideas. So the cases in this book, which I will explain in the moment, and then end, reveal how a certain looseness in the policing of boundaries, to put it mildly, or an ineptitude in certain forms of governance, is in fact the crucial mechanism of Shenzhen's dynamic growth. Our analyses show that for boundaries to function as value-producing mechanisms, they must both be ideologically firm and functionally blurry. In particular, the book focuses on three forms of spatial production. Borders, citizenship status, as in Hukou, and rural urbanization, since so much of Shenzhen was rural, and then found itself inside the newly created city. These three forms of borders, of citizenship status, and rural urbanization, we argue, mediate the city's political and vernacular geography of creating value through exploiting difference. The book details the progression of Shenzhen from experiment to official model. It's not an encyclopedic overview, but it is loosely chronological. It contrasts the early experimental period, roughly 1978 to 1995, during which the state was often an absent presence, with the period of urban consolidation, roughly from 1995 to the present, where the parting state apparatus increasingly intervenes in micro-level social change and appropriates the city's stunning economic success into larger national political narratives. The book is divided into three parts, experiments, exceptions, and extensions. Experiments begins with the ideological separation of politics and economics that positioned the zone as a target of governmental strategy, and starts by situating the city's very emergence against the backdrop of two genealogies of the special economic zone. One as a site of economic planning that enhances the accumulation of capital, and the second as a version of the imagined modern rational city with its inherent civilizing mission. The shifting relationship between economics and politics is made manifest in Shenzhen's early years, when political reforms were often forwarded and erased, becoming a case study of how experimentation in the early years often meant, in the first instance, strategic failure. The new city's urban planning apparatus also had to embrace strategic failure as a way of acknowledging difficult realities on the ground, and the need to diverge from national policy. One of these very difficult realities on the ground was the massive influx of migrant workers, and the section ends by detailing the shift from model leaders to model workers in the 1990s that prefigures a larger national shift in worker subjectivity as labor became increasingly commodified. We see thus by the end of the section how party-led campaigns, how state-run media and migrant worker written narratives themselves like the world of Da Gong, comes to operate together to forge a new consciousness through concepts such as Shenzhen's spirit. The second group of essays, Exceptions focuses on how the models discussed in the first part create and constitute exceptional spaces. The borders themselves to the formerly rural areas now located within the cities. We focus especially on the complex political and cultural geography of what are known as urban villages or urbanized villages, perhaps more appropriately, which we argue are the full-crim of Shenzhen's urbanization. These quasi-informal and quasi-legal communities are points of tension between the official world and village approaches to gray areas. There is a significant source of Shenzhen's ambiguity as a city defined by its gradations. Gradations between illicit, between formal and informal, between success and failure, between rural and urban. And this is especially true in the villages that straddle Shenzhen's political borders. The Sino-British border to Hong Kong in the south and a so-called second line to the rest of the mainland in the north. The section ends by taking us into the lives of the most marginalized of Shenzhen migrants. Female migrant sex workers whose day-to-day existence is shaped by socio-economic inequality and the structural violence of rural to urban migration as well as by a version of the desire for urban belonging. The third and final part, follows the Shenzhen model from its early construction of model leaders, model workers, model villages and citizens to its contemporary form of the city as a model. Posting model industries, model infrastructures and model professions. And indeed all around the world, from India to Africa, you often have the invocation of Shenzhen as a model for different forms of export-led and zone-led development. This idea of the city as a model entails mutually-referential negotiations with the global. Shenzhen becomes a model for the world through modeling itself after international examples. So we look in this section, for example, of cases from the creative industries by looking at workers in the infamous Dauphan oil painting village at public health through the way in which the Shenzhen municipality attempted to deal with the H1N1 flu pandemic, known as the bird flu, by creating a model based on the U.S. model of the Center for Disease Control and a really fascinating chapter on transport infrastructure. Looking at the informal check-in terminals that allow passengers in Shenzhen to check in for flights departing from Hong Kong International Airport. And unlike the very glorious international and empty international wing of Shenzhen's airport, these check-in counters are located in storefronts and shipyards and in border crossings. These cases underscore Shenzhen's increasing concern with the visibility of its model and the mobilization of the city's discourse of exceptionalism. Ironically, we argue, the more Shenzhen presents itself as model for others, the more it erases and marginalizes the diverse local histories and the various spaces, people, practices, and processes that were central to its development. So the title of the book, Learning from Shenzhen, echoes the slogans around a classic feature of socialist governance, like the models mentioned at the start of these remarks. Learn from Dajai. Learn from Daching. It also, of course, echoes the title of that famous book from the 1970s, Learning from Las Vegas, which provocatively at the time saw the liminal space of the Las Vegas strip as a new model for architectural design and urban development, as a site for reconfiguring socioeconomic relations through urban space. Although this is not a book about Shenzhen's architecture, we consider architects and urbanists among the stakeholders in China's historic experiment who can and should and must speak to the interaction to be explored between individual agents and governmental apparatuses, between foreign or migrant workers and local hookah-holding citizens. Other Chinese cities, particularly Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, have longer and more politically significant international and cosmopolitan interactions. And other city regions, such as Shamen, Chongqing, or Jiangsu, Delta have been equally influenced by foreign investment and ideas. But Shenzhen remains unique within China's post-Mao history as a place where the central government's early tolerance of informal and illicit practices, loosely confined within a variably administered space, created an excess of capital, of knowledge, and of imaginaries that extended beyond Shenzhen and into the rest of China and beyond. So what you'll find in the book is the city as a shifting subject, refusing easy incorporation into metanarratives of economic development, urban planning, or neoliberalism. One of the book's main points is that the city cannot be seen as a linear development from planned policy to execution. There are many grand narratives that can be used to explain Shenzhen. But whichever narrative one chooses, each of the authors and each of the cases finds in their own way that the crucial moments happened either much later or much earlier than would be expected or did not happen in a way that accorded with the plan or with theory or held a very different significance from a highly local perspective than for an outside observer with hindsight. Shenzhen then appears in this book as a condensed and instructive example of contemporary global modernity, where modernity is a force that relentlessly pursues standardization yet generates the very vernacular forms that it seeks to banish. We hope in this book to show how Shenzhen contributes to the ongoing reconfiguration of the meaning of collective life in China along with the reconfiguration of global economic and urban space for which Shenzhen is both emblematic and enigmatic. Thank you. Thank you, Jonathan. Okay, so I think you got a great insight into Shenzhen and what goes on in Shenzhen, both politically and from a cultural and anthropological viewpoint. Can I start the auto? I don't want it on auto. Seems to be doing itself automatically. I'm going to click, what? Oh yeah, that's in the PowerPoint though. Sorry about that, it just would be incredibly impossible to move the slides when I wanted to, so it would pose some difficulties. This book is not about Shenzhen, it's about Hong Kong, it's about the Hong Kong side of the border and particularly about the frontier closed area. The book is full of ideas, it tries to reclaim a space for the architect as a conceptual strategist in terms of urban planning. Most architects now don't get involved in large-scale urban planning and it really sets out an agenda for how architects can begin to contribute to thinking and about tactical interventions within complex urban areas. So Hong Kong's border with Shenzhen is dissolving. By 2047, 50 years after the 1997 handover, the border will most likely no longer exist. This will mean the conjoining of the economic, political and social systems that have so far been able to operate distinctly under the one country, two systems policy. Hong Kong will become fully integrated into mainland China, or will it? The uncertainty surrounding what will actually happen, which is still unknown has created huge anxiety for many Hong Kongers concerned about preserving cultural difference, language, and values, as well as freedom of speech and their right to vote. This was brought to the fore as you see here during 2014's umbrella revolution, initiated as a protest against Beijing's assertion that universal suffrage could only occur from a limited number of pre-selected candidates. However, Beijing has been adamant that the high degree of autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR, the special administrative region, is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely with the authorization by the central leadership. And over the last couple of years we've seen these infractions of how Beijing has begun to assert its control into the mainland, politically the notion of booksellers, which they were abducted for selling certain controversial news media, as well as the kidnapping of billionaire from the, was it the Shangri-La? The Shangri-La in Hong Kong. So again, this point where Beijing is inserting its control into Hong Kong. Now caught within this debate is the frontier closed area. This is a buffer zone, which was created by the British in 1951 to strengthen Hong Kong separation from the mainland. It was created after the British showed allegiance to the Americans during the Korean war, and as a result they begin to militarize this border, effectively creating DMZ along the line of the river between the mainland and Hong Kong. Today too it is being used and with it over 2,000 hectares of land are being opened up for Beijing uses. For 60 years this closed land has remained a landscape of ecosystems, including tidal estuaries, fish farms, primary forests, historic villages, and abandoned military posts. In stark context in just half the time the village of Shenzhen across the border has exploded into an urban metropolis which people now say is over 20 million with some of the nuances and some of the issues that Jonathan was discussing, particularly in his book. The future planning of the FCA exists at this critical juncture in the future unfolding of the political and economic relationships between Hong Kong and the mainland and ultimately in the acceptance and rejection of a conjoined Hong Kong and Shenzhen metropolis. The site is contested by numerous stakeholders including environmental conservation lobbyists, the powerful rural committee that are pushing the development interests of local villages. When the FCA was created this buffer effectively trapped villages within the zone, preventing them from developing their land and many of these villages who had kinship relationships in Shenzhen were very upset that they couldn't see how their land could be turned into economic wealth compared to their families over the border in Shenzhen. There are the stakeholders of course outside investors from both Hong Kong and the mainland and of course government pressure to supply housing. And in this instance we would argue that typical modes of land use planning including parceling off the land and zoning regulations do not take into account the kind of complexity of the border as a kind of contradictory site of both separation and exchange or the specific and synthetic landscape that exists within the frontier closed area. The border explores this unique ecology of this intermediary zone incorporating the specific narratives and their spatial effects that have evolved through the changing relationships and these dynamic fluctuations politically and economically between Hong Kong and the mainland. We want to reveal this kind of complex set of relationships that operate between the kind of macro policies and also these micro conditions on the ground. These nine strategies are insertions within this ecology offering alternate forms of development that are open ended to adjust to the region's unknown political future. The book is structured along the FCA and has these different chapters that go from deep bay in the west all the way to the east and we have six chapters focusing on different themes that have emerged from our field work in those specific locations. Enclaves encode debentancy which deal with the contrast between an aquaponics fish pond landscape and enclaves of suburban residential developments in betweeners which deals with the notion of a kind of in betweener identity of a population that go between and cross the border daily. Interstitial infrastructure which deals with the potential to embed a third space a mutual beneficial zone of infrastructure between the two sides. Scarred landscapes which deals with the flow of goods and materials and the scarring of the ground that occurs as a result of those border flows. Invisible exchanges which deals with these micro border crossings so that farmers within Shenzhen can still cross into Hong Kong to use their farmland through the tiny portal within the border and kinship economics and village alliances which really talks about some of the early variations of the border namely Chongming Street in Xiaotiao cock which was a kind of a border zone which allowed exchange between China and the British colony. So I want to just highlight two of these chapters and give you a little bit of an insight into the methodology and the approach that we've taken. The western most site at Deep Bay reveals a kind of extreme contrast between the kind of wetland landscape and these islands of suburban residential enclaves. Now this landscape has under has historically gone through multiple transformations through the changing uses of agricultural practices on the land. However at this moment this has stagnated and the fish ponds are currently artificially supported through government subsidies. The land caught between these two different types of enclaves becomes trapped and becomes very vulnerable for abuses by developers and villages who then try and encourage the process of degradation to these kind of trap parcels of land so that they can create an argument to re-designate the land for future development so that the land can be argued for new housing models. In our work in interviewing with the people who manage these fish ponds we learned that they had their own network of cooperation so that each of the fish ponds although managed by individuals they relied on each other to move water from one fish pond to the other to either refill the water or empty it in order to harvest the fish. So the idea in this case was to try and build off this network of exchange and turn the fish ponds itself into a kind of network of aquaponics systems and the proposal was instigating a kind of new mechanism of exchange between the fish ponds and also the enclaves. So we're trying to create new borders or new forms of exchange that can mutually benefit the fish pond owners as well as the people that were living in the enclaves themselves. This created exchange between the residential management companies and also the villages thereby offering an alternative to the publicly funded wetland compensation scheme. So here we see how we begin to work with the edge of the enclave and the edge of the fish pond to try and create facilities that could benefit the residents but also create cooperative ownership within this area so that it wouldn't just become a new development. It begins to reinstate the ecology of these fish ponds. You can see that just about this land has already been degraded because it's no longer filled with water or operating as a wetland. And the reason why the government is compensating of course is this is a protected area. It's in the MIPO WWF. It's a Ramzar site for bird wildlife that has only become recently into a kind of protected well since the 1980s into a kind of protected zone because it's encouraging this new migration of rare birds. So this is our proposition. In a different chapter we really look at this idea of in-betweeners. Every day there are over 500,000 passenger border crossings between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The majority via rail interchanging at the Lop Ma Chow or Lo Wu checkpoints. Over 60% of these travelers originate from Hong Kong and a proportion of this number is made by people who cross the border more than once a day for the purposes of informal trading. One individual was reported to have crossed the border 26 times in a single day and these parallel traders are exploiting a legal loophole. They buy in-demand goods from Hong Kong and sell them on the mainland. And this is how what we see one of the first stations on the Hong Kong side this is where the informal parallel trading begins. They load up with goods, they board the train, they go across the border and then they sell their goods informally and the types of products range from wine or even one of the majority of the products is actually milk powder due to the famous disaster melamine or melatonin that created death in the mainland. But this parallel trade is basically we begin to observe and trail the people responsible and find out how their systems and logistics were actually operating. And of course the scale of trade that was taking place would be a huge taxable amount but because they do it as individuals they're able to avoid that taxation and legal loophole. Another unique group of these cross-border commuters are school children who navigate the border daily to attend school in Hong Kong. Their numbers have increased from just under a thousand in 1999 to over 16,000 in 2012 and a predicted number by some of over 80,000 in 2017. They're Hong Kong citizens usually with one PRC parent with no right to abode in Hong Kong and therefore live in Shenzhen. These kids though don't have a local Hukou in Shenzhen and so are not able to attend school for free in Shenzhen and so every day they cross the border to the other side. As in betweeners they have to negotiate the differences between their citizen rights about where they live their education and their health care. In a way these two examples describe how these border dynamics initiate emergent flows and economies and begin to coalesce in physical space at the border control points of Lop Mao Chow and Luo Wu. The aim is to take advantage of these flows and try and utilize them and harness them and reposition them at one of the border control points. We chose to work at Lop Mao Chow. Lop Mao Chow has an ambiguous sovereign status basically it's a loop you can see in the bottom right corner a loop of land that was once part of Shenzhen but because of the straightening of the river became administered in the Hong Kong side. So since that occurred in the 1990s Hong Kong and Shenzhen have been debating the future of this piece of land they've been working towards a cooperative model of development but it's taken a huge amount of time to try and come up with a solution. What we're interested in is really this idea that the Lop Mao Chow is a type of third space. It's neither Hong Kong nor Shenzhen but it could harness this dynamic between the cross-border traders and the parallel cross-border children. Our proposal begins to superimpose these locations specific examples between the flows that we've been observing in the fields with the Hong Kong and Shenzhen government's intention to create a new university campus on the site. In this way the strategy begins to play top-down formal planning against more bottom-up methods such as the government's small house policy. So sort of learning through in a way what Jonathan was observing in some of these land use issues and rights to land that facilitated a type of development pattern in Shenzhen. We're thinking about how can we utilize this as a strategy for the development on this kind of barren piece of mud flat. And one idea was to take on the villages that have once been tracked for development within the frontier closed area and position and give them rights to small house development within the Lop Mao Chow loop. So we coupled this with a more formal strategy that would provide the kind of higher education systems that the government were asking for but also initiating this idea that these villages could build these houses and provide the more informal type of infrastructure such as shops, student accommodations in order to facilitate a much more dynamic urban model that was currently being proposed by the government. In this way we're trying to trigger urban diversity, community building and also shared resources such as libraries and other types of public facilities that might be catalyzed in this process. The final part of the book begins to attempt to widen the discourse and borders to begin to raise critical issues that are not only relevant to Hong Kong and Shenzhen but also that might impact the contemporary city. It approaches the city as an urban ecology based on the following concepts. That ecologies work with porosity rather than exclusion. They work with exchange rather than containment and cooperation rather than autonomy. It argues that the increasing polarization of the city and the prevalence of enclave as a mechanism to organize this segregated and closed model of urbanization which uses micro borders within the urban realm. So we said if we can learn from our strategies in Hong Kong we can extract those tactics, those organizations within the diagrams that we have and begin to deploy them on other case sites. The idea is to say given the contemporary city is beginning to have this increasing number of micro borders to certain tools that we can begin to extract and use them to begin to negotiate different types of territories and conditions from around the world. So the aim really is to create a series of spatial tools to negotiate difference and promote exchange. And these tactics are inherently agile and they're able to adjust to changes in the context and favor temporal shifts over permanent outcomes with the intent to allow the evolution of urban form its stagnation. In this way the design tools that we've derived from the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border can challenge the enclave through the use of ecology as a fundamental approach to designing the city. Thank you very much. I'm very happy to be here because I know everybody I know Jonathan about eight years ago I think that year you'll just start the research on the urban culture in Shenzhen. And in 2007 we worked together as gay loudest curators and last semester you gave me two books and I learned how you make the research on Hong Kong advice. Here I just shared the PowerPoint of my class last semester I lived and worked in Shenzhen for ten years from 1989 to 2000 and four years as Shenzhen University student and six years as cultural workers in the music industry and I also worked as the curator of the Shenzhen Hong Kong Biennale so I can say I know the city Shenzhen very well. I also believe you also know the story about how Shenzhen become a big city a small fishing village but today I would like to talk about something in the previous Shenzhen special economic period. Why Deng Xiaoping wanted to found the special economic zone in Shenzhen? Why is it that Shenzhen the small village on the Hong Kong borderline to find the special economic zone and then how is the organization situation before Shenzhen become a special economic zone then I pay attention to the third front movement and the reason I pay attention to this movement because a couple years ago I read a book by Philip Oswell, The Shrinking City Projects the project is talking about Detroit, New Orient Liverpool, Manchester, the city in Europe and United States which are shrinking and then I think of is China have some city shrinking? Then I make some research on this movement. So this third front movement start from 1964 to 1980. So 1980 is the year when Shenzhen was found and so the whole actually Deng Xiaoping also works as a main leader from the central government. He was in charge of the whole movement. So the movement because in 1960 China was in this cold war situation. Maladon got this coastal, the east coast as the first front and then the eastern province along the coast as the second front and then the third front mean including more than 14 provinces including Sanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Sanxi. So at that time China had a relationship with Soviet Union was broke up and then Soviet Union become the main enemy of China. So from the American, United States become another main enemy of China because Taiwan had a very good relationship with United States. So Maladon decided to move most of the liquid factory from northern and eastern to the inner land of China. So that is why China had this third front movement. And at that time during this movement the central government invest a lot of funding and move a lot of the factory and each factory then become a city. The central government also set up more than, it's about 100 research and development to achieve. So this is another kind of organism. I can say it is a very radical organism process because they build the city in the mountain or in the inner land China just for the national defense reasons. So the third front movement caused the largest human migration in China. Compared to the Shenzhen it was almost the same. Shenzhen, when Shenzhen was found, it was also called a large human migration. So a lot of the factory was moved from eastern from northern to the mountain. And those factory and then become a city because those factories should be confidential. They don't have to name, they just have a number. Nobody knows what those factories produce. And so all this city of factories is built for political and military purpose. And the human migration was mobilized by the state. It was a factory-centric city. It is a lot of an isolated danwei unit. And also it was managers in military's rave. It was not production space but it was just production space and not consumer space. A very typical sample is a city in Sichuan province. Just like Shenzhen it used to be a village because it has a very big island mine than the central government designed to build an island and still factory there. And then to show the factory they build everything for the factory including the school, hospital, so everything. And then Pan Zhihua became a city compared to Shenzhen is very similar. At that time Deng Xiaoping worked as the tree leaders for the South Front movement. But there's no work happened during 1990. So the central government invested a lot of money they produced a weapon but at the end of 1980 Deng Xiaoping, the central government also took the third front as a big ferry. Then also when Deng Xiaoping arrived in Shenzhen at the end of 1979 there was a very serious phenomenon in Shenzhen. There was so many local people. They escaped from Shenzhen to Hong Kong. They practiced the Mingming by Xiao Chenning and in 1952 it was about 100,000 people. In 1957 it was about 50,000 people escaped from Shenzhen to Hong Kong. In 1979 just before the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was found still have 100,000 people escaped from mainland China to Hong Kong including some parents from Hunan, from Jiangsu, not only the Guangdong province people. So Deng Xiaoping said so it was not because the PLA the People's Liberation Army not because they did not do a good job it's because the people who escaped from mainland to Hong Kong they got you rich in Hong Kong. I think if we want to stop the escape we need to develop the economic and Deng Xiaoping designed to build a special economic zone in Shenzhen. So we can see the connection between the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Deng Shenzhen started to become a city but all the city and factory in first front then stopped thinking. And also this very serious depopulation phenomenon happened in those cities. As an artist Cheng Jiagang he took a lot of photos about those factory and city. The situation depopulation situation in the third front area. So you can see this military organism the political proposed city was a big ferry and a lot of people from this area they left their hometown and then they went to Shenzhen and went to the eastern coast to find a job. So most of this city become empty. There was two films talking about this history. One was by Wang Xiaoshuai, the Shanghai Jun and Deng Xiaoping's 24 cities. So in the contemporary history of China I think it movement was very important. Actually because it was a big ferry it caused the open door policy and the funding of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. So that was the true book I read. And today in Panzu the city because the depopulation phenomenon was very serious. So the local government want to develop the tourism to activate the local economic. One of the policies is trying to transform the historical resources of the source front into a tourism content. So they developed the museum of China's in Panzhua. So a lot of city was built for the political purpose. There was also a lot of city like Shihe in Xinjiang actually was built from a Norman's land to a big city. Because the central government, they want to build the city for the land defense reasons. And when we look at the history Shenzhen was in the eastern coast and also from Ming dynasty, the central government of Ming dynasty already start to build the watch tower city in Shenzhen and in Yantai province. That was the why they built this watch tower because of the coast defense reasons. And then when I work in as the curator of Shenzhen, Hong Kong Biennial, I search a lot of the old photo from the local library and I found this photographer He Huang You took a lot of photo when Shenzhen was still a fishing village. There was the law who check point in 1965. And in the in 1987 the commercial, the borderline business start to be activated. And the main avenue was built in 1983. I also collect the color photos by an American guide. I think he was from California. He visited Hong Kong in 1980 and he was interesting in the small change the railway system in mainland China. Then he take a one day trip to Shenzhen and took the photo. You can see from the photo in 1980 Shenzhen was a sleeping Guangdong style town. People still using the bicycle and no visitors at that time. And there was a shop, the only shop in Shenzhen at that time. And after the special economic zone was gone, then Shenzhen have two borderline. The first borderline between Hong Kong and the second line is the center between mainland China. And in 2005 I was commissioned by Yang Hu Chang to do a research to participate in the Shenzhen Biennale and I was interesting in the second line borderline. You know the borderline was built along the geography it's a geography line. But Shenzhen, the demonstration Christian line is different from the second borderline. Then let's say right here, this is the second borderline. For example this the Longgang Christian demonstration line was like this. I mean in this area it belonged to the Longgang district but it was outside the second borderline. Then this area become no man's land. In Chinese we call it I saw a translation from it was translated as flower arrangement land. Because nobody take care of this land there was a lot of illegal development in this no man's land. So in 2005 I made a research on this no man's land because the illegal building was a clash and somebody died in 2004. At this time if you want to enter Shenzhen you need to have a Shenzhen special economic pass. When I was curating Shenzhen Hong Kong Biennale the second line almost just you can enter Shenzhen without the pass but still on the second line still have a lot of track point. Then every car or truck when they go through this track point they have to stop. So the second borderline become for the logistics and then a lot of people asked to demolish all this track point and demolished the second line. Shenzhen of course is another purpose built city and it was also a very famous arrival cities for Chinese people I believe at the beginning of 1980 a lot of Chinese people immigrated from the inner land and they realized their dreams in China and it became but today the Shenzhen government decided to demolish most of the urban village actually was a very good place for those people when they first when they moved to Shenzhen especially for those low income people they can fire a spade in this city and when Shenzhen government demolished all this urban village low income immigrant worker they could not stay in the city. Then Shenzhen was now criticize Shenzhen was not arrival city anymore and about the urban village actually I started research about urban village in Guangzhou, San Yuan Li that was in 2003 I made a documentary about San Yuan Li, the urban village in Guangzhou I think it was the first time that artists to make a research about urban village so after that because I present this documentary film and research in Venice Biennale and then the urban designer and architect pay a lot of attention to the phenomenon. So last semester okay I also use the title run from the urban village so it's a post-prandem vision so we learn from the urban village in Guangdong province. It is like they give say to the architecture instead of the architecture setting rule for life. In the urban village people they in the urban village people they build house according their life so when their family size become bigger and they will add they will build additional structure on their house that was the life give the shape to the architecture not the architecture setting rule for life and all of the urban village is a traditional village. There are so many traditional culture was kept by different older generation and younger generation and also there's a lot of people they farming on the rooftop. A self-organized society there's not only so in the urban there's a police station but also the religious looking at security they have a security team by themselves urban village is a 24-hour community with energy people. There's a lot of small business. A necessarily low cost place for the newcomer in the city and a spring ball for life and investment and career so social mobility via stratum solidification solidification so I believe urban village actually can change can provide space for the immigrant people and then they can make living in the city so last year New York Times have a report about Bai Shizhou which made a research on this village and they criticized Shenzhen was not a rival city anymore. Then in 2007 when Martin Yuan created Shenzhen Hong Kong Biennale he commissioned me to do a research about the second life so I visited a different trap point and I also proposed to propose in an artistic way to transfer the trap point on the second life let's say we make some animation so we transfer a trap point in Buji where a hostile container hostile okay that's all in an artistic way to just relaunch the second life issue to the Shenzhen I'm the only one on the slide prepared so I think we should try to show on this show some books so maybe as I mentioned it's another one of those slides I'll try to be useful here and I think Jonathan and Joshua are both far too comfortable to suggest that you should buy their books so I'll do it it's about their books and I think both it's a really kind of themes between the two books and I think one thing that unifies them as a interdisciplinary approach learning from Shenzhen is fundamentally ethnographic but also pulls in questions of economics and land use policy and recognizing that urbanists are also important actors as you say and then Joshua's book which is really about a kind of architectural and proposal but in fact it's kind of an understanding of kind of ecological systems and infrastructure and kind of a client because they make it happen so I think that's quite an interesting sort of parallel I think obviously both all three kind of talk dealing with the question of sort of borders which needless to say is very relevant as you know not only in China but I think all over the world the question of I think the kind of borders of so many different kind of borders the first line and second line in Shenzhen but also the kind of the urban villages which Jonathan refers to as a kind of exception within exception series of sort of I think kind of exacerbated differences as Ram called it in the project on the city a long time ago so in fact rather than in a way kind of creating value by exploiting differences I think being a sort of key theme between all three maybe just a kind of question then is like or a kind of third theme is actually a sort of model and to what extent Shenzhen is a kind of model so Jonathan you talked about like how kind of all three a lot of contributors are basically don't necessarily take issue with the idea of the kind of Shenzhen model but rather it's kind of uncritical incorporation of events that took place after the fact right and it's funny because when I was reading that I thought a lot about in architecture school like this we work a lot with models and that often happens actually as a kind of creative in a way that's the kind of creative process in fact and it's evidence I think in Shenzhen the idea of first being an economic model based on the long hand exports and kind of direct investment changing into a kind of economic model based on service industries and technology on the other hand the kind of urban villages seem at first I think as something to be erased or removed or stigma on the city but then as Uning has been kind of advocating for a long time in fact the urban villages being in a way the kind of essence and sort of driver and kind of the arrival of the city and then finally I think maybe another kind of elements perhaps of Shenzhen originally the sort of the issue of piracy and copying and kind of Shanzai phenomenon being seen as actually a kind of the sort of creative impulse so I'm just kind of I don't know that's not really a question actually but a kind of I guess a third theme of the kind of model so yeah maybe you want to react to any of those any of those comments actually I lived in Shenzhen for a few years but at the time of the narrative I was in the way taught actually in school was that the along with Shenzhen there were a bunch of other especially economic ones so I found it at the same time and in the way looking back now that only Shenzhen became something that really that's really something special so somehow the idea of the Shenzhen model actually copied and so translating to other geographic areas I wonder if that can be seen as a I don't know what's the appropriate word but it's an impossibility but maybe Shenzhen's success would be because it was close to Hong Kong maybe has its own unique policy advantages compared to Zhuhai, the city next to Akao I think it's interesting that in the book itself the chapter by Feng Weiwen the chief planner of one of the Persians he says very clearly that he thinks the Shenzhen model cannot be reproduced that it was a product of a local time, place, and local conditions and can't really be replicated but I think one question is what is it that's being replicated and if you think about the idea of the zone as a political and economic strategy that has been replicated with tremendous success throughout China not all as SECs but then you have various kinds of different kinds of developing zones, high tech zones, this kind of zone, another kind of zone so that after the initial SECs were created then there were 14 high tech and development zones that would fall along the coast without going down all the way down to Hainan and that was one of the original failed SECs and so in a sense the specifics of Shenzhen could not perhaps be replicated but the spirit of Shenzhen was replicated and that has taken on its own kind of narrative and its own sense of an imaginary such that when you look at some of the literature or talk to people in India who are creating special economic zone they will often refer to Shenzhen as a model even if they're not necessarily thinking concretely about the situation so the answer is both that Shenzhen is not a model that can be replicated anywhere else and as an imagination Shenzhen is a model that has already traveled Yeah I think you kind of answered your own question I think that of course Hong Kong made an incredible difference and those kinship networks that was alluding to the past conduits of the market but also to set up the factories holding Shenzhen areas which actually facilitated that enabled the specific context of Shenzhen economic zone to emerge but I think what's interesting is that of course the zone as Kerala recently obviously points out is something that is important and recently you might have heard of Shanghai in Shenzhen which is a new formulation of Shenzhen which basically recreates the economic regulations of Hong Kong within Shenzhen in the sense that there are certain other incentives that begin to internationalize the random being that are centered specifically to attract Hong Kong based lawyers so in a way they're trying to recreate the advantages of Hong Kong within Shenzhen there's even a store that sells Hong Kong based goods based in Shenzhen and also those dynamics that have been created by that difference between the logic of the exceptionalism that's at play and the exceptionalism I wonder what's the sort of extreme version of that let's say we went to an extreme version of a zone that presents itself as extremely porous and then everyone else tried to replicate that everywhere, there it becomes a sort of flattened totally neoliberal I guess you could see zones along kind of a continuum I mean the one end of a continuum would be conveniently camp-like industrial spaces in some ways to the third front attempts and similar to the early export processes zones that were set up in places like the Philippines that were essentially kinds of farmed camps that were that could be shut down and relocated when wages rose by companies and then on the other end of the spectrum you would have a zone which is essentially a city so not just a zone that is completely self-contained and separate but a zone which is indistinguishable from a city, Shenzhen really is that in the sense that to the extent to which zone nomenclature is relevant, most people go to Shenzhen and don't think of it as a zone they think of it as a city but then you have the way which cities are adopting these kind of segmentation internally to redefine how cities are built and in a sense some of the cities in the Emirates are a good example of this, like Dubai where you have a lot of job and where you have X city, everything is functionally different, education city you've got NGO city, you've got media city, you've got everything city and each of these are almost like your own little zone lit so that instead of having really mixed use spaces you end up with cities that are created out of tiny little zones so maybe take it to an extreme that's sort of what you end up with is a world that's zoned in these I think one kind of question that sort of when I was there last summer with some students from here, at GSAP was like the question of actually the recognition that places like Baishu Zhou, the urban villages in Shenzhen which have very different, I'm sure most of you know very different land ownership structures, density, planning regulations, etc are actually precisely because of the kind of contrast and difference sustain and facilitate food provision, housing and pseudo informality sustain the rest of the city from working so in other words the differences are what rather than seeing global capitalism as a kind of smoothing or leveling everything is actually the kind of production of differences that are generating value and I think maybe to kind of turn that into a question for Joshua like in a way I kind of read your border proposal as a sort of stitching or sort of bridging what has been kind of split actually and I'm wondering to what extent your proposal actually is attempting to kind of bridge or erase differences versus kind of you know, drive them or turn up the kind of contrast I think we were quite conscious on the one hand not to try and create an overarching strategy that formally looked like we were stitching the border together but we were trying to understand the specific flows or observations from the characteristics of the existing global border in order to begin to harness or from the tactical move within the site so the sense that it moves away from a singular end but it tries to capitalise multiple possibilities through these what are the effect of kind of devices in some cases we try to increase the contrast in terms of creating more of these kind of abandoned conditions in other cases we are in a specific difference but one thing that we learnt quite quickly is that a lot of the projects were actually dealing with what's happening in Hong Kong of course using the vehicle of Shenzhen to begin to control what was happening in Hong Kong it is very much siding towards the FCA in the frontier closed area and Jonathan I was surprised in your book there's no access about copying the Shenzhen model because a couple years ago I heard the China central government really they want to copy the Shenzhen special economic model to Africa but it seems there's a lot of NGO in Africa in this model and it did not happen and I think that was interesting I mean for your book learning from Shenzhen Yes I mean in the book we restricted ourselves very much to Shenzhen itself but you're absolutely right the sequel which looks at Shenzhen outside of Shenzhen in all of the different imaginations in India and Africa in the way that it is appropriately deployed as a short hack and there are special economic zones in Africa and China has been involved in building some of them outside of Wanda there's Wanda and several others but it's hard to say to an extent that because I have a question is it Shenzhen as a big model or is it this idea that the exceptional space with all the tax everything else that comes through it and what was really very unique to Shenzhen even in the case of other Chinese cities is that it was a county was elevated to an urban designation so suddenly and thus all of the rural areas literally found themselves in the middle of the city by decree and thus it's hard even in China to replicate the role of the urbanized villages in other cities because in other cities and established cities when the cities will expand they will start to encompass villages that were originally outskirts or even further away from the city but in Shenzhen they are in the center of the city and because of the work that in the early days they were still the former collective village farms and towns in the village enterprise were left under rural land law while the area around it was under urban land law so it was very stark difference that could be exploited in various ways whereas to be sent I can tell in more contemporary cases where city of Chongqing is going to expand its urban municipality in the state I guess that Shenzhen may, if you want to look at it that way, of leaving the former villages under rural land law and that way they kind of make it less possible to recreate the types of situations that you have in the early days of Shenzhen so in that sense the Shenzhen model is an idea much more do you see for the for example the parallel trading I know has been causing a lot of conflicts between Shenzhen and Hong Kong with regards to things like milk potter shortage and stuff like that and I was wondering if in your proposal you sort of had a way of dealing with the social aspect of the border crossing in terms of creating a zone where maybe people could I don't know, just a way of easing that burden maybe sort of economic and also social that exists between these two groups that was the idea, it was rather a lot of the issues that we think of, we try not to solve directly as a kind of problem solution type model but we try to understand what's going on and we suggest strategies where some of those conditions could actually be taken advantage of and in a certain way it goes back to the idea of the the main privilege was able to take advantage of those conditions to have a more, let's say fairer, looser regulation about land development so what we're trying to do in the Loch Mo Chow example is couple that with the sort of notion of a more top down planning model which is very hierarchical, which is about bringing the institutions from the government and then contrasting with that looser regulation for village housing so it becomes much more sporadic and in that tension or in that kind of productive tension or in that possible exchange then some of those ideas for the power of the traders could be used to hammer the shop funds of those houses but the state is in between the citizens there's a hundred and fifty people that are allocated that can have their, are applying to have a loan in only a hundred and fifty per year so can we find a way to begin to allocate those in between the families so if you're a child from B.R.C. one of your parents has to live in China so for that population, in between the population, can we seek sites within that border area to actually allow them to be villages that live in the community an advantage is they can build a house and then rent it out to people the people from the other side can actually have rights or privileges to those status and that could also be sites for these power of the traders to also take root and allow this non-dead space that you should produce by top-down funding to begin to activate in the same way that we see in the villages is a much, much more diverse. The border is a really custom case of so many different ways and visually for those of you who know that border, for those of you who don't know the border you have the massive city of Shenzhen stopping and then right on the other side of the river is green country stuff and of course one of the double concerns is one is that without an adequate concept that you're trying to develop, you're just going to have the same kind of development on the other side of the border that you have on Shenzhen and you have this very beatologically valuable green space and the other is that there's a lot of dumping in this border so there's the fear of development and there's the fear of leaving empty and I think one thing that the planning authority is obviously aware of the issues but they're kind of checking that because it said all right let's just call it a recreation. The conservationists and environmentalists are unhappy because it's not conserved enough and the villagers and developers are unhappy because they can't move forward with any development. So the designation of recreation is actually an unfortunate designation because it means that people take advantage of it. So it allows for people to dump it allows for people to put their containers on it or start smaller businesses and there's very famous legal case from the heart health case which said as a villager he had right so whether you designate a conservation or I'm going to do what I want I'm going to dump in steel bars and that became new so now we have this kind of scarlet and populous landscape vibe that is doing it for purely economic reasons so that's where you get this very strange pop-hole landscape that begins to appear so again that comes out of saying well how can we begin to intervene or how can we begin to find methods that could effectively say that that end form of development is just the environmental conditions and that which ecology just gets destroyed so we're trying to in this scarlet landscape chapter it's about trying to instrumentalise this only policy that can bring about a certain amount of remediation but that remediation then comes out of the car so you say okay you can do whatever you want in the land as long as you can relieve it so you try and control a staged process of occupation and of kind of biological remediation over time but still not saying you can't do those economic things that you wanted to do it so we're trying to introduce ways to think of different speeds of temporal occupations of the land so that it is not just conservation of the water but so there's something that we can begin to navigate in two years to the extreme so one last question it's not just a very sympathetic to Joshua's pressure I think relating to what this related to what he just asked I think like for instance the problem with the milk power and with like you know children who have parents who one of them being a Hong Kong citizen I think part of the problem is also just simply problem of citizenship so if you deconate like a zone in that green area that's not being used right now for parents and children like that families like that like what kind of citizenship they can hold you know because I think right now what China and Hong Kong is facing not just the problem with space and borders but also a lot of people from Hong Kong they basically hold double citizenship in the sense that they're both a citizen of China maybe not so much but mostly they're under the laws and governance of the Hong Kong government which is a total different ideological and legal system so do you want to stand and touch upon that in your book? we definitely recognize that it's an issue obviously as a Hong Kong citizen you get your own card which is called which you can have access of course to the rest of the mainland but as a Shenzhen citizen then you don't compromise they're used to being able to allow every Shenzhen Hong Kong citizen to travel to Hong Kong whenever they like but they curtail that in 2015 and they limited it to just once a week so constantly the PRC government in the Hong Kong government are constantly changing the designations of those rights of citizenship it happens all the time so in a way we're saying that's how government decisions are made that we have to into certain political opinions in 2015 the reaction was pretty much because of the umbrella revolution and because there was much more in-bill hostility from some mainstream Chinese so they stopped the limited amount of access into Hong Kong so I guess what we're saying is we're playing into that constantly this access or this designation of what rights you have as a citizen could actually play into our strategy and to think of the Love March Art Loop which already has this ambiguous subject status that it is Shenzhen land officially within the legal designation of Hong Kong isn't that an opportunity to give those people between these citizen status to give them the opportunity and rights to have access to this area and to take advantage of it which sounds like a color war city a greener thank you