 Good evening and welcome to the new Center for Strategic and International Studies This is the house that John Hamry built and I'm privileged to work for John Hamry and and Thank him as much as possible for putting us in this new building. We are truly truly fortunate to be here Some of my other bosses are on the way One of them being Sam none our chairman, so I wanted to acknowledge him and Sue Cobb our One of our trustees general Scowcroft and Fred Kusrabi. I believe are also on the way Thank you all for coming out on a you know, Washington weather night. This is truly And it'll be well worth it because this is a truly remarkable panel that we have I'd like to start by giving a few congratulations to Bob Schieffer one you see on this banner that The TCU Schieffer School of Journalism. Well, it's been renamed. It's now that the TCU Schieffer College of Communication so congratulations Bob. That's a real milestone The second bit of news about Bob Schieffer is Bob is some of you may know hosts a little show called face the nation Last November in November sweeps, which is the big marker for all-network television face an average face the nation average 3.58 million viewers which was the show's best sweep in over 25 years And it was first in every household in the United States of America Among viewers and adults aged 25 to 54 face the nation is the number one Sunday public affairs show congratulations And while everybody continues to roll and there are plenty of seats and if there aren't seats You can stand in the back and we can also have a little bit of concourse seating But I'd also really like to thank our benefactor the Stavros, New Yorkers Foundation and Vasili Tzamias who is here Vasili, could you stand up? I'm not sure where you are Vasili. I went. Oh, there you are Vasili I want to thank you so much for being here the Stavros, New Yorkers Foundation is a real truly significant partner for CSIS and both an intellectual sense and in a sense of support and we thank them for everything they're doing for us and We just are so glad that you could make it down also from New York in this terrible weather With that I'd like to hand it over to Bob Schieffer. Mr. Reinhardt, why don't you just start us off by telling us? What is this deal? What are we talking about here and? What does it encompass and what what did both sides hope to get out? Well, I wouldn't call it a deal a complete deal. It's I call it a preparatory deal a preliminary deal It was designed by the US and its partners really to stop the clock To stop the clock on Iran's nuclear program It the program could advance substantially in coming months This deal very comprehensively and for six months puts a cap on that program All the issues you've read about this Iraq plutonium reactor the Fordo enrichment facility the advanced centrifuges all those things have been capped So while they're negotiating over the six next six months for a comprehensive deal There'll be no advancement in the program and that's very very important Also, there are some innovative verification procedures so we can be very confident That Iran is not in fact advancing its program the inspectors for the In international atomic energy agency will be able to visit the key facilities every day Which is it's usually once every week or two weeks They'll be going to some facilities. They haven't had access to before play workshops where they Iranians produce centrifuges Uranium mines it's important to get a handle on uranium ore and yellow cake from the beginning So it's very well verified in exchange for that. Of course, there's some sanctions easing measures That's the principal reason Iran is interested in negotiations to Get relief from the sanctions. They're having a crippling effect on their economy And by estimates of the administration the sanctions easing steps will be worth at most about seven billion dollars for the six-month period But that compares to Roughly 30 billion dollars it during the six-month period That they'll law that they'll lose in oil revenues compared to the six-month period before the sanction oil sanctions were imposed I've seen estimates that the total sanctions bill for Iran is about a hundred billion dollars a year And so set up to seven billion is very small So I think they're getting a freeze on Iran's program for very little they're also getting a slight rollback if you remember Prime Minister Netanyahu his cartoon character, you know cartoon bomb at the at the UN He talked about the accumulation of enriched uranium enriched to 20% level which gets you near to weapons grade And he said that when it's once it get to 250 kilograms That's his red line well this deal rose it back to zero in that category because the The most worrisome form of 20% enriched is either put into a patterned form or diluted to below 5% So it does a lot, but all of this is preparatory to a final deal And there's some general principles agreed to in the document from November 24th And they talk about a long-term agreement. They couldn't reach agreement on exactly how long that would be They talk about a mutually defined uranium enrichment program That would only be agreed if there's also agreement on specific limits and monitoring measures To make sure that Iran doesn't have the capability to break out of constraints suddenly and Quickly get enough highly enriched uranium for bombs But you know key issues were really put off the disposition of this plutonium production reactor They couldn't agree on that they put it off to the final deal the disposition of this Underground uranium enrichment facility off into the future So, you know the next six months will be very hard negotiations It's the president just the other day said he gave it about a 50-50 Possibility of actually reaching a final deal, but I think it's a very promising first step So I would just ask you to this good deal or bad deal Where are we here? What do you think of it? I think it's a good deal Considering the context in which it was being pursued Considering the legacies of the last X number of years in which the relationship became increasingly antagonistic dominated by suspicions some very justified and In which the alternative of course in the absence of the deal Probably would have been some sort of a military collision a military collision which in a short Sort of sense we would probably initially win But which would probably plunge us into a much more prolonged much wider regional conflict So yes, I think this is a good beginning But as we were just told it has a long way to go and the difficult parts are still ahead. What about it Tom? Yeah, I support it. I think it was a good deal. I think it was well negotiated Under the circumstances, I think the thing to keep it monocleases has really shaped my own thinking is I think the sanctions regime was rather safe That is we we've probably enlisted as many people as we were going to enlist In the age of Ahmadinejad, let's remember Iran was led For this class of the decade, I guess by a president who was so obnoxious So foul a Holocaust denying You know really bad guy he was the gift that kept on giving because It was very easy or relatively easy to maintain an international sanctions regime with Iran headed by this kind of person He was gone. He's replaced by someone much more sophisticated Foreign Minister much more Adept at dealing with the West and the world and I think also we have to see this in the context of the last Iranian election Which is the precursor to all of this negotiation? So Iran just had a presidential election in which the supreme leader and his guides allowed six men to run And their names were mr. Black mr. Black mr. Black Mr.. Black mr. Black and mr.. Black and Lo and behold 51% of Iranians Decide they're all going to go for mr. Light black. I'm actually told the true number was 64 percent But the supreme leader was so freaked out by so many people going for the guy Who just was a little more moderate than everybody else and really wanted to try and opening with the West and so I think the external conditions and the internal conditions in Iran right now were the ideal moment to test And that's all this is but so legitimate test whether Iran can be a partner for a secure deal That allows them to enrich at the level of their electrical needs and nothing. I Was very interested that I read in the I think it was in the Atlantic that Rouhani has more Cabinet members with PhDs from American universities He has more of those in his cabinet than president Obama But does that really make a difference dr. Brzezinski is that something that? Is this a is Rouhani a different kind of leader? Tom's talking about black black black black and and and like black Well, I think that sort of defines it, but I think perhaps even more than that I mean he was part of the revolution. He was part of that elite that Usher didn't an era of intense hostility with the United States But he appears to be also a person who has evolved with time and who has begun to think in a somewhat different fashion And I think that is worthy of exploitation more over and I think that's maybe even more important Iran is changing Iran I think was swept up by a revolutionary passion Which to some extent was derived from a rather historically legitimate resentment of foreign domination foreign exploitation perhaps even extreme interference in the Iranian internal affairs that United the Iranians in a kind of nationalistic passion and self-assertion But then 20 30 years followed of increasing misery frustration fundamentalist extremism and a significant part of the Iranian population increasingly begun to view this as a kind of reactionary counterproductive self-destructive regime that needs to be altered Preferably peacefully and these elections are in a sense a signal that there is in Iran a population now perhaps a majority even certainly in the in the urban areas that Wants to be more like for example, Turkey and I know Iran a little bit and I know Turkey a little more But my sense is that Iran has a stronger chance of being a democratic country as Iran has So in terms of education history orientation and so forth. So who then is driving this in Iran Is it the general or are the generals doing it or is it these in more enlightened people that are more familiar with the West? Is it the theocrats? Is it the bureaucrats? Who who is the driving force there? I'll tell you what is the driving force the driving force is the sanctions I think that is the incentive. That's why Iran has come to the negotiating table I think that's why a majority whether 51 or 64 percent of Iranian people voted for Rahani Because there's some way to get out from under these sanctions It was also people like the foreign minister Javad Zarif who really Felt that their country had become a pariah. They didn't want to be isolated they wanted to be part of the international community and You know when you saw it you saw pictures of The Tehran Airport when the negotiating team came back from Geneva. There are these young faces jubilant faces What were they so happy about it wasn't because they may have gotten a right to enrich They didn't know what was in the nuclear deal They were happy because they saw pictures of the American Secretary of State and their foreign minister shaking hands and smiling at one another I think there's a large community especially young people who've had enough of this isolation and want to be part of the world again then Why is Israel so much against this? Or are they I mean we know What Netanyahu is saying but Tom? That's a very good question Next question over here No, look Even paranoid seven enemies as dr. Kissinger said and The fact is under Ahmadinejad you did have a regime that in you know They'll always say well that wasn't exactly the right translation of we want to wipe you off the map. We you know but Yeah, we had a regime and a leader who made extremely a hostile aggressive statements about Israel as I said was a holocaust denier building a nuclear weapon and I Think any Israeli leader on that included even a hood Olmer who was not Netanyahu Believe that it was prudent for Israel to Take steps to try to engineer global sanctions and even if necessary threaten war To ensure that Iran did not get a nuclear weapon my you know, so I don't think that that's wrong or What was was crazy at all? I Do though I have been critical of the fact that I think that It can't also be an excuse for not working on the Israeli Palestinian front And I think there are people who suspect that to some degree it is nevertheless It was a legitimate It's a legitimate threat, but what you have in Israel is a lot of diversity of opinion about what Israel should do about it We know the former intelligence chiefs And many former generals have come out and come out against any Military option and really believe that now is the time to cash in on the sanctions. Now. Israel's view was that We we we cashed in our sanctions too early. We should have doubled down on the sanctions and To the point where Ron would have basically evacuated its whole program. There's no experts. I know of on Iran In this country at least well, I'm not gonna say no But I think the majority of experts the people that Bob works with don't believe that I mean we've been doubling down on sanctions and Iran has just kept building its program and There was every reason to believe having sacrificed as much that they would have gone all the way or one screwdriver away So, you know, I think that the challenge for Israel will be to Not allow just what Iran it was trying to prevent which is to be isolated to be split off from the global consensus and be split off from the United States and I Notice that Netanyahu has quieted down a lot in the last couple of weeks because I think one thing he saw was After really sending two ministers here and really trying to generate a lot of opposition With Israel's allies up on the hill that at the end of the day that Congress really sided with the president of this one and For the most part and so I hope the Israelis will you know, I think there is a value of having a threat a pistol on the table when negotiating with Iran and You always want to have leverage on your side and you shouldn't take anything off the table But I think we should let this play out now and I think that's in Israel's best interest about yeah You can ask the question if we have so much leverage now. Why don't we put it to use? Why don't we give it a try? Maybe they won't accept it? Let's give it a try. There's a reason for that because you know until now the Iranians have been the intransigent party We've been the reasonable one if we ask for an outcome that no one believes is achievable We will become the intransigent side We have counted on being the reasonable side in order to get support for the sanctions regime If we look like we're not interested in a deal then our partners in this international sanctions coalition Will they'll they'll leave the coalition and we need that pressure over the next six months To get Iran to accept an acceptable final deal And I think that's one of the risks of kind of going for a maximalist position Dr. Brzezinski I Noticed that you tweeted. I didn't know you tweeted but I see that my sense You said Obama carry best policy team since Bush Jim Baker Congress is finally becoming embarrassed by Netanyahu's efforts to dictate US policy Well, I think there's something to that Talk about that well, you know, we're all engaged in maneuvers and One can only decipher what might be the modus of particular maneuvers But I think it's fair to say that Prime Minister Netanyahu expected the agreement not to appear Yeah, I think he was rather surprised that it did a lot of people in this country were surprised And I think one also has to take note of the fact that this was an agreement Not just between the United States and Iran, although those were the principal parties But an agreement which involved also Russia and China and Europe And I think that is a very important step forward in the sense that it creates a kind of a framework On which to build and it commits these countries also to in a sense an Outcome which is vaguely being previewed without being overly specific. I think we all have a common interest in Iran not deteriorating into a total social failure a Fundamentalist extremists and a source of violence and I think that is shared by many Israelis And this is why Israeli public opinion as far as I can sense, but Tom knows it much better is not all that enthused with Netanyahu's tactics or assertions You know, I would just point out that the day after the agreement was signed the Tel Aviv stock market went up That's rather telling. Yeah As You all know there is talking in the Senate to go ahead and passing a sanctions bill That will go into effect if there's no progress made within six months. I just like to get the What each of you thinks the impact of that would be would that be a good thing or in your view? Or is it something not so good? I don't think it would be a good thing The view is not I don't think it would be a good thing The view is if you know some sanctions are good more sanctions much must be better I don't think more sanctions are even needed at this point. These sanctions are having a crippling effect They brought her onto the table. They've made significant concessions in this interim deal They know That if they drag their feet and there isn't and they don't negotiate seriously over the next six months The Congress can pass a new sanctions bill immediately at any at any time It'll take them 24 hours less than 24 hours to do that Why does it have to be done now this actually a provision in the interim deal that says the u.s Will refrain from imposing additional sanctions now, you know If the if it's a kind of delayed trigger on a sanctions law and doesn't take a fix for six months Maybe that's not inconsistent with the letter of the agreement But it seems to be inconsistent certainly with the spirit of the agreement and the Iranians have said that if there are new sanctions That will be a violation of the agreement and hardliners in Iran will take advantage of that and they'll undercut the Negotiating authority of the Iranian negotiating team. I think it'll make things very difficult Well, I think we can always have sanctions We will have sanctions if there's not a deal after six months and the Iranians are not Negotiating seriously there will be more sanctions. We just don't need to do it now Yeah, I think you know President Obama and Secretary Kerry are I mean there their Reputations are on the line to know about they've they've struck this deal They said this is a proper framework for negotiating if Iran tweets. I if you run sorry cheats You really got into my head If you run cheats, I'm so tired I Think they'll be the first to call for more sanctions. I mean they would be extremely embarrassed They would be politically very vulnerable. Their worst critics would have been proven true. Let's give it a chance Let's give it a proper clear clean lab test But yeah, I'll ask you Dr. Brzezinski. You do not think holding this out Would make it easier to make a deal if this is already on the books Let's remember the sanctions still exist. We're the same they've been lifted But I mean this would be more sanctions if you don't go ahead and close the deal Well at some point we have to ask ourselves, you know, what is it that we can live with and be reasonably confident That Iran is not in a position to use the nuclear weapon in some fashion that gives it some benefit And unless one becomes a believer that the Iranians are hell bent on committing suicide And therefore the moment they have the first Allegedly bomb they'll attack Israel One has to ask oneself, you know, is the assumption behind that that this country is totally Suicidal that the leadership wishes the country to be destroyed is going to attack with the first Assumed nuclear weapon a country which has 200 nuclear weapons and has the capacity to deliver them I think at some point we will have to think about that dilemma And I am of the view that at some point probably in the course of these negotiations when as they're being finalized We will have to go more on records. That is to say the United States That we will under any circumstance of a threat from Iran Directed at Israel react the same way we would have reacted at any threat by the Soviet Union at Europe principle ally or the same way as we're still committed to reacting on behalf of the Japanese or the Koreans South Koreans if threatened by North Korea That is to say that that action is Tantamount on attack on the United States now This is a further reinforcement of a situation in which Iran may end up with a nuclear program And the nuclear program may always have some potential for a breakout But it provides I think a reassurance and in that context It's also useful to remind ourselves that achieving a nuclear capability is Much more complicated than having a theoretical capability for making a weapon And you know, there's sort of a public assumption Which has been fostered to some extent by Netanyahu that The Iranians are just months away from having a weapon, but the point is having a weapon doesn't mean anything If you have a so-called weapon first of all, you have to test You better make sure it works if you're intended committing effective suicide That is to say to take a lot of other people with you then secondly you have to have a delivery system That is reliable. So it has to be tested to and then thirdly presumable unless you're totally totally suicidal Which is hard to assign as a characteristic of a nation of 80 million people has endured for 3,000 year You have to have some sense that you want to have a capacity to retaliate if you were struck Now all of that will take an enormous amount of time to achieve So what I'm trying to say is even if we're not positioned in a perfect way to achieve a truly truly Absolutely full proof Agreement with the Iranians that in effect precludes them from being co-equal with a lot of other nuclear generating nations We have that option and I think we ought to exercise it on behalf of stability in the region and guarantee not just Israel Which may be a fact that offended by being guaranteed by us But anyone in the region whom the Iranians could threaten with the nuclear weapons and let me make one final point What we don't really pay much attention to that the fact is that the real nuclear player in that region is someone else It's not Iran and my judgment is not going to be soon Pakistan Pakistan has a lot of nuclear weapons and it's Increasing the range of its delivery capabilities that is food for thought You know about can you say add something to what is a big point he made when I one of the weaknesses I've always found in in a certain School of Israeli analysis of the countries around them, which they tend to relate to through newspapers I mean I talk about the facade of what not but daily is that I mean if you talk to Netanyahu Israel has politics in fact He's his hands are tied on the peace process if he does anything the head of shots There's some parties in a come in if he doesn't install a kosher kitchen in the Ministry of Interior by five o'clock He's out of government. You know I mean just you know my hands are tight We have politics in Israel Saudi Arabia has politics Turkey has politics America's politics only Iran has no politics all 80 million people want to get a bomb and drop it on the Jews the next day That's that's basically what we are being told and I think one of the Predicates one of the presuppositions of this deal is actually Iran has more politics Or as much politics as any country in that region and if you open up the cleavage by easing the sanctions and rewarding people Who want to have greater outreach with the outside world and actually? Deliver something for them that they can then leverage in their internal politics You also begin to change the whole equation and that's very much part of the presupposition of this deal Bob let me ask you this Let's say we make a deal How can we be sure? That the Iranians aren't cheating on us or our technical capabilities good enough that we can be reasonably Certain that when we make a deal we'll know if they break it This the interim deal we have very high confidence that the international time began energy agency can verify every Element of that that's really not a problem The more problematic issue will come in a final deal if one is concluded and there you have to do something More difficult you have to be confident that they don't have a covert program clandestine program now the Iranians don't have a good track record at keeping a covert program covert They had a an enrichment program Enrichment facility at Natanz the MEK a dissident group outed it They had another covert enrichment program at near the holy city of comb Western intelligence agencies discovered it in and during 2009 it's made I think the Iranians a bit wary of Being able to keep a covert program covert and they paid a very high price for those that you know They the price they paid was crippling sanctions or a calm their economy is in the gutter now And so they're going to be wary of doing this, but we're going to have to insist on some very intrusive verification measures To be able to give some measure of confidence that they don't have covert facilities going forward What do you think the best deal? could be that From a practical standpoint, I mean we know what Prime Minister Netanyahu says, you know just everything stop everything Dismantle everything. What do you think the best we can do? Well, you know, I think President is more or less said it, but I think it's that you reduce the Iran's enrichment capability Down to the level required for it to generate the electricity it claims it needs and is the Justification for this program and you convert its heavy water reactor to light water And you have intrusive inspections On everything else and I think Bob is a real expert on this and I'd be interested in his thoughts But I think then you're you're putting a year year and a half between any breakout capability Would that be the goal really I mean when you come right down to it to keep them by year and a half away from To keep them substantially work. Let me conceptually what we're trying to do what I think we should be trying to do We want to be able to Detect any effort at breaking out of constraints immediately. That's why you have daily inspections You want an enrichment program that's so tightly constrained in numbers of centrifuges and an enriched uranium available So that the breakout timeline is long that the breakout timeline is a time from a breakout decision to lay have enough Highly enriched uranium for a bomb. You want that as long as possible Why do you want it as long as possible so that you can intervene to stop them from building a nuclear weapon? That's the critical thing and You know people say it should be three months or six months or 12 months before they do it It's a kind of subjective question The real issue is does the international community have the will to intervene once they've detected it? And that's it. That's a key question If you have great confidence that the US or Israel or somebody is going to intervene to prevent a bomb from being built Then you know it could be three months if you have no confidence It can be 18 months or two years and it's not adequate So that's a critical element of it and the international with a deal is Concluded the international community has got to reach agreement that if there's a violation or if there's a breakout Then they'll be firm consequences and predictable consequences to me. That's the critical element No, I have no problem with that except it's hard for me to imagine firm commitments by the international community That there would be consequences if by that is meant that the international community would be prepared to do something Ultimately, it will be either the United States alone or Conceivably with someone else, but I frankly find it hard to imagine who that someone else would be And I think what we have to add to what has been said with most of which I agree is this We have to operate in a fashion that a volatile Political entity, which is an 80 million nation is not driven into circumstances In which it feels somehow or other its identity itself pride its status Requires them again to engage in surreptitious efforts to obtain nuclear weapons And that is a political calculus and that I conclude leads me to the view that We have to be also sensitive of their pride and their status There are a lot of nations that have signed the NPT and we have to be able to find some sort of a measure That puts them somewhere in that category While precluding the ability to engage in a rapid and significant nuclear program Which is what they try to do but which they failed to achieve in part because it's not easy to hide It's not easy to hide and if we have all of these additional inspections that we will now be having It's going to be increasingly difficult to do that So we have to be careful not to slide in the position in which an Accommodation to the majority of Iranians begins to look like a one-sided capitulation Bob I'd ask something that to elaborate on some things big said earlier If I were 40 years younger and back in in college looking for a PhD thesis It would be called Iraq 1991 to 2003 and It would be about what the UN sanctions did to basically crush Iraqi society So that when we finally did invade Iraq, we didn't find people throwing flowers at us. We found people really Really a society that had been devastated By international sanctions and we are still praying paying the price today in Iraq We've already left of We didn't you know crush that society because the leader they had but I'm talking about you know That's why I think this is an ideal moment to bring these This sanctions regime and test it if we can get negotiations. This is a great civilization. This is not You know some desert, you know country. This is a great civilization has enormous potential Given a different, you know approach to its own future. I want to I think it's a very important point and I just want to add to it the following We have to take into account the Iranian memories of recent times during the Iraqi Iranian war The Iraqis who are using chemical weapons against the Iranians Guess who was helping Iraq select and hit targets. I Don't even want to say it, but you all know what the answer is it embarrasses me so much I want to go to the question, but let me just ask one question and then we'll go to the To all of you for some for your question. How does Syria figure into all of this? Who'd like to talk about that? Well, certainly as a complication because it's going to be an additional factor in the course of the next few months Namely is it going to be a terrain in which we have to be engaged in some sort of forcible solution? In which case a collision with Iran at least on a limited scale is more likely Or is it going to be something that on that international umbrella? That is now extant We will be able to achieve some sort of progress and therefore calm down that aspect that otherwise could be very Inflammatory to the relationship. Well, but what I say is your question really is a reminder And I think again, it's often forgotten By some members of Congress that we we actually have independent interests in this region from any of our allies or enemies that we Approach this region in a different way. We are ending a decade in which post 9-11 We decided we were going to try to deal with this region directly with boots on the ground And that has proven extremely costly To people there into us and we know the whole story yet We still have an interest even more than ever in a stable Middle East Well one way we want to stabilize this region is the traditional way of balance of forces balance of power And part of that balance is between Sunnis and Shiites Okay, and let's not remember that's not forget because he's right the Iranians certainly don't I was in Tehran and interviewed Java Zareef about this in 2002 that Iran played a vital role in helping us defeat the Taliban, which was also their enemy a fundamentalist Sunni militia and when we want to get out of Afghanistan and Preserve some of our gains that we will need Iran again as an ally in this So we have interests in this region and in a relationship with Iran to both balance You know the Sunni part of the Arab world and to deal with Northern Asia Pakistan and and Afghanistan after we leave in which we have a lot of shared interests Now Syria is a is a place of confrontation But what's happened is basically is that the sanctions regime disguised the very divergent interests of all the parties underneath, okay, particularly Saudi Arabia Israel in the United States So Saudi Arabia Wants a Iran that has no nuclear weapon But it also wants a weak Iran period paragraph and it okay It does not want a strong Shiite Persian competitor second largest oil producer in the region And we've had a very unnatural situation 34 years ago Iran was like it was at least like a family in the big brother Iran One day walked out and slammed the door This is a big took your shoes. I took his bed Bob took his bicycle And we all got used to having our own Totally monopolized relationship with Uncle Sam One day 34 years later knock knock Big brothers back he wants his bicycle his tennis shoes his bed and his own Relationship. Oh my god with Uncle Sam and the region is freaked out and That's the psychology of what's going on Did you want to say anything? Well, let's go right here Thank you so much and thank you for your time today and thank you for your service My name is Josh Rogan. I'm a reporter with the Daily Beast website here in Washington. My question is First of all, it seems pretty clear that the number one point of contention as this deal goes to Congress is The the tentative plan to negotiate The Iran's ability to maintain some level of uranium enrichment. I'll be it under safeguards. No, my question is How can we be sure since such a Safeguards would depend on continuous monitoring and valuations and inspections That that won't allow Iran to maintain its status as a threshold nuclear weapons state At Inferno in other words can a final deal that allows Iran to have any uranium enrichment capacity Really be considered final and my second very quick unrelated follow-up is for Mr. Reinhardt and that is what about North Korea if they're Ramping up their own uranium enrichment program Is there a possibility that that could become Iran's store of highly enriched uranium just located in another location? Thank you You want to go first? Yeah on the enrichment program I Think the Iranians are going to be surprised at how token the P5 plus one Require its enrichment program to be the the joint plan of action that was agreed Talked about a managed a mutually defined enrichment program consistent with practical needs Now the way the P5 plus one governments view those practical needs is very limited They have an enrichment. They have a research reactor in Tehran that already has enough fuel for a few decades They have a power reactor at Bushier that the Russians provide fuel for they don't need any fuel for that on the drawing board They have some other research reactors planned, but they haven't broken ground on them for the foreseeable future They have very little practical need So I think the P5 plus one are in the rights to call for a very very limited enrichment program Which would provide very little breakout? Capability on the North Korean case. I think these are very very difficult different cases The North Koreans have you know cheated from day one. They've had nuclear weapons They in 1992 they agreed with the South Koreans not to have enrichment or reprocessing capabilities Even if there is a limited enrichment program allowed in a final deal with Iran I don't think the North Koreans can legitimately say we want one too. All right. Here we are go ahead Yeah, Mohammed Hussaini from the Arab League I wonder here whether really the Israelis are really concerned or seriously concerned about the Iranian nuclear program Perhaps they are more concerned psychologically If we know that they are the only power in the region that who possess nuclear chemical and biological weapons The second in the world may be next to the North Korea now. Is it really or is it to? To make the To divert the attention of the Arab countries from the main conflict the main issue the Arab-Israeli conflict To the Iranian threat so that they make us believe That it's really the threat is not Israel. This is the Iran and it's working. It seems The Arab world is buying billions of dollars billion of dollars now weapons and Hager just now yesterday is talking about I mean a missile umbrella for the fence of the Gulf countries only. Thank you. Oh I must say the microphone is distorting. It was up here. It's very difficult. Exactly. I had the same reaction Could you just say that without speaking into the microphone? It distorted your voice. Yeah, give me the thrust of your question again Are the Israelis really concerned, okay About the Iranian program Well, you know, let me just I get the point. Okay. Let me just say if you talk to the Arab countries today They're a lot more concerned about Iran than they are about the Israeli-Palestinian issue If you if you listen to what's coming out of Saudi Arabia the UAE The Gulf countries in particular so that if anyone's diverting things what we have is a tacit alliance been quite written about Between Israel and Saudi Arabia now where they're both obsessed with the Iran Issue now one could argue This is unprovable, you know that each one has its interest in diverting attention from you know Domestic issues whether it's Israel the Israel-Palestinian thing Saudi Arabia, you know in the wake of the Arab Spring not wanting to people to focus on that question But to suggest that the Arab countries really want to talk about the Israel-Palestine question And only Israel wants to talk about Iran I think would be a complete misreading of what's actually going on in the region the region We have this tacit alliance now between Saudi Arabia and Israel is that they're much more obsessed about the Iran issue right now At the government level than they are with the Israeli-Palestinian question. All right over here the light Thank you very much Christine Vargas-Avesant When I was at Johns Hopkins size side the privilege of having a general an army general come in and speak to my class about Chinese US military relations and when it was finished speaking I asked him What kind of trust-building exercise could the US and China do together? That would be effective and without skipping a beat. He answered pirate catching and I thought okay Applying that thinking here What sort of trust-building exercise could the US and Iran do post this particular scenario? Let's say it goes well That would not give Saudi Arabia and Israel heart palpitations and from a both Well, mostly political as opposed to military standpoint Show the world that the US and Iran can get along in more ways than this. Thank you I'll just say I know they would like to comment just interesting When I was involved in these negotiations with the Iranians over the last five years They would come to us and say let's spend time working on Syria and Bahrain And we said we wouldn't do it We knew that our girlfriends would be outraged if we started talking about these sensitive issues without their participation And without their knowledge so we refuse the one area. We said let's work on anti-piracy together Thank God for pirates. Did you want to say something? Okay? Yes, ma'am right here. They'll always be pirate Hi, Brenda Schaefer at Georgetown University and these sanctions were so successful because a number of allies Really took big risks to join the sanctions, especially states that are bordering Iran like Azerbaijan Emirates as you mentioned. What's your advice? I'd like to mr. Friedman What's your advice to these countries that sort of put their security on the line for the United States for the sanctions often in very Uncomfortable risky positions these countries are already getting the payback from Iran They have the means for destabilization in Azerbaijan in Emirates and a variety of Gulf states What would be your advice to these states and to Washington? Well, yeah, the short answer. I think it's a perfectly legitimate question I think they've thought this through that they deserve the best deal we can get you know We have to negotiate the kind of deal that Bob has been talking about and I think if we do They will feel that their investment, you know in this process was justified, but I think we owe them that Again, it's why I'm not I'm not uncomfortable with Netanyahu out there You know doing his dr. Strange love thing and the others, you know You know, it's good to have a little a little crazy on your side You know when when you're negotiating in that part of the world, so I I hope they keep the pressure up I I had no problem with that Right there Steve Lauer be read to dr. Brzezinski It seems to me that the United States has said that there is no direct and formal relationship between the Iranian nuclear deal and Syria on the other hand, I think it's inconceivable that it isn't in some way indirectly linked because if the deal goes forward Iran is going to have to think about any move it makes in Syria or towards Syria what impact that will have on the negotiating On the new fleet deal and so will the United States so it seems to me there isn't a relationship disagree with that I Agree that there is a relationship if there is some movement on the Syria issue It makes it somewhat easier to have some sort of an arrangement regarding the nuclear issue and vice-a-versa And if you are an Iranian Realizing that your country is in the midst of really significant division regarding its future position in that region And if you were concerned that American disengagement from Afghanistan might unleash new problems in the region I think you would want to have a situation in which some sort of stable relationship with the United States Is in fact a reality the Iranians after all Are very much aware of the fact that they are living in a region in which sectarianism is rising It can become totally destructive for the entire region for most of the countries in the region and hence Some sort of an accommodation not only with the United States But an accommodation in which involves also China it involves Russia involves Europe gives them the option of becoming a more serious reviewed and more positively accepted Participant in the international process from which they have largely Excluded themselves and I think it's the sense of sudden awakening to the overall Consequences of what has been happening over the last 30 years that has stirred the more Articulate Iranian public into a Increasingly significant revision of their attitudes Peter Sharfman, MITRE Corporation Do you think that there is actually enough common ground for a deal if you were mediating the negotiations? Is there an outcome that? Would be acceptable to Iran with its politics and to the United States with its politics and to our allies with their politics Who'd like to do that? I Can't do better than the president on 50-50 It's it's I mean the gaps really are large I mean we have in mind a tiny enrichment program that genuinely is consistent with their very minimal needs They talk about you know 20 big nuclear reactors and so forth, which is an aspiration that will never be achieved You know they want to to keep this Iraq Plutonium production reactor functioning. We think it has only one legitimate purpose I mean not legitimate one one intended purpose, which is produced plutonium for nuclear weapons We want it destroyed or turned into a light water reactor They we they have an underground enrichment facility that we thought was going to be part of a covert military program We would like it destroyed or repurposed. They want to keep it running. There are huge gaps One huge gap is the duration of the final deal. It was papered over in the interim agreement We talked about they agree to long-term duration It's important because at the end of that duration Iran can have any rights that other non-nuclear weapons states party to the NPT can have in other words The special restrictions on enrichment and so forth go away So the United States wants that length to be 20 30 or more years The Iranians want it in single digits. So these are going to be hard issues To a hard differences to bridge, you know, I think that there's a Non-technical answer to your question. I think and I'm big alluded to it. I think it's how Iran Chooses to define its future. Does it want to be a big North Korea? Or does it want to be a small China? Does it want to see its future as being a bigger sort of global outlaw always kind of fighting and bumping up and chafing against its neighbors in the world or Doesn't want to define its power as unleashing its remarkable people In a way that will enable them to realize their full potential with a little nuclear program on the side Let me just add to that. I agree with every word that Tom said there's also an American side to that And what do we want to impose on Iran and how far we prepare to go? With insistence on arrangements, which in addition to being a very strict can be massively humiliating And so destructive and reverse what so me is an important process of change within Iran Which it is in our interest to reinforce and to make Iran a more constructive player in a part of the world In which we have a variety of interests all of which are increasingly under stress And in which we may be increasingly challenged and I don't think any of us want to repeat some of the recent experiences We have had in that region. It's hard to think of anything that has damaged our interests more or caused us more grief expense and Wasted energy than the Iran US Cold War over the last 34 years So sometimes the ideal can be in the enemy of the adequate and I am in favor of an adequate arrangement with Iran But not an ideal arrangement, which yes is foolproof. Absolutely. It's like a Failsafe, you know parachute will never fail Which has the effect of forcing someone to commit suicide and take us with them right here This is Marco de Capua. I'm national looker security administration Is it possible that Iran's perception of its security environment has radically changed to the point where they have decided They may not need nuclear weapons anymore. Well, I think it's possible But the question still remains, you know, how much of a leeway do they have in having an essentially peaceful nuclear program? And how strict do we want to be to make sure that under no circumstances ever ever can they cheat for a while But the record is that even when the inspections and everything else was much more lax Their attempts to cheat in secrecy failed. It's not a simple process So that we do have a lot of opportunities to say hey, wait a minute you're violating all these arrangements you're going beyond the spirit and Then you know return to some arrangement including threats including renewed sanctions if we can and so forth The Iranians are not suicidal. Let's just get that across because the whole notion that they are ready to commit Suicide the moment they get an alleged bomb Creates a mental attitude towards this problem, which is selfless destructive. It precludes any possibility of a Reasonable accommodation I would just add that Ultimately the only way you get that sure sure sure foolproof thing is when you have a change in the character of the Iranian regime and part of this whole process is To initiate or to enhance actually what has already begun We saw that with the 2009 Green Revolution of an Iranian effort to change the character of their regime We you know we in this country we saw the Soviet Union die with 80,000 nuclear warheads You know in its bunker so ultimately was about the change and we do we do not basically Everything to many Americans who don't sleep tonight because they're worried about the Soviet nuclear capability But in fact they threaten us okay if they wanted to China can threaten us But when the character of the regime changes that changes the whole equation and that's got to be part of the dynamic here I just add to that. I don't think they've made Marco I don't think that they made a strategic decision not to have nuclear weapons I think in 2003 when we invaded Iraq They put on hold one element of their program, you know the weaponization part They didn't abandon nuclear weapons. They deferred it. They were gonna wait till the coast is clear The coast hasn't cleared and they saw their tremendous cost to be paid for being court-cheating and so forth I still I think it's an open question It's a nuclear weapons program that's on the shelf and our job in this agreement is to keep them as far away from a near breakout capability as we can to deter any Decision for them to cross the threshold and to keep deterring them from crossing that threshold Until there's a basic change in character and they can make that strategy. Yeah, I said one thing This is very relevant point, which is that if you ask what's the biggest thing that happening in the Middle East since? 2010 okay, it's been a pan region-wide movement By I say shouldn't be since 2009 the Green Revolution of young people throughout the Muslim Middle East Realizing they were living in you know what I call a flat world where they could see how everybody else was living just how far behind they were and Demanding governments that enable them to realize their full potential If you ask me that's the biggest thing that's been happening If you ask me what will define this region in 10 years It will not be how many how much enrichment you know Iran has or is allowed It's will be whether and how governments Respond to that movement in a region where 75% of the population is under the age of 30 Let's not get that and this will have to be our final question My name is Greg Craig from Skaden. I wonder if the panel would comment on the internal dynamics Inside the p5 plus one and whether you have confidence that over the next six months We're gonna remain on the same page with all our negotiating partners Under the best of circumstances this is gonna be a very challenging Negotiation on diplomatic objective There was some reason to believe that there was internal stresses between the p5 plus one as we approached The preparatory agreement I'd be curious to know what you think about how the p5 plus one are going to work together going forward Let me just start well the The president has admitted administration officials have admitted that there was substantial bilateral interaction between the US And the Iranians and the run-up to the November 24th agreement In fact the piece of paper that was given to the p5 plus one representatives By Catherine Ashton of the EU was it was a US Iranian Draft with a few bracketed formulations that have been cooked up in bilateral discussions This took us a number of our p5 plus one partners by surprise They would have liked to had a greater role in the production of this document I think this led to foreign minister Fabius's public remarks on that Friday in Geneva And I think but I think they recovered very quickly And within 24 hours they had a consensus text that they gave to the Iranians, but I think going forward Managing that group will be difficult. I think they all realize on the one hand if it really is going to be progress It will be the result of US Iranian bilateral interaction on the other hand They have a legitimate role the EU sanctions played a critical role in moving the Iranian calculus At also you have the Russians and Chinese who will be happy to have any deal They're not going to want to be as fussy as we're going to want to be in a final outcome So I think management going ahead is going to be pretty tricky I think that by and large all of the participants in that process on the outside of Iran Have a shared interest in the situation being resolved and in any case not letting it Slide into a state in which eventually some sort of explosion takes place and massive regional violence erupts so in that sense there's consensus But I think there's a subtle difference perhaps in the longer-range interests of the Europeans The Japanese and us on one side and the Russians to some extent The Russians still view us as arrivals in that area and they would like to regain some of their influence But at the same time they don't want to go too far and they don't want to collision with us But they may be tempted at some point to take a deviant position I think the Chinese basically are interested in resolving this issue So there's no violence because they're interested essentially in a steady flow steady flow of oil at a reasonable price And they will have neither if there is any eruption the Europeans have no choice to go with us Even the vocational one of them wants to posture a little bit as the French did for some other reasons the Russians might at some point Want to test us and here the difference could arise over actually Syria Rather than Iran because the Russians feel they have a particular historical ties with Syria And they have a role to play and it's To some extent a symbolic expression of the regional influence There's also the potential tie between escalating violence in the region especially in Syria and instability in the southern Caucasus and the Russians there feel Very vulnerable. So they are different feelings mixed feelings and this is what restrains them in my view so that in the end If push came to shove and I had to say yes, will they be helpful or will they create problems for us? I would say they probably will be helpful in this they will all agree that we mustn't rub Iran's nose in the dirt In order to get an agreement I would simply say I think it's a very good question and it's um, I Make two points one is something that's been apparent, you know from the start, which is that the sanctions regime Disguised multiple and different interests of the parties and the minute you go from that to cashing it into a final deal Those different interests are gonna make themselves Apparent and the question is as Bob and Zabik said how much you know what trade us but I will venture a reckless statement Which is that? I think it's going to be very hard To get a successful deal If we also don't make some progress on Syria Because it's hard for me to imagine all these actors agreeing on Iran and Then having a widening Syrian civil war where many of the same parties are Contesting one another and acting in ways that are very frightening to one another I think it's going to be hard so I hope that we both use this six months to give me Ron deal and To find some way to get a ceasefire at a minimum in Syria So neither side sees themselves losing ground in both theaters at the same time All right. Well, ladies and gentlemen, thank you all so much for coming