 So my next question relates to China. And a lot of people are saying that Professor Wang, China seemed to be the biggest winner out of the current trajectory if this current trajectory is sustained. So number one, do you believe in this? And number two, everybody that is involved in the process talks about red lines in the process. Are there any red lines for China as we move on? Thank you, Chairman. I think, yes, in terms of security, China is very happy with the recent thought of tensions between the United States and North Korea and the improvement of South-North relations. However, many in China's policy circles have the suspicion that whether it is a question whether Kim Jong-un is very sincere in his commitment to denuclearization. So in a sense, China is a beneficiary because the bottom line of China policy toward North Korea is no conflict. And North Korea's political survival is very important to China. Another thing China is scared about is denuclearization that North Korea is committed to. But there are suspicions in China to both the United States and North Korea. And I think most Chinese in policy circles say that the United States, rather than North Korea, is the major source of instability. They see that the United States is targeting at North Korea superficially, but the long-term target is not the North Korea, but China. Look at that, for instance. It is designed, the Americans say that that is directed against North Korea. But most people, especially in China, are saying that that is against China. And there are even suspicions that North Korea could reach a tacit understanding or some kind of agreement that the North Koreans can keep some of the nuclear devices if they are not threatened in the United States. So the worry is that in the long run, you'll see the nuclear weapons kept in North Korea could be turned against China because it is closer to China. And along with the improvement of North Korean, US-North Korean, South Korean relationship, China might lose something. That is a worry because most Chinese see the United States as a major security threat. Whether Kim Jong-un and Trump will talk about China in what way they will refer to China, will Kim Jong-un say very good things about China in his discussion with Trump? Or will Trump say very good things about China in his discussion with Kim Jong-un? The Chinese are very suspicious. But then also the Americans are suspicious as well because they don't know what Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping talked about in their three rounds of conversations in China. And Xi Jinping may go to North Korea for a state visit maybe in the next few months. So we don't know exactly what is happening. But one thing that is very peculiar between China and North Korea is their long-term ideological affinity. That ideological affinity has existed ever since the two Communist parties took power in the late 1940s. And, literally, China's sense is very high-ranking official by name of Lee Chan-shu to North Korea to join the celebration of North Korea's establishment at their 70th anniversary of the establishment of the DPRK. And I think the Chinese highly value the party-to-party relationship, or even the top priorities, the party-to-party relationship rather than state-to-state relationship. So I don't know when the two Communist parties get together they will talk more about denuclearization of North Korea or their common grounds in resisting America's scheme to undermine the Communist Party's leadership. So this is something we have to keep in mind. And, as I said before, the worst scenario in Chinese mindset is that the United States may prefer to keep the nuclear threat alive so that they can justify the relationship and perpetuate U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia and to maintain U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea. So I think this kind of distrust is not a plus in U.S.-China relations and that will be due for the time being. When the U.S.-China relationship is worsening as we see it today, some in Beijing are further convinced that Washington is definitely trying to take advantage of its newly-established ties with Pyongyang at the expense of China. And finally, my point is that the official position toward the North Korean nuclear issue in China will remain consistent. But given the softening of attitude of the Moon government and the Trump administration toward the DPRK, China is expected to resume economic cooperation with North Korea with less constraint. So my conclusion is that the likely outcome may be North Korea's gestures of denuclearization plus some superficial or artificial dismantlement of its nuclear sites. In exchange of East international sanctions and increased foreign trade, the DPRK may win broader international recognition without sacrificing the essence of the nuclear capacity. However, if its demands are not satisfied, Pyongyang may again resort to the threatening of force. I hope I'm not right in this regard. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Wang.