 Good morning. Welcome. My name is Bob Perrito. I'm the Director of the Center for Security Sector Governance here at the U.S. Institute of Peace. I'd like to welcome you this morning and thank you very much for braving the weather and coming in. We have more than 100 people who said they wanted to come and join us this morning, so we're hoping that they will be trickling in over time. For those of you that have been to our Security Sector Reform events before, you'll notice we're not in our usual space today. The conference level, which you see above you, has been taken over this morning by talks on the state in direction of the Darfur peace process. At the request of the State Department, USIP has brought together representatives of all the major armed groups in Darfur, plus U.S. officials and ambassadors, Sudan experts, members of civil society, and everyone else who has a stake in the Darfur peace process. And they've been conducting talks in these conference rooms around us, so peace is being made, hopefully, even as we speak. This morning, we here are assembled to discuss the issue of police corruption. Police corruption is a universal problem. It affects countries and all parts of the world at all levels of development. It is particularly disruptive in situations of post-conflict states and states emerging and dealing with crisis. The proof of all this is just to sort of look at what's going on around us. Today, the British government launched an official inquiry into the involvement of the London police in the phone hijacking case of Rupert Murdoch and the World News tabloid. This is something which has been going on for quite a while, but this is a new step in that process. Already, among the victims of this scandal has been the head of Scotland Yard. Closer to home, we remember back a few years ago to what was called the Rampart scandal, which engulfed the LAPD when a group of police officers who were in the anti-gang unit engaged in all types of criminal activity, all sort of in the name of suppressing gang violence. And our panelists here this morning, Michael Burkow, played a role in all of that, and we'll hear more about that later. Not as a perpetrator, but as somebody who put things straight, although we always wonder about Mike. An example of the impact of police corruption in a post-conflict environment, I think we need to look no further than the situation in Afghanistan today. This presents an enormous challenge to the US-led effort to train Afghan national police. Police abuses in Afghanistan have become so endemic in some places that Afghan citizens have turned to the Taliban to protect them against the law enforcement agents of their own government. Recently, a former US ambassador to the Interior Ministry told me a particularly jarring story about corruption in Afghanistan. The story was that an NGO had brought a group of disadvantaged children to the top of a hill in Kabul on a windy day and then passed out brand new kites for the children to fly. The kites, which had been paid for by USAID, were barely aloft before a unit of Afghan national police arrived, and the kites chased off the kids, confirming probably the feeling that many Afghans had that they were on police force to simply a bunch of thugs wearing badges and uniforms. The problem of police corruption is universal, and police scandals are highly visible. Often when they break, they're on the front pages of the newspapers and on television. However, the solutions to the problem of police corruption are much more elusive. The efforts by donor governments, by non-governmental organizations, and by international organizations to deal with police corruption have been hampered in the past by several factors. First, corruption, particularly at high levels, is hidden by its very nature and therefore probably doesn't come to public attention until long after the fact. Corruption, as we all know, is culturally relevant. What is an illegal activity in one country may simply be a matter of a family obligation or just good manners in another country. And finally, police corruption is very difficult to control in a situation where you may not have courts and prisons that function effectively. This raises two questions, which we have assembled a panel today to discuss. The first of these questions is what is a working definition for police corruption that applies equally in all countries and at all levels of development. And the second one is how can police corruption be controlled, particularly in situations where there is a lack of effective governance. You have the biographies of our speakers, so I will limit my introductions. The panel will speak in the order that they are introduced. Our first speaker today is David Bailey, the former dean and current distinguished professor of the School of Criminology at the State University of New York in Albany. David is the principal author of a new USIP special report, which is on the table outside on the issue of police corruption called What Can Past Scandals Teach Us About Current Challenges? David will speak first. Our second speaker is Anton Soper, who is an assistant commissioner in the New Zealand police force and is currently on assignment to the United Nations Police and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Secretariat in New York. And we're grateful that he came all the way down from New York this morning. Our third speaker will be Sanja Ifkovich, who is a professor of criminal justice at Michigan State University and the author of an extremely fine book called Fallen Blue Nights Controlling Police Corruption. And we're very grateful to her because she already gave one speech this morning at the national conference that's going on up at the Hilton Hotel, a gathering of criminologists from all over the United States, and she managed to get into a cab and get here on time, so we're grateful for that. And last is Michael Burkow, who is the former chief of the Savannah Chatham Metro PD and deputy chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, who played a large role in cleaning up the rampart scandal. Michael and I go back a very long time. I was responsible for sending him off in the early part of his career to both Mogadisio and Port-au-Prince, and the fact that he still speaks to me at all always amazes me. But he has a really broad background, which includes both working in post-conflict interventions and doing very high-level policing in the United States. So we're grateful that he's here. So we have a very distinguished panel. We also have an amazingly well-informed audience, and we're growing by numbers all the time here. So we look forward to an exchange question-and-answer period at the end of the presentations. So why don't we get started? David, the podium is all yours. Thank you very much, Bob. Good morning, everybody. I should also mention that he described me as the principal author. I would describe him as my colleague and joint author on this report that we've just published. And indeed, Bob has a way of keeping me grounded with respect to what's going on in Washington and the American government, and that's very helpful indeed. What we tried to do in this report is to assess current knowledge about recommendations about solutions to police corruption and to judge the utility of that for stopping and reducing police corruption in conflicted countries, countries that are not particularly well-developed and countries that are only imperfectly democracies. And this is where the U.S. is heavily engaged, as you know, and many of you in the audience are doing this kind of work and report constantly about how you're stumbling over police corruption and what may be done about it. Now, what we're going to say to you today is, at the end, the conclusion that we have worked toward is that generic solutions across a police agency altogether against corruption will probably fail. And I'm going to take you through our logic in doing this, and what we're going to say in the end is that to be successful in reducing corruption in police agencies abroad in the places that I mentioned, the places we're concerned about, it is necessary to prioritize the focus of those anti-corruption activities and to think tactically about them. And I shall explain that later on at the end. Now, our logic goes like this, that there are two reasons, two kind of sets of findings on our part that have led us to this conclusion. One is that context matters, that both the forms of police corruption and the solutions suggested for it are very dependent upon the particularities of place. And secondly, that the standard knowledge that we bring to bear, that is we, you and I in this audience, largely a Western audience including New Zealand and so forth, these outliers of civilization, that the standard knowledge that we share about how to deal with police corruption is very limited and especially limited in its application to the places that concern us the most. Now, let me take you through this very quickly because I only have about 15 minutes. The first about context matters. What Bob and I did was to systematically look at what we consider to be the best sources of information about the forms of corruption and recommendations for their solution. And these come what I will describe as blue ribbon panels. And we canvas the English-speaking world, 58 countries including Israel, which only sometimes translates things from Hebrew into English, but nonetheless included Israel. What we looked at was commissions that had been established, independent of government, outside of the control of the police, whose findings were published and who had a legal authority to command people to come and testify and to collect documents. And these reports, which we're going to report to you and the findings from them, these reports constitute really what is the basis for our standard knowledge about police corruption, its forms, and its recommendations. And if you begin to look at the second, and if you read carefully the secondary literature on police corruption, you will find that these reports are cited again and again and again. All right. Now, on context matters, what's interesting here is that the forms of police corruption, let me show them to you, are very contextually specific. Let me come to these. As you are, you have a look at them first. Now, these are the forms that are reported most often in these reports that I've cited. Now, what's interesting to us about this is that although these are the most commonly cited forms of police corruption, they only occur in about 43% of the kinds of corruption that are mentioned. In other words, there's another 60% of particular forms of corruption in particular places that aren't covered by these particular categories. So what I'm saying is to you is that there is not a standard kind of set of behaviors that constitute police corruption even in the English-speaking world whose reports we have drawn on. There is an incredible variety, and that's going to lead us in the end to saying we must take into consideration the particularities. Now, the same is also true for the standard recommendations for reducing police corruption. Let me show you what that list looks like. Have a look. It's a longer list, and you'll be familiar with many of these. Okay. Once again, what I am saying to you about these, although these are the most common suggestions that have been made in the English-speaking world for reducing police corruption, these only arise in about 43% that constitute only 43% of the total number of recommendations that I might have provided on this list. In other words, once again, about 60% of the suggestions that Blue Ribbon Commissions have made for reducing police corruption aren't covered by this particular list. And once again, why is that the case? And the answer is because where these, where corruption occurs determines its form, and as a result of that, the recommendations also are highly context-specific. That's the point that comes out of our reading of what we know about police corruption, especially in the English-speaking world. Now, let me move to the second point, and that the standard knowledge that we have, both about forms and about recommendations, is not only limited or is limited, and there are two reasons for saying that. In other words, limited in the sense of applicability to the conflicted places in the world that we are operating in and would like to do something good about. First is that these reports that I've reported to you are really... Well, let me start again. In the English-speaking world, in the past century and a half when Blue Ribbon Commissions were first done, there have been only ten independent Blue Ribbon Commissions on police corruption. There have been 22 others on police generally, and when I say what I have in mind, when I say Commissions on police corruption, there's the NAP Commission, the Fitzgerald Commissions in Queensland, and so forth, some of these. You'll be familiar with the Mollon Commission in New York, and so forth. There have been only ten of these. The interesting part of this is that seven out of the ten come from two countries, the United States and Australia. There is only one that's ever been done on police corruption in what we would refer to as the Third World, and that's Uganda, and that was in the year 2000 done by a very competent Supreme Court justice. That's the only one. Now, there are some... So what I'm saying to you is that even our knowledge... So what I'm saying to you is this. Despite the fact that our knowledge is based upon forms of police corruption and solutions of police corruption in only a few countries, the fact is that there's even enormous variation across those reports in terms of forms and recommendations. Now, that strikes me as very interesting. The other point that I would like to make here is that we often say that the solution abroad to police corruption is to constitute Blue Rubin Commissions. Why aren't they more common in the English-speaking world? Why has Canada had none on corruption? Why has the UK had none on corruption? Why have you, perhaps, at all, had none on corruption? It seems to me that's an interesting finding in itself that the way in which polities respond to this particular problem is by no means standard even in our part of the world. And we must keep that in mind when we design solutions for the rest of the world. If it's rare here, it's going to be even rarer and perhaps more difficult in the rest of the world that you and I are interested in. So what I'm saying to you is our knowledge is very peculiar. And that is something that I think people should investigate why even in our part of the world this Blue Rubin Commissions solution is not more standard. The second thing I want to say to you, and in some ways this is more important, is that our standard suggestions, our standard recommendations for policing, police corruption assume conditions in the surrounding environment, political, social, and economic, that simply don't exist in the countries that you and I are concerned with today. And let me show you what that list looks like. It looks like this. These are conditions that exist in the countries from which we have good reports of corruption. Do they exist in the countries you're concerned about in Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and so forth? Have a look. They don't, do they? You know, you all have extensive foreign experience. These conditions simply don't exist. But they do exist in the countries from which we think we have learned things about solving police corruption. But so exporting what we know into the places that we're concerned with is at least on the surface very naive. Okay, what do we do then in this dilemma where there is a huge variation in forms, huge variation in recommendations, and doubtful applicability of these recommendations to the troubled world? Bob and I think there are three things that possibly can be done. One, if context is so all-important, especially the context of these conflicted places. One, you could change the context. We don't go into that because you'll all know that that nation-building at a very fundamental level takes a lot of time. We don't know how to do it, and that's probably not a practical thing to suggest. The things that we do discuss in this report are two-fold. One, we could think of triage where you look at context where we would come to the conclusion it's absolutely hopeless here because of all of these reasons, and we can't touch them. And we would give some small support to those countries which are already moving well down that road, and we would try to facilitate it. And then the art of this would be to find that small group of countries that are at a tipping point where our support might move them off of one kind of column and into another. And we talk about that. Now the problem that I won't go into in great detail here is that I don't believe we have the knowledge to triage successfully and to come up with these three batches of countries. So we then come out with a third suggestion which we call bootstraps. And what bootstraps is changing the perspective on solving police corruption altogether? And it says, let's ignore the context and trying to change the context to create a favorable environment for reducing police corruption. Let's turn to the police agency itself and ask what the police agency on its own might be able to do despite these kinds of circumstances. Remember this, a police organization is paramilitary and it runs by commands and directions and it has usually an intense system of supervision. Can that be used in order to reduce police corruption? And possibly then to show how police corruption can be reduced and become a demonstration project for honest government more broadly. Now what would a bootstrap strategy look like? Where you say to the police, we want you on your own to do something about police corruption. And we call this bootstraps and we have six suggestions to make and they are these. Let me say something about only two of those and that's the first one and the third one. First we think it is terribly important to prioritize do not try to solve the problem of police corruption all of its forms across the entire agency but pick out your target of opportunity and what we are suggesting is find that form of corruption which is most in the face of the population and most resented. In other words we often sometimes stumble over the fact that certain forms of corruption are rooted in culture and people accept it as part of the way things are but at the same time we know in most of these countries there are things that the police are doing with all corruption which people detest, right? Start right there. Don't start with the culture and changing that. Start with that and see if you can devise a strategy to take and reduce that form which is causing the alienation between the police and the public, government and the public more largely and therefore we say think tactically. Think about things particularly that will reduce that form of corruption and don't think. This is what we are also kind of arguing against. Don't think about changing the recruitment system or teaching ethics in the police college or about improving supervision generally. Think of improving supervision situationally. Don't think first of pay raises although that may be part in the end of it. Don't think of generic civil society development but the development of civil society focusing on what are the particular problems that you are prioritizing. So the second thing is think tactically. Now what do I mean by that? What I mean by that is to think about let me come back to prioritization for a minute. A couple of examples. If I want to devise such a strategy for India my priority would be when people come to a police station to report a crime and sign what is called a first information report an FIR, money should not be required. Period. Start right there. It's what the Indian population hates most. Talk to them. We won't go to a police station because any service that we ask for requires the payment of money. That's true. So start right there. Eliminate that and you would do something wonderful in terms of reorienting the public toward the police. If I were to do something in Nigeria where might I start? I think I might start with eliminating those police checkpoints on all the major highways at about 20 kilometer intervals where people's registration and licenses are checked and of course back sheesh has to be paid to move on, right? Some of you have been there. There are parts of Africa for example where I think the major form of police corruption one at least, not in monetary terms perhaps but at least in the face of the audience or in the face of the public is the extortion that's required of street vendors. The people who sell vegetables and it's nice, you know, colorful pyramids of this and that they are hit up all the time. Indians in fact call them Mamouls a regular payment for such kind of people. Start there and see what you can do and then come up with the tactics that will eliminate that. And here we could talk for a very long time about what some of these tactics might look like but you have to do it on the basis of that particular problem in that particular place with respect to the Indian problem of payment for signing an FIR. What I would do, one of the things I would do was to put up a big sign in every police station. You have a right to report a crime and have that taken as an FIR without paying any money. Start right there. That sends a message both to the people who are in the police station and tells something about the people in the population who are reporting the crime. What we're saying here in the end, our takeaway is then is don't think about systemic generic solutions to the problem of police corruption in these troubled places. But prioritize first and think tactically. And this requires, as I say, extensive up-close knowledge of those places and devising particular plans for them. Thank you. Thanks very much, David. Ethel. Thanks very much, Bob. I just wanted to touch on a few things following on from David and just by starting that the definition is so wide-ranging that it encompasses absolutely everything. It's universal corruption. It's not just restricted to developing or non-developed countries, post-conflict or conflict societies, even though they are probably more vulnerable than most. And it crosses all the spectrums, public, private and political areas. And depending on which country you're in, the corruption could be overt or covert, and we face this challenge quite often. The police occupation lends itself well to corruption because it provides opportunity and ability to undertake some of these activities with a degree of impunity. But it impacts on justice, as we all know. It adversely affects the public potential to lead to a wider range of offences being committed right through the spectrum, from public disorder through transnational organised crime and murders. It really isn't a front to equality before the law. So we try and address these issues and all the tasks that we have to do. The scale goes from grand to petty if that's a way to describe it. From accepting vast sums of money through to just taking a simple coffee or a lunch as a perk. Or just to enable the police officers to do as daily duties. Like in most Asian countries where I've worked there's insufficient fuel for the motorbike or the police car to be done. And they need lunch money. So they do traffic stops, as we've heard from Bob, to get those, to get petrol for the police vehicle to actually do their business. So it's not, in those cases you might not say it's for personal enrichment, it's to enable the job to be done. Which leads me to the second point about absolute versus relative. So in some countries where there's no tax system the police pay in directly, the public pay in directly for their police services. Just by doing those particular things. And so overt and covert are issues that we deal with all the time. In terms of the UN we've got several conventions against corruption and I'm not going to address all of them but really we're looking at issues around prevention, criminalisation, international cooperation and in some cases, asset recovery. And that asset recovery is particularly important in developing countries where corruption just plunders the national wealth and impacts on the state's ability to be able to reconstruct and rehabilitate. So it has an even greater effect in those areas as has been mentioned. So we should be concerned about the seriousness of the problem because it is on a huge scale. We should be looking at the links between corruptions and other forms of crime and we're pretty vigilant about that. They impact on political stability but more and more for us in the UN it's got a transnational issue or problem for us and they seem to be sometimes greater than the national issues. So to deal with it we need to have a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach and I'll pick up later on the tactical that David talks about. But more and more peacekeeping and peacemaking now is not about disputes on the ground and doing some monitoring it's more about development and institution building and these challenges of corruption impacts severely on that new role that we have in peacemaking and trying to develop these institutions. So I just wanted to touch on some of the triggers for corruption as we see it and particularly dealing with police in a whole lot of areas the low educational levels have an impact for us and I'm talking here post-conflict countries and I'll come back to it again and again in these areas the new police service is usually built up from ex-combatants or others who probably wouldn't be your first choice to recruit for police but for a whole lot of reasons that's what we get so we start from a point where it may be quite difficult anyway we talk about the lack of salaries the lack of oversight mechanisms and most of all for us it's about the police culture because that's an immovable beast almost it's quite difficult to change and I'm sure Mike's going to elaborate on those sorts of things again from the UN perspective issues like post-conflict Europe in the 90s and the recent film the whistleblower just really highlights the exploitation of those vulnerable groups the protection of perpetrators the blue wall of silence and a lot of people just turning a blind eye to the involvement of people across all levels of our organisation through other areas as well so the UN like others aren't immune to these things on a regional basis South East Asia in particular where there's been selection and recruitment examples and organised crime involvement and police misconduct and a large number of day jurisdictions there linkages that they have to judiciary and political connections aren't helpful either so corruption is always in pursuit of something, it's a means to an end so maybe now just some comments and observations on trying to break down maybe the income that some police officers receive enable to probably survive is probably a good word and from experience we're pretty much based that any money that some frontline police officers get a third goes to support the family a third goes to operational requirements like trying to get the petrol and the motorbike etc. for duty and in a lot of countries the other third is to pay off senior officers because you can't get into the police service or you can't get to be a police officer, the privilege of being a serving police officer without some form of payment or other favours being taken into account so there's a need for senior management willingness and confidence to make the required changes because there is a lot of talk about making changes but sometimes there's not the confidence or the willingness to be able to make the changes and the challenge is to change the police culture and to be fair some police organisations have identified the problem themselves and pulled back from the brink of commission of inquiries and police commissions and other things but the reality is I don't think we're learning enough from those previous inquiries and previous reports on how these are dealt with and we've got to think more about how we deal with that there's also the issue of political interference in senior police appointments and we know what that leads to in terms of arrests and releases based on political party affiliations or bias so for us in police and probably for us in the UN police the change needs to be major but we talk about incremental done in a positive way and not necessarily in a retrospective deficient way it's about the process that David talked about with beach traps pick off some of those key target areas early and I think the relationship between frontline police staff and police leadership has a huge impact on this because sometimes they're not in sync about what needs to be done and the reasons why so that's an area that we're trying to get our UN police commissioners on the ground more in sync not only with their frontline police officers who do cause problems on some of these missions but also for the capacity building they're doing with the host state police in that regard as well so if we talk about domestic policing most of the issues during my experience have been property related offences and sexual exploitation and in those early days the key drivers for that were alcohol and drugs in international policing that focus has changed slightly and not only does it come a human trafficking and sex exploitation but it covers a much wider range than probably what each national individual country might face and one of the factors for that is the economic imbalance of currency that the UN footprint brings into an operational brings into a conflict country when it goes there we bring a lot of US dollars on the ground we upset the balance our people spend that money on rest and recreation which might take forms that some people would consider breaching laws but certainly breaching ethics so for me that's a huge factor that imbalance that a heavy UN footprint might cause so let's talk about the numbers of peacekeepers, peacemakers that are currently around the world and we currently have 18 missions that we're actively working on involving more than 90,000 troops more than 17,000 police officers and an undetermined number of civilians who are now part and parcel in the development area of our interventions and of those people that we put in missions they come from 96 what we call police contributing countries so for those 96 countries the values are different so police are values and they are and they probably are in your home police service but when you come together as an international police officer in the UN it's more a rules based organisation than a values one and that has impacts and as we've seen on some occasions our people break the rules they're not immune to that and some of these corrupt practices so those missions range from Afghanistan which you've got particular problems Iraq Haiti where there's a different set of problems but still cause and grief right through to the spectrum of the Congo and or in the future Libya which we'll touch on later so all those issues for us are challenges that make this quite difficult because all our contributing police officers who make up police come with different sets of values and that's hard when you're trying to not only change a culture but develop a new one so in particular in those developed countries that we talked about commissions of inquiry police commissions congressional hearings they're all about systemic issues which run normally parallel to criminal inquiries for obvious reasons there is a criminal inquiry and these things are dealt with but those systemic issues have to be dealt with in those other forms now it's incumbent on us to learn the lessons from all of those documents that David's talked about what we do pretty well is we listen and read what we don't do so good is do something to fix the problem and some of that is because of that confusion that we talk about in terms of the problem so big that we have to deal with it the beatstraps is one potential way that we can start dealing with those things I also just wanted to touch on agenda and ethnicity in terms of providing positive role models when placed in leadership or influencing roles within police organisations to prevent and sometimes change behaviour after the event we're working on strategies including women into leadership positions has been beneficial but we've made the mistake sometimes of not putting some of our women there on merit and probably setting them up to fail so we need to do more in that area to better utilise their skills and currently the UN have got a global effort to increase the number of women peacekeepers, peacemakers to 20% of our contribution now that's a difficult challenge because most domestic jurisdictions only have around 15% anyway so that's a huge ask in terms of what we're trying to achieve I just wanted to also touch on what the UN are doing to develop international police standards just to give you a flavour that we're not sitting down on this and doing nothing but we are working on developing new curriculums first of all the strategic doctrinal framework what we're trying to do is get a framework for international policing and a lot of people in this room and on this panel have been involved in that process so we're desperate to get our own international standard and it's not going to be a Rolls Royce model because it can't be because there's so many different contributing countries but we are trying very hard to get a standard that we can adhere to so we're working on curriculums processes, training guidelines latest things like serious crime support units transnational organised crime units to support police services in those post conflict states to try and at least target some of those key areas to prevent the bigger picture happening later and if I just made a comment that we're very good we're making very good progress in all those areas but I think we deficit in this particular area of addressing police corruption we may be just not doing enough and maybe it's almost like a no-go area at the moment but that's just the personal opinion that I have at the moment so the transnational organised crime impacts of corruption impacts on us hugely across borders and across states the triage strategy that's been mentioned here for us is an evolving process and what what we're trying to do is see what elements of that can best work it's like the new process that we have in Libya the UN are going to have a footprint in Libya and we're trying to think about all the things that we need to learn about those processes so I think you'll find the UN get involved in this process it will be with a very light footprint it won't be a whole lot of people on the ground it'll be more train the trainer concepts more about providing countries experts in country to assist so that could be a completely new way for the UN to be able to operate that might alleviate some of the challenges that we have especially in this area here but I come back to the fact that quality limitations hugely impact on us and I've already talked about the 96 police contributing countries the standard of those police officers that we sometimes get are less than the standards and skills of the police officers in the host country that we're trying to institutional strengthen their institutions and do capacity building on part of the reason for that is our pre-inspection standards for UN selection may not have been good enough so we're working on those processes to help in terms of the host state ex-combatants who come in to be part of the fledgling new police service in some cases, hugely delay the incremental development that police can have from a whole range of backgrounds we could talk about the vetting process for a long time but in some cases it just doesn't happen so we need to be conscious of those things and finally because I'm conscious of the time I'd just like to close with zero tolerance versus gradual reduction on impacts so for me maybe zero tolerance is an aspirational because we might not be able to get there unless the political and the other triggers are addressed so probably a gradual and more incremental change will bring a sustainable reduction of corrupt developments and that might be achievable and keep your eye on that police culture because that takes time to change as I've said so the facts appear to be simple our organisation and I talk about that as the UN needs to improve our collection and analysis of the scale of the problem and the impact of corrupt practices because we're not there yet we don't know the full extent we don't know the individual statistics that make it up so it makes it hard to be able to deal with we need to strengthen our investigative practices and to develop transparent deterrent mechanisms currently for police behaviour in a mission or misbehaviour or misconduct mostly what happens is the person gets sent home from that mission not much follow up is done in some cases and next week they go on another mission so where this relates to corruption is we're not dealing with the problem we're sending it away to another destination displacing the issues so these tasks require the coordination and willingness of a wide range of stakeholders not just the police and I'm particularly interested in David's issue here because inside