 I fear my paper will be too long. So just, there is a certain point where I can stop. Let's see where we go. So Vidyanandin was one of the most industrious medieval Degambara authors on philosophical issues. Eight works of him have survived. A reported nine work seems to be lost. This is the mathematical study of his work. We'll take more time, but one thing is safe to say. In Vidyanandin's thoughts, we can expect to find an attempt to refine the philosophical heritage of Jainism in a fierce scholastic context with the other traditions of Indian thought. The starting point of my research has been the issue addressed by most of the speakers today, namely Anikantavada or Jain Perspectivism. I am interested in the question how to claim that Jainism offers a model for reconcilating a multitude of perspectives is manifest in Vidyanandin's discosive practice. How does he deal with the numerous concepts of opposing philosophers? Are there in fact signs of a reconciliation? How does he handle the conflicts that undeniably exist between concepts pertaining to the core of the South Asian philosophical debate? That is the conflict in propositions about the nature of liberation, the nature of the self, of substance quality and the relation, of the means of knowledge and their object, et cetera. It turned out that Vidyanandin's discosive practice shows fewer traits of Perspectivism than I initially hoped for. More precisely, the notion of tolerance that was attributed to Jainism, even in scholarly publications up to the 80s, plays no role in Vidyanandin's approach to the views of other intellectual tradition. He slashes opposing views as firstly as any of his colleagues from the Buddhist Danyaya Department. More surprisingly than the absence of intellectual ahimsa is the sparse application of the theories on viewpoints and on modal predication in Vidyanandin's examination of non-gyne traditions. I did not encounter a Sabta Bangi statement in his Satya Shasana prediction, for instance, a work dedicated to the examination of tenets from non-gyne traditions. The terms Naya or Durnaya are not even used there. From this one could assume that this Jain author got carried away in his argumentation against non-gyne views and that he neglected perspectivistic tendencies of Jain thought in favor of the emphasis of an uncompromising philosophical stance. I do indeed think that absolute postulates coming with, that absolute postulates coming with such a stance are evident in Vidyanandin's work. However, I do not think that the theories of Naya Vada and Syaad Vada are mere goose to conceal these absolute postulates. I have previously argued that Vidyanandin was a way of dealing with non-gyne traditions does in fact reflect a pluralistic attempt to establish Jain belief. He thereby uses the method of falsification to solve a central question that is connected with epistemic pluralism. I put the question like this. How can it be established that a certain epistemic event is part of a wider complete vision of an object investigated? In my paper today, I will spend most of my time for expounding this question. I will be presenting less textual evidence than I hoped I will be able to, but I will sum up briefly my published interpretation of how Vidyanandin deals with the question. The proponents of a pluralistic epistemological model assume a variety of epistemic events for a single object. The components to be considered in this respect can be sketched as follow. First, on the ontological plane, there is something. Secondly, within the epistemological sphere, there is an epistemic event that reveals as an object. We see something, smell it, taste it, infer it, hear about it, et cetera. Due to this epistemic event, we are able to act with regard to the object, for instance, in the form of a speech act. The proponents of epistemic pluralism now assume that a multitude of epistemic events reveal one and the same object. Individual cognitive acts provide multiple epistemic excess for a single object. Each and every one of these epistemic events highlights a particular aspect of the object and thereby provides adequate knowledge. The theoretical counterpart of epistemic pluralism is epistemic monism. Within this epistemological model, a single epistemic event only would be accepted for providing adequate knowledge. The divergences and the characterization of a single object would not imply a plurality in the epistemic sphere, but would have to be regarded as a matter of speech. The unique epistemic event carries the potential to be adaptable to various contexts. Against this loose connection between epistemic excess and the acts based on it, representatives of epistemic pluralism can claim a very close connection. By the different point of views of various epistemic agents, the vision of one and the same object can be diversified to so large an extent that it would not make sense to presuppose a single valid cognition only. It seems rather reasonable to assume a variety of valid cognitions which are justified according to the particular standpoints from where an object is apprehended. In this respect, the parable of the blind and the elephant is sometimes referred to. The story is about a number of blind men grasped different parts of an elephant and gravel foolishly about the elephant's nature, proposing that it would be a pillar, a wall, a rope, et cetera. Within the context of epistemic pluralism, the blind men are to be interpreted as epistemic agents who have limited access to the thing as a whole. They grasp only parts and build a proposition on the limited epistemic excess available to them. The topos that... I'm sorry. This is the slide. The topos that limited epistemic excess is the reason for divergent propositions about one and the same thing is also a distinctive feature of China thought. Hemajandrein is Anja, Yoga, Vyavacheta, Dvartimchika, put it like this. In the way other statements, that is statements of other schools, are hostile because they are confronting each other as position and counter position. In that way, your tradition, that is Jinna Mahavira's tradition, does not fall to a position as it accepts all viewpoints without distinction. While other doctrines seek to establish the respective theories on a single view and therefore engage in conflict with each other, Jainism provides a worldview in which all views are considered and put into frame. Such a concept of Jain pluralism fits to the interpretation of the parable of the blind and the elephant sketched above. On the ontological level, an object possessing innumerable properties, anekadarmakavasthu is assumed. According to the specific conditions and intentions of the epistemic agents, the properties become manifest in viewpoints and perspectives, Nyaya, which grasp only a single part of the object, ekadesha grahin. These individual epistemic events diverge from each other according to different circumstances but converge in the object. They are the basis for various acts with respect to the object. Speech acts are to be considered correct if they are carried out in the awareness that only limited access is provided with the viewpoint. The adding of siad to a proposition would be highlighting this awareness. However, these components are not sufficient for a satisfactory description of the cognitive act. I hope to make this clear by turning back to the parable of the blind and the elephant. The epistemic events that lead to the false statements of the blind about the elephant's nature can be declared as highlighting parts of the whole under one condition only. Namely, if I know what they are talking about. If a form of knowledge is available that defines the object under investigation, completely partial knowledge can be identified as such. Only epistemic access to the thing as such allows for the identification of other epistemic access as being partial. If this complete vision is available as a cognitive criterion, one can declare statements based on the partial epistemic events as being correct in a certain respect. This distinction between two different types of epistemic events is reflected in Jainan philosophy under the terms Pramana and Naya. Yashavitri as Jainataka Basha puts it like this. Viewpoints are particular assertionments that grasp only a single part of a thing without rejecting the other facets of it, that is of the thing, which is completely defined by the means of knowledge. A graphical representation of this concept would like this. So we have the complete knowledge would be the great triangle and then we have a partial focus inside this complete knowledge which are the basis for speech act based on this particular which are the basis for the speech actors. The Naya more specifically would be a partial epistemic event compatible with the complete vision. Alternative epistemic access is not excluded. It is there. It lingers in the background but it is not the focus now. And resulting from this Naya is a correct statement about an aspect of the object. The dual Naya however would be the neglecting of other aspects. It is an epistemic event which disregards the complete vision of its alternative epistemic access. What results is a one-sided statement about the object. With Parmana Naya and dual Naya, the inventory for different types of epistemic access would be so far the following. We have Parmana, a correct and complete vision of an object under investigation. It is a valid cognition. Then we have the Naya also valid. They are a partial cognition of the effectiveness of alternative epistemic access is somehow implicit. And then we have dual Naya, the collection of alternative epistemic access and this would be the only invalid cognition so far. This inventory of types is the one most prominently referred to in the picture of China perspectivism. However, it is not complete with regard to invalid epistemic access. True, if one focuses on a certain aspect of an object, the neglect of other parts is an error. It is erroneous to say an elephant is a rope and nothing else. But what about statements based on epistemic events which are not directed at the object under investigation, neither as a whole nor as a part of it? What about the fools I'm sorry. What about the fools or the willful statements like in our example, the thing you are talking about is very tiny like a mouse. It is a statement based on an epistemic event which is not directed at the object under investigation. Speech is elastic and we can attribute anything we want to an object under consideration. The question is are our attributions adequate and how do we decide? How real, rational, acceptable cognitions are to be distinguished from meats, fairy tales, figments of the imagination, untenable gasworks and irrational dogmas in short how can objective knowledge and subjective prejudice be told apart? Taking this into consideration the inventory for different types of epistemic access has to be supplemented as follows. There is first the complete vision of the object investigated, then there has partial epistemic access including the acceptance of alternative epistemic access that would be invalid and then of course there is an epistemic event directed at another object and not the object investigated. Such an inventory may be nice but how do we apply it in the process of gaining knowledge? How can the blind be enlightened on the elephants to nature? In modern narrations of the parable sometimes a passing sage tells the struggling blind man what is all about. He shares his complete vision and makes them believe that their previous assumptions were based on limited epistemic access and they lived happily ever after. But how to make it plausible, preferentially and rational grounds that certain epistemic events are perspectives that is that they are consonant with each other and can be dissolved in a wider complete vision. In this regard it is interesting to note how the presumable complete vision appears to those who are lacking it. It is nothing else than another epistemic event dissonant to the others. It may be richer in content but still forms an unresolved alternative. I see two methods how an advocate of epistemic pluralism could make use of his epistemological model in the investigation of an object. Metaphorically speaking the wise man or a person who believes in him has two options how to explain to the blind what they have at hand. The first method would be the attempt to show them that they are somehow right in their assumptions. The second method that they are wrong. The first method consists in a collection of all the statements available and declare them to be based on alternative epistemic access for the object investigated. The sage could say the entity we are talking about is indeed like a pillar but that's not all. It's also a bit like what your colleague is saying, like a wall, like a rope. However this method of identifying certain epistemic access as partial and as consonant with others is rationally unsatisfying. It seems naive to believe that by gluing together certain epistemic events an integrative, cognitive criterion is accomplished. How should one know that the diverse epistemic events are referring to a single identity indeed and that they do not in fact refer to separate entities. Without the clarification of whether it is legitimate to connect certain epistemic events as referring to one and the same thing or whether they have rather to be stated separately as referring to different things, a discriminative criterion produced by a mere aggregation of components is a figment produced by historical circumstance. The second method to put epistemic pluralism to use is the falsification of dissonant epistemic alternatives to refer to the parable once more the sage or his follower could start saying you are assuming the invested entity is a pillar. Well, a pillar has such and such properties. They do not apply here. Therefore it is not a pillar. This is the method that Yanandani is using and I will finally illustrate it by the example how he examines the relation of jiva and cognition in the Satya Shasana Pariksha. The object of investigation is the relation of soul and cognition. For the examination of this relation, he collects four alternative statements as a first step. The divergent positions are soul and cognition are completely different from each other Savatabhina or identical in a certain respect Katanchitabhina or the relation is to be regarded as a complete identity Savatata atma or as a particular difference. The next step consists of a confrontation of the two respective pairs of contradictory epistemic events. In this pair here, one alternative is the position of the Vasheshika namely that soul and cognition are completely different from each other Savatabhina. The other is the giant's position that they are somehow identical. These alternatives are mutual exclusive dissonant to each other. It is not possible that both apply. What Vidyanandin now does appears to be most remarkable. He is not arguing in favor of the alternative proposed by his tradition. He is arguing against the other. This reflects a decisive stance in the question how adequate knowledge can be achieved. The stance is this an epistemic situation where two mutually exclusive alternatives are given for one and the same object for one and the same subject matter investigated may not be solvable with regard to their validity as both could represent false knowledge. But it can be solved with regard to their invalidity since at least one of them has necessarily to be false. If a falsification of one of two dissonant epistemic alternatives is successful a handheld is received with the remaining epistemic event. If this residual epistemic event withstands even further attempts at falsification it can be suspected that its content represents adequate knowledge of the subject matter investigated. With regard to the alternatives here Vidyanandin thoroughly falsificates the position of the Vashishika that soul and cognition are completely identical and draws the conclusion that the statement identical in a certain respect is the valid epistemic event. He applies the same method in the examination of the position of Advaita Vidyanta that soul and cognition are completely identical. And concludes that particular difference is correct. By this procedure the collected epistemic events can be gradually separated in two groups. A group of epistemic events which has been subjected to a falsification and another group of epistemic events which have not been disproved. Here now the epistemic pluralist can proceed to step 3 by building up the hypothesis that the later group consists of epistemic events that equally provide valid epistemic access and that by a complete vision of the subject matter investigated all of them have to be taken into account. I come back to the question of the paper. How can it be established that a certain epistemic event is part of a wider complete vision of an object investigated? Vidyanta's answer to this question would be in my eyes that we have to start with a confrontation of mutually exclusive epistemic events and the attempt to falsify one of them. His refutation of the main tenets of doctrine supposed to Jainism is not a mere logical consequence of the epistemological theories of the Jainist but an attempt to rationally establish it. Against the backdrop of a multitude of demonstrably invalid epistemic events, the respective opposed epistemic events can be regarded as valid. The Jainist's proposal and willingness to comprise the latter in a single unified and complete vision gains and strength and plausibility with every epistemic event that has been identified as false. The lesson for the blind men and for us is we are lucky if we find one who contradicts our statements. It could turn out that at least one of us is wrong. That's what I wanted to say. Thank you for your attention.