 Ladies and gentlemen, Professor Michael Sandel. Thank you all for being here. I've been given a difficult assignment. You've been studying about liberalism and Zionism and the possible tension between them and I'm supposed to speak to the philosophy of that. And then I was asked by Natan and Yonatan and Robbie what am I discussing the relation between liberalism and Zionism by also discussing the law of return and the Palestinian claim to a state, small, uncontroversial questions about which we will all agree. And I can't possibly live up to that, but I'll try. Let me put two questions to the group. These two questions are the philosophical questions on which all of this really depends. The first question is, does Israel as a Jewish state have a special responsibility, a special responsibility for the welfare and security of Jews that it doesn't have for other people? That's question number one. And question number two is, does Israel have a special responsibility to help relieve the suffering of Palestinian refugees, even though their plight has been cynically deepened and exploited by Arab countries, does it have a special responsibility to do that and to help the Palestinians realize their aspirations to a state of their own? Two questions. Not much easier than the ones I was assigned. I would like to suggest that the figuring out an answer to these two questions requires a philosophical excursion and that these two questions are actually connected in ways that maybe we will explore. And as a way of exploring them, I would like to make this a lecture about a more abstract topic, or it may seem more abstract, the ethics of solidarity because that's really the issue that lies at the heart of these fraught vexing questions. Zionism was built on an ethic of solidarity and the law of return is one expression of it. But before thinking about the law of return or about Israel's relation to the Palestinians, I would like to engage in this philosophical excursion and put to you a few questions so that we can have a discussion. And we'll see what people think. Some examples that explore the moral complexities of loyalty and solidarity. Let's start with some non-Jewish cases. These days over the past 10, 15, 20 years, we've heard a lot in many different countries about public apologies and reparations by countries for past wrongs. In Australia, for example. A debate has raged in recent years over the government's obligation to the Aboriginal people. And the question has been whether the government of Australia, whether the Prime Minister should issue a public apology for the treatment of the Aboriginal people. And John Howard, who was the Conservative Prime Minister not long ago, said no. And his argument was actually an interesting argument of principle. He said this. I do not believe that the current generation of Australians should formally apologize and accept responsibility for the deeds of an earlier generation. This was John Howard's argument. And there was disagreement within Australian politics. His political opponent, Kevin Rudd, took a different position, was elected and did issue an apology. There are probably some people here from Australia. Is that anyone? Only one. A small handful. And there have been similar debates about public apologies. In 1988, in the U.S., President Ronald Reagan signed into law an initial policy to Japanese-Americans for their confinement in internment camps on the West Coast during World War II. In addition to an apology, the legislation provided compensation of $20,000 to each survivor of the camps and funds to promote Japanese-American culture and history. And also in the U.S., there's been a debate about an apology and reparation for the legacy of slavery. There's been a reparations movement. There's been proposed legislation in Congress. And in many states that used to hold slaves. Many states have enacted formal apologies. Virginia in 2007 was the first. But here, too, there's been an argument. And the most interesting aspect of the argument has been not about the immediate effects, but about an issue of principle. And when the argument was going on in the U.S. Congress, there was a Republican congressman named Henry Hyde who rejected the idea of reparations on principled grounds. He said this, quote, I never owned a slave. I never oppressed anybody. I don't know why I should have to pay for someone who did own slaves generations before I was born. This is Henry Hyde. So his argument was a principled argument similar to John Howard's in Australia. And it was principled in the following sense. It said underlying their arguments was an idea about moral responsibility. We are morally responsible for what we as individuals do for the wrongs we may commit, for the sins we may perform. But we can't even in principle be responsible, morally responsible for writing the wrongs that someone else committed, our great grandparents, for example, or their parents. There is no such thing on this view. There is no such thing as collective responsibility. Moral responsibility is an individual matter and it doesn't reach across time and it's not collective. So here's our first question. I'd like to get people's views about this debate over the character of responsibility. I never owned a slave. I never oppressed anyone. Why should I have to pay for someone who did own slaves generations before I was born? I want people to respond to the matter of principle in the apology and reparations case. How many think that Henry Hyde and John Howard have a point that moral responsibility is not something that can reach across generations? And how many think they're wrong? So let's just take a vote on that. How many think that they're right? It's a matter of principle that moral responsibility is an individual matter. I'm responsible for what I do, not for what somebody else did. Raise your hands. And how many disagree with that? How many think there is something to the idea of collective moral responsibility that can reach across time? And so the majority sees something in the idea. Let's start with those who believe there is such a thing as moral responsibility that extends over time across generations. And can you tell us why? Who will start us off and explain why? Why you think that? And I think we have runners with microphones. All right, in the back of the room. Yes. Stand up. We'll get you a microphone. Hello, I'm Liad from Koma Community University. I wanted to think that we have responsibility, first of all, because our culture, economy, and all the things that we have now is also because what we used to do. We still enjoy what our grandparents did by having slaves. That's for first. So there might be some continuing benefit that we enjoy. Not maybe, for sure. Yeah. For sure there's a benefit. In America, you know, people are rich and have a lot of wealth. Also, not everybody, of course, not, but also some people are rich because their grand, grand, grand, grand feathers used to have slaves and they still continue that wealth in the States. Also, I know in Australia. And I think the other things that we are still doing that, it's not slaves like it used to be, but I just have a conversation with the CEO of Timberland two weeks ago and he told me all the big corporations do it. Manufacturing in China, in Africa, and we still have modern slaves, so we don't do it with valiant, but we do it in other respects. Let me see if I understand. So the reason moral responsibility can extend across generations is that there is continuing benefit in enjoying the fruits of the injustice. Who would like to respond? Who disagrees? Who disagrees with the idea that moral responsibility is anything other than an individual matter? Those of you who raise your hands agreeing with John Howard and Henry Hyde. Who else? Go ahead. There is no limit. Tell us who you are. My name is Sviraviv, I represent the WZO. There is no limit to injustice. You can talk about exploitation of Western civilization in Europe, of Africa, of South America. Somebody in Mexico calculated that the entire world of Europe cannot cover for the exploitation they did, or the European powers did in Latin America, et cetera, et cetera. So we start digging in the past, we have absolutely no present and certainly no future, because the feuds will continue adding finitum. You have absolutely no way to compensate what happened in the past. That does not mean that you have to behave the same way at present. At present you have to change your manner of behavior, not to repeat the mistakes of the past, but to pay for the mistakes of the past. I can go, I know that the Romans took, destroyed the second temple, and with the money they took from the second temple they built the Colosseum. They are making huge amounts of money of visitors of the Colosseum today. I want it. Now, Ben-Gurion once said, Ben-Gurion once said that we should take royalties for the Bible. Now imagine had the world started to pay royalties for the Bible. You know, the Jewish agency wouldn't have been in such financial trouble. That's a pretty strong argument. Who has a reply? I have a reply. Yes, right here. Yes. I have the microphone. Right here, we'll get you a microphone. Stand up, stand up. We'll get you a microphone. Well, I think this goes to the argument... Tell us who you are. Sorry, Reaver Forman, South African Zionist Federation, and Otzenu. I think this goes back to our earlier argument of individual as opposed to collective. Now, the Jewish people are certainly a collective identity in that we care for one another. And according to Artora, the other, the stranger in our midst is also part of our responsibility. Thus, if we were to go back to biblical times, as my friend there said, it's what we're talking about now refers to an era that is a little bit more modern than biblical times. And also I think that as a collective, if we don't take responsibility now for the other, the very future of our society, including a democratic, so-called society, will be at risk. So I think it's the era now where we as a collective have to resume the responsibility of correcting the past so that together as a collective, as Jews, and humanity, we can have a better future. Alright, Riba, stay there. Stay there. Would you like to respond? What would you say? I've had so many discussions with Riba in the past, so this wouldn't be the first. But, look, stand up. We have to draw the line somewhere. I understand that those of originally in Australia are a very clearly defined group. They are clearly defined group of today. I understand that in Canada we've got some defined groups so they call the First Nations, etc. If we will try to correct the wrongs of history, we will never be able to deal. You know what, we have two alternatives in life. Either to deal with important things, or to deal with urgent things. And all those things that will come from the past will become the urgent things that will not allow us to deal with the important things that will build the life of our children. Again, I say, we have to correct the present. We cannot oppress people at present. We cannot do the wrongs at present, although, as my friend said before, we are doing it every day with Timberland, with production in China, production in Latin America, etc. However, we have got to identify what we can do as people, as human beings, etc. in order to improve the life of current and future generations. My name is Svi, all the time. Your name is still Svi. Alright, stay there. Riva? Just a very short reply, Svi. If we don't accept responsibility to correct an other which lives in our midst today, be it the Aborigines who are living in Australia, being at the Israeli Arab who's living here, being at the Palestinian, in other words, we're talking about the stranger in our midst. And if a reparation and apology can give them more of a self-respecting identity which would mean less bloodshed and less war in the future, it is our responsibility in a western world with a very small act of reparation and apology to allow them to live in a society. Riva. Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. Riva. Sorry, I mentioned the wrong word. No, no. I'll just mention the other in our midst. Do you have... Do you have... This is a question for Riva or anyone else who can think of another example, maybe a 20th century historical example involving one nation issuing an apology and actually paying reparations. The South African... I'm going to give it to her. Oh, sorry. The South African apology to the black community of the chief rabbi who apologized the Truth and Reconciliation Commission allowed people to live together with no political analogy or no reference to the Israel-Palestinian. All right, so there's one example. Are there any other examples? Yes. I'm Barbara Wind of the Holocaust Council of Metro West, so of course I would bring up Germany. And it's a problem because the third generation now doesn't want to pay reparations and is feeling that they've had enough. They've done enough and they've had enough. And what do you think is the... Do you think that one generation, two generations, three of Germans after the Holocaust, a German generation, none of whom in any position other than a childhood if for that matter even born during the 30s and 40s, do you think they have still a moral responsibility to Israel or to the Jewish people? They have a moral responsibility to remember and I agree with what the first speaker said. They are many of them beneficiaries of the businesses that were organized, of the homes that were organized. It's a very complex question and when you ask that question originally my hand would have gone up for both sides because one can make an argument for both sides very easily. So do you think that there is... Do you think that the example of Germany illustrates that there is some... that there is a possibility of moral responsibility across generations? Moral responsibility in terms of... To acknowledge and to right a wrong across generations. Yes and I think Germany has upheld that responsibility very honorably in terms of teaching but what really goes on in Germany that I know also there is a lot of pushback and I know that there is growing anti-Semitism and I know that some of it not all of it but some of it is caused by the reparations etc. Alright so who would like to respond to Barbara? I'm Stephen Fuchs from the World Union for Progressive Judaism. We see in the Torah that there is something to say on both sides. Ten Commandments makes it very clear. The eternal... Jealous God visiting the guilt of the fathers or parents upon the children to the third or the fourth generation and of course the purpose of that is to compare God's anger to God's chesed which extends to the thousands generation and yet in Deuteronomy we see a clear rebuttal. Fathers shall not be put to death for the sins of their children, every person shall be punished for his or her own sin of you the prophets back up. But what are we left with? We're left with I think a clear fact. We do suffer for the sins of our parents. If my father, God forbid, would rob a bank and I was a child in school I would suffer great consequences because of his act and so I think that the bottom line is we do have a responsibility. I know that my mother was very grateful for the reparations paid her by the German government for what they did to my father and I think that it is a fair concept. I think the state of Israel is certainly grateful for those reparations. We wouldn't be where we are today without them and I think that we need to look as honestly as we can and we Jews have a higher responsibility for this issue as Riva pointed out so eloquently to really examine what we may have done and do what we can of course within the context of recognition a desire to live with us in peace etc etc etc to redress those wrongs. So we have here what this discussion has brought out very powerfully now with a range of examples are two ways of conceiving moral responsibility one way the way that rejects in principle the possibility of collective responsibility across generations says what it means to be morally responsible is to be held responsible for the acts that I do for the sins that I commit not that somebody else commits and this idea of individual responsibility is connected with a certain appealing idea of freedom it's an idea of freedom that says the obligations, the moral obligations I have are not just given to me by nature or by history, by culture or tradition the obligations, the moral obligations I have as a free person are the ones that I've chosen through acts of consent I've willingly incurred so that's for the individualistic idea of freedom and then we've heard expressed by Riva and others in Barbara the idea that moral responsibility can can be collective and can reach across generations that we can inherit moral responsibilities in virtue of our membership in a particular community and maybe our ability to bear the moral burdens of our parents and grandparents generation is connected to a different idea of what it means to be free according to this second idea to be free is not only to be morally responsible for the choices I make the acts I perform to be free is to participate in a culture or a society or a people that has some continuity through time so there are big philosophical issues at stake as between these two different ideas of responsibility for writing past wrongs I want to turn now to another set of cases not to do with writing past wrongs but with where my obligations lie today are there certain special obligations I owe to certain other people not to humanity as such not to persons as persons but to particular others with whom I share in a common life during World War II members of the French resistance in the Air Force ran bombing missions over occupied France, Bichy France a story is told it may be apocryphal but it could well be true of a pilot who was given his orders one day and realized that the village in Bichy that he was to bomb that day was his village his people still live there and he took the following position he said I recognize that this mission is as important to the cause of free France as the bombing mission that I piloted yesterday and the one the day before but I can't be the one to do it someone else will have to run this mission because even though some of the people in my village may have to die for the sake of the larger goal I can't be the one to be the instrument of their loss now you could see depending on how you think about responsibility and solidarity you could see this as a kind of weakness of will, a weakness of principle he wasn't disputing the importance of the mission he couldn't be the one to do it or you could see this as something admirable something to admire something to respect and different people may have different moral intuitions about this case by a show of hands let's just see how many how many find this pilot admirable and how many find him well unprincipled or weak he really should have been able to summon up ideally at least the courage to do it how many find him admirable and how many see it as a certain weakness that ideally at least he should have been able to overcome not too many maybe I told the story too evocatively on his behalf then let's take another story another example no before I do those of you who nonetheless see a certain weakness let's hear from you what would you say? let's say he agrees with the decision but can't completely carry out the mission but he knows his mother and father are living there can he tell them to leave and do we assume that telling them to leave will not imperil the success of the mission we might need to know that wouldn't we have to know that it would be easy I think it would be too easy if he could tell them so quietly and secretly that it would in no way damage the mission but the hard test is suppose that revealing this to them word would get out and imperil the mission that would be the test well I want to give you one other case and get your views about this unless there's someone else who wants to speak critically of this pilot it would be a difficult question or you wouldn't pose it it's very easy to develop a plan of war and to be executing it as long as you're not the one who has to execute it everybody else benefits from the hard work that other people do and so if how can it be fair for all of us sitting in this room to say well he he's a bad person he's going to move ahead and bombs it because we don't live with the consequences or the responsibility so do you think he should have tried to summon the courage to do it I think yes because if we just always pass it on down if we're all very committed that this is the right action and that this has to be done we can't then say but let someone else do the dirty work because we all have to take of the problem or the hard part, along with the benefits of having executed that plan. Right, even if it's especially hard this day for him. Yeah. Yeah? So my original reaction, I mean, Lon Wagner, my original reaction was to think he was admirable, and I thought about it a bit as you asked, and I started thinking about what's the distinction between that and between bombing a neutral village of innocent people as well? Yeah. And where is actually the problem? Is it carrying out a mission in which people will get hurt who are not the belligerents, or is the fact that I have some degree of affinity with them? Right. And I felt at the end that if I could carry out the first one, I'm not sure I could, but if I could carry out the first one against those who are innocent, then I would do this one as well. And that's the major question, is being able to hurt others who aren't to blame for the sake of a greater cause, a greater mission. So we assume in his previous missions, let's say four civilians died in each attack, and let's assume four would die in this bombing raid. So it meets your requirements. Yeah. And in that case? In that case, I think I would see him as not being admirable, but as not being consistent, and I think he would need to carry out both of the attacks. Principal is principal, and his affinity with those people, he is something he should be able to rise above. Ideally. Yes, give him, because he has affinity with actually both groups, just of different degrees. There's a universal affinity with those he doesn't know on the other side as well. And he can overcome that, so he should overcome this. Okay, that's good. What's your name again? Elon. Elon. Now, all right, who disagrees with Elon and can explain why? Because this gets to the issue of principal here. Who admires, even on reflection, admires what Elon sees as a moral inconsistency, actually. Yeah, go ahead. My name's Jennifer, and I do admire the pilot in this case because I think we ask soldiers in every war to do some awful things, but we also ask them not to lose their humanity, their affinity with the people that they're fighting for. And I think that by asking him to bomb his home village, people he knows were asking him to put aside that humanity. I think I would admire him less if he said, I agree with it, but I refuse to do any bombing. That's not what he's saying. He's saying he will bomb other places, but he doesn't feel that he can do this particular place. Everyone has personal weaknesses, things they can't do. But is this a weakness, or is it admirable? I consider his actions admirable because it was something that he believed in and he stood up for in this case. He didn't simply fall in line and follow orders. But Elon points out the day before he bombed a village and people equally innocent died. He just didn't happen to know them. I agree. I think that he's admirable because he's willing to stand up for his convictions and I think that it's a different thing to bomb someone you don't know. You recognize their humanity, but it's a different thing to bomb people you do know, especially if you have to go back to that place and live in that community. It's morally different, you would say. Good. And what would you say? He's not asking for that village to be there. He's friends and family to be spared, but you do have to give him some credit for not wanting to have it done at his hand. And if you're fighting for, if you remember what you're fighting for and if it's for the greater good of all these people, the fact that he has some humanity in him to not want to have the hand that physically takes out his own family, I think is something that needs to be valued. Even if it's not admirable, there is space between admirable and the other end of this argument. But Elon says yesterday, he bombed a village knowing that the same number of innocent civilians would die. He just didn't know them. So what's admirable in his prejudice for his own people? I'm not saying it's admirable. I'm just saying it's not worth condemning him for, for having that humanity to not want to be the hand that physically takes out his own family. What would you, how would you reply, Elon, to that? I don't know. I understand, again, from the personal point of view, the difficulty of it, it's more difficult. But I'm trying to think about it as a question of principle. I don't see the distinction of principle. I think it's more emotionally difficult to overcome the command to hurt innocent people you know than those you don't know. But I don't know if it's really a principle distinction. It's a very human distinction. So I can understand more his reluctance. But if I'm thinking about what's the right thing to do, if the first one is right, then it seems to me the second one is right too. The first one might not be right. And the question might be whether you should bomb innocent people at all. But if we assume that is what needs to be done, then I still hold on to that principle question. And the principle, as I understand your argument, is equal respect for innocent human life, whether you happen to know them or not. Correct, correct. Yes, go ahead. Ilana Horowitz-Rettner. As some would say that we live in circles of different loyalties, so that my loyalty to my nuclear family is more intense than my loyalty, and then my like Rough Cook's quote, than my loyalty to my neighborhood, than my loyalty to my synagogue, than my loyalty to my state, and circles extending out from there, so that one could argue there are different levels and intensities of loyalty. Not only different levels and intensities, but you seem to be saying that the ones closest to home, the most intimate ones, the most personal ones. Yes. The smallest ones. Yes. Are most intense, and would you say they morally are the most important? Perhaps, yes. I would, yes I would. Always? No. Actually. There's a dynamic tension, this is not easy. There was an Enlightenment philosopher, Montesquieu, who took the exact opposite view. And he put it this way. He said, if I knew of something useful to myself, but harmful to my family, I would reject it. And if I knew of something that would help my family, but that would harm my community, my city, my town, I would reject it. I would reject it. And if I knew of something that would help my town, but would be damaging to France, I would reject it. And if there were something that would help France, but do harm to humanity, I would see from it. And the reason he said, the reason he said is I am a man before I am a Frenchman. He said, because I'm necessarily a man or a human being, but I'm only a Frenchman by chance. So he also thought that there were circles of loyalty and identity, but he drew the opposite conclusion. Why is he wrong? He may not be wrong. I have to think about it. Okay, fair enough, fair enough. But that's the issue that we're trying to get to here. Take one other example. In the 80s and again in 1991, you know about the airlift carried out by Israel, of Ethiopian Jews. And there were many Ethiopians, these were from the refugee camps in Sudan. There were many Ethiopians who were suffering from the famine and from the civil war. And yet Israel had only a certain capacity and rescued the Ethiopian Jews. Now in principle, and Ilan, I wonder if I could ask you. In principle, do you think that it would have been better? Ideally, maybe impossible politically or humanly, but ideally do you think it would have been better given limited capacity to hold a lottery, let's say? I have two voices of this. Two voices, two microphones, which shows that you're conflicted, maybe. What would you say about that? About the morality of it? What do you think? So the major thought I had, and I don't know if this will hold water morally, but I thought of the distinction between doing good and not doing harm. It seems to me that doing good for those closest to you is morally justifiable, doing more good for them than those further away from you. And that's a different question than, would you cause more harm to those close to you than those far away from you? If you understand. Suppose you've got two refugees in equally desperate need and you can only take one, or you have 20,000 and you can only take 10,000. So the way I answer the question is that my obligation to do good for those who are closest to me leads me to choose the Ethiopian Jew over the non-Ethiopian Jew, the non-Jewish Ethiopian. And I say I'm not sure it holds water because I understand that I'm causing harm to the non-Jew. But I focus on sort of the sense of doing good and see it, at least in my mind, as a little bit of a different kind of calculation and that I do feel there's a moral defense for doing more good for those who are closer to you in identity. And that's why I would justify choosing those who I have that kind of collective link to. But when it came time to dropping a bomb in a good cause, but with the risk of civilian innocent deaths, then you thought that affinity is something we should overcome, ideally. In the question of who do I do harm to, yes. And again, I'm not sure if it's a good distinction, but kind of thinking about am I being motivated by doing good or am I doing motivated by avoiding harm? It seems to be two different calculations, maybe. Maybe, fair enough. That's good, that's really good. Go ahead. Yeah, heart people, I wanted to throw another twist in a sense on this topic because one of the things, one of the impacts of affinity is that I think it changes the amount of good that people do. The Israeli airlift is a very good example. If there had been no Jews in Ethiopia, it is unlikely that Israel would have moved anybody out of Ethiopia. And in fact, the motivation to do that stemmed from the affinity. So it may not morally in the abstract impact on one person is the same as another person, but I think the practical impact of affinity is to cause people to do a greater amount of good than they would otherwise do in terms of the airlift, in terms of charity. And in that sense, it may be that there's a moral justification for affinity because of the way people react to it. Somehow, it's just easier to be motivated to do good if we know the people or feel some special connection to them. And that's better than nothing. That's better than nothing. Actually, it's an idea that was voiced also by the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He was talking about patriotism, which is after all an instance of affinity. The writ large, bigger than a family or a village. He said something similar to, what's your name again? Harvey. So Rousseau agreed with Harvey and he put it this way. It seems that the sentiment of humanity evaporates and weakens in being extended over the entire world. And that we can't be affected by the calamities in tartary or Japan the way we are by those, Rousseau said, of a European people. Interest and commiseration must somehow be limited and restrained to be active. So that's Harvey's philosophy, right? Rousseau anticipated Harvey. And talking about patriotism, Rousseau said, it's a good thing that the humanity concentrated among fellow citizens takes on new force through the habit of seeing each other and through the common interest that unites them. But if fellow citizens or those whom we know or have an affinity with are bound by ties like these, ties of loyalty and solidarity, this would seem to suggest that we owe more to one another, those closest to us than we do to outsiders, to human beings as such. And that brings us back to the dilemmas with which we began. The argument against, because if we think of Zionism as an instance of nationalism, nationalist movements were movements that played out the logic of the ethic of solidarity. The idea that we have not just as a practical matter but as a moral matter, a special obligation to those with whom we share a common life, history, tradition, peoplehood. And yet there's, we know there's a dark side to patriotism, to all patriotisms. And there's a counter argument to nationalism, the ethic of solidarity, of affinity. And the main argument against it, morally, takes the form of a question, a challenge. And the question is this, when a certain person, an individual, acts on behalf of his or her own interests, we call that self-love, self-interest, prejudice in one's own favor. When a community does it, shouldn't we call it by the same name? Isn't it an instance of collective prejudice? The ethics and the politics of affinity, of solidarity, of loyalty, of caring more about our own people than human beings as such. Is there any way of answering the objection that this really is simply prejudice writ large, prejudice writ collective? I think there's an answer to that question. And the answer is that in ethic of solidarity, taken seriously, sometimes points inward and gives rise to special obligations for the welfare of those with whom we share a common life. But an ethic of solidarity also sometimes points outward and may give rise to special obligations toward other people and other communities with which our community has a morally burdened history. How is it that an ethic of solidarity can point inward and also outward in giving rise to special obligations? Well, it goes back to these two different pictures of moral responsibility and freedom. If you take seriously the idea that we are not just individual moral agents who choose all of our obligations. If you take seriously the idea that what it means to be free is to recognize certain moral ties we haven't chosen, ties bound up with history, membership, memory, then it's hard to separate the idea of obligations that point inward sometimes and that also point outward. Think back to those cases of public apologies or reparations. They presuppose this idea of personhood as situated or claimed by the past, by memories, by collective experiences. If we think of moral responsibility in a way that abstracts always from our particular identities, it's hard to make the case that present day Germans bear a special responsibility to make recompense for the Holocaust or that Americans of this generation have a special responsibility to remedy the injustice of slavery and segregation. Why? Because once I set aside my identity as a German or as an American and conceive myself as a free choosing individual self-defining self, there's no moral basis for saying that my obligation to remedy these historic injustices is greater than anybody else's. So the question is really, it turns out to be quite a big question of philosophy. It's a question of how to conceive moral responsibility, how to conceive freedom. What it means to be a free person which is why pride and shame or the capacity for pride and shame go together. Take a mundane example, we've been discussing fairly grave ones. If you are an American and you're traveling abroad and you hear some loud rude, boisterous, raucous, obnoxious American tourists, even though you don't know them, how do you feel? Kind of ashamed. Now, if there were sitting in the same restaurant, let's say, or going at the same museum, if there were some Swedish tourists, they could deploy that behavior or disapprove of it, but they couldn't be ashamed of it really in the way that you, now why is that? Why is, or be embarrassed by it to take a less morally freighted response? The capacity to feel embarrassed or ashamed at somebody else's behavior, you weren't the boisterous one and yet it made you feel embarrassed because they too were, let's say, Americans. Presupposes that there is a certain kind of tie that you haven't chosen, you don't know these people, you don't like them, but you feel embarrassed. This is often an issue with higher stakes and passion in the relation between diaspora jury and the state of Israel. So you might, like John Howard and Henry High, take the position that it's impossible, even in principle, for me to have a special responsibility to the right, to right the wrongs of my grandparents or great-grandparents generation. But if you take that position, it's pretty hard to account for the possibility of taking pride in the achievements of my great-grandparents generation or for that matter in the achievements of my people. So we began with two fraught questions. Whether Israel as a Jewish state has a special responsibility for the welfare and security of the Jewish people, that it doesn't have poor humanity as such, and the second question, the seemingly different one, does Israel have a special responsibility to help relieve the suffering of Palestinian refugees and to help them realize their aspirations to a state of their own? These seemed, on the face of it, like radically different questions. But the ethic of solidarity and the picture of moral responsibility and freedom as situated or claimed suggests that they may be connected after all and that the answer to the first, which after all is at the heart of the Zionist project to create a homeland for the Jewish people. The answer to the first may carry consequences for the second. These are not easy questions. And by trying to identify the big philosophical questions lying behind them, I don't claim to have made them easier or even to have diffused the passions that these questions inescapably stir. But listening to the debate, to the arguments that we've had about these cases, suggests at least a small hope that the discourse, the public discourse we engage in across the Jewish world, in Israel and the diaspora, within both places and between them, actually could proceed in a way, just as our discussion, our brief discussion here may have intimated that our public discourse maybe could proceed in a way that reaches bigger principles and partly as a consequence involves more listening, attending to the views of one another than we are sometimes accustomed to do. Thank you very much.