 I appreciate this argument that they discussed with you, difficult subject to chemical weapons. I'm afraid I interrupted someone who was probably better able to act this than I am. I know some of you have recognized the importance of this issue and strongly supported maintaining a different capability. While others I think had concerns about this and hoped that other nations would follow our lead and refrain from the use of these weapons. In that regard, our foremost goal regarding chemical weapons is to negotiate a comprehensive verifiable plan or BAM on the production and storage and use of these terrible weapons. Our draft chemical weapon treaty tabled in Geneva by Vice President Bush was a significant step towards such a BAM. But our desire to rid the world of these weapons has not yet been matched by Soviet willingness and is to join us in constructive negotiations at the conference on disarmament. For 16 years, we have unilaterally reframed from producing these weapons. Unfortunately, we've witnessed no slowdown in Soviet production and use of new chemical munitions. Equally distressing, the list of nations possessing these weapons and hostile to our national interests continues to grow. The lessons of history I think are clear on this subject. Our own experience in World War I demonstrated the horror of these weapons more than a quarter of all our casualties in that war were caused by gas warfare. A chemical war can be deterred and I think the greatest example of deterrence and effective deterrence was World War II when we know that every nation in that war was possessed of those weapons and they were never used. And the threat of retaliation, I think, in kind can prevent the use of these munitions. Sadly, in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq, forces unable to respond in kind have suffered horribly. The state of our deterrent, therefore, is of great importance to this nation's security. I welcome the call by Congress to establish the Chemical Warfare Review Commission. Our national policy in this critical area must be clear and based on a full understanding of the threat and our appropriate response. The work of the Commission has been critically important in this regard. You've already heard and I interrupted Ambassador Stessel discuss the conclusions reached by his Commission. The distinguished members of this bipartisan Commission have completed an independent, thorough reassessment of the facts regarding our chemical stockpile and the deterrence of chemical war and have concluded unanimously that the production of modern binary munitions is urgently needed in order to restore this nation's chemical deterrent and to enhance the chance of achieving a ban on chemical weapons. I strongly endorse their findings that a modernized chemical stockpile will best prevent use of these terrible weapons against our forces and those of our allies and increase the possibility of successfully instituting or negotiating a ban on these weapons. Our program will result also in a much smaller but more reliable stockpile of chemical munitions. As you've heard, the majority of funds that we're requesting are for chemical defense and the destruction of obsolete weapons. Let me make one final point before taking your questions. At present, our inadequate deterrent invites first use against the men and women in armed forces. We ask them to respond to such a despicable attack with weapons of incorrect height and insufficient number. The mere transport of these munitions that we have now endangers both soldiers and citizens. A situation is intolerable and can only grow worse. We must act now to correct this problem and to put this issue behind us and I think you will ensure that our troops will not again suffer the horrors of chemical warfare and will support our request in this year's defense bid. Now, meaning told, did we answer all the questions? Nobody else has answered all right. Let me say that one of the things that concerns me is that I think we are so close in achieving what you desire on this issue. What worries me is our colleagues that we have heard time and time again that have said, I have gone to the well on MX. I have gone to the well on this issue. I've got to have something to vote against. And I have chosen the chemical, Secretary Zacki because I'm sure we've heard, we've all heard it. I have chosen the chemical issue as the one vote that I'm going to cast aside. What can we do to answer those questions or those allegations? What can we do to say that the strength and the importance of this issue is almost of the magnitude of MX or is greater than, minor than, equal to that issue? Well, I think what we have to say to them is this isn't a case of, you know, should you try for two points after the touchdown or one, this is a case of that every single issue in the state of our defenses and what they had declined to, we have to look at everyone and see how vital it is. Now, right now, and correct me if I'm assessing this wrong, right now our situation is that yes, we have in storage chemical weapons, but they're not by now. They are the, and they're deteriorating. Age has taken its toll that we have had to remove some already. But we're faced with the possibility, let's say in transit and so forth, of weapons that a leak or an accident or something can cause tremendous damage. And the weapons we're talking about are weapons that have a safety factor that they have to be mixed before they're lethal. And so do we just because someone has supported us on our view that we needed help in the nuclear deterrent or something of that kind that now we must put up with this deteriorating situation that does represent a great hazard and represents also the fact that in the face of chemical warfare, and I'm quite sure that our opponents are aware of this, they know we haven't been building, they know that we cannot adequately respond, so they're kind of home free of the situation ever arises. Mr. President, I was asked the other day when I was talking to some of my colleagues about this issue, how we plan to dispose of the existing deteriorating stockpile that we have, and I was wondering if you or somebody could... How to dispose of it? How they will dispose of it. I'm going to ask for some help on this question here because the technology of getting rid of those weapons is... There is a program now for disposing of the dangerous weapons. Those that aren't leaking and are actively hazardous. The method used is incineration. There are special incinerators, very high-deat processes, a very safe one that's drawn through all the EPA requirements and so on. Our recommendation and our report is that this process of destruction be accelerated, which would mean building more incinerators and speeding up the process. Would that be on the side, or would that be...? No, they have to be taken to... It has to be in another... It's a very expensive process, but it does have to be done because these are more dangerous than to us. They were concerned about the transporting of them, because there is a risk... It's why it costs so much. No, they'll be done in a very safe way, but very expensive way. Thank you. Mr. President, Duncan Hunter from San Diego, I think that one thing we've failed to emphasize enough in the past debates has been the safety issue, the binary issue. In fact, you've got two elements until you put them together. You don't have a lethal gas, whereas we have many areas in the United States that right now are repositories for nerve gas. And when the killer amendment is offered in the next couple of days on the last floor by Mr. Porter and Mr. Vacell, Mr. Skelton, the Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, myself are going to offer a substitute. The substitute is going to say that we're going to go ahead with the funding, but that we are going to require that the harmless elements, the binary elements, be stored in separate states. And that means that the mayor of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, instead of having nerve gas in his state as he is in his city, as he has right now, will have the element that is similar to sulfur or insecticide, which is one of the binary elements. And the gentleman who is a mayor in Utah will have one of the other elements. And that these elements will not be put together until, in fact, we are moving forward to deploy them in a forward area. And this is going to solve, I think, a great deal, a great many of the fears about transportation and about location. In fact, I think it would be, if people's constituents knew what they're voting for, if they vote against it, in this room it's going to be doing them a real service, especially if they live in the towns in which the nerve gas are assigned. And we got a letter, as I understand that Dr. Welch told me just now from the Secretary of the Army saying that this is feasible. It can be done. I think that message should be put out to the American people that now instead of having nerve gas in your particular state, they have one of the binary elements that in itself is relatively harmless. Both elements are harmless until they're mixed. And the mixture is going to take place until that project is launched. And in a sense, Dr., that is feasible. But it isn't all that practical from the point of view of having a ready or retaliatory capability. But I guess it can be done. I don't want to estimate what's necessary to get to reject the killer then, but as you put it, but these are harmless, even though they're stored next to each other. And until they're put into a project and the project was launched, that's why you can transport them so much more. I understand that. I think that the way to make that message clear to the American people is to be able to give governors and mayors the fact that they're the assurance that this stuff will be stored in separate states. Anyway, I think it's going to be necessary, Cap, to get that 15 or 20 votes to knock that amendment. Could I just comment? It seemed to me, it would follow that practice, but you certainly could minimize the distance that they're apart. They don't have to be 800 miles apart. They could be much closer. There's a place in the west of the state of Brooklyn, you know where four states come together. Now, Mr. President, I'll bring you all up on my own. I have this concern. We presently have unitary weapons in Europe. Now, if this plan were to be implemented, we would withdraw those destroyed. I think we'll have a great problem in deploying binaries in Europe because of the same kind of drill we went through with the Plectons and the Pershings. And secondly, if we don't deploy these as the unitaries presently are at the front, we run the risk that if it kept in the United States that taking them to the front would trigger a possible Soviet reaction in the event of a wartime mode. So I think I have a real concern about that overall pattern that would be a necessity of either the absence of being able to deploy the binaries as opposed to the fact that the unitaries are already there and secondly, the implications of deployment during wartime. I would think that the local opposition to that would be lessened by the fact that you were replacing what could be a hazard to the nearby community with something with a much greater degree of safety. But do we have any agreement with these countries to accept binaries? You don't have to. You can transport them much more quickly and much more safely. You can also pre-position the binaries on the ships and have them somewhat closer to the place where they would be needed. But you don't have to pre-position. You don't have to have them deployed in Europe the way the others are. Yeah, but if you introduce them during wartime that is I think would be a very bad signal in person. I think we'd be better to have them where they are presently. We would have no judging, obviously, for their being there, but the Europeans do. And we are trying to reduce some of the short points of integration and they're very justified in worrying about having the unitaries to collect where they are now. Could I add one thing to that, Mr. President? And that is that in dealing with this subject with the NATO Military Committee, it consistently said, don't press our politicians for an agreement before you produce those weapons. But for heaven's sake, get them produced. And then we can deal with that issue later on. But if they're never produced, they can certainly never be stored here. And so it's easier to prevent it by never having them produced. But every NATO military leader recognizes the need for producing those weapons and having them in turn. But political leaders, do you have the problem? What I would say to you is that everyone recognizes the need for them and that the political problem, there is no political problem they've never produced. So let's produce them and then deal with that later on. I just reminded one thing, and I take this question, I know I'm running out of time here, but one thing also that we have to remember is talking about voting on this. And that is that there is one country, the one country that we have asked to join us in a treaty banning these weapons, and which has refused to do that, is the company, or is the country, that is producing them regularly and quite heavily, and is armed with them, which I think should emphasize that there is a reason for us to seek a deterrent. Is the Soviet binary or unitary? Unitary. Please don't worry so much about the barren level. Or whether you kill if you stand by. Mr. President, Jen and my other is overlooking Park, Kansas. How many weapons are we requesting in the bill? The reason I ask is because my constituents say to me, the ones that are opposed, I'm sure there's probably some support in my district too, but the ones that are opposed say that if you destroy all of the current defective weapons, that we still have three to five hundred thousand viable chemical rockets and bombs. And I don't know the number that we're requesting and I don't know the accuracy of those figures. Well, I think I've just had a chance to eat plants with this. I think what we're talking about here is the comparison of existing stocks of unitary and the planned stockpile of binary initiatives. We have the usual small classification problem as to the actual numbers, but the chart accurately represents the proportions of the percentages that all of the new ones would be militarily useful, but they would be in that proportion to the existing stockpile. So the new one is the existing and that's what we'd be getting rid of and we'd be coming down to that agreement. I see. The comments made, of course, in terms of the point that we already have a deterrent and that it is a viable deterrent and why are we going to an unresisted, unturban, smaller number of weapons to be a deterrent and we already have one. I wanted to ask you because I don't know the accuracy of all of that. Well, I think that one reason is that many of these weapons are deteriorating age-wise. That's the real problem that they just have. It's like finding that your ammunition that the bolster does is what we're afraid of with the supply that has been there so long. It's the atomic weapons and so many of our people, as you have and the rest of us have found out who have been opposed to nuclear weapons are also opposed to systems which don't use nuclear weapons. In fact, we had a little piece on the front page of the New York Times this morning indicating that some distinguished staff, people in Congress, saying that our land-based missiles are no longer valuable, somehow they have decided that they don't work. So if these people are really against nuclear weapons and they want to lower, they want to raise the threshold against nuclear warfare, this is the best way to go. I hope that works. Yes, I see that point and I agree completely. I just think the fact that if you look at the Soviet Union and you see the progress that they've made, again I'll stand corrected if I'm wrong, and it's the progress they've made in protective gear and clothing for their soldiers on the NATO line against chemical warfare indicates that they've not ruled out the possibility that someday it may happen. Did you have your hand up? Yeah. Well, following up on that, Jan Myers, this may be a question as much for Ambassador Cecil as yourself, excuse me, I'm John Miller from Seattle. I think on the negotiations issues, the arms control issues, the arguments cut very strongly and they were going ahead. The harder issue is the dollars or cents whether it's been spent and that gets back to this issue whether for these hundreds of millions of dollars, ultimately over a billion, we get a significantly greater deterrence. The opponents are arguing that right now with our present stockpile, even though some may be leaky and some may not be deliverable, as your report acknowledged, there are enough chemical weapons to cover the battlefields of Europe, the short range. I think your report says that. So the question then is if there is that sufficiency in the present stockpiles, then in terms of dollars and cents, why go for this extra? And again, either you or the ambassador maybe wrote the report that could reply to that. Well again, I would have to say that we should pay attention to the inadequacies of what we have now. There are some short range weapons. The rate of use and how many miles of battlefields could cover obviously would depend on the type of the battle and the scenario and so on. But it is a very limited capability which we now have in Europe. And as I was saying, the range is very short. Many of these short range weapons do not have the right kind of age in them. So while there certainly is a deterrent present, it is not a very impressive one. And if you have to think of replacing this, transporting it, replenishing the stocks, it's simply too dangerous. You really have to go to the vineyards to have that safety and ease the transport. And what you're saying is that present deterrent, in your opinion, is not sufficient to deter, to give assurance of deterring the Soviet chemical weapons like that. There's no problem measuring it entirely by numbers of organs. You're going to work it effectively with some useful support. I'm not going to deal with a rose garden here, but with regard to deteriorating ammunition, I'm probably the only one in the room, practically, I think entirely that can say this, but after World War I, before there was a World War II, I was a reserve officer in Calgary and I can remember being out on the pistol range and speaking of deteriorating ammunition, with a .45 automatic on the range and shooting. You'd be surprised how many times the gun shot out and then your gun was jammed and you'd look in there and the next cartridge that was coming up from the magazine into the barrel, the brass case had just peeled and caught and it was jammed. And if you were doing that to somebody else who had a gun coming the other way, you wouldn't have time to get out your knife and dig this bullet out there and see if the next one would work. So ammunition can deteriorate and you can find it when you really need it. Maybe it jams. So, excuse me.