 It's such a remarkable, remarkably good time to have a discussion on Pakistan, you know, hostage release incident. Unfortunately, a terrorist attack that killed several Pakistanis in Quetta just happened. The vice president has just called the prime minister on the after after that after that hostage rescue incident. And so some positive signs there. And then the Secretary of State has given a major speech on India, so you really couldn't find a better day to have this discussion, which makes me suspect that USIP has some power behind the scenes. If I were conspiracy minded, I would be wondering. Ambassador Khalilzad basically hit two of my, I think, four things that I would that I would raise to a president who's thinking about how do we get a constructive dynamic in the US-Pakistan relationship. The first is obviously the terrorism issue. Unfortunately, it's not in some ways it's not actually the most important because it's not the strategic issue, but it is the burr, it is the thorn. And the and the question, the unanswerable question for American policymakers has always been, is it an issue of won't or is it an issue of can't? That is to say, is it that Pakistan will not crack down on terrorist safe haven and the freedom of action that terrorist networks have or is it that Pakistan genuinely cannot? It's a very similar to a dilemma we face with China and North Korea. Can the Chinese pressure the North Koreans or or can they not pressure the North Koreans? And where you come down on that deeply influences how you see the nature of the relationship. I would say that since the raid to kill Osama bin Laden, both the consensus in the United States has been that the problem is that Pakistan won't. It is not that Pakistan can't. And I don't think that has changed. And I don't see that changing absent some significant progress in counterterrorism cooperation that I believe would have to go so far as to actually not just affect Afghanistan, but also Kashmir and also other aspects. So I think that the only way is that a sense that there is a serious effort to crack down on militant groups from Let to TTP is the only path actually that would that would that would start to change that that belief. So this is a fundamental challenge and it makes it hard to deal with the other areas. The second, I would say, is just the Afghanistan piece. So what is what are Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan? What are the United States' interests in Afghanistan and do those things align? And basically they don't. So this is why we've had a hard time. Fundamentally, for Pakistan, the best thing to have is a client friendly Afghanistan where Pakistani influence extends all along the Durand line and over. That is to say governorships and, you know, who's in charge of security should be something that is compatible with Pakistan's interests in those parts of Afghanistan. And that is that sort of a fundamental way that for Pakistan, this would be a good outcome for the United States. That's not the case at all. And, you know, whether it's the United States welcoming Indian cooperation, whether it's the United States wanting to see Afghanistan as a place from which it can project power and maintain its counterterrorism capabilities, whatever that may be, these issues are at odds. And so that's the first area of interest that would require attention from a president trying to fix our policy. The second, the next is the sort of regional context. So Pakistan has tilted towards China and China is trying to invest very heavily in Pakistan. There's a sense, I think, among Pakistani leaders that maybe we've got the relationship we need with China and the opportunity to have massive investments, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, et cetera. Pakistan's place in China's vision of its Belt and Road Initiative and how it's building connectivity westward is both potentially a great opportunity for Pakistan, but also likely a double-edged sword for Pakistan. One, the commitments will probably be far less beautiful than they look because that is the history of these kinds of commitments from China. And two, they will come with lots of strings attached. So that leaves you in a situation where the United States seems to be pretty comfortable, bipartisan, comfortable with a very robust India relationship. And the Pakistanis are seeing a China relationship in some ways a hedge and in some ways an opportunity to get resources into Pakistan that dwarf anything that Western countries are going to be able or willing to provide. And so you've got a little subset of the global strategic balance issue. And I think if you start looking regionally now, is Pakistan going to once again, every several years, Pakistan plays a pivotal role for the United States, whether that's after 9-11, whether that's the opening to China, whether there are regular moments where Pakistan-U.S. relations become extraordinarily important and Pakistan and the United States behave as allies for a brief moment. Are we going to have another one of those moments, or are we shifting to a world in which essentially China, Pakistan, and then a handful of countries scattered across the region, maybe Sri Lanka, almost certainly Cambodia, who knows with some of these other countries, are sort of one side and the United States, India, Singapore, Japan, Australia, are sort of on another side. And this is interesting because one of those dynamics is Pakistan on the democratic community of nations supporting continuing constructive international order, or is it more on the Chinese side of this equation, which is a desire to revamp the international order in a way that's more favorable to China's perceived interests, and how that plays out with Pakistan will be key. And so for the United States, looking at how you shape those decisions becomes a critical factor. And I'm sure I've hit my three minutes, so I shall stop.