 Please make your questions very, very precise. Okay, thank you very much. Let's go to the back. Or okay, let's start here, and I'll get you in second. For South Africa, you indicated that you were not considering border tax adjustments, and you didn't say for Australia whether you were or not, but a lot of the literature suggests that for a highly carbon-intensive economy, it can be economic and political suicide if you don't have border tax adjustment. So I just wonder what your rationale was for not considering them. I've got one question for Mr. Adams and one for Mr. Pan. For Mr. Adams, what's the story of Australia's change politically to embrace carbon taxes? Because I know that even the first labor leader, Kevin Rudd, didn't at first enact a carbon tax. So I know you could say government change, but even within the government, within the Labor Party, something had to give. So I'd be curious about what made it politically acceptable across Australia. And for Mr. Pan, your initial slide had tremendous increase in China's emissions, and yet the carbon-intensity targets suggest quite significant intensity reductions, but it's not quite clear when the actual emissions will peak, because even a growing economy with lower carbon intensity will continue to grow in emissions for some time. So I'd be curious what your thoughts are about when you or the government thinks the emissions will peak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Augustin for UNU-Wider, very simple question to the first speaker. I was very surprised to learn that the carbon tax effect on GDP was small, quite minimal. That seems to fly in the face of the usual Hexholene and Stoper-Samuelsson framework, and that seems paradoxical, consequently. So could you please help me, and maybe others understand why the carbon tax is small? Maybe I should be asking James, because I think you're quoting from James' model, and given the last speaker's comment about the black box, perhaps James can open the black box for us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a question just in front of James. Oh, okay. Ignoring Augustin's question. It was to Dr. Pan. I was wondering whether or not you have very ambitious targets that you laid out, and Fundi was talking about in South Africa, how some of the efforts there are gonna lead to very large increases in electricity prices and energy prices. Do you know what your initiatives are going to do to electricity prices, and have you had a pushback or a resistance from the private sector, from industries, or how is that being managed? If that's the right of questions, that would be fabulous. We have one more here, and then we'll stop, because these are excellent questions. Okay, thanks. We have a question for the last speaker. Would you please introduce how your model's interaction between the climate system and the CGE-based economic system? Thank you. Especially it's a dynamic CGE-based model, I think. Thank you. Let's, Dr. Pan, why don't you start and take whichever the questions you feel are relevant for you? I've got two very simple questions. The Chinese target for 2020 is set as intensity target, and then after 2020, it is very likely, probably by 2030 or so, some sorts of, you know, quantitative limit might apply, and then later on, probably some absolute reduction may apply. So this will be a process. If you look at the historical records, and if you look at the current and projected demands for energy consumption and emission, and then this will be a process. And then when actually the peak will arrive, as you can see from the first slide, the U.S. and the U.K., their peak appeared, you know, some 20 years earlier, and then after their peak, there has been some, you know, at the same level for quite a few more decades before reduction was the case. So in this case, I think that, you know, for China, not only peak is a problem, but also after peak, we have to reduce emissions very fast and very substantially. So we have actually not only one challenge, but two challenges that's, you know, the earlier we have, we need to peak, and then the earlier we need to reduce emissions. So these are the two challenges quite different from the, you know, the path from the developed countries. And then with regard to the incentives for emission reductions, well, in China, we have a portfolio of policies, regulation that's, you know, many of the target, you know, the measures like buildings codes, like energy efficiency standards, they are mandatory. So this is, you know, even if you have the money, you cannot go further beyond the requirements. And we also have the subsidies for renewable energy like, you know, fade-in price for wind power, fade-in price for solar PV. So this, we do have the incentives. And then in terms of, you know, electricity price, if you look at the absolute amount, the price is somewhat, you know, higher than the electricity price in the United States and certainly higher than the electricity price in Australia. So the price has been higher already. If you look at like the oil price, the gasoline price is also much higher than, you know, the price in the United States. But still, you know, we do have some pressing mechanisms which is under design and implementation. That is the emissions trading scheme is being piloted in quite a few provinces. By the end of this year, we would have a few programs initiated. And then by the end of 2015, some of these two or three regional emissions trading schemes would be somewhat, you know, operational. And then the next five years, this 13th five-year plan that's between 2016 to 2020, a national emission trading scheme would be experimented. So we do have a portfolio of instruments for emission reductions, not only one. So I think that my answer may give you some, you know, explanations, thank you. Board of Tax, you might... Sorry, yeah, Board of Tax. You can use whatever word you wish. The motivation could be good or bad, but fundamentally restriction on trade, which would be the view that the Australian government would take and it would never be considered in Australia and certainly hasn't been in any of the policy debates so far. The political system, I'll leave you to try and work this out. Five years ago, Kevin Rudd was elected in a landslide on a platform which included as the number one issue, climate change in Australia's mitigation obligations. A year and a half later, having done nothing, he declared for reasons which are still not understood that he would not be enacting the carbon tax policy. Public sentiment swept him away and he was replaced by a new leader, Mrs. Gillard, who had for some time been proclaiming a platform of no action unless the globe takes action. Six months later, she put in place legislation for a carbon tax. That's how politics works in Australia. The interaction of the environment with the CGE, well, the problem is that there isn't much at the moment. And that's a issue that we need to deal with, in my opinion. I think the issue of a border tax adjustment in South Africa is still being debated. Of course, I have to come here and give you the official position. I think that in terms of the current design, we will not have the capacity to be able to have border tax adjustments immediately. The one area where we might be able to consider border tax adjustments would be for energy products because those are fairly easy to work out the values for. But currently, it's not there in the documentation that we're going to put out, but it doesn't mean it's something that we've dismissed because we have decided to take a phased approach. So we might consider it over time. James, where are you? He ran out that way. Yeah, he ran out that way. Do you want to respond to? Okay. I can say the number is pretty standard for this literature. You'll notice, for example, Phil goes all the way out to 2050 and he gets 1.4% and this one's only going out to, I think, 2025 and we're getting around that. So there's more happening in a shorter period of time, partly because we don't have permits to buy and so forth, but the number is right in the range of what the literature tends to pick up. If there's only time, yeah. Well, I agree entirely with what Channing has said. You'll see in the literature, whatever the literature means, because it needs to cover a whole host of economies, some of which are very different. You'll seldom see GDP effects of more than 7%, 8%, even under the most stringent of targets. Now, you can get some intuition behind that, say for Australia or indeed South Africa. As my slide showed, about 33, 35% of emissions in Australia come from the electricity sector. The electricity sector in Australia represents around about 2.5% of GDP. Now, this is very, very rough numbering. Get rid of the electricity sector, you get rid of 2.5% of GDP and you achieve 35% emission reductions. Now, there's a lot more happening, obviously. We're reshaping the electricity sector. We're not getting rid of it. We're moving it away from increasingly cheaper, sorry, we're moving it away from fossil fuel towards over time, increasingly cheaper renewable alternatives, including PV and in Australia, geothermal, let me tell you about geothermal one day. And so in a sense, the costs are far less, even though the reductions in emissions still remain around about 30%. And similar stories apply to transport and so forth. So even back of the envelope, we'll give you a sense of roughly 50% reductions in emissions with fairly small cuts in real income or real GDP. I'll emphasise one point yet again, at least for my, or for our set of results, a lot of that emission abatement did not come through real GDP cutting changes in ways of producing. It came about by buying permits overseas. So the actual fall in real income, the true measure of welfare for the incumbent population was significantly more than the 1.5, but nothing like some of the dire projections of 20, 30% that I've seen with some of the more extreme studies. Well, we're ending near the session. Let me just take the opportunity to thank our panelists for giving us a stimulating discussion. Thank you.