 Okay, so my chapter looks at the determinants of mobility in the global south. We start with the observation that persistence of economic status is higher in the lower middle income countries for many measures that we can estimate. So why is it higher in the developing world? Now there are many potential candidates, but most of the evidence we have is actually coming from high income countries. So we could use that literature to have an idea, or we can think of what we know from the development literature in general of things that are peculiar or characteristic of developing countries to give us an idea of what might explain that high intergenerational persistence. I'm going to focus on three domains, labor market segmentation, credit and risk market failures, and information frictions. So domain number one, labor markets. When in the standard mobility literature, the main models, you know, Becker and Tom, Solon, they implicitly assume a unitary labor market where your skills are equally rewarded across sectors. Now we know from the development literature that it may not be true in the developing world. In fact, you have people with exactly the same skillset potentially earning very different type of income. So that creates the dual labor markets that all of us development economists are very familiar with from our grad school development class. Now if the sector in which you end up is inheritable, then you can see how this translates potentially to lower mobility. Now the point is that it's hard to identify which parts of this sort of where you end up, in which part of the dual labor market you end up, which part is inheritable and which part is not. So that's the challenges for us to study in this literature. What is crucial is understanding how you can create those bridges between the bad jobs and the good jobs to use a very simplified version of what the dual labor market is. So I'm going to give you just a couple of examples, location. If you're born in a faraway area of a rural part of a low income country, it's harder for you to move to where jobs are and where wages are higher. So that's one potential segmentation. In fact, there's evidence in South Africa, for instance, from Kali Ardington and others showing that an exogenous arrival of income in the family actually has effects on the younger, in this case was a pension for older South Africans, actually has an effect on the younger prime agent individuals and allows them to migrate and look for job. This is very much consistent with this type of barriers to mobility. Connections, like Kunal was saying, one of the things that are very much inheritable are the connections you have that get you jobs. So in this case, again, evidence from South Africa shows that a network-based having good networks allows you to get better job, which again increases intergenerational correlation of status. Now, one point that I like to make and I make it in every time I talk about mobility is that the fact that these type of things are what increases intergenerational mobility is not just inequitable, it's also inefficient because there is imperfect correlation between the kind of quality networks you have and the ability you have. So just because you have good connections, you get a good job, it doesn't mean you're the best person to get that job. So Plato and the Republics talk about this, by the way, for philosophers in the room. So you see how this kind of things increase intergenerational persistence and also have an effect on the efficiency of the economy, meaning which people are allocated to which jobs. So I don't have a lot of time, but this gives us quite a few potential avenues of future research. For instance, one idea that I propose in the chapter is, just in the high-income literature, we're looking at this geography of mobility studies, right, in which we study, like, for instance, in the US has done this, in which you have these maps of different mobility levels around different areas. So I'm imagining something similar for variation in economic mobility across regions in the developing world or across occupational segments or across other type of, again, segmentations in the labor market. And this could also be coupled with more narrow-focused interventions, perhaps less descriptive, more on the causal side of things, where we can see the effect of specific interventions that allow to build those bridges I was talking about. So it could be some type of retraining for people who have lost a job or things like that. Essentially allowing this, or vocational education, is one that often gets mentioned because it's kind of one of those programs that allows you to move from a potentially low-income situation into a high-pay job situation. So those are just two examples I have more in the chapters that you can read. Second domain, credit markets. This has been started in the high-income country literature, but the evidence is a bit inconclusive, meaning are credit constraints that important for explaining higher persistence in the high-income country? We don't know because the evidence is mixed. Now we have reasons to believe that in the developing world that might be actually very important. Why are credit constraints important? Because if not everybody is equally able to access credit, then you have a situation in which potentially high-ability children cannot get education because their parents cannot secure a loan to pay for their education. Again, this is both inequitable and inefficient because you want the high-ability children from low-income families to get high education because they would contribute to society. And instead, this marketing perfection, credit constraints, doesn't allow that jump to happen. Now we have evidence showing that this is actually the case. For instance, there is this paper in Chile showing how a college loan program allowed to close the gap in enrollment by socioeconomic status. So this is consistent with the credit constraint hypothesis. And also there is evidence from Mexico, so two Latin American examples, where here the lower-income families seemed to respond well to an intervention that changed the cost of education, again, consistent with credit constraints. So there seems to be evidence that credit constraints do matter more in the developing world. If that's the case, that gives us a direct policy tool to do something about it, so to decrease the intergenerational persistence. So now, empirically, it's kind of hard to measure how important credit constraints are because then you need the definition of who is credit constrained. And it's not empirically easy to do so. One thing that we know is that whatever test we come up with should take into account what is more widespread in developing countries. For instance, many families, many more than in the high-income world, don't have collateral to, again, access credit. In some places, market penetrations in rural areas is not very deep, which explains the success of things like MPESA in Kenya, where essentially you bypass the banking sector by doing it by phone. And also the large number of small institutions. Those are all characteristics, again, of the low-income world that might change our definition of credit constraints. One thing that I wanted to mention is that this, again, within the spirit of using the larger development literature to tell us something about intergenerational mobility literature, there's a large literature on the importance of cash transfers and how some type of jump-starting the investment on human capital, but also in terms of self-employment. So again, something that would allow, for instance, small entrepreneur or people who want to be self-employed to access loans could also have that kind of dynamic effect on people. So that's the link to, again, fairly large literature in development economics. The other thing that it's, again, potentially of bigger importance in developing countries is earnings volatility. Other than that, time to go through all the reasons why that's the case. But essentially there is more volatility in the more unpredictability in your income and in your occupational status in developing countries. So this low-pay, unpredictable income may make, in the absence of credible insurance products, may make people more risk averse, but also they will manage the resources in a way that might be less optimal. So again, this linking to the literature we know, in other, for instance, in the agricultural economics literature, we know that having risk products, insurance products allows people to take risks, which is good for investment, which is good for growth. The same could apply for the investment we're talking about here, which is the investment in your children. So if parents are particularly risk averse, and even if they're not currently credit constraints, but they may perceive a future risk on their income, they may be less likely to invest in their children. Again, here, some type of combination of the product we were talking before, some credit constraint, something that releases credit constraints and something that also helps in terms of risk, might, again, improve intergenerational mobility. And this is particularly important for people at the bottom of the income distribution who tend to be more prone to risks. I'm gonna skip on this because I don't have much time, but there is a bunch of, again, because I'll just say this first point, which is that there is zero studies on this intergenerational mobility literature. So if any of you is shopping for PhD thesis topics, I think this is one. The last domain I'm gonna talk about is information frictions in the labor market and in the education market. So another reason why there may be more persistence in the developing world is that there are more informational frictions. For instance, the signals that job seekers use to find a job may be less credible or there may be more variance in the quality of education. So essentially, employers have much more uncertainty on which to judge the quality of different job seekers. If that's the case and if there is more uncertainty on people from this advantage group in a paper I have in South Africa, I showed that that's, for instance, the case for women where employers are more uncertain about women's skills, then this uncertainty is almost a penalty on the woman job seeker in this case, right? So if we have interventions that can reduce these frictions that essentially can help the matching between seekers and employers, that should help mobility because again, the friction or market frictions essentially are not neutral. The people are penalized more by frictions are people in the bottom part of the distribution. So anything that kind of relieves frictions will help mobility in that sense. Yeah, for instance, there is a series of studies in largely in Sub-Saharan Africa showing how interventions that lower these informational frictions are particularly beneficial for disadvantaged groups who suffer from the lack of good information because they don't have the connections. They don't know who to ask for valuable information. Last point, another type of information frictions is frictions on the returns information limited ability to know what the real returns to education are, right? So if again, children of higher income parents are better informed about the importance of education, they may be more likely to acquire education. If children of lower income parents have less understanding of the returns to education, less understanding even of how to apply, for instance, to when you said I was on this or something like that, then you will have again a differential effect on people from lower income background versus higher income background. So intervention that reduce this friction will once again benefit people from lower socioeconomic status families. So here the agenda would be to, which connects to the labor market information frictions is to have this sort of low cost intervention because information frictions are usually fairly cheap, especially now with technology. So you can have the direct policy intervention here is to help people get out to what here I'm calling habits of the mind of essentially getting resigned to a life in that sort of lower segment of the market. And here the information frictions could help you figure out, well I don't need to be here in the lower segment of the market, I can go up there, the guys up there have nothing I don't have except privilege and circumstances as Chico would call them. I'm gonna stop right here. Thank you. Thank you.