 Sections 45-59 of Berkeley's Treatise. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Sagan Victoria. Sections 45-59 of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part 1 by George Berkeley. Sections 45-45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived. The trees, therefore, are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlor. No longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes, all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing. And barely upon opening them, it is again created. An answer to all which are a further reader to what has been said in section 3, 4 and C. And desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words. And I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible, either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause. But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defense of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity than not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them. 46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids, all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing. And yet, is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge when they agree on all hands that light and colors, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For the schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of matter and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation. 47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow the existence of matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unvoidably follow from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the particular bodies of what kind so ever do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For it is evident from section 2 and the following sections that the matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrated beyond all exception. Hence, it follows, there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of matter which are not perceived by sense. The reason, therefore, that any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense is not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion, therefore, as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute, the body shall seem infinite, during all which there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body, therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended and consequently void of all shape or figure, from which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of matter to never be so certain, yet it is with all is certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense nor anything like them exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world. Anyone whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived. 48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in section 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. 49. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived, yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them, though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them. 49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured, since extension is a mode or attribute which, to speak with the schools, is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea, which no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, then it does that it is red or blue, because those colors are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition, a die is hard, extended, and square. It will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend. To me, a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die. 50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things explained by matter and motion. Take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, and the study of nature, do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or matter, doth, really exist. To this, I answer that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena is all one as to show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how matter should operate on a spirit or produce any idea in it is what no philosopher will pretend to explain. It is therefore evident that there can be no use of matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities which are in truth no more than mere ideas and therefore cannot be the cause of anything as hath been already shown. See section 25. 51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes and describe everything to the immediate operation of spirits. We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats or water cools, but that a spirit heats and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at who should talk after this manner? I answer he would so. In such things we ought to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar. They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say the sun rises, the sun sets, or comes to the meridian, and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenants. 52. In the ordinary affairs of life any phrases may be retained so long as they excite in us proper sentiments or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false so ever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. 9. This is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in the most rigid philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavaliers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But a fair and ingenious reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor in connection of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable. 53. As to the opinion that there are no corporal causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some of the schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it, and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But then that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them. This I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagance supposition. 54. In the eighth place the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of matter or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? I answer, first, that upon a narrow inquiry will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction or has no meaning in it is impossible, and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment and is so nearly present to them, or some senseless unthinking being, but that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words and form thereof a settled speculative opinion is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. 55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so universally instead fastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness by the unreflecting, which are the far greater, part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities, even by men of learning, and if it be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world. 56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, an account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer that men knowing they perceived several ideas where of they themselves were not the authors, as not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills, this made them maintain those ideas or objects of perception had an existence independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind. They in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar, but at the same time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances imprinted by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. 57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of the repungency there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because the supreme spirit which excites those ideas in our minds is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are, by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because his operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But when we see things go on in the ordinary course, they do not excite in us any reflection, their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a free spirit. Especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom. 58. Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths and philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the Earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived, it exists not. But the motion of the Earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles we have premised. For, the question whether the Earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this. To it, whether we have reason to conclude from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances and such or such a position and distance both from the Earth and Sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them. And this, by the established rules of nature, which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena. 59. We may, from the experiences we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say, uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions, concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and being able to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. End of section 45-59. Recording by Sagan Victoria. Section 60-70 of Barclay's Treatise. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Geoffrey Edwards. Section 60-70 of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Part 1 by George Barclay. 60. In the 11th place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals, might not vegetables grow and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together, which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connection with the effects ascribed to them. If it be a spirit that immediately produces every effect by fiat or act of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist hath made the spring and wheels and every movement of a watch and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose and that it is an intelligence which directs the index and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the intelligence do it without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which, being mended by a skillful hand, all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature. Great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle and scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apocet use assigned them and serve to explain abundance of phenomena. 61. To all which I answer first though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of providence and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a priori with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties, for it may still be demanded what and God should take those roundabout methods of affecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been affected by the mere command of his will without all that apparatus. Nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind. For it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See section 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist, allowing the supposition possible, when they are not perceived, does it manifestly to no purpose, since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects, which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but spirit. 62. But to come nire the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant, regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects. These are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use of an ornament of life, as to the explaining various phenomena. Which explication consists only in showing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects, as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the supreme agent hath been shown in section 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standard mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God or the intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things might, if he reminded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it, but yet, if he will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions, as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected, all is right again. 63 It may indeed, on some occasions, be necessary that the author of nature display his overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rule of nature are proper to surprise an amen into an acknowledgement of the divine being, but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose to convincing our reason of his attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of his being by anomalous and surprising events. 64 To set this matter and yet a clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in section 60 amounts in reality to no more than this. Ideas are not anyhow and at random produced. They are being a certain order and connection between them, like to that of cause and effect. There are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret separation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connection? And, since those instruments being barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made, or in other words what reason can be assigned to us upon a close inspection into his works, behold, so great a variety of ideas so artfully laid together and so much according to rule it not be incredible that he would be at the expense, if one may so speak, of all that art and regularity to no purpose. 65 To all which my answer is, first, the connection of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines that is, artificial and regular combinations is the same with that for combining letters into words that a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions. It is necessary they be variously combined together and to the end their use be permanent and universal these combinations must be made by rule and with wise contrivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas which in effect is all that I conceive to be mostly meant when it is said that by discerning a figure, texture and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon or the nature of the thing. 66 Hence it is evident that those things which under the notion of a cause cooperating or concurring to the production of effects are altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities may be very naturally explained and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the author of nature that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle that supreme and wise spirit in whom we live, move and have our being. 67 In the twelfth place it may perhaps be objected that though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless extended, solid, figured movable substance existing without the mind such as philosophers describe matter yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance that exists without the mind or unperceived which is the occasion of our ideas or at the presence where of God is pleased to excite ideas in us it does not appear but that matter taken in this sense may possibly exist an answer to which I say first that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents than it is to suppose accidents without a substance but secondly though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist yet where can it be supposed to be that it exists not in the mind is agreed that it exists not in place is no less certain since all place or extension exists only in the mind as has been already proved it remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all 68 let us examine a little the description that is here given us of matter it neither acts nor perceives nor is perceived for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless unknown substance which is a definition entirely made up of negatives accepting only the relative notion of it standing under or supporting but then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all and how nearly this comes to the description of a non entity I desire may be considered but say you it is the unknown occasion at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God now I would feign know how anything can be present to us which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflection nor capable of producing any idea in our minds nor is at all extended nor hath any form nor exists in any place the words to be present when thus applied must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning in which I am not able to comprehend 69 again let us examine what is meant by occasion so far as I can gather from the common use of language that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect or else something that is observed to a company or go before it in the ordinary course of things but when it is applied to matter as above described it can be taken in neither of those senses for matter is said to be passive and inert and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause it is also unperceivable as being devoid of all sensible qualities and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it what therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion the term is either used in no sense at all or distant from its received signification 70 you will perhaps say that matter though it be not perceived by us is nevertheless perceived by God to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds for say you since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of there being produced that is to say that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of matter corresponding to our ideas which though they do not excite them in our minds or any wise immediately affect us as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us they are nevertheless to God by whom they are perceived as it were so many occasions to remind him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner end of section 60 to 70 recording by Jeffrey Edwards section 71 to 84 of Barclays Treaties this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jeffrey Edwards section 71 to 84 of a treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge part 1 by George Barkley section 71 in answer to this I observe that as the notion of matter is here stated the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from spirit and idea from perceiving and being perceived but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort in the mind of God there are notes or notes that direct him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes and may be entirely ignorant of them but this notion of matter seems too extravagant to deserve a computation in effect no objection against what we have advanced is that there is no senseless unperceived substance 72 if we follow the light of reason we shall from the constant uniform method of our sensations collect the goodness and wisdom of the spirit who excites them in our minds but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from sense to me I say it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise good and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature but as for inert senseless matter nothing that I perceive has any the least connection with it or leads to the thoughts of it and I would fancy anyone explain any of the meanest phenomenon in nature by it or show any manner of reason though in the lowest rank of probability that he can have for its existence or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition for as to its being an occasion we have I think evidently shown that with regard to us it is no occasion it remains therefore that it must be if at all the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us and what this amounts to we have just now seen 73 it is worthwhile to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of material substance that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons we may proportionably withdraw the ascent that was grounded on them first therefore it was thought that color, figure motion and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents did really exist without the mind and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or substance wherein they did exist since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves afterwards in process of time men being convinced that colors, sounds and the rest of the sensible secondary qualities had no existence without the mind they stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities leaving only the primary ones figure, motion and such like which they still conceived to exist without the mind and consequently to stand in need of a material support but it having been shown that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a spirit or mind which perceives them it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of matter nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind 74 but though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents and the reason entirely ceasing one might expect the mind should naturally and without any reluctance at all quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts that we can scarce tell how to part with it or inclined since the thing itself is indefensible at least to retain the name which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being or occasions though without any show of reason at least so far as I can see for what is there on our part or what do we perceive amongst all the ideas sensations notions which are imprinted on our minds either by sense of reflection from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert thoughtless unperceived occasion and on the other hand on the part of an all sufficient spirit what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect he is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds 75 it is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice and much to be lamented that the mind of man retains so great a fondness against all the evidence of reason by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the providence of God and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world but though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of matter though when reason forsakes us we endeavor to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility yet the upshot of all is that there are certain unknown ideas in the mind of God for this if anything is all that I conceive to be meant by occasions with regard to God and this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing but for the name 76 whether therefore there are such ideas in the mind of God and whether they may be called by the name matter I shall not dispute but if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or supportive extension motion and other sensible qualities and to me it is most evidently impossible that there should be any such thing since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance 77 but say you though it be granted that there is no thoughtless supportive extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive yet there may be an unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities as incomprehensible to us as colors are to a man born blind because we have not a sense adapted to them but if we had a new sense we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colors I answer first if what you mean by the word matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities it is no matter whether there is such no since it no way concerns us and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what and we know not why 78 but secondly if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, color and the like qualities as has been shown are nothing else but sensations or ideas which exist only in a mind perceiving them and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever 79 but you will insist what if I have no reason to believe the existence of matter what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it or even conceive what is meant by that word it's still it is no contradiction to say that matter exists and that this matter is in generally substance or occasion of ideas though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties I answer when words are used without a meaning you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction you may say for example that twice two is equal to seven so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not what and by the same reason you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other 80 in the last place you will say what if we give up the cause of material substance and stand to it that matter is an unknown somewhat neither substance nor accident spirit nor idea inert, thoughtless, indivisible immovable, unextended existing in no place for say you whatever may be urged against substance or occasion or any other positive or relative notion of matter have no place at all so long as this negative definition of matter is adhered to I answer you may if so it shall seem good use the word matter in the same sense as other men use nothing and so make those terms convertible in your style for after all this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition the parts were of when I considered with attention either collectively or separate from each other I do not find there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term nothing 81 you will reply perhaps that in the more said definition is included what does sufficiently distinguish it from nothing the positive abstract idea of quiddity entity or existence I own indeed that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas you talk as if they had such an idea which is say they the most abstract and general notion of all that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others that there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the author of my being has bestowed on me I see no reason to deny and for me to pretend to determine by my own few stinted narrow inlets of perception what ideas the inexhaustible power of the supreme spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption since there may be for ought that I know innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations as different from one another and from all that I have perceived as colors are from sound but how ready so ever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist yet for anyone to pretend to an ocean of entity or existence abstracted from spirit and idea from perceived and being perceived is I suspect a downright for pugnancy and trifling with words remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of religion. 82. Some there are who think that though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration yet the holy scriptures are so clear in the point as well sufficiently convince any good Christian the bodies do really exist and are something more than mere ideas there being separate innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone mountains and rivers and cities and human bodies to which I answer that no sort of writings whatsoever sacred or profane which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation or so as to have a meaning in them are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine that all those things do really exist that there are bodies even corporeal substances since have been shown to be agreeable to our principles and the difference betwixt things and ideas realities and chimeras has been distinctly explained see sections 29, 30, 33, 36 and see and I do not think that either what philosophers call matter or the existence of objects without the mind is anywhere mentioned in scripture. 83. Again whether there can be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions or things only as they are known and perceived by us when it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significance of language and the discourse of what kind so ever so far as it is intelligible remains undisturbed but all this seems so manifest from what has been largely set forth in the premises that it is needless to insist any further on it. 84. But it will be urged that miracles do at least lose much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses Rod? Was it not really turned into a serpent or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And can it be supposed that our savior did no more at the marriage feast in Cana than impose on the sight and smell and taste of the guests so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats or allusions of fancy. To this I reply that the rod was changed into a real serpent and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sections 34 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained and so often referred to and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before that it were enough front to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I shall only observe that if at table all who are present should see and smell and taste and drink wine and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather fore than against what has been said. End of section 71-84 Recording by Jeffrey Edwards Sections 85-99 of Barclay's Treatise This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Alan Shaw Sections 85-99 of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge Part 1 by George Barclay 85. Having done with the objections, which I endeavored to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the enforcement weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets and their consequences. Some of these appear at first sight as that several difficult and obscure questions on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away are entirely banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance can think whether matter be infinitely divisible and how it operates on spirit these unlike inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages but depending on the existence of matter there is no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are as well with regard to religion as the sciences which it is easy for anyone to deduce from what has been premised but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. 86. From the principles we have laid down a follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads that of ideas and that of spirits of each of these I shall treat in order and first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these have been very much obscured and confounded and we have been led into very dangerous errors by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense the one intelligible or in the mind the other real and without the mind whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits this which if I mistake not have been shown to be a most groundless and absurd notion is the very root of skepticism for so long as been thought that real things subsisted without the mind and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all for how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived or exist without the mind. 87. Color, figure, motion, extension and the like considered only as so many sensations in the mind are perfectly known there being nothing in them which is not perceived but if they are looked on as notes or images referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind then are we involved all in skepticism we see only the appearances and not the real qualities of things what may be the extension figure or motion of anything really and absolutely or in itself it is impossible for us to know but only the proportional relation they bear to our senses things remaining the same our ideas vary and which of them or even whether any of them at all represent the true quality really existing in the thing it is out of our reach to determine so that for odd we know all we see hear and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera and not at all agree with the real things existing in rare room natura all the skepticism follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived it were easy to dilate on the subject and show how the arguments by skeptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects 88 so long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things distinct from their being perceived it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being but even that it exists and it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth of everything they see or feel even of their own bodies and after all their labor and struggle of thought they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things but all this doubtfulness which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words and not amuse ourselves with the terms absolute external exist and such like signifying we know not what I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense hit being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch and at the same time have no existence in nature since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived 89 nothing seems of more importance toward directing a firm system of sound and real knowledge which may be proof against the assaults of skepticism then to lay the beginning in a distinct of what is meant by thing reality existence for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things or pretend to any knowledge thereof so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words thing or being is the most general name of all it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous in which have nothing common but the name fidelity spirits and ideas the former are active and divisible substances the latter are inert fleeting dependent beings which subsist not by themselves but are supported by or exist in minds or spiritual substances we comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection and that of other spirits by reason we may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds of spirits and active beings or have in a strict sense we have not ideas in like manner we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related in as much as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former to me it seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse and that the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of 90 ideas imprinted on the senses are real things or do really exist this we do not deny but we deny that they can subsist without the minds which perceive them or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived and an idea can be like nothing but an idea again the things perceived by sense may be termed external with regard to their origin and that they are not generated from within by the mind itself but imprinted by a spirit distinct and leaves them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be without the mind in another sense namely when they exist in some other mind thus when I shut my eyes the things I saw may still exist but it must be in another mind 91 it were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things it is acknowledged on the received principles that extension motion and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support as not being able to subsist by themselves but the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities and consequently cannot subsist by themselves thus far it is agreed on all hand so that in denying the things perceived by sense and existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist we detract nothing from the received opinion of the reality and are guilty of no innovation in that respect all the difference is that according to us the thinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert extended unperceiving substance which they call matter to which they attribute a natural subsistence exterior to all thinking beings are distinct from being perceived by the mind whatsoever even the eternal mind of the creator wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substance is created by him if indeed they allow them to be get all created 92 for as we have shown the doctrine of matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar in support of skepticism so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion nay so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive matter produced out of nothing that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers even of those who maintain the being of a god have thought matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with him how great a friend material substance has been to atheists in all ages were needless to relate all their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary dependence on it that when this cornerstone is once removed the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground in so much that it is no longer worthwhile to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of atheists 93 that impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favor their inclinations by deriding immaterial substance and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body which exclude all freedom, intelligence and design from the formation of things and instead thereof make a self-existent stupid unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings that they should hearken to those who deny a providence or inspection of a superior mind of the affairs of the world attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body or another all this is very natural and on the other hand when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking matter and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it me thinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support and driven from that only fortress epicureans, hobbists and the like have not even the shadow of a pretense but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world 94 the existence of matter or bodies unperceived has not only been the main support of atheists and fatalists but on the same principle death idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend did men but consider that the sun, moon and stars and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations in their minds which have no other existence but barely being perceived doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas but rather address their homage to that eternal invisible mind which produces and sustains all things 95 the same absurd principle by mingling itself with the articles of our faith has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians for example about the resurrection how many scruples and objections have been raised by Sosinians and others but do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the same with regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense but the material substance which remains the same under several forms take away this material substance about the identity where of all the dispute is and mean by body what every plain ordinary person means by that word to wit that which is immediately seen and felt which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas and then their most plausible objections come to nothing 96 matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many skeptical and impious notions such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers and made so much fruitless work for mankind that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration as to me they evidently seem yet I am sure all friends to knowledge and religion have reason to wish they were 97 beside the external existence of the objects of perception another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas such as it have been set forth in the introduction the plainest things in the world those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know when they are considered in an abstract way appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible time place and motion taken in particular concrete or what everybody knows but having passed through the hands of a metaphysician they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words and conceiving that particular time and place or the motion by which he is to get thither he finds not the least difficulty but if time be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that justify the day merely for the continuation of existence or duration and abstract then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it 98 from my own part whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time abstracted from the secession of ideas in my mind which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings I am lost and embrangled in an extricable difficulties I have no notion of it at all only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life both which seem equally absurd time therefore being nothing abstracted from the secession of ideas in our minds it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions seceding each other in that same spirit or mind hence it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the existence of a spirit from its consultation will I believe find it no easy task 99 so likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities and consider them by themselves we presently lose sight of them and run into great extravagances all which depend on a twofold abstraction first it is supposed that extension for example may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities and secondly that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived but whoever shall reflect and take care to understand what he says will if I mistake not acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real that where the extension is there is the color too i.e. in his mind and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined blended or if one may so speak concreted together none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived end of sections 85 to 99 recording by Alan Shaw sections 100 to 114 of Berkeley's treatise this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recorded by Craig Campbell sections 100 to 114 of a treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge part 1 by George Berkeley section 100 what is it for a man to be happy or an object good everyone may think he knows but to frame an abstract idea of happiness prescended from all particular pleasure or of goodness from everything that is good this is what few can pretend to so likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue the opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions abstracted from all particular persons and actions seems to have rendered morality very difficult and the study thereof of small use to mankind and in effect the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed toward spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge section 101 the two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense are natural philosophy and mathematics with regard to each of these I shall make some observations and first I shall say somewhat of natural philosophy on this subject it is that the skeptics triumph all that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low drawn principally from this head namely that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things this they exaggerate and love to enlarge on we are miserably bantered say they by our senses and amused only with the outside and show of things the real essence the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object from our view something there is in a drop of water every grain of sand which is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend but it is evident from what has been shown that all this complaint is groundless and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend in 102 one great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is a current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernable qualities flow and thereon they depend some have pretended to account for appearances by a cult qualities but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes to it the figure motion weight and such like qualities of insensible particles whereas in truth there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit it is evident that motion as well as all other ideas is perfectly inert hence to endeavor to explain the production of colors or sounds by figure, motion, magnitude and the like must needs be labor and vain and accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory which may be said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another I need not say how many hypothesis and speculations are left out and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine section 103 the great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction that a stone falls to the earth or the sea swells towards the moon may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby but how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency and that it is by mutual drawing of bodies instead of there being impelled or protruded towards each other nothing is determined of the manner or action and it may as truly for all we know be termed impulse or protrusion as attraction again the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together and this also is accounted for by attraction but in this as in the other instances I do not perceive anything is signified besides the effect itself for as to the manner of the action by it is produced or the cause which produces it these are not so much as aimed at section 104 indeed if we take a view of the several phenomena and compare them together we may observe some likeness and conformity between them for example in the falling of a stone to the ground in the rising of the sea towards the moon in cohesion, crystallization etc. there is something alike namely union or mutual approach of bodies so that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature for that only is thought so which is uncommon or a thing by itself and out of the ordinary course of our observation that body should tend towards the center of the earth is not thought strange because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives but that they should have alike gravitation towards the center of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men because it is discerned only in the times but a philosopher whose thoughts take in a large compass of nature having observed a certain similitude of appearances as well in the heavens as the earth that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other which he denotes by the general name attraction whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terequia's globe towards the moon which to him does not appear odd or anomalous but only a particular example for a general rule or law of nature section 105 if therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena we shall find it consists not in an exact knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them for that could be no other than the will of a spirit but only in a greater largeness of comprehension whereby analogies, harmonies and agreements are discovered in the works of nature in the particular effects explained that is reduced to general rules which rules grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects are most agreeable and sought after by the mind for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distance of time as well as to predict things to come which sort of endeavor towards omniscience is much affected by the mind section 106 but we should proceed warily in such things for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies and to the prejudice of truth humor that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems for example in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction because it appears in many instances some are straight away for pronouncing it universal and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever whereas it is evident the fixed stars of no such tendency toward each other and so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances quite contrary principle seems to show itself as in the perpendicular growth of plants and the elasticity of the air there is nothing necessary or essential in the case but it depends entirely on the will of the governing spirit who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws whilst he keeps others at a fixed distance and to some he gives a quite tendency to fly asunder just as he sees convenient section 107 after what has been premised I think we may lay down the following conclusions first it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain when they inquire for any natural efficient cause distinct from a mind or spirit secondly considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good agent it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts contrary to what some hold about the final causes of things and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived should not be thought one good way of accounting for them and altogether worthy of philosopher thirdly from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied and observations and experiments made which that they are of use to mankind and enable us to draw general conclusions is not the result of any immutable attitudes or relations between things themselves but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world fourthly by a divergent observation of the phenomena within our view we may discover the general laws of nature and from them deduce the other phenomena I do not say demonstrate for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the author of nature always operates uniformly and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles which we cannot evidently know section 108 those men who frame general rules from the phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules seem to consider signs rather than causes a man may well understand natural science without knowing their analogy or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so and as it is very possible to write improperly through too strict and observance of general grammar rules so in arguing from general laws of nature it is not impossible we may extend the analogy too far and by that means run into mistakes section 109 as in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language so in pursuing the volume of nature it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to effect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules or showing how it follows from them we should propose to ourselves nobler views namely to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty order extent and variety of natural things hence by proper inferences to enlarge our notions of the grandeur wisdom and beneficence of the creator and lastly to make the several parts of the creation so far as in us lies subservient to the ends they were designed for God's glory and the sustenation and comfort of ourselves and fellow creatures section 110 the best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated treatise of mechanics in the entrance of which justly admired treatise time space and motion are distinguished into absolute and relative true and apparent mathematical and vulgar which distinction as it is at large explained by the author does suppose these qualities to have an existence without the mind and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all section 111 as for time as it is there taken in an absolute or abstract sense for the duration of perseverance of the existence of things I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has already been said on that subject for the rest this celebrated author holds there is an absolute space which being unperceivable to sense remains in itself similar and immovable and relative space to be the measure thereof which being movable and defined by a situation in respect of sensible bodies is vulgarly taken for immovable space place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body and according as the space is absolute or relative also is the place absolute motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place as relative motion is from one relative place to another and because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable but it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest or likewise one of the same body may be in relative rest and motion or even moved with contrary motions at the same time recording as its place is variously defined all which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions but not at all in the true or absolute which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy and the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties first in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole partake of the motions of the whole secondly the place being moved that which is placed therein is also moved so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place thirdly true motion is never generated or changed otherwise then by force on the body itself fourthly true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved fifthly in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force which nevertheless in that which is true or absolute is proportional to the quantity of motion section 112 notwithstanding what has been said I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies where of the distance or position in regard to each other is varied hence if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved this seems evident in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation section 113 but though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one yet it may be that one only is moved namely that on which the force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies is impressed for however some may define relative motion so as to term that body moved which changes its distance from some other body whether the force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life it should seem that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best ever now I ask anyone whether in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets the stones he passes over may be said to move because they change distance with his feet to me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it as a man may think of somewhat which does not think so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not there for itself in motion section 114 as the place happens to be variously defined the motion which is related to it varies a man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel with relation to the land or he may move eastward in respect of the one and westward in respect of the other in the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so but philosophers who have a greater extent of thought in juster notions of the system of things discover even the earth itself to be moved in order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions if we sound our own conceptions I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can freeing the bottom no other than relative motion thus defined for as hath been observed absolute motion exclusive of all external relation is incomprehensible and to this kind of relative motion all the above mentioned properties causes and effects ascribed to absolute motion will if I mistake dot be found to agree as to what is said of the centrifugal force that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it see philosophia naturalis principia matematica in shore definition eight for the water in the vessel at that time we're in it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion hath I think no motion at all as is plain from the foregoing section end of sections one hundred to one hundred and fourteen recorded by Craig Campbell in appleton wisconsin in two thousand and nine sections one fifteen to one twenty nine of berkeley's treatise this is a liberal box recording all liberal box recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liberal box dot org recording by heather jane hogan sections one fifteen to one twenty nine of a treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge part one by george berkeley one fifteen for to dominate a body moved it is requisite first that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body and secondly that the force occasioning that change be applied to it if either of these be wanting I do not think that agreeably to the sense of mankind or the propriety of language a body can be said to be in motion I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance from some other to be moved though it have no force applied to it in which sense there may be apparent motion but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move which indeed shows we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not and that is all one sixteen from what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute space distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related bodies which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense and perhaps if we inquire narrowly we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure space exclusive of all body this I must confess seems impossible as being a most abstract idea when I excite a motion in some part of my body if it be free or without resistance I say there is space but if I find a resistance then I say there is body and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater I say the space is more or less pure so that when I speak of pure or empty space it is not to be supposed that the word space stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion though indeed we are to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others which has occasioned infinite mistakes when therefore supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body I say there still remains pure space thereby nothing else is meant but only that I can see it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance but if that too were annihilated then there could be no motion and consequently no space some perhaps may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense see the essay concerning vision 117 what is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up among the learned concerning the nature of pure space but the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced to wit of thinking either that real space is God or else that there is something beside God which is eternal uncreated infinite indivisible immutable both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions it is certain that not a few divines as well as philosophers of great note have from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space concluded it must be divine and some of late have set themselves particularly to show the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it which doctrine how unworthy so ever it may seem of the divine nature yet I do not see how we can get clear of it so long as we adhere to the received opinions 118 hitherto of natural philosophy we come now to make some inquiry concerning the great branch of speculative knowledge to wit, mathematics these how celebrated so ever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration which is hardly anywhere else to be found cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes if in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind mathematicians though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences each part whereof mathematics not accepted does consequently participate of the errors involved in them that the principles laid down by mathematicians are true and their way of deduction from those principles clear we do not deny but we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of mathematics and for that reason not expressly mentioned though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof to be plain we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas and the existence of objects without the mind 119 arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of number of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge the opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers abstract has made them in a steam with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought it has set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use but serve only for amusement and half therefore so far infected the minds of some that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers and attempted the application of natural things by them but if we inquire into our own thoughts and consider what has been premised we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions and look on all inquiries about numbers only as so many difficile new guy so far as they are not subservient to practice and promote the benefit of life 120 unity and abstract we have before considered in section 13 from which and what has been said in the introduction it plainly follows there is not any such idea but number being defined a quote collection of units unquote we may conclude that if there be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures the theories therefore in arithmetic if they are abstracted from the names and figures as likewise from all use in practice as well as from the particular things numbered can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice and how Jojoon and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation 121 however since there may be some who deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use it will not be a miss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretense and this will plainly appear by taking a view of arithmetic in its infancy and observing what it was that originally that science and to what scope they directed it it is natural to think that at first men for ease of memory and help of computation made use of counters or in writing of single strokes, points or the like each whereof was made to signify a unit i.e. some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points and lastly the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use wherein by the repetition of a few characters or figures and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains all numbers may be most aptly expressed which seems to have been done in imitation of language so that an exact analogy as observed betwixt the notation of nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former corresponding to denominations in the latter and agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures we contrived methods of finding from the given figures or marks of the parts what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole or vice versa and having found the sought figures rule or analogy being observed throughout it is easy to read them into words and so the number becomes perfectly known for then the number of any particular things is said to be known when we know the name of figures with their due arrangement that according to the standing analogy belong to them for these signs being known we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them and thus computing in signs because of the connection established between them and the distinct multitudes of things where of one is taken for a unit we may be able rightly to sum up, divide and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number one twenty two in arithmetic therefore we regard not the things but the signs which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake but because they direct us how to act with relation to things and dispose rightly of them now agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general section nineteen introduction it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds I shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject but only observe that it is evident from what has been said those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things except only names and characters which originally came to be considered on no other account but there being signs or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute when sit follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise and to as good purpose as if a man neglecting the true use or original intention and subservience of language should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words or reasonings and controversies purely verbal 123 from numbers we proceed to speak of extension considered as relative is the object of geometry the infinite divisibility of finite extension though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connection with the principles and demonstrations in geometry that mathematicians never admit it into doubt or make the least question of it and as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debouched by learning so it is the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtlety which renders the study of mathematics so difficult and tedious hence if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts or is infinitely divisible it follows that we shall at once clear the science of geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason and with all make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been 124 every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind and consequently each part thereof must be perceived if therefore I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider it is certain they are not contained in it but it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line surface or solid which I either perceive by sense or figure to myself in my mind wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas that is that they are not infinitely divisible if by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea I declare I do not know what that is and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it but if the terms extension parts etc are taken in any sense conceivable that is for ideas then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so and it is impossible it should ever gain the ascent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees as a converted gentile to the belief of transubstantiation ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle only themselves but likewise whatever is deductible from them thought privileged from all examination and there is no absurdity so gross which by this means the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow 125 he whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that whatever be thought of the ideas extension in abstract is infinitely divisible and one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts really existing though too small to be discerned these errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men and have a like influence on their reasonings and it were no difficult thing to show how the arguments of geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them at present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are so fond and tenacious of that doctrine 126 it has been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in geometry are conversant about universal ideas section 15 introduction where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood too wit the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes or in other words the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea but only that he cares not what the magnitude is whether great or small but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts since it is regarded not in itself but as it is universal and it is universal only in its signification whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself it is distinguished ten thousand parts or more though there may not be above an inch in it after this manner the properties of the lines signified are by a very usual figure transferred to the sign and thence through mistake though to appertain to it considered in its own nature 127 because there is no number of parts but it is possible there may be a line containing more the inch line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number which is true not of the inch taken absolutely but only for the things signified by it but men not retaining that distinction in their thoughts slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable there is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth which may be signified by that inch when therefore I delineate a triangle on paper and take one side not above an inch for example in length to be the radius this I consider as divided into ten thousand or one hundred thousand parts or more ten thousandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing at all and consequently may be neglected without an error or inconvenience see yet these described lines being only marks standing for greater quantities where of it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable it follows that to prevent notable errors in practice the radius must be taken of ten thousand parts or more one twenty eight from what has been said the reason is plain why to the end any theorem become universal in it's use it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not in doing of which we examine the matter thoroughly we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of a thousand parts but only some other line which is far greater than an inch and represented by it and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible we must mean a line which is infinitely great what we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry the several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might one would think have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it but by I know not what logic it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contradictions if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connection with truth or flow from it but whoever considers the weakness of this pretense will think it was contrived on purpose to humor the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent skepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true end of sections 115 to 129 129 of a treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge part one by George Berkeley recording by Heather Jane Hogan of redheadhogan.com