 Remember, 10 years ago, Secretary Baker proposed creation of a new security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok. He didn't know then that his highest point in his career would be to debate Secretary Christopher in Florida. So at the time, the first Bush administration was, in a very vague terms, thinking about a new strategy, and Vancouver to Vladivostok is something where Russia is in. You cannot make it without Russia. And it was not created. Instead, the United States preferred to enlarge Western institutions. Like NATO, the outcome is that Russia, because Russia does not belong to these institutions, has been marginalized, has been reduced in its status. We ended the Cold War 10 years ago, and it was we who ended the Cold War 10 years ago, not to be treated like a defeated nation. The decision on NATO enlargement, despite Russian objection, was a clear case of Russia being presented with a feta-complete, a treatment of Russia as, well, they can howl and growl, but what can they do? They will swallow it, they have no choice. It's a big mistake. Russia will never agree to this kind of a treatment. And when we think about, well, a positive model for Russian-American relations, I think Polo made my task very easy by defining some of the points. Let me concentrate on, let me mention three main components of what real strategic partnership should be, not a declaratory partnership. That's the definition of common interests. And yes, we do have common interests. Very important common interests. Some interests are diverging, but we should agree that we should operate on the basis of common interests. Then we should have the mechanism, when on the basis of the common interest we should make common decisions, institutionalization of the partnership. It cannot be done in a way when the United States decides and gives it to Russia on the basis of, or take it or leave it. And finally, there should be a mechanism for implementation of these decisions. Unfortunately, and that's both Russian and American fall, we failed to create this mechanism, this partnership in the 90s. The result of lack of institutionalization and lack of strategy was extreme fragmentation of Russian-American relations. But each issue is treated separately without thinking what kind of impact it would have on a larger, long-term strategic goal. I'm afraid the United States also did some very bad mistakes. Some of them were related to excessive personalization of American policy. When I was studying in the United States, I heard from my friends that you believe in institutions and checks and balances, not in personality. Unfortunately, in Russia, you did something else. In economy, there was no martial plan. And the United States did support criminal privatization, the result of which is enormous confusion in the Russian economy and economic decline. The United States supported as clever policy to control inflation, creation of financial pyramid, this huge domestic debt, which we accumulated, and also the situation which resulted in enormous capital flight from Russia, not only private capital flight, but Russia is also in a typical foreign debt trap. Last year, which was a very good year in relative terms for Russia, because the economy partially stabilized, the Russian government spent 35% of all its revenues to pay the foreign debt. And that's in a situation when we are not paying the Soviet debt. If we were paying the Soviet debt, then we had to pay 50% of all our revenues. The problem of the foreign debt is like German reparations after the First World War. And in the military field, let's face it, the United States lost its enthusiasm about arms control. Maybe the reason, because Russia is no more equal in power to the United States. But whether we look at American attitude to city beauty, the threat to withdraw from the ABM treaty, lack of enthusiasm about Star 3, it seems that somehow arms control is perceived in this country more and more as a unilateral concession by the United States. Because Russia cannot respond in a symmetrical way. I think it's a very worrisome development. And I think it's time again to think whether the United States policy towards Russia should be integration of Russia into the community of political democracy and market economy. Whether you perceive Russia at some point in the 21st century, I don't know. Maybe not under the second Bush administration, but under the third Bush administration. Because in Russia they say, well, now they have the administration of George Bush, the father. They will be the administration of George Bush, the son. And then it will be replaced by the administration of George Bush, the Holy Spirit. But let us imagine that we agree on the goal. Then in the year 2010, 2015, 2000 X, Russia does belong. Then let's see what kind of steps, what kind of stages we have to go. To achieve this purpose and institutional engagement is absolutely necessary. Yes, Russia may be not qualified to be admitted to many western institutions. But it shouldn't be treated as either or. Japan is not a member of NATO. Israel doesn't have even a mutual security treaty with the United States. There are many countries which belong to the West, quote, unquote. Which are not members of NATO. And thus we should think about some special arrangements between western institutions and Russia. Unfortunately, the founding act was not treated seriously. That's why the dialogue which we have today lacks substance. And clearly, well, Russia is not going to be satisfied with something like partnership for peace, if it's not sufficient for Estonia, why it should be sufficient for the Russian Federation. Secondly, or maybe the top priority, as somebody said eight years ago, it's economy stupid. This is the crucial issue for Russian recovery. This is the crucial issue for Russian domestic developments and Russian international behavior. And let me make it very clear, without restructuring of the Russian foreign debt, the optimistic scenario in Russia is impossible. I made my parallel with Weimar, Germany. But Russia needs a break, because if we continue to lose all this capital, simply we will always don't have sufficient investment. Yes, a lot depends on Russian government. We should fight against corruption. We should adopt the necessary legislation. But the foreign debt restructuring is something which only the western community can really agree upon. We cannot do it unilaterally. Unilaterally, it only can go on default and announce bankruptcy. That's also related to the terms of Russian integration and the World Trade Organization. If you want to be a part of global economy, we should join. But if we join now, Russian economy would simply collapse because we are not competitive. Mutually should destruction. Why 10 years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States in the strategic field still operate within the rules of mutually should destruction? There are no ideological reasons for continuation of this mechanism. There is no geopolitical competition that existed during the Cold War. So when George W. Bush challenged this notion, there were some parts of his speech which I particularly liked. There were some parts of his speech which I didn't. But if we're serious about going beyond mutually should destruction model, then we should see a transition period when we make steps both in strategic offensive weapons and in strategic defensive weapons. And strategic offensive reductions should be something not simply related to low numbers. The result should be we reach the point when the Cold War scenario of the bolt out of the blue counter-force attack, all this crazy scenario becomes impossible. And in this situation, the whole issue of strategic defenses, ballistic missile defenses, would look different. So if the United States proposes to go to this transition period, I hope Russian response will be positive. But if the United States will unilaterally try to achieve absolute superiority both in offensive and defensive weapons by watching Russia to reduce its missiles unilaterally and by deploying ballistic missile defenses in violation, in unilateral violation of the ABM Treaty, then we're going to have a much more serious scenario. And the last point, geopolitical importance of Russia. Russia is not a superpower anymore. And Russia probably never will be a superpower like the Soviet Union was. But Russia does remain one of the major international players. And let me mention just two examples. One, unfortunately, Brunsk-Alcroft left. But remember his idea about the kind of a security directorate for Europe with the United States, the European Union, and Russia. I'm not sure that should be the exact arrangement. But these are major players on which European security depends much more than on Estonian membership and NATO. China. It is, again, a triangular relationship. Russia, China, the United States. It's not a kind of triangular relationship which exists during the Cold War, because Russia is not the Soviet Union. And China is something different from what it was 20 years ago. But in both these triangles, Russia will be an active player. And that's why the question isn't my final word is, Russia will come back. We don't know when exactly it will happen, how much time it will take. But Russia will come back as a major player. And the question is whether Russia will come back as a major player who is integrated, who is your reliable partner, who shares your main values, who is institutionally connected to you, or as a country, as a great power, which perceives that it was mistreated, that the new world order is detrimental to its national security interests and which will try to undermine this new world order. Michael, we will choose a more optimistic scenario. Thank you. I want to thank our panelists for three very fine presentations. We have, I think, about 15 or 20 minutes. Let's just open it up for questions from any members of the audience. And I guess people want you to step to the microphone if you would, so that we can pick up the questions for the webcast. Yes, ma'am? The missile defense question. Do the panelists, including Mr. Hadley, think that it is possible that it could go forward in a way that would bring Russia in along the lines that Mr. Rogov described? Yes. I think there is a real opportunity here. If you listen to what Sergey said today and what he has said in other forums and read the speech that then Governor Bush made in May, I think there is a real overlap there. Both start from the proposition that the relationship between Russia and the United States has moved beyond the Cold War logic, but our nuclear deterrent posture really has not. Now, we can debate that issue, but I think what we can all agree on is more can be done. And if we could move and have a dialogue at a strategic level that begins to rethink the issue of the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia, for which nuclear weapons has been at the heart, and ask, what is the appropriate strategic relationship in the post-Cold War world? And then look at our strategic force requirements in that light. I think you will see a basis for a lower nuclear posture, a different nuclear posture, a concept which says that for the threats that we both face from in the post-Cold War world, a mix of offensive and defensive forces makes sense, is stabilizing, and can enhance deterrence. And if we could get that common framework, I think we can work out the issues of our force structure on the offensive side and defensive side. It's going to be very difficult. The Allies have a lot of concerns. China has a lot of concerns. This is a major initiative undertaking, very difficult to do, but I think we have an opportunity here. And I think there's some indication of responsiveness on both sides. So I think there's a real opportunity, and I hope we can take advantage of it. Could I add a word, Steve? Trudy, I'd like to give you an answer from my perspective as somebody who is handing the baton off both generally and I think quite specifically to Steve on this. I agree with absolutely everything that Steve just said by way of assessment of the problem and of the potential solution. John Holm, who is here and who served as our Under Secretary for Arms Control until a couple of weeks ago, and I spent much of a year between September of 1999 and September, October of 2000 working this issue within our government, with the Russians, with our Allies, and with others. And on the strength of that experience, particularly with the Russians, I believe that on the terms that Steve just articulated and with that kind of framework in mind, it can happen. It will happen because it makes sense. Now here I'm going to jump the gun a little bit and switch into the role of a commentator, which I won't be for another week or so, but offer an opinion that's entirely my own. And I'll leave it to Ambassador Ushakov and whether he wants to confirm it or not. But my guess is that the reason we ran into the big net from the Putin administration with regard to what we were proposing with regard to NMD, which is very much along the lines of what Steve just said, is very simple. And that is that President Putin and his colleagues decided all things considered. If they were going to do a deal, they wanted to do a deal with the president who would deploy, as opposed to doing a deal with the president who would talk about deploying or tee up deployment for his successor. Well, now they've got one, and we'll test the proposition. But I think Steve is right. Yes, ma'am. Casey Schaefer with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All of the speakers focused, I think, quite properly on the building blocks that ought to be the basis for a new relationship on the positives. I wonder if any of you would care to comment on the differences in interests that the US and Russia will have to manage in building this new relationship. Do you want to start? Well, in my own comments, I suggested some of the fundamental areas in which we have differences and that I don't think are going to change, one being the whole issue. And you certainly refer to it more extensively in your comments. And that's the question of Russia and Russia's role in the future of Europe. Question of institutions. How Russia fits in that overall scheme? What happens with the issue of NATO enlargement? It's an ironic issue to mention, however, because on one hand, although I see this as being an issue that's going to pose problems in the future, nevertheless, when one looks at the past, I saw it a bit differently. As I suggested, I saw the outcome as being a rather favorable one, maybe not the most optimal one from all parties' concern. But in the first round of NATO enlargement, I did think it was handled very deftly where we pursued our interests. We knew that there were differences at the same time that a mechanism was established for engaging Russia in the process of security-related issues in the future of Europe. The Balkans is certainly an issue in which not only in this country we have differences, but I think with Moscow, we will have differences over the handling of Serbia over questions of Kosovo, over questions of Bosnia. We've had differences to date. That will continue. And then thirdly, I'm repeating myself, but I do see this as a fundamental stumbling block, and that's the question of Chechnya. I don't see any kind of, if one could use the word give, in the outlook and the way in which Russia sees the issue. And we see it, and also our allies, in particular, the French, are the most outspoken on the issue in question of the handling of Chechnya. Those are examples of some of the main differences that I see as continuing in the time ahead. I might make a couple comments on this, and then Straub, I know, may have a comment and Sergey as well. Three things quickly. One, I think one of the problems with Russia is a problem in some sense of our politics, and it's also a problem in our thinking. I mean, we like clarity as Americans, and we like the side, whether somebody is sort of on our side or against us. Is it a friend? Is it a foe? Is it an ally? Is it a potential adversary? And we do less well, and I think our politics does less well when we say this is a country for whom we have some common interests, and on which we can work on common problems. And this is also a country where we have some areas where our interests diverge and where we're going to butt heads, and we need to try and constrain those areas where we're going to butt heads and figure out a way to manage them in a way that don't rupture the relationship. That is a fairly sophisticated approach. It's very easy to want to decide a country is one thing or another and hold the areas of cooperation hostage to the areas where we have differing interests. It's a very difficult relationship to manage. It is, I think, though, what we have to do, the approach we need to adopt with respect to Russia. And I should say I'm speaking personally here now. The new administration has not sorted through all of this. But my own personal view is when you think about it, that's the framework we need. I think it was in October the US Institute of Peace had a session in Europe on Russia where we tried to go through a series of regional and functional issues and ask the question, do we have common interests or not with Russia? And if we do, what are the potential areas of collaboration? And we didn't hit a 10 strike on every issue. But in a number of areas, we found potential areas for common interests and potential areas for common ground, as well as areas where we are going to have differences. And I think we need to focus on how to maximize those. And finally, I think it's important that this dialogue and addressing of these kinds of issues not simply be confined to governments, but that there be track one and a half and tracks two and however many tracks we now have where Americans, Russians, Europeans engage on these issues in a concrete way and try and define potential areas of collaboration. I think that can be very useful to supplement the governmental relations of the parties. Paul? I'm sorry, Sergey? Well, let me add that there are some interests of Russia and the United States which simply don't overlap. We don't pretend we are global superpower. So there are today, unlike the Soviet, there is plenty of areas in this world which we don't care about. But there are, of course, areas we do care about. And Stroh mentioned the difference between CIS and NIS. If we are engaged with the United States in a kind of zero-sum game, I think it would be a very unfortunate misreading of our interests. I don't think that really our interests there compete. But there is one area when I'm afraid we can really develop a very serious problem. I mentioned already this ballistic missile defense. And clearly, it's clear why Russia is concerned about American unilateral deployment. Because Russia sees the United States only potent. You are 10 feet tall. The laws of physics don't exist for you. So Russia is concerned about its nuclear retaliatory capability. But in the real world, it's a much greater challenge to China. And the most unfortunate scenario will be if both Russia and China will interpret that this is a common threat. And they have a common interest to oppose it. In my view, that is something which should be avoided. Steve, I want to come back to the original question. But just one thing, Sergei, in response to what you picked up on in my earlier remarks. We would, as an administration, have been happy to refer to the Commonwealth of Independent States as the umbrella identity for the 12 former republics of the USSR if the 11 non-Russian republics had told us that they were enthusiastic about us doing so. And when the day comes that your fellow CIS members are as comfortable with the CIS as apparently the leadership in Moscow and Minsk are, then I think it would be appropriate for American policy to switch from referring to the NIS to the CIS. Taisy, my response, which I think to your question, which I think is consistent, actually with what all three of my colleagues have said, zeroes in on use of force and particularly use of American force as a generic and continuing point of tension between the United States and Russia. If you look back over the last eight years, as I'm now having occasion to do, the toughest episodes that we went through were where it was necessary we felt as the United States to bomb, whether it was Serbs in Bosnia or Serbs in Serbia or Osama bin Laden targets in Afghanistan or very, very much to the point Saddam Hussein. And I understand why this has been and will continue to be a real challenge for Russia. This is a deeply neurologic issue, but it goes to the institutional point that we're talking about. What we are all trying to do here is put in place post-Cold War structures, including security structures. Those include the United Nations, the OSCE, organizations where Russia was present at the creation, as it were, is on the board of directors. But there are going to be issues that will continue to arise in the future where come let us reason together will not be a sufficient motto, where economic sanctions will not be a sufficient instrumentality and where the use of force will have to come into play. And that will mean the United States, and it will mean NATO, and it will mean disagreements with the Russians. I think that the great accomplishment in the Balkans is that we were able, as a relationship, call it a partnership, to survive the Coastal War. And to do so, that is to have the relationship survive. And to do so in a way where Russia played an instrumental role in bringing about the diplomatic outcome, despite its profound distaste for the bombing. And one reason I wanted to highlight this use of force issue is because of Iraq. I would be fascinated to know what sort of confabs are going on in Baghdad at whatever equivalent of the United States Institute for Peace there is there, as they look forward, to the administration of Bush the Sun, never mind the Holy Ghost. And they wonder what's down the road in, shall we say, military-to-military relations between the United States and Iraq in the coming period. But I know this. Whatever happens, if it involves use of force, it's going to be a problem between the Bush administration and the Putin administration. But I've got a lot of confidence that Steve and his colleagues will handle it as brilliantly as we did. Patrick Cronin is the enforcer here of the clock. And he's about to mount the podium and strike us dead. Patrick, can we have one last question since gentlemen? You're the chair. Final question. Thank you. I'm Bob Khan, president of the Corporation for National Research Initiative. It's widely understood that information technology has broad economic and national security implications. My understanding is that in the former Soviet Union, information technology was viewed somewhat warily, not rapidly accepted with open arms and fairly tightly controlled. I'm just wondering if any of the people on the panel would care to comment about the role of information technology as an instrument in forging a better relationship between the US and Russia? That could probably be a conference in itself, at least a panel. Sergey, you want to try any comments on that? I'm looking for a grant to buy more computers for my institute. Well, I'm not. You've either come to the right place or the wrong place, depending on who you're looking at in the audience. It's all I can say. I suspect more the right place, but not up here at the front of the room. I think that the revolution in information technology, more than any other single factor, is responsible for the collapse of the Soviet system in the Soviet Union, as well as dictatorship in Chile and the opening of China and many other things. The fact that there are people in remote areas of Russia who are now on the web, that there are 50 public access internet sites, is crucial both to what has happened and to my own fundamental optimism about what will happen in the future. I do think, though, it is worrisome, if not ominous, that the president administration in Russia has talked about information security, a phrase and concept which, when elaborated, begins to sound a little bit like beginning to close some of those portals. And I would hope that that issue would be very much on the agenda of the next administration, as well as, now that I'm about to move into it, the NGO community in the United States and its interaction with Russia. Let me thank our panelists and thank the members of the audience for a useful session this morning. Thanks very much.