 The following, Dahlia and Brandon, I want to look first at the structure of the book. This is a policy book, but it's with a non-analytical approach to policy. We deal with three major categories in the analysis. Section A, after the introduction and the executive summary, which are the outlining of the four scenarios that Brandon has dealt with, we deal with the major issues involved. The present context, the past, present and future. We go on in Section B to look at the options and scenarios applied to the analysis. And in sections C and D, we look at the implications for Ireland and for Britain and Europe. And we conclude then with, as Brandon explained, a prescriptive agenda for action. Looking at chapters three and four by Tony Brown and Dahlia Kelly and James Kilcourse, it tracks the history and the older history and more recent history with the UK refusing to join the EU at the beginning, when it joined immediately trying to change the rules, the various disputes over budgets, the refusal then to join the EMU, Schengen and the Justice and Home Affairs. The term we use end game in the title is inspired by Beckett's play. As Dahlia says, it concerns the decision rather than any inevitable exit. But the middle game, if you like, in the chess game that inspired Beckett, was reached during the single market negotiations in the 1980s, which of course were very much driven by Mrs. Thatcher and her government. And that concluded that period in the 1990s with the refusal to join the EMU, which, as Brandon explained, became the core element of the EU. And since that time, we've really got the end of the middle game. It's been a prolonged end to that game, but we're now reaching what we believe will be in the next five or certainly ten years, a decision point that has to be reached. And Britain has been described famously as an awkward partner by Stephen George, the British academic, who wrote a chapter in our first book. The chapter, chapter five by myself, argues that we're facing here a dual sovereignty question, which is, links the internal and external aspects of Britain's development. Now the internal elements are dealt with in terms of Scotland, devolution, the whole question of devolution, which has so many echoes of the Home Rule debates in Ireland a hundred and more years ago. The question of federalization of this structure, what is the alternative to Scottish impatience with the nature of devolution as it stands, and the argument is made that really, if Britain is to hold together and not break up, it will have to federalize taking due account of the problems of scale that it faces, where England has 85% of the population and roughly similar proportion of the resources. That's a very difficult question, but not an impossible one. The external dimension of their sovereignty problem, defined classically as the absolute parliamentary sovereignty of the monarch and parliament, is to do, of course, as we outlined with the sharing sovereignty in the EU itself, but also questions of law. And a major issue for the Conservative Party in the current argument is with the European Court of Human Rights, which they want to repatriate, and if that happens it's also highly disruptive, including for Northern Ireland where it's entrenched legally and constitutionally and in treaty terms in the Belfast Agreement, as well as for the devolution settlements in Wales and Scotland. Now we argue that there is a linkage, and the linkage is most obviously expressed by the fact that the Scottish National Party leadership of Scotland, who have had the most extraordinary political development in the last period, have said that if there were to be a referendum on the EU, Scotland would claim the right to make its own decision, which is if you're like a unilateral statement of federal choice, and if that happened and if it went to, in the event that it did go to a referendum with an English majority taking the UK out of the EU, it seems to us quite obvious that the whole Scottish question would be reopened. If we look at the next slide, we have a matrix, and I'll just draw your attention to it in page 88 of the book, where we bring together the question of the UK's relationship to the EU and the relationship between Scotland and the UK, and there are four possible outcomes of this, I won't go into them now, you see that in each of them there are major consequences for Ireland in particular, and including, I just looked at you, if the most radical outcome would be that of the UK exit from the EU and the Scottish exit from the UK in outcome four, we would face a major question here of British Irish relations, and it seems to me that you would find if this happened very rapidly, and conceivably it could, in the next five or more years, we'd be facing an issue of Irish unity on the political agenda here much more rapidly than anyone is prepared for North or South. We would have our different attitude to that, and this is a question for argument, of course, but we're trying to get people to think about what often is unthinkable. Going on then to chapter six, Brendan Halligan and Tony Brown examined the future of the EU under a number of headings, enlargement and expanding agenda and deepening interdependence. They also deal with the question of popular support and legitimacy, a profound political question facing the future of the integrated Europe. The question of politicisation was lent to kind of official support by the Spitzon candidate, the lead candidates in the European Parliament elections, but the contestation involved and the deep cleavages between North and South, creditors and debtors that we see exemplified by the Greek crisis demonstrate how political the whole entity has become, within which the Eurozone is developing as a core, but if we're to deal with the rational basis of the British claim, the Eurozone is not the whole EU. We have to find a relationship between that Eurozone and the other members who aren't members of it in terms of relating the single mark to the Eurozone. A lot of the book actually revolves around the difficulty of doing that in the knowledge that you have a particular and even a unique position facing the British. In Chapter 8, Brendan Halligan deals with the consequences of an exit and he explains the process that would be applied out of the treaties, a two-year process, a negotiation, a final decision by the European Council, consent needed from the European Parliament and ratification by national parliaments. This would be a very hard bargaining process in which Ireland would be placed in a particular dilemma of wanting to up the cost of exit, at the same time want to keep open the bilateral relationship with Britain. If this was to happen from 1917 to 1919, we're facing it to very deep water. In the same way Brendan analyzes the likely, and he's dealt with this, the likely outcomes, whether it be in Norwegian, Swiss, Turkish or Singapore model, none of which we argue applies. And the argument there is that Britain is sufficiently large and powerful in the European setting, even out of the EU, that some kind of a deal would have to be reached with it. And if that's true, it's far better in our view to have to do the deal by keeping them in rather than going through the process of seeing them out. So having said that, the next section of the book goes on to look at the implications economically, which I'll hand over to John Bradley. Thank you very much.