 delighted to welcome you back this afternoon and at least as delighted to be the person moderating these two gentlemen. This is again one of these situations where no introduction is required, but I'll do just a very brief one starting on the far end Larry Diamond. I would say with the exception, if you guys would allow that of our very own Tom Carruthers, perhaps the or certainly one of the most distinguished scholars of democracy in the country, former director of this place, current Freeman Spogli Institute fellow, and next to him Larry's relief, right at this place, Frank Fukuyama, political order, political decay over a vast sweep of human history. With that, let me just, you know, we've been looking at a region all day in which a certain mode of governance has had huge and I would say largely negative economic and security ramifications. It's been governance and I don't even want to get into authoritarian, democratic, that kind of thing. Governance by and for a network is another way that we can think about it. And we just heard Yemen 10 families before and after same 10 families. And that has led to I would say kind of extractive economies and you can think of that also broadly, right, including sort of predation on ordinary citizens but predation on international inputs to some extent. But it's been unequal. It's led to increasing economic inequalities and not particularly economically diverse. And I think the security ramifications have been made obvious both in the previous panel and earlier. And I think the security ramifications have been intense both in the ways that populations have reacted to this network rule and the economic impacts of it and in ways that the network has adapted to these popular reactions, right, either by repression, by playing segments of the population off one against the other, the diverse ways of handling this new popular agency, if you will. So now what we want to do is put these dynamics in a broader international context. So what I'd ask you gentlemen is bearing in mind what you've heard during the course of the day, I wonder if you could draw some international parallels. And what I'm going to do is ask a couple of questions of both of you and that means that, you know, the same question of both of you means interact with each other and stuff like that. But I'd like to start, you know, with the word democracy with Larry. So democracy at least in the U.S. context, right, we talk about liberty and justice for all, right. I mean, on some level you could talk about the huge wave of popular popular uprisings in the late 1980s as liberty broadly liberty revolutions. I mean, systems of governance were providing a certain kind of modicum, if you will, of material livelihood for people, but subsistence if you will, but clearly not enough liberty very broadly. In some respect I think you could look at what happened across the Middle East in and around 2011 as justice revolutions. I mean, there was a liberty element to it. But your governance was seen to be rigged in favor of the cliques that I was talking about. And I guess what I want to start asking is, does this have any resonance elsewhere in the world? What is the content of the democratic demand today? Well, I mean, it varies across countries. There's several things I'd like to say in response. One is that I think justice is a really core global value and concept. I think it's very important to the human spirit and to social cohesion and increasingly in the world we live in today. And yes, I do agree, it's in a way even more of a common overarching normative aspiration in the Middle East today than democracy as such, though I want to come back to that. We need to separate these. You can have a formal democracy that's a real electoral democracy and has elements of kleptocracy or some substantial degree of it. I do think that authoritarian regimes tend to be heavily inclined to be more unjust, more unequal, more regressive in distribution of income. But of course we got a lot of injustice here. And well, you think we have a certain degree of kleptocracy here, I believe, but however you're going to use the word, democracies are not immune from it. So we need to keep that in mind. But I think we need to come back to basics and to build on what's been said and I think an excellent series of sessions so far. Samia, I didn't ask this question because I knew I was going to have the opportunity to make this comment now in talking about Morocco said that people want social and economic inclusion. And I think that which is another way of saying some degree of fairness and justice. I think what we are learning in the region is what we have generally learned in the world for a variety of reasons, including the ones you alluded to but not limited to the ones you alluded to in opening this panel. It is very hard to get real social and economic justice without political inclusion that brings about political accountability and of course that isn't enough. You need political accountability which I think requires at least some degree of democracy with the rule of law. And all of this begs the question of where is the real political inclusion coming from in the region now? I would say I don't think Morocco is getting enough attention. I have the impression that the situation is deteriorating there even more than maybe Samia, even more than might have been gleaned from Samia's remarks and much more than most people in Washington understand. But generally in the region, Sarah, I don't think the democracy issue is dead. And I don't think that the region can get back to organic stability whether it is in the context of the hard security issues that were the subject of the most recent panel or the kind of broader issues of social and economic security that run through our deliberations today without moving toward political inclusion toward democracy. And I would just add two more thoughts that might kind of provide fodder for some future discussion in this session. One is that getting to formal democracy is not enough. So I think we've had some good and probing initial discussion of Tunisia. Carnegie has produced two amazing recent reports on Tunisia that I highly recommend to everybody in this room. And so I think those show that there's a lot of heavy lifting to do to reform the situation there if you're going to get fairness, justice, social and economic inclusion. And some of the heavy lifting in Tunisia speaks to precisely the issues you raised a few minutes ago that have not been adequately addressed there. The final kind of opening salvo that I would issue here is that I think the region needs to find each country in a distinctive way. And I do think this is a lesson we learned from a lot of places. Some kind of formula timetable method for getting to democracy that is hopefully more sustainable than what happened in 2011. There's a great wariness of revolution now. There's a great wariness of sudden disruptive and destabilizing change that's understandable after what the region went through. But if you look at the aerobarometer data carefully, I do not think that people's concern for political inclusion and accountable government has by any means evaporated. Yeah, I suspect everyone in this room would agree with that. Frank, how would you place this region's lasting democratic demand within a global context? I'll get to that. I have a question, though, for the people that know this region, which I do not. My understanding is that when we at Carnegie are standing to use the word justice, we mean like social justice meaning a welfare state and redistribution and so forth. But justice has a very specific meaning in the Middle East, which is really related much more to law than to social redistribution, which is why many of the Islamist parties have the word justice in like the PJD in Morocco. Is that correct? I've heard Noah Feldman argue this. Yeah, and I think I meant more like the Arabic version of justice. I meant justice laws applying equally to all the members of society. And that can bleed into social justice. But that complicates it because if it's law, there's different versions of law, and there's a lot of disagreement over which law is going to prove. So that was just my point of information. So I think that there's a bigger deficit in the Middle East compared to other regions that way before you get to democracy is really kind of it's a deficit of statements. And I was going to get to that. So go ahead. And I mean it in a very specific sense. So the famous Weber definition of the state is the legitimate monopoly of force over territory. Certainly many Arab countries have had the monopoly of force. It's the legitimate part that never quite got there. And I think they're very specific historical reasons for that. Most of that region. So there are two Muslim majority countries, Turkey and Iran, that have a much longer tradition of centralized state. So the basic problem just to back up historically a little bit is that you start it with a tribal society and you have to get beyond kinship to state structures, to impersonal state structures. The Middle East as a region has gone through these incredible efforts to do this. In a sense Islam itself is one of the attempts to do this because it's a universal religion trying to get people beyond their families and tribes and so forth. And then you have this whole system of slave soldiers that was introduced in the Abuya dynasty and then got picked up by the Ottomans where you literally kidnap people that were outside of the tribal system and turn them into your administrators in general because you couldn't trust the tribal levies to actually obey orders and this sort of thing. And then actually the groups in that region that figured this out first ended up with all the marbles. So the Ottomans used the system, well the Mamluks first and then the Ottomans used the system of basically foreigners running their government and then were taken over by the European colonialists. So the actual recent experience of Arab states running themselves in a legitimate deeply rooted fashion with a long state tradition, it's kind of not there. And they got the force part, the monopoly of force part, but they didn't get the legitimate part down all that well. And that's partly also this failure of national identity and this is a very conventional observation about the Middle East. So you compare it to East Asia, which has been by far the most successful region to develop both politically... We're going to work on that. I'm trying to eliminate the problem. Oh, did Larry solve it? We may have solved it. So, you know, in East Asia, I mean you have modern states, you know, going back, in the case of China, I would argue it goes back more than 2,000 years, but Korea, Japan, I mean all these places had first of all pretty coherent national identities and they had states in the pre-modern period way before the Europeans arrived and then imposed, you know, different systems of governance. And so I would think that that failure is, you know, I mean you have to have a...you can't have a democracy if you don't have a state just to begin with. And right now I think a lot of countries would be lucky to have a state, you know, much less something that we would label a liberal democracy. And those traditions are actually pretty hard to establish in a situation where, you know, you've got that degree of ethnic diversity and that degree of international intervention with lots of people who...actors who find it very easy to prevent stuff from happening, you know, using various tools of intervention which then, you know, unlike other regions where state formation could happen, you know, organically within the society, that just hasn't been allowed to happen in, you know, in this part of the world. So that's, I would say the first point of difference. And I would just love to jump in on that one a little bit. I think it might be worth us all thinking about a little bit. Do we need a state to have democratic governance? I'm not entirely sure that's correct. I think there are certainly in the region, and we heard about it again with respect to Yemen, some of the, you know, dispute resolution practices and things like that. I think UAE, if you look at UAE before it became a state, arguably it was a lot more democratic. So I just, you know, throw that in there that democratic governance may be on a more local level or on a more homogeneous group level is certainly, I mean, I would submit, might be possible without getting to state first. Well, I would submit that anyone who spent a week in Iraq after the American invasion would come to the conclusion that if you don't have a state, you can't have a democratic state. Well, if you're assuming we need a democratic state, then obviously you need a state. If we're talking about democratic governance... Practices, yeah. Practices, right. Well... But generally when we use the word democracy in this day and age and, you know, trying to stabilize places as democracies, we're talking about democratic governance at the level of a nation state. If you have a weak state that doesn't have the properties that Frank said, then nothing else is possible. You might get micro, you know, innovations in a place like Somalia, but you can't restore a country to real political and economic security, prosperity and so on and so forth. Well, but it also gets to the question that you're raising at the outset. What is it that people really want? Do they want participation? Do they want justice in the sense of law? Or do they want governance in the sense of actually delivered services like education, health, security and so forth? And I think actually that we tend to elide a lot of the governance part into our definition of democracy and say, well, yeah, they want democracy, but there are plenty of countries that have reasonably good governance without having democracy. And I would submit that, you know, if you had an Arab state that was, well, I mean, okay, so you actually have some examples of this in the Gulf, right? I mean, Dubai, you know, has got enough of a kind of reasonable governance system that it's, you know, and they're not just oil ronters, you know, they actually created something there. So it does seem to me it's possible in that region, but so this is again a question more for the group than one that I can answer. But what is it that people really want? Do they want governance in that sense? Or do they want actually democracy in terms of actual procedural participation? And where would you put then this demand or whatever it is? So that's what I'm saying. What's the content of the demand for democracy and how would you place the region in the rest of the world now? I mean, so you said you'd get to that part of it, that part of the question. I mean, there's clearly a roiling demand for something that's part of the content of democracy elsewhere in the world. All right, so the one thing that happened in the Arab Spring, and I think that in our discussion at dinner last night, I don't know who pointed this out, but maybe it was Hisham or Hisham. So I think the one really, oh, sorry. Okay, well, I don't know where I heard this, but somebody said, somebody said, you know, that that was a really important event just in itself because of the degree of mobilization and public participation that occurred. You cannot have a democracy simply if the thing is imposed from the top down by, you know, narrowly, I mean, there's a big controversy among academics as to whether European democracy was a top down or a bottom up thing. But I think if you look at that whole history without the bottom up pressure, the people at the top would never have made, you know, democratic concessions. And so you need social mobilization. And one of the things people were saying before 2011 is, oh, the Arabs are somehow different. You know, they're passive, they accept, you know, authority. They're, you know, they won't get angry over their lack of political agency. And I just think, you know, that's just not going to ever be true in that region again. So that's, you know, the beginning point. I think, you know, that is much easier to provoke and get moving than it is to then build the necessary institutions that you need to actually complete the process. But again, I would point out, this took a long time in Europe, you know. I mean, in a way, I mean, in my last book, I actually tried to make the comparison between the revolutions of 1848 and the actual arrival of real democracy in Europe. And it was about a 70-year period, you know. I mean, actually, those revolutions were popular mobilizations. Just like the Arab Spring before the Internet, every country in Europe had a popular uprising. It was, you know, pretty quickly crushed. And then the authoritarians, you know, managed to put institutions in place. And so it really was not until after World War I that you had anything like universal franchise and opening up of those systems. And that, you know, so I'd love to follow up on that teasing out institution states. I mean, there are some scholars who highlighted the different quality of state institutions in delivering different types of, I'd say, security and economic outcomes, right? Or even vice versa. If you start with a certain economic objective, sometimes that evolves into or that produces or helps build different types of institutions. I think what we've been hearing about today, some of these networks are bending, you know, shaping institutions such as they are in these various countries to suit their purposes or deliberately hollowing some of them out. And we've been seeing this also in the West, right? And then some state institutions are fighting back against that, in particular, judiciaries. You want to kind of speak to that also, sort of put this in, you know, in a more global framework of, you know, where do state institutions, what's happening with them? And which of them are standing up for themselves? Well, I mean, globally you see judicial systems and prosecutors doing some interesting things. Witness Brazil, for example. You see parliament standing up. I mean, within democracies that may be going through troubles. So look at Brazil's South Korea. We shouldn't assume this is a linear process. There's a pretty nasty character waiting in the wings to run for the presidency of Brazil, who I think has been described as the worst, most authoritarian and misogynistic elected official in the world and could become the next president of Brazil. So, I mean, we shouldn't assume. Bolsonaro is his name. He's a member of the House. You've been looking at this somewhat, Sarah. There is a kind of accountability revolution going on. We talked about freedom of information in an earlier panel. I think there are probably people here who have been involved in the open government partnership. I mean, all of this is at least... Spoilers such as ISIS or whoever. Activating, right, the non-state identity affiliations. There's also a Healy that actually got these ethnically extremely diverse countries to have a pretty distinct sense of national identity. Needless to say, I think very few... I mean, with the exception of Egypt, which has always had a pretty strong sense of itself as a separate nation, it's been the divide-and-conquer strategy rather than the identity-building strategy that has prevailed. The other thing that's very uncomfortable for people like me and Larry who believe in democracy is that if you look historically at where strong national identities originally came from, it is very hard to think of a case where a democracy actually produced that. I'd say India is one. Well... I don't question your general assumption, but anyway, go ahead. Yeah, I mean, the thing is that identities are always contested. And so even in these efforts to create a single one based around language or whatever, there's always going to be people left out. And I think that the problem in a lot of democracies is that left-out people can veto whatever that choice is. And so Pierre Mandon, the French political theorist, wrote a very nice essay in the Journal of Democracy a few years ago about this that actually we that live in modern liberal democracies sort of kid ourselves about this process because actually most of the successful democracies, post-1945 democracies in Europe inherited a sense of national identity from an earlier regime that was not democratic. So France, Germany, England, these were all created using largely authoritarian means and then you democratize after that. And it's really hard to think of cases where you can create a strong sense of national identity when all these stakeholders are arguing over what that ought to be and so forth. And so that doesn't lead to a very optimistic, you know, illusion for what may happen. But on the other hand, there aren't very many democracies in the Middle East, so maybe that's... I mean, I was also thinking about how some of these networks, or as I say, the spoilers, have been activating, really activating the subnational identities, which include, I think sometimes including again here, political parties becoming almost a group identity that makes it really... That's an old story in Sub-Saharan Africa and frankly in much of Asia and Africa. It's a very common phenomenon. It doesn't have to mean national disintegration and I think we've seen countries including for all of its problems, I hope I don't wind up eating these words, Nigeria managed these things. But if you want to get globally comparative, let's talk about devolution of power for a minute. If Kenya holds together through the extraordinary stress of successive rigged elections, in my view, going back through several of the past elections and what I think is likely to be a repeat of the questionable election, that is a repeat of the outcome of the questionable election that re-elected president, Kenyatta now must be held because of the Supreme Court ruling. The reason why it will hold together is because really serious devolution of power. Has given maybe not people who are free of the problems you were talking about at the regional level, but at least ethnically different power brokers, a stake in the system. And it's very important to note the distinction between the system of devolution of power in Kenya or in Nigeria for that matter and what Samia was talking about in Morocco. There's no parallel system. The people who are elected in these devolved states and regions and in India and in other federal systems have real power to govern. Now, there's a lot of corruption and sometimes authoritarian enclaves that are introduced in that system. But this is what, so this is the reason why I think India is a very instructive case on the identity front, what Al Staphan calls holding together federalism. And I do think given the deep regional and identity divisions in a number of Arab countries, it's a model to look at. But you can't, you know, there is a big flaw in the federalism literature that was introduced by William Riker, not to get too academic, which was the notion that real federalism could exist in an authoritarian system. And I don't think it can. In the absence of democratically binding devolution of power, you can't have authentic federalism. But if you got authentic federalism, and we were talking about Yemen as well, I mean, I think that's going to be the only solution for several of these Arab countries. Really interesting. And for Iraq, by the way. I think at that we might, you know, throw this open. There, yeah, there was a real early one right here. Yeah. And let us know who you are. Hi, John Sullivan. I used to be with the Center for International Private Enterprise, and I bring that up because in the late 1990s, we held a conference in Cairo. Let's take a couple of them. We held a conference in Cairo on the concept of corporate governance, thinking that that would be very important. But during the conference, the finance minister, Boutros Gali, leaned over and said, nobody here can understand what you're saying unless they speak English. And I said, why? We have the best translators. He said, there's no word in Arabic for governance. And it took two years. Halkama is the word, but it took two years with the Arab Linguistics Institute, Amr Musa and others. And they actually issued a decree saying now and forever more the word for governance shall be Halkama. But my point is, how deeply understood, how does governance get to be accepted? Not government, but governance. They were originally translating corporate governance as corporate government, which means something very different. Exactly. What we're all trying to avoid, ideally. So how do you get it understood? Right. Did I see one here? One, two, three. So let me start right here. I'm going to work back. Thank you, Michael. I want to give you two quick examples. We talk about democracy. Quick. I was in Malawi in 1983 speaking before a group. And one of the respondents said to me, look, Mike, you Americans come here and talk about democracy. These people don't have enough to eat. Number one. Number two, there was a survey, not a survey, a news ABC News walking around the streets in China many, many years ago. And they asked the person about democracy. He said, I don't care what's going on in Beijing. I'm living better. I have a job. I have an apartment. That's what's important to me. So is that an overriding situation also in the Middle East, that they want a better life for themselves, for their children? For sure. They want to be more secure. What the government is many, some of them probably don't care. Thank you. Right there. I am Adam Drucker from Anchor Consulting. So back to the state versus democracy question, I wanted to bring up the example of Kurdistan. So can you vote to have a state that is democratic through democracy first? And is it necessary to have like an identity first in the examples of Quebec, Catalonia, Scotland? Or can you have a pluralist identity through that same form? One more, yeah, right in the back there. Sorry, no, the gentleman, yeah. I have a question on that sort of, a characteristic of successful democracies anyway is knowing what to do with the ex-leaders. And that's a problem that seems to plague a lot of so-called democracies. Either there's no such thing as an ex-leader or the ex-leader is pretty well devastated, including family members. Is there any movement other than Mohammed Ibrahim to work on that as an aspect? In other words, find a place for these people when they leave office that includes some dignity and some honor, and perhaps that helps to promote the notion of supporting democratic institutions. You want to take a critical whichever of those you want? I'll start. So this question is related to this governance thing. I mean, yeah, so that's the question, is do people really want democracy understood in this procedural sense of the actual ability to participate in political decision-making, or are they only interested in the outcome, which is the delivery of services and you know, economic growth, and that sort of thing. I think that Americans probably underestimate the demand for the outcomes, you know, just because we're so wedded to democracy. However, I think as Larry has indicated, I mean, you can deliver those outcomes over, you know, a certain period of time in the absence of democratic procedures, but the sustainability of that, you know, usually depends on one charismatic leader or you have a great guy like, you know, Museveni in his first, you know, say 10 years as Uganda's president, who then just runs off the rails because he's in power too long. And so I think the procedures are actually over the long run really pretty critical for sustaining the outcomes. So that's how I would... So on the Kurdistan question, yeah, so of course you can have an ethnically divided society and yeah, and you can certainly vote, you know, for a lot of regions are voting for independence these days, not just that one. I think however that, well, Kurdistan is just a separate issue because there the international dimension is important, but you still have to solve some important questions, you know, in that separated region about exactly what is the political basis for membership because if it's, you know, purely a Kurdish fate, what about the Arabs that are going to be in it, you know? I mean, you got... So I think they have to, you know, give a lot of thought to really what it means to be a citizen and, you know, how inclusive it's going to be. With some history in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, you know, I mean, this isn't the first time we've done this. So I think the first and easiest thing to respond to and to most quickly dispel is the notion that poor people don't care about democracy. I think it's a little offensive in principle, but I know that it is empirically wrong and the reason why I know it's empirically wrong is because we've got 70 years of history in India, first of all, that shows that very poor Indians have cared a lot about democracy and in fact that voting turnout rates are higher, often significantly higher, among the poor and less educated than among wealthy elites. I know because I really spend a lot of time looking at the Afrobarometer and the Afrobarometer is now a very systematic survey. Actually, of 33 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and including a few in North Africa, but the data is mainly Sub-Saharan, which as a group of the poorest countries in the world and the levels not only of general support for the word democracy, oh, you can say, well, it's just kind of a social desirability effect, but when you start getting into statements about the way power should be organized, about the rule of law, about accountability of the President of Congress and so on and control of corruption in a really deep institutional sense, you find just not only surprisingly shockingly robust and frankly fairly sophisticated understandings of what democracy is, I think increasingly we can't say that poverty and low education is a barrier to wanting democracy and I think there was something to Amartya Sen, something powerful, not just rhetorically eloquent, to Amartya Sen's argument that the poor need democracy in a way even more than other groups. It doesn't mean that there weren't plenty of people in China who were happy to go along for the authoritarian ride of the developmental miracle, but I think a growing number of them frankly want democracy as well, more than is generally recognized, including by Xi Jinping. As to the point about ex-leaders, well, if they go voluntarily, sure, I'd give them dignity and honor in the Moe Brahean Prize, maybe, and if they do what the clerk did in South Africa, I'd certainly give them amnesty for their crimes if they kind of voluntarily spare their country the agony of violent civil war, more authoritarianism, my inclination, then in that context leans toward forgiveness without sacrificing historical memory. So you get to Samuel Huntington's injunction in his book The Third Wave. Do not forgive, do not punish, do not prosecute. Maybe you can even forgive, but when they hang on murderously, I mean, what else is there? And they drag their country through what Assad has in Syria. At that point, you've entered a process of no return. I am sad that Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein, you know, met the fates they did and the way they did, not because I'm against the death penalty, which I am, though I must say my commitment to that principle was sorely tested in those two instances, but I think it would have been much better for the societies if there could have been a trial in a historical accounting. As a general rule, I think that, you know, unless there is a kind of revolutionary situation or a rapid shift in power toward social forces mobilizing from below, you really need to cut a political pact, a deal, which is going to give more amnesty to the forces of the old order than probably would be morally really very satisfying to their victims. But my bias is always looking to the future and trying to stabilize it. Just point out that you've got a whole human rights, international human rights community that won't buy into that. Yeah, and I would also say stability. Often those bargains, we only think about the bargain required for immediate stability and not about when that bargain gets entrenched what happens next. So we almost need like two-stage bargains to have. Well, that sometimes happens. Like El Salvador is now reopening all these cases from 20 years ago. Did you still have one? Yeah, if you can do it concisely. I wonder how you can go about all this definition from procedure to outcomes to this and that. Without room for the notion of self-determination. Of self-determination. At the different levels, sort of individual, community and national. Because I think this is probably what's missing if we get lost in definitions of them. I mean, you can understand democracy in various ways, but at least this component should stick there and how this would change the whole attitude of what is it that we want and what do we perceive in the Arab world as possible and demanded. Jessica, back there. Jessica Matthews, Carnegie. When I think back my 17 years here, without question the most unequivocal failure that we ever had was an effort, a project to, an ambitious project to look at reform of primary and secondary education in the Middle East, in the Arab world. The premise being that, although that's a very long pathway, that you had to begin educating citizens at that level with basic ideas about questioning and taking responsibility for what's in their world, it was, we couldn't get anywhere. We could raise the money for it, but we couldn't and we had a few tentative nibbles, but boy, it was a complete failure. And it really left me with a question about this pathway. The end state is a bit clearer, but the pathway to me of how you get from where we are to coherent viable states is very hard to see. I'm doing favoritism here. This guy, I owe this guy a lot. I mean, we go way back. True, way way back. So, building on the self-determination, Bill Lawrence, GW and other hats. Building on the self-determination argument, where do the two of you come down in the context of the issues on the sovereignty and non-interference arguments? And I'm thinking specifically of the whole debate around R2P and Libya, where I was in favor of the intervention, but I also thought some lines were crossed. But what is the broader question? What is the role of the international community, and particularly the West, given the histories, given the self-determination, given the non-interference arguments, often made by authoritarian regimes, what's the, where do you come down on sovereignty issues? I think we had just given the time. We better let it go at that. Very unfortunately, there's some, I think, great questions still out there. And let me also, before I start with you guys, just say, unfortunately, we don't get to give ourselves a break after this panel, so I'd like to ask you to kind of stretch in place, right? Yeah, after we're done here, which will be at the end of these answers. You want to take a crack first, Larry? Well, I have a hunch Frank is going to give a more interesting answer on self-determination than I would since he's just finished a book on identity. Let me speak to the last two questions. First to Jessica's, I really know nothing, not next to nothing, nothing, about K through 12 education in the Middle East. But I do know this. We are increasingly in an era with the internet and social media where young people have other ways of acquiring not just education, not just facts, but I think norms and ways of looking at the world. And I think we have been seeding too much of the competition for values, for ideas, for ways of looking at the world and for facts and for fake facts to bad actors, whether they're terrorist organizations or Russia or China or Iran or their agents. And I think if we're going to revive the cause of trying to encourage and support the world to become and remain more democratic, more liberal, better governed, I think that investing in ideas, knowledge, information and partnerships toward that is as undervalued and underinvested in as anything we're doing right now. And it's the easiest thing for us to do in many ways. And I'll just say it's such a tiny thing and it's so self-referential. I am honestly embarrassed to mention it, but I do think it's one example. I taught a massive open online course on comparative democratic development. I just took my Stanford course and taught it as a mook a couple of times. And I was pretty astonished by the reaction I got from pretty much lots of different parts of the world, but in part the Arab world. And I didn't even translate it into Arabic. I didn't have the resources for that. I think there's so much we could do now that I'm not saying it can replace public or K through 12 education, but I think it could fill in maybe some of the gaps and help to inspire knowledge and attitudes of citizenship among at least some leading elements of the youth population. And on non-interference, I just don't believe in it. I'd say screw it. I think that when states violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and when they violate basic conceptions of shared global norms, they have forfeited their moral, and I would say, I would argue, I realize it's a radical argument, their international legal right is not to have their sovereignty infringed upon. And look, we're living in a world where everybody's violating everybody's sovereignty. And if anybody doubts that, all you have to do is take a quick look at what happened in the 2016 election in the United States. So there's a difference between that and the question of when do you use force. That should be a pretty rare event. I think we should never have invaded Iraq. I favored the intervention in Libya because I felt the resistance was in imminent danger of being completely murderously slaughtered. And I think that we have drawn some of the wrong lessons from Libya. And part of the failure there was a failure to follow up with something that's very dear to Frank's heart, which is state building. On the issue of self-determination, I agree completely with Larry. Self-determination is an active agency which is an independently valuable good, apart from food and economic growth and all that other stuff. I think that goes without saying. So you want a political system to provide that. The problem is that if you only have self-determination in the absence of good outcomes, you're also in trouble. That's not a sustainable situation. And that is actually the position of a lot of democracies. They've got procedurally, you know, people are participating and voting. There's no growth. There's no jobs. You know, there's no electricity. So I think that that's... So you need both of those. Jessica, just on the question of primary and secondary. What country has ever succeeded in really reforming its primary secondary education system? I mean, think about the amount of money that we've put in this country into that general project and how little in terms of, you know, measurable outcomes that's produced. Well... Yeah, well, I... I have spent a fair amount of time looking at education reform in Latin America. You don't have religious opposition so much, but you've got teachers unions. You've got... I mean, it's a really hard... It's a separate discussion. It's one of the hardest parts of the public sector to reform anywhere, all right? Sovereignty. I agree with Larry. You know, our colleague Steve Krasner wrote a book called Sovereignty, you know, Organized Hypocrisy, which basically... I mean, the argument is that actually people claim they're sovereign and it's ridiculous. They're really not. So I would say, yeah, stop worrying about it. On education, too, I mean, there's something that goes on said which is it's not apolitical. It's sort of like you were saying about corruption, I think, that you can't write like... Education, we think of it as a technical thing. Not at all. It's... Yeah, right, exactly. Yeah, it's very, very political. Yeah. Thank you, guys. That was great. Yeah. Okay.