 Section 7 of Prolegamana to Any Future Metaphysics. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Fernando Jahangiri. Prolegamana to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. Translated by Paul Karos. Section 7. Third part of the transcendental problem. 50 to 54. 2. The cosmological idea. 50. This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most remarkable curiosity. It serves as a very powerful agent to rouse philosophy from its dogmatic slumber and to stimulate it to the arduous task of undertaking a critique of reason itself. I term this idea cosmological because it always takes its object only from the sensible world and does not use any other than those whose object is given to sense. Consequently, it remains in this respect in its native home. It does not become transcendent and is therefore so far not mere idea. Whereas to conceive the soul as a simple substance already means to conceive such an object, the simple, as cannot be presented to the senses. With the cosmological idea extends the connection of the conditioned with its condition, whether the connection is mathematical or dynamical, so far that experience never can keep up with it. It is therefore with regard to this point always an idea whose object never can be adequately given in any experience. 51. In the first place, the use of a system of categories becomes here so obvious and unmistakable that even if there were not several other proofs of it, this alone would sufficiently prove it indispensable in the system of pure reason. There are only four such transcendent ideas as there are so many classes of categories, in each of which, however, they refer only to the absolute completeness of the series of the conditions for a given condition. In analogy to these cosmological ideas, there are only four kinds of dialectical assertions of pure reason, which as they are dialectical, thereby prove that to each of them unequally specious principles of pure reason, a contradictory assertion stands opposed. As all the metaphysical art of the most subtile distinction cannot prevent this opposition, it compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources of pure reason itself. This antinomy, not arbitrarily invented, but founded in the nature of human reason and hence unavoidable and never seizing, contains the following for thesis together with their antithesis. 1. Thesis. The world has as to time and space a beginning, limit, antithesis. The world is as to time and space infinite. 2. Thesis. Everything in the world consists of elements that are simple. Antithesis, there is nothing simple, but everything is composite. 3. Thesis. There are in the world causes through freedom. Antithesis, there is no liberty, but all is nature. 4. Thesis. In the series of the world causes, there is some necessary being. Antithesis, there is nothing necessary in the world, but in the series, all is incidental. 52. A. Here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason, no other instance of which can be shown in any other use. If we, as is commonly done, represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves and not merely of experience, as is usually nay without our critic unavoidably done, there arises an unexpected conflict which never can be removed in the common dogmatic old way. Because the thesis as well as the antithesis can be shown by equally clear, evident and irresistible proofs, for I pledge myself as to the correctness of all these proofs and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with itself, a state at which the sceptic rejoices but which must make the critical philosopher pause and feel elities. 52. B. We may blunder in various ways in metaphysics without any fear of being detected in falsehood, for we never can be refuted by experience if we but avoid self-contradiction, which in synthetical though purely fictitious propositions may be done whenever the concepts which we connect are mere ideas that cannot be given in their whole content in experience. For how can we make out by experience whether the world is from eternity or had a beginning, whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? Such concept cannot be given in any experience, be it ever so extensive, and consequently the falsehood either of the positive or the negative proposition cannot be discovered by this touchstone. The only possible way in which reason could have revealed unintentionally its secret dialectics, falsely announced as dogmatics, would be when it were made to ground an assertion upon a universally admitted principle and to deduce the exact contrary with the greatest accuracy of inference from another which is equally granted. This is actually here the case with regard to four natural ideas of reasons, when four assertions on the one side and as many counter assertions on the other arise, each consistently following from universally acknowledged principles, thus they reveal by the use of these principles the dialectical illusion of pure reason which would otherwise forever remain concealed. This is therefore the decisive experiment which must necessarily expose any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason. Contradictory propositions cannot both be false except the concept which is the subject of both is self-contradictory. For example, the propositions a square circle is round and a square circle is not round are both false. For as to the former it is false that the circle is round because it is quadrangular and it is likewise false that it is not round that is angular because it is a circle. For the logical criterion of the impossibility of a concept consists in this that if we presuppose it, two contradictory propositions both become false, consequently as no middle between them is conceivable, nothing at all is thought by that concept. 52c The first two antinomies which I call mathematical because they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogeneous are founded on such a self-contradictory concept and hence I explain how it happens that both the thesis and antithesis of the two are false. When I speak of objects in time and in a space it is not of things in themselves of which I know nothing but of things in appearance that is of experience as the particular way of cognizing objects which is afforded to man. I must not say of what I think in time or in a space that in itself an independent of these my thoughts exist in a space and in time for in that case I should contradict myself because the space and time together with the appearances in them are nothing existing in themselves and outside of my representations but are themselves only modes of representation and it is palpably contradictory to say that the mere mode of representation exists without our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist only in experience whereas to give them a self-subsisting existence apart from experience or before it is merely to represent ourselves that experience actually exists apart from experience or before it. Now if I inquire after the quantity of the world as to space and time it is equally impossible as regards all my notions to declare it infinite or to declare it finite for neither assertion can be contained in experience because experience either of an infinite space or of an infinite time elapsed or again of the boundary of the world by a void space or by an antecedent void time is impossible. These are mere ideas. This quantity of the world which is determined in either way should therefore exist in the world itself apart from all experience. This contradicts the notion of a world of senses which is merely a complex of the appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations that is inexperienced since this latter is not an object in itself but a mere mode of representation. Hence it follows that as the concept of an absolutely existing world of sense is self-contradictory the solution of the problem concerning its quantity whether attempted affirmatively or negatively is always false. The same holds good of the second antinomy which relates to the division of phenomena for these are mere representations where the parts exist merely in their representation consequently in the division or in a possible experience where they are given and the division reaches only as far as this latter reaches. To assume that an appearance e.g. that of body contains in itself before all experience all the parts which any possible experience can ever reach is to impute to a mere appearance which can exist only in experience and existence previous to experience. In other words it would mean that mere representations exist before they can be found in our faculty of representation. Such an assertion is self-contradictory as also every solution of our misunderstood problem whether we maintain that bodies in themselves consist of an infinite number of parts or of a finite number of simple parts. 53. In the first the mathematical class of antinomies the falsehood of the assumption consists in representing in one concept something self-contradictory as if it were compatible i.e. an appearance as an object in itself but as to the second the dynamical class of antinomies the falsehood of the representation consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible so that as in the former case the opposed assertions are both false in this case on the other hand where they are opposed to one another by mere misunderstanding they may both be true. Any mathematical connection necessarily presupposes homogeneity of what is connected in the concept of magnitude while the dynamical one by no means requires the same when we have to deal with extended magnitudes all the parts must be homogeneous with one another and with the whole whereas in the connection of cause and effect homogeneity may indeed likewise be found but is not necessary for the concept of causality by means of which something is posited through something else quite different from it at all events does not require it. If the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in themselves and the above laws of nature for the laws of things in themselves the contradiction would be unavoidable so also if the subject of freedom were like other objects represented as mere appearance the contradiction would be just as unavoidable for the same predicate would at once be affirmed and denied of the same kind of object in the same sense but if natural necessity is referred merely to appearances and freedom merely to things in themselves no contradiction arises if we at once assume or admit both kinds of causality however difficult or impossible it may be to make the latter kind conceivable as appearance every effect is an event or something that happens in time it must according to the universal law of nature be preceded by a determination of the causality of its cause a state which follows according to a constant law but this determination of the cause as causality must likewise be something that takes place or happens the cause must have begun to act otherwise no succession between it and the effect could be conceived otherwise the effect as well as the causality of the cause would have always existed therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have originated among appearances and must consequently as well as its effect be an event which must again have its cause and so on hence natural necessity must be the condition on which effective causes are determined whereas if freedom is to be a property of certain causes of appearances it must as regards these which are events be a faculty of starting them spontaneously that is without the causality of the cause itself and hence without requiring any other ground to determine the start but then the cause as to its causality must not rank under time determinations of its state that is it cannot be an appearance and must be considered a thing in itself while its effect would be only appearances if without contradiction we can think of the beings of understanding as exercising such an influence on appearances then natural necessity will attach to all connections of cause and effect in the sensuous world though on the other hand freedom can be granted to such cause as is itself not an appearance but the foundation of appearance nature therefore and freedom can without contradiction be attributed to the very same thing but in different relations on one side as a phenomenon on the other as a thing in itself we have in us a faculty which not only stands in connection with the subjective determining grounds that are the natural causes of its actions and is so far the faculty of a being that itself belongs to appearances but is also referred to objective grounds that are only ideas so far as they can determine this faculty a connection which is expressed by the word art this faculty is called reason and so far as we consider a being man entirely according to this objective determinable reason it cannot be considered as a being of sense but this property is that of a thing in itself of which we cannot comprehend the possibility I mean how the art which however has never yet taken place should determine its activity and can become the cause of actions whose effect is an appearance in the sensible world yet the causality of reason would be freedom with regard to the effects in the sensuous world so far as we can consider objective grounds which are themselves ideas as their determinants for its action in that case would not depend upon subjective conditions consequently not upon those of time and of course not upon the law of nature which serves to determine them because grounds of reason give to actions the rule universally according to principles without the influence of their circumstances of either time or place what I adduce here is merely meant as an example to make the thing intelligible and does not necessarily belong to our problem which must be decided from mere concepts independently of the properties which we meet in the actual world now I may say without contradiction that all the actions of rational beings so far as they are appearances occurring in any experience are subject to the necessity of nature but the same actions as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason are free for what is required for the necessity of nature nothing more than the determinability of every event in the world of sense according to constant laws that is a reference to cause in the appearance in this process the thing in itself as its foundation and its causality remain unknown but I say that the law of nature remains whether the rational being is the cause of the effects in the sensuous world of reason that is through freedom or whether it does not determine them on grounds of reason for if the former is the case the action is performed according to maxims the effect of which as appearances is always conformable to constant laws if the latter is the case and the action not performed on principles of reason it is subjected to the empirical laws of the sensibility and in both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws more than this we do not require or no concerning natural necessity but in the former case reason is the cause of these laws of nature and therefore free in the latter the effects follow according to mere natural laws of sensibility because reason does not influence it but reason itself is not determined on that account by the sensibility and is therefore free in this case too freedom is therefore no hindrance to natural law in appearance neither does this law abrogate the freedom of the practical use of reason which is connected with things in themselves as determining grounds thus practical freedom with the freedom in which reason possesses causality according to objectively determining grounds is rescued and yet natural necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the very same effects as appearances the same remarks will serve to explain what we had to say concerning transcendental freedom and its compatibility with natural necessity in the same subject but not taken in the same reference for as to this every beginning of the action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining grounds is always a first start though the same action is in the series of appearances only a subordinate start which must be preceded by a state of the cause which determines it and is itself determined in the same manner by another immediately preceding thus we are able in rational beings or in beings generally so far as their causality is determined in them as things in themselves to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states without falling into contradiction with the laws of nature but the relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a time relation in this case that which determines the causality does not proceed in time the action because such determining grounds represents not a reference to objects of sense e.g. to causes in the appearances but to determining causes as things in themselves which do not rank under conditions of time and in this way the action with regard to the causality of reason is considered as a first start in respect to the series of appearances and yet also as a merely subordinate beginning we may therefore without contradiction consider it in the former aspect as free but in the latter in so far as it is merely appearance as subject to natural necessity as to the force antinomy it is solved in the same way as the conflict of reason with itself in the third for provided the cause in the appearance is distinguished from the cause of the appearance so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself both propositions are perfectly reconcilable the one that there is nowhere in the sensuous world as cause according to similar laws of causality whose existence is absolutely necessary the other that this world is nevertheless connected with the necessary being as its cause but of another kind and according to another law the incompatibility of these propositions entirely rests upon the mistake of extending what is valid merely of appearances to things in themselves and in general confusing both in one concept 54 this then is the proposition and this the solution of the whole antinomy in which reason finds itself involved in the application of its principles to the sensible world the former alone the mere proposition would be a considerable service in the cause of our knowledge of human reason even though the solution might fail to fully satisfy the reader who has here to combat a natural illusion which has been but recently exposed to him and which he had hitherto always regarded as genuine for one result at least is unavoidable as it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason with itself so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for things in themselves and not for mere appearances which they are in fact the reader is thereby compelled to examine over again the deduction of all or a priori cognition and the proof which I have given of my deduction in order to come to a decision on the question this is all I require at present for when in this occupation he shall have thought himself deep enough into the nature of few reason those concepts by which alone the solution of the conflict of reason is possible will become sufficiently familiar to him without his preparation I cannot expect an unreserved ascent even from the most attentive reader end of section 7 section 8 of Prelegomena to any future metaphysics this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Farno Jahangiri Prelegomena to any future metaphysics by Emanuel Kant translated by Paul Carros 3. The Theological Idea 55. The third transcendental idea which affords matter for the most important but if pursued only especulatively transcendent and thereby dialectical use of reason is the ideal of pure reason reason in this case does not as with the psychological and the cosmological ideas begin from experience and air by exaggerating its grounds in striving to attain if possible the absolute completeness of their series it rather totally breaks with experience and from mere concepts of what constitutes the absolute completeness of a thing in general consequently by means of the idea of a most perfect primal being it proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore the actuality of all other things and so the mere presupposition of a being who is conceived not in this series of experience yet for the purposes of experience for the sake of comprehending its connection order and unity i.e. the idea the notion of it is more easily distinguished from the concept of the understanding here than in the former cases hence we can easily expose the dialectical illusion which arises from our making the subjective conditions of our thinking objective conditions of objects themselves and an hypothesis necessary for the satisfaction of our reason a dogma as the observation of the critic on the pretensions of transcendental theology are intelligible clear and decisive I have nothing more to add on this object general remarks on the transcendental ideas 56 the objects which are given us by experience are in many respects incomprehensible and many questions to which the law of nature leads us when carried beyond a certain point though quite comfortably to the laws of nature admit of no answer as for example the question why substances attract one another but if we entirely equate nature or in pursuing its combinations exceed all possible experience and so enter the realm of mere ideas we cannot then say that the object is incomprehensible and that the nature of things proposes to us insoluble problems for we are not then concerned with nature or in general with given objects but with concepts which have their origin merely in our reason and with mere creations of thought and all the problems that arise from our notions of them must be solved because of course reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure as the psychological cosmological and theological ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason which cannot be given in any experience the questions which reason asks us about them are put to us not by the objects but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction they must all be capable of satisfactory answers which is done by showing that they are principles which bring our use of the understanding into thorough agreement, completeness and synthetical unity and that they so far hold good of experience only but of experience as a whole although an absolute hold of experience is impossible the idea of a whole of cognition according to principles must impart to our knowledge a peculiar kind of unity that of a system without which it is nothing but piecework and cannot be used for proving the existence of a highest purpose which can only be the general system of all purposes I do not here refer only to the practical but also to the highest purpose of the speculative use of reason the transcendental ideas therefore express the peculiar application of reason as a principle of systemic unity in the use of the understanding yet if we assume this unity of the mode of cognition to be attached to the object of cognition if we regard that which is merely regulative to be constitutive and if we persuade ourselves that we can by means of these ideas in larger cognition transcendentally or far beyond all possible experience while it only serves to render experience within itself as nearly complete as possible i.e. to limit its progress by nothing that cannot belong to experience we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of the proper application of our reason and of its principles and from a dialectic which both confuses the empirical use of reason and also sets reason as variance with itself conclusion on the determination of the bounds of pure reason 57 having reduced the clearest arguments it would be absurd for us to hope that we can know more of any object than belongs to the possible experience of it or lay claim to the least atom of knowledge about anything not assumed to be an object of possible experience which would determine it according to the constitution it has of itself for how could we determine anything in this way since time, space and the categories and still more all the concepts formed by empirical experience or perception in this sensible world have and can have no other use than to make experience possible and if this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of the understanding they do not determine any object and have no meaning whatever but it would be on the other hand a still greater absurdity if we conceded no things in themselves or set up our experience for the only possible mode of knowing things or way of beholding them in a space and in time for the only possible way and our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible understanding in fact if we wish to have the principles of the possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in themselves our principles which limit the use of reason to possible experience might in this way become transcendent and the limits of our reason be set up as limits of the possibility of things in themselves as use dialogues may illustrate if a careful critique did not guard the bounds of our reason with respect to its empirical use and set a limit to its pretensions skepticism originally arose from metaphysics and its licentious dialectics at first it might merely to favor the empirical use of reason announce everything that transcends this use as worthless and deceitful but by and by when it was perceived that the very same principles that are used in experience insensibly and apparently with the same right that are still further than experience extents then men began to doubt even the prepositions of experience but here there is no danger for common sense will doubtless always assert its right a certain confusion however arose in science which cannot determine how far reason is to be trusted and why only so far and no further than this confusion can only be cleared up and all future lapses obviated by a formal determination on principle of the boundary of the use of our reason we cannot indeed beyond all possible experience form a definite notion of what things in themselves may be yet we are not at liberty to abstain entirely from inquiring into them for experience never satisfies reason fully but in answering questions refers us further and further back and leaves us dissatisfied with regards to their complete solution this only one may gather from the dialectics of pure reason which therefore has its good subjective grounds having acquired as regards the nature of our soul a clear conception of this object and having come to the conviction that its manifestations cannot be explained materialistically who can refrain from asking what the soul really is and if no concept of experience suffices for the purpose from accounting for it by a concept of reason that of a simple immaterial being though we cannot by any means prove its objective reality who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the quantity of the world of freedom or of natural necessity since every answer given on principle of experience begets a fresh question which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows it insufficiently of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason finally who does not see in the thorough going contingency and dependence of all his thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of experience the impossibility of stopping there and who does not feel himself compelled notwithstanding all interdictions against losing himself in transcendent ideas to seek rest and contentment beyond all the concepts which he can vindicate by experience in the concept of a being the possibility of which we cannot conceive but at the same time cannot be refuted because it relates to a mere being of the understanding and without it reason must needs remain forever dissatisfied bounds in extended beings always presupposes a space existing outside a certain definite place and enclosing it limits do not require this but are mere negations which affect the quantity so far as it is not absolutely complete but our reason as it were sees in its surroundings a space for the cognition of things in themselves though we can never have definite notions of them and are limited to appearances only as long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous definite bounds to it are inconceivable in mathematics and in natural philosophy human reason admits of limits but not of bounds with that something indeed lies without it at which it can never arrive but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal progress the enlarging of our views in mathematics the possibility of new discoveries are infinite and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature of new powers and laws when continued experience and its rational combination but limits cannot be mistaken here for mathematics refers to appearances only and what cannot be an object of sensuous contemplation such as the concepts of metaphysics and of morals lies entirely without its sphere and it can never lead to them neither does it require them it is therefore not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences and there is not as it were any point or line of contact natural science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of things which though not appearance yet can serve as the ultimate ground of explaining appearances nor does that science require this for its physical explanations may even if such grounds should be offered from other sources for instance the influence of immaterial beings they must be rejected and not used in the progress of explanations for these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object of sense can belong to experience and be brought into connection with our actual perceptions and empirical laws but metaphysics leads us toward bounds in the dialectical attempts of pure reason not undertaken arbitrarily or vantally but stimulated there too by the nature of reason itself and the transcendental ideas as they do not admit of evasion and are never capable of realization serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the pure use of reason but also the way to determine them such is the end and the use of this natural predisposition of our reason which has brought forth metaphysics as its favorite child whose generation like every other in the world is not to be ascribed to blind chance but to an original germ wisely organized for great ends for metaphysics in its fundamental features perhaps more than any other science is placed in us by nature itself and cannot be considered the production of an arbitrary choice or a casual enlargement in the progress of experience from which it is quite desperate reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding which suffice for empirical use i.e. within the sensible world finds in itself no satisfaction because ever recurring questions deprive us of all hope of their complete solution the transcendental ideas which have that completion in view are such problems of reason but it seems clearly that the sensuous world cannot contain this completion neither consequently can all the concepts which serve merely for understanding the world of sense such as space and time and whatever we have reduced under the name of pure concepts of the understanding the sensuous world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected according to universal laws it has therefore no subsistence by itself it is not a thing in itself and consequently must point to that which contains the basis of that experience to beings which cannot be cognized merely as phenomena but as things in themselves in the cognition of them alone reason can hope to satisfy its desire of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions we have above number 33 and 34 indicated the limits of reason with regard to all cognition of mere creation of thought since the transcendental ideas have urged us to approach them and thus have led us as it were to the spot where the occupied space with experience touches the void that are which we can know nothing with nomina we can determine the bounds of pure reason for in all bounds there is something positive e.g. a surface is the boundary of corporeal space and is therefore itself a space a line is a space which is the boundary of the surface point the boundary of the line but yet always a place in space whereas limits contain mere negations the limits pointed out in these paragraphs are not enough after we have discovered that beyond them there still lies something though we can never cognize what it is in itself for the question now is what is the attitude of our reason for this connection of what we know with what we do not and that and never shall know this is an actual connection of a known thing with one quite unknown and which will always remain so and though what is unknown should not become the least more known which we cannot even hope yet the notion of this connection must be definite and capable of being rendered distinct we must therefore accept an immaterial being a world of understanding and a supreme being all mere known because in them only as things in themselves reason finds that completion and satisfaction which it can never hope for in the derivation of appearances from their homogeneous grounds and because these actually have reference to something distinct from them and totally heterogeneous as appearances always re-suppose and objecting itself and therefore suggest its existence whether we can know more of it or not but as we can never cognize these beings of understanding as they are in themselves that is definitely yet must assume them as regards of sensible world and connect them with it by reason we are at least able to think this connection by means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense yet if we represent to ourselves a being of the understanding by nothing but few concepts of the understanding we then indeed represent nothing definite to ourselves consequently our concepts has no significance but if we think it by properties borrowed from the sensuous world it is no longer a being of understanding but is conceived as an appearance and belongs to the sensible world let us take an instance from the notion of the supreme being our basic conception is quite a pure concept of reason but represents only a thing containing all realities without being able to determine any one of them because for that purpose an example must be taken from the world of sense in which case we should have an object of sense only not something quite heterogeneous which can never be an object of sense suppose I attribute to the supreme being understanding for instance I have no concept of an understanding other than my own one that must receive its perceptions by the senses and which is occupied in bringing them under rules of the unity of consciousness then the elements of my concept would always lie in that appearance I should however by the insufficiency of the appearance be necessitated to go beyond them to the concept of a being which neither depends upon appearance nor is bound up with them as conditions of its determination but if I separate understanding and sensibility to obtain a pure understanding then nothing remains but the mere form of thinking without perception by which form alone I can cognize nothing definite and consequently no object for that purpose I should conceive another understanding such as would directly perceive its objects but of which I have not the least notion because the human understanding is discursive and can perceive it can only cognize by means of general concepts and the very same difficulties arise if we attribute a will to the supreme being for we have this concept only by drawing it from our internal experience and therefore from our dependence for satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require and so the notion rests upon sensibility which is absolutely incompatible with the pure concept of the supreme being Hume's objections to Deism are weak and affect only the proofs and not the deistic assertion itself but that's regards Deism which depends on a stricter determination of the concept of the supreme being which in Deism is merely transcendent they are very strong and as this concept is formed in certain in fact in all common cases irrefutable Hume always insists that by the pure concept of an original being to which we apply only ontological predicates, eternity omnipresence omnipotence we think nothing definite and that properties which can yield a concept in concreto must be super-added that it is not enough to say it is cause but we must explain the nature of its causality for example that of an understanding and our will he then begins his attacks at the essential point itself i.e. Deism as he had previously directed his battery only against the proofs of Deism an attack which is not very dangerous to it in its consequences all his dangerous arguments refer to anthropomorphism which he holds to be inseparable from Deism and to make it absurd in itself but if the former be abandoned the latter must vanish with it and nothing remain but Deism of which nothing can come which is of no value and which cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals if this anthropomorphism were really unavoidable no proofs whatever of the existence of a supreme being even where they all granted could determine for us the concept of this being without involving us in contradictions if we connect with the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of few reason the command which apparently conflicts with it to proceed to concepts that lie beyond the field of its eminent empirical use we discover that both can subsist together but only at the boundary of lawful use of reason for this boundary belongs as well to the field of experience as to that of the creations of thought and we are thereby taught as well how these so remarkable ideas serve merely for marking the bounds of human reason on the one hand they give warning not boundlessly to extend cognition of experience as if nothing but the world remained for us to recognize and yet on the other hand not to transgress the bounds of experience and to think of judging about things beyond them as things in themselves but we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgments merely to the relation which the world may have to a being whose very concept lies beyond all the knowledge which we can attain within the world for we then do not attribute to the supreme being any of the properties in themselves by which we represent objects of experience and thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism but we attribute them to this relation to the world and allow ourselves a symbolic anthropomorphism which in fact concerns language only and not the object itself if I say that we are compelled to consider the world as if it were the work of our supreme understanding and will I really say nothing more than that a watch a sheep, a regiment bears the same relation to the watchmaker the sheep builder the commanding officer as the world of sense or whatever constitutes the substratum of this complex of appearances which I do not here by cognize as it is in itself but as it is for me or in relation to the world of which I am apart 58. Such a cognition is one of analogy and does not signify as is commonly understood an imperfect similarity of two things but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite similar things by means of this analogy however there remains the concept of the supreme being sufficiently determined for us though we have left out everything that could determine it absolutely or in itself for we determine it as regards the world and as regards ourselves and more do we not require the attacks which you makes upon those who would determine this concept absolutely by taking the materials for so doing from themselves and the world do not affect us and he cannot object to us that we have nothing left if we give up the objective anthropomorphism of the concept of the supreme being for let us assume at the outset assuming his dialogues makes fellow grant Clintus as a necessary hypothesis the day-stical concept of this first being in which this being is taught by the mere ontological predicates of substance of cause etc this must be done because reason actuated in the sensible world by mere conditions which are themselves always conditional cannot otherwise have any satisfaction and it therefore can be done without falling into anthropomorphism which transfers predicates from the world of sense to a being quite distinct from the world because those predicates are mere categories which though they do not give a determinate concept of God yet give a concept not limited to any conditions of sensibility thus nothing can prevent our predicating of this being a causality through reason with regard to the world and thus passing to Theism without being obliged to attribute to God in himself this kind of reason as a property inherent in him for as to the former the only possible way of persecuting the use of reason as regards all possible experience in complete harmony with itself in the world of sense to the highest point is to assume supreme reason as a cause of all the connections in the world so to principle must be quite advantages to reason and can hurt it nowhere in application to nature as to the latter reason is thereby not transferred as a property to the first being in himself but only to his relation to the world of sense and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided for nothing is considered here but the cause of the form of reason which is conceived everywhere in the world and reason is attributed to the supreme being so far as it contains the ground of this form of reason in the world but according to analogy only that is so far as this expression shows merely the relation which the supreme cause unknown to us has to the world in order to determine everything in it conformably to reason in the highest degree we are thereby kept from using reason as an attribute for the purpose of conceiving God but instead of conceiving the world in such manner as is necessary to have the greatest possible use of reason according to principle we thereby acknowledge that the supreme being is quite inscrutable and even unthinkable in any definite way as to what he is in himself we are thereby kept on the one hand from making a transcendent use of the concepts which we have of reason as an efficient cause by means of the wheel in order to determine the divine nature by properties which are only borrowed from human nature and from losing ourselves in gross and extravagant notions and on the other hand from deluding the contemplation of the world with hyper physical most of explanation according to our notions of human reason which we transfer to God and so losing for this contemplation is proper application according to which it should be a rational study of human nature and not a presumptuous derivation of its appearances from supreme reason the expression suited to our feeble notions is that we conceive the world as if it came as to its existence and internal plan from supreme reason by which notion we both recognize the constitution which belongs to the world itself yet without pretending to determine the nature of its cause in itself and on the other hand we transfer of this constitution of the form of reason in the world upon the relation of the supreme cause to the world without finding the world sufficient by itself for that purpose thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism disappear by combining with Hume's principle not to carry the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience this other principle which he quite overlooked not to consider the field of experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of our reason the critic of pure reason here points out the true mean between dogmatism which Hume combats and skepticism which he would substitute for it a mean which is not like other means that we find advisable to determine for ourselves as it's very mechanically by adopting something from one side and something from the other and by which nobody is taught a better way but such a one as can be accurately determined on principles 59 at the beginning of this annotation I made use of the metaphor of a boundary in order to establish the limits of reason in regards to its suitable use the world of sense contains merely appearances which are not things in themselves but the understanding must assume these latter ones in our reason both are comprised and the question is how does reason proceed to set boundaries to the understanding as regards both these fields experience which contains all that belongs to the sensuous world does not bound itself it only proceeds in every case from the conditioned to some other equally conditioned object its boundary must lie quite without it and this field is that of the pure beings of the understanding but this field so far as the determination of the nature of these is concerned is an empty space for us and if dogmatically determined concepts alone are in question we cannot pass out of the field of possible experience but as a boundary itself is something positive which belongs as well to that which lies within as to the space that lies without the given complex it is still an actual positive cognition which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this boundary yet without attempting to pass it because it there finds itself in the presence of an empty space in which it can conceive forms of things but not things themselves but the setting of a boundary to the field of the understanding by something which is otherwise unknown to it is a silica ignition which belongs to reason even at this standpoint and by which it is neither confined within the sensible nor a strain without it but only refers as the fist in knowledge of a boundary to the relation between that which lies without it and that which is contained within it natural theology such a concept at the boundary of human reason being constrained to look beyond this boundary to the idea of a supreme being and for practical purposes to that of an intelligible world also not in order to determine anything relatively to this pure creation of the understanding which lies beyond the world of sense but in order to guide the use of reason within it according to principles of the greatest possible theoretical as well as practical unity for this purpose we make use of the reference of the world of sense to an independent reason as the cause of all these connections thereby we do not purely invent a being but as beyond the sensible world there must be something that can only be thought by the pure understanding we determine that something in this particular way though only of course according to analogy and thus there remains our original proposition which is the resume of the full critic that reason by all is a priori principles never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience and even of these nothing more than can be cognized in experience but this limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the objective boundary of experience is to the reference to something which is not itself an object of experience but is the ground of all experience reason does not however teach us anything concerning the thing in itself it only instructs us as regards is soon complete and highest use in the field of possible experience but this is all that can be reasonably desired in the present case and with which we have cause to be satisfied 60 thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as it is actually given in the natural predisposition of human reason and in that which constitutes the essential end of its pursuit according to its subjective possibility though we have found that this merely natural use of such a predisposition of our reason if no discipline arising only from a scientific critic bridles and sets limits to it involves us in transcendence either apparently or really conflicting dialectical syllogism and this fallacious metaphysics is not only unnecessary as regards the promotion of our knowledge of nature but even disadvantages to it there yet remains a problem worthy of solution which is to find out the natural ends intended by this disposition to transcendent concepts in our reason because everything that lies in nature must be originally intended for some useful purpose such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature and I acknowledge that what I can say about it is conjecture only like every speculation about the first ends of nature the question does not concern the objective validity of metaphysical judgments but our natural predisposition to them and therefore does not belong to the system of metaphysics but to anthropology when I compare all the transcendental ideas the totality of which constitutes used a particular problem of natural pure reason compelling it to quit the mere contemplation of nature to transcend all possible experience and in this endeavor to produce the thing be it knowledge or fiction called metaphysics I think I perceive that the aim of this natural tendency is to free our notions from the fetters of experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so far as at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the pure understanding which no sensibility can reach not indeed for the purpose of especulatively occupying ourselves with them for there we can find no ground to stand on but because practical principles which without finding some such scope to their necessary expectation and hope could not expand to the universality which reason unavoidably requires from the moral field so I find that the psychological idea however little it may reveal to me the nature of the human soul which is higher than all concepts of experience shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough and thereby deters me from materialism the psychological notion of which is unfit for any explanation of nature and besides confines reason in practical aspects the cosmological ideas by the obvious insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in its lawful inquiry serve in the same manner to keep us from naturalism which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself finally all natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional as it always presupposes the dependence of things upon others and unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of the cause different from the world of sense but as the causality of this cause in its turn where it merely nature could never render the existence of the contingent as its consequence comprehensible reason frees itself by means of the theological idea from fatalism both as a blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself without the first principle and as a blind causality of this principle itself and leads to the concept of a cause possessing freedom or of a supreme intelligence does the transcendental idea serve if not to instruct us positively at least you destroy the rash assertions of materialism of naturalism and of fatalism and thus to afford a scope for the moral ideas beyond the field of speculation these considerations I should think explain in some measure the natural application of which I spoke the practical value which a mere speculative science may have lies without the bounds of this science and can therefore be considered as a Skolian merely and like all Skolia does not form part of the science itself this application however surely lies within the bounds of philosophy especially a philosophy drawn from the pure source of reason where its speculative use in metaphysics necessarily be at unity with its practical use in morals hence the unavoidable dialectics of pure reason considered in metaphysics as a natural tendency deserves to be explained not as an illusion merely which is to be removed but also if possible as a natural provision as regards its end though this duty a work of supererogation cannot justly be assigned to the metaphysics proper the solutions of these questions which are treated in the chapter on the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason should be considered the second Skolian which however has a greater affinity with the subject of metaphysics for there are certain rational principles are expounded which determine a priori the order of nature or rather of the understanding which seeks nature's laws through experience they seem to be constitutive and legislative with regard to experience though they spring from pure reason which cannot be considered like the understanding as a principle of possible experience now whether or not this harmony rests upon the fact that just as nature does not in here in appearances or in their source the sensibility itself but only in so far as the latter is in relation to the understanding as also a systematic unity in applying the understanding to bring about an entirety of all possible experience can only belong to the understanding when in relation to reason and whether or not experience is in this way immediately subordinate to that legislation of reason may be discussed by those who desire to trace the nature of reason even beyond its use in metaphysics into the general principles of a story of nature I have represented this task as important but not attempted its solution in the book itself and thus I conclude the analytical solution of the main question which I had proposed how is metaphysics in general possible we are ascending from the data of its actual use in its consequences to the grounds of its possibility end of section 8 section 9 of Rologamana to any future metaphysics this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Larry Wilson Rologamana to any future metaphysics by Emanuel Kant translated by Paul Keras Sculia solution of the general question of the Rologamana how is metaphysics possible as a science metaphysics as a natural disposition of reason is actual but if considered by itself alone as the analytical solution of the third principle question showed dialectical and illusory if we think of taking principles from it and in using them follow the natural but on that account not less false illusion never produced science but only a vain dialectical art in which one school may out do another but none can ever acquire a just and lasting approbation in order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim not mere fallacious plausibility but in sight and conviction a critique of reason must itself exhibit the whole stock of a priori concepts their division according to the various sources sensibility understanding and reason together with a complete table of them the analysis of these concepts with all their consequences especially by means of the deduction of these concepts the possibility of synthetical cognition a priori the principles of its application and finally its bounds all in a complete system critique therefore and critique alone contains in itself an approved and well tested plan and even all the means required to accomplish metaphysics as a science by other ways and means it is impossible the question here therefore is not so much how this performance is possible as how to set it going and induce men of clear heads to quit their hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation for one that will not deceive and how such a union for the common end may best be directed this much is certain that whoever has once tested critique will be ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle which he formerly put up with because his reason must have something and could find nothing better for its support critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the schools as chemistry does to alchemy or as astronomy to the astrology of the fortune teller I encourage myself that nobody who has read through and through and grasped the principles of the critique even in these prologamana only will ever return to that old and sophisticated pseudoscience but will rather with a certain delight look forward to metaphysics which is now indeed in his power requiring no more preparatory discoveries and now at last affording permanent satisfaction to reason for here is an advantage upon which of all possible sciences metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be incapable of further change or of any augmentation by new discoveries because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in itself not in objects and their observation on Chuang by which letter its stock of knowledge cannot be further increased when therefore it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty and so definitely is to avoid all misunderstanding there remains nothing for pure reason to cognize a priori nay there is even no ground to raise further questions the sheer prospect of knowledge so definite and so compact has a peculiar charm even though we should set aside all its advantages of which I shall hear after speak all false art all vain wisdom lasts its time but finally destroys itself and its highest culture is also the epic of its decay that this time has come for metaphysics appears from the state into which it has fallen among all learned nations despite of all the zeal with which other sciences of every kind are prosecuted the old arrangement of our university studies still preserves its shadow now and then an academy of science tempts men by offering prizes on it but it is no longer numbered among thorough sciences and let any one judge for himself how a man of genius if he were called a great metaphysician would receive the compliment which may be well meant but is scarce envied by anybody yet though the period of the downfall of all dogmatical metaphysics has undoubtedly arrived we are yet far from being able to say that the period of its regeneration has come by means of a thorough and complete critique of reason all transitions from a tendency to its contrary pass through the stage of indifference and this moment is the most dangerous for an author but in my opinion the most favorable for the science for when party spirit has died out by a total dissolution of former connections minds are in the best state to listen to several proposals for an organization according to a new plan when I say that I hope these polar gammona will excite investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy which seems on its speculative side to want sustenance I can imagine beforehand that everyone whom the thorny paths of my critique have tied and put out of humor will ask me upon what I found this hope my answer is upon the irresistible law of necessity that the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether to avoid inhaling impure air there will therefore always be metaphysics in the world nay everyone especially every man of reflection will have it and for want of a recognized standard will shape it for himself after his own pattern what has hitherto been called metaphysics cannot satisfied any critical mind but to forgo it entirely is impossible therefore a critique of pure reason itself must now be attempted or if one exists investigated and brought to the full test because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge ever since I have come to know critique whenever I finish reading a book metaphysical contents which by the preciseness of its notions by variety, order and an easy style was not only entertaining but also helpful I cannot help asking has this author indeed advanced metaphysics a single step the learned man whose works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed to the culture of my mental powers will I hope forgive me for saying that I have never been able to find either their essays or my own less important ones though self-love may recommend them to me to have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least and why here is the very obvious reason metaphysics did not then exist as a science nor can it be gathered piecemeal but its germ must be fully performed in the critique but in order to prevent all misconception we must remember what has been already said that by the analytical treatment of our concepts the understanding gains indeed a great deal but the science of metaphysics is thereby not in the least advanced because these dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials from which the intention is to carpenter our science let the concepts of substance and of accident be ever so well dissected and determined is very well as a preparation for some future use but if we cannot prove that in all which exists the substance endures and only the accidents vary our science is not the least advanced by all our analyses metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove all priori either this proposition or that a sufficient reason still less any more complex theorem such as bound to psychology or cosmology or indeed any synthetical proposition by all its analyzing therefore nothing is affected nothing obtained or forwarded and the science after all this bustle and noise still remains as it was in the days of Aristotle though far better preparations were made for it than of old if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been discovered if anyone thinks himself offended he is at liberty to refute my charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to metaphysics which he would prove dogmatically all priori for until he has actually performed this feat I shall not grant that he has truly advanced the science even should this proposition be sufficiently confirmed by common experience no demand can be more moderate or more equitable and in the inevitably certain event of its non-performance no assertion more just than that hitherto metaphysics has never existed as a science but there are two things which in case the challenge be accepted I must deprecate first trifling about probability and conjecture which are suited as little to metaphysics as to geometry and secondly a decision by means of the magic wand of common sense which does not convince everyone but which accommodates itself to personal peculiarities for as to the former nothing can be more absurd than in metaphysics a philosophy from pure reason to think of grounding our judgments upon probability and conjecture everything that is to be cognized all priori is thereby announced as apodiectically certain and must therefore be proved in this way we might as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures as to the doctrine of chances in the latter it does not contain probable but perfectly certain judgments concerning the degree of the possibility of certain cases under given uniform conditions which in the sum of all possible cases infallibly happen according to the rule though it is not sufficiently determined in respect to every single chance conjectures by means of induction and of analogy can be suffered in an empirical science of nature only yet even there the possibility at least of what we assume must be quite certain the appeal to common sense is even more absurd when concept and principles are announced as valid not insofar as they hold with regard to experience but even beyond the conditions of experience for what is common sense it is normal good sense so far it judges right but what is normal good sense it is the faculty of the knowledge and use of the rules in concreto as distinguished from the speculative understanding which is a faculty of knowing rules in abstracto common sense can hardly understand the rule that every event is determined by means of its cause and can never comprehend it thus generally it therefore demands an example from experience and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what it always thought when a pain was broken or kitchen utensil missing it then understands the principle and grants it common sense therefore is only of use so far as it can see its rules though they actually are a priori confirmed by experience consequently to comprehend them a priori or independently of experience belongs to the speculative understanding and lies quite on the horizon of common sense but the province of metaphysics is entirely confined to the latter kind of knowledge and it is certainly a bad index of common sense to appeal to it as a witness for it cannot hear form any opinion whatever and men look down upon it with contempt until they are in difficulties and can find in their speculation neither in nor out it is a common subterfuge in those false friends of common sense who occasionally prize it highly but usually despise it to say that there must surely be at all events some propositions which are immediately certain and of which there is no occasion to give any proof or even any account at all because we otherwise could never stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments but if we expect the principle of contradiction which is not sufficient to show the truth of synthetical judgments we can never adduce in proof of this privilege anything else indubitable which they can immediately ascribe to common sense except mathematical propositions such as twice two make four between two points there is but one straight line etc but these judgments are radically different from those of metaphysics for in mathematics I myself can by thinking construct whatever I represent to myself I add to the first two the other two one by one and myself make the number four where I draw in thought from one point to another all manner of lines equal as well as unequal yet I can draw one only which is like itself in all its parts but I cannot by all my power of thinking extract from the concept of the thing the concept of something else whose existence is necessarily connected with the former I must call inexperience and though my understanding furnishes me a priori yet only in reference to possible experience with the concept of such a connection i.e. causation I cannot exhibit it like the concepts of mathematics by unshown visualizing them a priori and so show its possibility a priori this concept together with the principles of its application as a prerequisite in metaphysics a justification and deduction of its possibility because we cannot otherwise know how far it holds good and whether it can be used in experience only or beyond it also therefore in metaphysics as a speculative science of pure reason we can never appeal to common sense that may do so only when we are forced to surrender it and to renounce all purely cognitive cognition which must always be knowledge and consequently when we forego metaphysics itself and its instruction for the sake of adopting a rational faith which alone may be possible for us and sufficient to our wants perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself for in this case the attitude of the question is quite altered metaphysics must be science not only as a whole otherwise it is nothing because as a speculation of pure reason it finds a hold only on general opinions beyond its field however probability in common sense may be used with advantage and justly but on quite special principles of which the importance always depends on the reference to practical life this is what I hold myself justified in requiring for the possibility of metaphysics as a science in this section 9 section 10 of prologamana to any future metaphysics this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Bukharnar prologamana to any future metaphysics by Emmanuel Kant translated by Paul Karas appendix on what can be done to make metaphysics actual as a science since all the ways here to foretaken have failed to attain the goal and since without a proceeding critique of pure reason it is not likely ever to be attained the present essay now before the public has a fair title to an accurate and careful investigation except it be thought more advisable to give up all pretensions to metaphysics to which if men but would consistently adhere to their purpose no objection can be made if we take the course of things as it is not as it ought to be there are two sorts of judgments one a judgment which proceeds investigation in our case one in which the reader from his own metaphysics pronounces judgment on the critique of pure reason which was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics the other a judgment subsequent to investigation in the latter the reader is enabled to wave for a while the consequences of the critical researches that may be repugnant to his formally adopted metaphysics and first examines the grounds when those consequences are derived if what common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably certain as for instance the theorems of geometry the former way of judging would hold good for if the consequences of certain principles are repugnant to established truths these principles are false and without further inquiry to be repudiated but if metaphysics does not possess a stock of indisputably certain synthetical propositions and should it even be the case that there are a number of them which though among the most species are by their consequences in mutual collision and if no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical synthetical propositions is to be met within it then the former way of judging is not admissible but the investigation of the principles of the critique must precede all judgments as to its value on a specimen of a judgment of the critique prior to its examination this judgment is to be found in the Gurtikishin-Gelettin Onsykin supplement to the third division of January 19, 1782 pages 40 and on when an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and endeavors to present his independent reflections in its elaboration falls into the hands of a reviewer who in his turn is keen enough to discern the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the book rests who does not cling to words but goes to the heart of the subject sifting and testing more than the mere principles which the author takes as his points of departure the severity of the judgment may indeed displease the latter but the public does not care as it gains thereby and the author himself may be contented as an opportunity of correcting or explaining his positions is afforded to him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge in such a manner that if he believes himself fundamentally right he can remove in time any stone of offense that might hurt the success of his work I find myself with my reviewer in quite another position he seems not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which successfully or unsuccessfully I have been occupied it is either impatience at thinking out a lengthy work or vexation at a threatened reform of a science in which he believed he had brought everything to perfection long ago or what I am unwilling to imagine real narrow mindedness that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts beyond his school metaphysics in short he passes impatiently in review a long series of propositions by which without knowing their premises we can think nothing intersperses here and there his censure the reason of which the reader understands just as little as the propositions against which it is directed and hence his report can either serve the public nor damage me in the judgment of experts I should for these reasons have passed over this judgment altogether where it not that it may afford me occasion for some explanations which may in some cases save the readers of these prologamina from a misconception in order to take a position from which my reviewer could most easily set the whole work unfavorable light without venturing to trouble himself with any special investigation he begins and ends by saying quote this work is a system of transcendent or as he translates it of higher idealism and quote a glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that I had to expect much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or heard of geometry having euclid and coming upon various figures in turning over its leaves were to say on being asked his opinion of it the work is a textbook of drawing the author introduces a peculiar terminology in order to give a dark incomprehensible directions which in the end teach nothing more than what everyone can affect by a fair natural accuracy of I etc let us see in the meantime what sort of an idealism it is through my whole work although it does not by a long way constitute the soul of the system the dictum of all genuine idealists from the eliotic school to Bishop Barkley is contained in this formula all cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion and only in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth end quote the principle that throughout determines my idealism is on the contrary all cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion and only in experience is there truth but this is directly contrary to idealism proper how came I then to use this expression for quite an opposite purpose and how came my reviewer to see it everywhere the solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work if the reader had only desired to do so space and time together with all that they contain are not things nor qualities in themselves but belong merely to the appearances of the latter up to this point I am one in confession with the above idealists but these and amongst them more particularly Barkley regarded space as a mere empirical presentation that like the phenomenon it contains is only known to us by means of experience or perception together with its determinations I on the contrary prove in the first place that space and also time which Barkley did not consider and all its determinations a priori can be cognized by us because no less than time it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same and therefore all its phenomena possible it follows from this that as truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria experience according to Barkley can have no criteria of truth because its phenomena according to him have nothing a priori at their foundation once it follows that they are nothing but sheer illusion whereas with us space and time in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding prescribed their law to all possible experience a priori and at the same time afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein my so called properly critical idealism is of quite a special character in that it subverts the ordinary idealism and that through it all cognition a priori even that of geometry first receives objective reality which without my demonstrated ideality of space and time could not be maintained by the most zealous realists this being the state of the case I could have wished in order to avoid all misunderstanding to have named this conception of mine otherwise but to alter it all together was impossible it may be permitted me however in future as has been above intimated to term it the formal or better still the critical idealism to distinguish it from the dogmatic idealism of Barkley and from the skeptical idealism of Descartes beyond this I find nothing further remarkable in the judgment of my book the reviewer criticizes here and there makes sweeping criticisms a mode prudently chosen since it does not betray one's own knowledge or ignorance a single criticism in detail had it touched the main question as is only fair would have exposed it may be my error or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into this species of research it was moreover not a badly conceived plan in order at once to take from readers who are accustomed to form their conceptions of books from newspaper reports the desire to read the book itself to pour out in one breath a number of passages in succession torn from their connection and their grounds of proof and explanations in which must necessarily sound senseless especially considering how antipathetic they are to all school metaphysics to exhaust the readers patients ad nauseam and then after having made me acquainted with the sensible proposition that persistent illusion is truth to conclude with the crude paternal moralization to what end then the quarrel with accepted language to what end and whence the idealistic distinction a judgment which seeks all that is characteristic of my book first supposed to be metaphysically heterodox and a mere innovation of the nomenclature proves clearly that my would be judge has understood nothing of the subject and in addition has not understood himself my reviewer speaks like a man who has conscious of important and superior insight which he keeps hidden for I am aware of nothing recent with respect to metaphysics that could justify his tone but he should not withhold his discoveries from the world for there are doubtless many who like myself have not been able to find in all the fine things that have for long past been written in this department anything that has advanced the science by so much as a finger breath we find indeed the giving a new point to definitions the supplying of lame proofs with new crutches the adding to the crazy quilt of metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern but all this is not what the world requires the world is tired of metaphysical assertions it wants the possibility of the science the sources from which certainty therein can be derived and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth to this the critic seems to possess a key otherwise he would never have spoken out in such a high tone but I am inclined to suspect that no such requirement of the science has ever entered his thoughts for in that case he would have directed his judgment to this point and even a mistaken attempt in such an important matter would have won his respect if that be the case we are once more good friends he may penetrate as deeply as he likes into metaphysics without anyone hindering him only as concerns that which lies outside metaphysics its sources which are to be found in reason he cannot form a judgment that my suspicion is not without foundation is proved by the fact that he does not mention a word about the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori the special problem upon the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly rests and upon which my critique as well as the present one entirely hinges the idealism he encountered and which he hung upon was only taken up in the doctrine as the sole means of solving the above problem although it received its confirmation on other grounds and hence he must have shown either that the above problem does not possess the importance I attribute to it even in these prologomena or that by my conception of appearances it is either not solved at all or can be better solved in another way but I do not find a word of this in the criticism the reviewer then understands nothing of my work and possibly also nothing of the spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself and is not what I would rather assume the hurry of a man and sense that the labor of plotting through so many obstacles that through an unfavorable shadow over the work lying before him and made its fundamental features unrecognizable there is a good deal to be done before a learned journal it matters not with what care its writers may be selected can maintain its otherwise well merited reputation in the field of metaphysics as elsewhere other sciences and branches of knowledge have their standard mathematics has it in itself history and theology in profane or sacred books natural science and the art of medicine in mathematics and experience jurisprudence in law books and even matters of taste in the examples of the ancients but for the judgment of the thing called metaphysics the standard has yet to be found I have made an attempt to determine it as well as its use what is to be done then until it be found when works of this kind have to be judged of if they are of a dogmatic character one may do what one likes no one will play the master over others here for long before someone else appears to deal with them in the same manner if however they are critical in their character not indeed with reference to other works but to reason itself so that the standard of judgment cannot be assumed but has first of all to be sought for then though objection and blame may indeed be permitted yet a certain degree of leniency is indispensable since the need is common to us all and the lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed attitude of judge unwarranted in order however to connect my defense with the interest of the philosophical commonwealth I propose a test which must be decisive as to the mode whereby all metaphysical investigations may be directed to their common purpose this is nothing more than what formerly mathematicians have done in establishing the advantage of their methods by competition I challenge my critic to demonstrate as is only just an a priori grounds in his way a single really metaphysical principle asserted by him being metaphysical it must be synthetic and cognized a priori from conceptions but it may also be any one of the most indispensable principles as for instance the principle of the persistence of substance or of the necessary determination of events in the world by their causes if he cannot do this in silence however is confession he must admit that as metaphysics without apodactic certainty of propositions of this kind is nothing at all its possibility or impossibility must before all things be established in a critique of the pure reason thus he is bound either to confess that my principles and the critique are correct or he must prove their invalidity but as I can already foresee that confidently as he has hitherto on the certainty of his principles when it comes to a strict test he will not find a single one in the whole range of metaphysics he can bring forward I will concede to him an advantageous condition which can only be expected in such a competition and will relieve him of the onus probandi by laying it on myself he finds in these prolegomena and in my critique chapter on the thesis and antithesis of the four antinomies the three propositions of which two and two contradict one another but each of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics by which it must either be accepted or rejected although there is not one that has not in this time been held by some philosopher now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these a propositions at his pleasure and accepting it without any proof of which I shall make him a present but only one for waste of time will be just as little to him as to me and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition if I can save this one and at the same time show that according to principles which every dog medic metaphysics must necessarily recognize the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly proved it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing not to be explained much less set aside until we ascend to its birthplace pure reason itself and thus my critique must either be accepted or a better one take its place it must at least be studied which is the only thing I now require if, on the other hand I cannot save my demonstration then a synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent then also I will deem my impeachment of ordinary metaphysics as unjust and pledge myself to recognize his stricture on my critique as justified although this would not be the consequence by a long way to this end it would be necessary it seems to me that he should step out of his incognito otherwise I do not see how it could be avoided then instead of dealing with one I should be honored by several problems coming from anonymous and unqualified opponents proposals as to an investigation of the critique upon which a judgment may follow I feel obliged to the honored public even for the silence with which it for a long time favored my critique for this proves at least a postponement of judgment and some supposition that in a work leaving all beaten tracks and striking out on a new path in which one cannot at once perhaps so easily find one's way something may perchance lie from which an important but at present dead branch of human knowledge may derive new life and productiveness hence may have originated a solicitude for the as yet tender chute lest it be destroyed by a hasty judgment a test of a judgment delayed for the above reasons is now before my eye in the Gautier-Schengallet in Saitung the thoroughness of which every reader will himself perceive from the clear and unperverted presentation of a fragment of one of the first principles of my work without taking into consideration my own suspicious praise. And now I propose since an extensive structure cannot be judged of as a whole from a hurried glance to test it piece by piece from its foundations so thereby the present prolegomena may fitly be used as a general outline with which the work itself may occasionally be compared. This notion if it were founded on nothing more than my conceit of importance such as vanity commonly attributes to one's own productions would be immodest and would deserve to be repudiated with disgust but now the interests of speculative philosophy have arrived at the point of total extinction while human reason hangs upon them with inextinguishable affection and only after having been ceaselessly deceived does it vainly attempt to change this into indifference. In our thinking age it is not to be supposed that many deserving men would use any good opportunity of working for the common interest of the more and more enlightened reason if there were only some hope of attaining the goal. Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality etc. do not completely fill the soul. There is always a space left over reserved for pure and speculative reason the faculty of which prompts us to seek in boundaries, buffooneries, and mysticism for what seems to be employment and entertainment but what actually is mere pastime in order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason which in accordance with its nature requires something that can satisfy it and not merely subserve other ends or the interests of our inclinations. A consideration therefore which is concerned only with reason as it exists for itself has as I may reasonably suppose a great fascination for everyone who has attempted thus to extend his conceptions and I may even say a greater than any other theoretical branch of knowledge for which he would not willingly exchange it because here all other cognitions and even purposes must meet and unite themselves in a whole. I offer therefore these prolegomena as a sketch and textbook for this investigation and not the work itself. Although I am even now perfectly satisfied with the latter as far as contents, order, and mode of presentation and the care that I have expended in weighing and testing every sentence before writing it down are concerned for it has taken me years to satisfy myself fully not only as regards the whole but in some cases even as to the sources of one particular proposition yet I am not quite satisfied with my exposition in some sections of elements. As for instance in the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding or in that on the pyrologisms of pure reason because a certain diffuseness takes away from their clearness and in place of them what is here said in the prologomena respecting these sections may be made the basis of the test. It is the boast of the Germans that where steady and continuous industry are requisite they can carry things farther than nations. If this opinion be well founded, an opportunity of business presents itself the successful issue of which we can scarcely doubt in which all thinking men can equally take part though they have hitherto been unsuccessful in accomplishing it and in thus confirming the above good opinion. But this is chiefly because the science in question is of so peculiar a kind that it can be at once brought to completion into that enduring state that it will never be able to be brought in the least degree farther or increased by later discoveries or even changed leaving here out of account adornment by greater clearness in some places or additional uses and this is an advantage no other science has or can have because there is none so fully isolated and independent of others and which is concerned with the faculty of cognition, pure and simple and the present moment seems moreover not to be unfavorable to my expectation for just now in Germany no one seems to know wherewith to occupy himself apart from the so called useful sciences so as to pursue not mere play but a business possessing an enduring purpose to discover the means how the endeavors of the learned may be united in such a purpose I must leave to others in the meantime it is my intention to persuade anyone merely to follow my propositions or even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so but attacks, repetitions limitations or confirmation completion and extension as the case may be should be appended if the matter be but investigated from its foundation it cannot fail that a system albeit not my own shall be erected there shall be a possession for future generations for which they may have reason to be grateful it would lead us too far here to show what kind of metaphysics may be expected when only the principles of criticism have been perfected and how because the old false feathers have been pulled out she need by no means appear poor and reduced to an insignificant figure but may be in other respects richly and respectably adorned but other and great uses which would result from such a reform strike one immediately the ordinary metaphysics had its uses and that it sought out the elementary conceptions of the pure understanding in order to make them clear through analysis and definite by explanation in this way it was a training for reason in whatever direction it may be turned but this was all the good it did service was subsequently effaced when it favored conceit by venturesome assertions sophistry by subtle distinctions and adornment and shallowness the ease with which it decided the most difficult problems by means of a little school wisdom which is only the more seductive the more it has the choice on the one hand of taking something from the language of science and on the other from that of popular discourse thus being everything to everybody but in reality nothing at all by criticism however a standard is given to our judgment whereby knowledge may be with certainty distinguished from pseudoscience firmly founded being brought into full operation in metaphysics a mode of thought extending by degrees its beneficial influence over every other use of reason at once infusing into it the true philosophical spirit but the service also that metaphysics performs for theology by making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation thereby assuring it completely against the attacks of all such opponents is certainly not to be valued lightly for ordinary metaphysics although it promised the latter much advantage could not keep this promise and moreover by summoning speculative dogmatics to its assistance did nothing but arm enemies against itself mysticism which can prosper in a rationalistic age only when it hides itself behind a system of school metaphysics under the protection of which it may venture to rave with the semblance of rationality is driven from this its last hiding place by critical philosophy last but not least it cannot be otherwise than important to a teacher of metaphysics to be able to say with universal ascent that which he expounds is science and that thereby genuine services will be rendered to the common wheel end of prologamana to any future metaphysics by a manual found translated by Paul Karras