 sections 130 to 144 of Berkeley's treatise. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. sections 130 to 144 of a treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I, by George Berkeley. Of late the speculations about infinities have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples of disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content withholding that less finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts, or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on add infinitim. These I say assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, etc., without ever coming to an end, so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity add infinitim of parts. Others there will be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all, thinking it, with good reason, absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet, on the other hand, it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube, or other power of a positive real root should itself be nothing at all, which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain. Have we not, therefore, reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our principles, that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of speculative mathematics may be paired off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw off their thoughts from those amusements and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners. It is besaid that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it. I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible. Nay, it will be evident that this is never done, it being impossible. By what we have premised it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise, and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful principles from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, have been shown to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious of enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinkable things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature. But on the contrary, a great many inexplicable difficulties arise. If the supposition of matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason, if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretense of infinites being incomprehensible, if with all the removal of this matter be not attended with the least evil consequence, if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay, much easier conceived without it, if lastly both skeptics and atheists are forever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to reason and religion, many things we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as in hypothesis, and the existence of matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning are rejected as useless. But how great a prejudice so ever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labor of study and make human sciences far more clear, compendious, and attainable than they were before. Having dispatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of ideas, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of spirits, with regard to which perhaps human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is not our having an idea of it. But surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it is not perceived the idea of spirit. If it is manifestly impossible there should be any idea. And this, if I mistake not, has been demonstrated in Section 27, to which I shall here add that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support wherein unthinkable beings or ideas can exist, but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense, as some have imagined, proper to know substances with all, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much skepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects. And it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives. This and this alone constitutes the signification of the term. If, therefore, it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived, whereas a soul or spirit is an active being whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirits and idea. C. 27. In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit, that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we supposed to be resemblances of them, so we know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that sense is the image or idea of them, it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another. It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation, even by the infinite power of the Creator, who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed, who hold the soul of a man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishable and corruptable as the body, since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture so ever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more distant and heterogenous from them than light is from darkness. We have shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be planer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies, and which is what we mean by the course of nature cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance. Such a being, therefore, is indissoluble by the force of nature. That is to say, the soul of man is naturally immortal. After what has been said it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of an idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them, and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of, I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so. But yet it can do sith to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be remarked that, all relations, including an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if in the modern way the word idea is extended to spirits and relations and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern. It will not be a mist to add that the doctrines of abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure, which are particularly confersen about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them presended as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distraction and disputes amongst the learned. But nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul. This infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily is that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence and morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves and attentively consider their own meaning. End of sections 130 to 144. Sections 145 to 156 of Barclay's Treatise This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Carmanchester 2009. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part 1. By George Barclay. 145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes and combinations of ideas that inform me there are certain particular agents like myself which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas. But depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself as effects or concomitant signs. 146. But though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to everyone that those things which are called the works of nature, that is the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by or dependent on the wills of men. There is therefore some other spirit that causes them, since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. C. 29. But if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never enough admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites and passions of animals, I say if we consider all these things and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes, one eternal, infinitely wise, good and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid spirit, quote, who works all in all, end quote, and quote, by whom all things consist, end quote. 147. Hence it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men, because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that spirit who is the author of nature. For it is evident that in effecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body. But that such a motion should be attended by or excite any idea in the mind of another depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, quote, upholding all things by the word of his power, end quote, maintains that intercourse between spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other, and yet this pure and clear light which enlightens everyone is itself invisible. 148. It seems to be a great pretense of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see him, say they, as we see a man? We should believe that he is, and believing, obey his commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the sovereign Lord of all things with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow creatures. Not that I imagine we may see God, as some will have it, by a direct and immediate view, or see corporeal things, not by themselves but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is I must confess to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning. A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense as not being an idea. When, therefore, we see the color, size, figure and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds, and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man, if by a man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives and thinks as we do. But only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like ourselves accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God. All the difference is that whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, with the so ever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the divinity. Everything we see, hear, feel or any wise perceive by sense being a sign or effect of the power of God, as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men. 149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to anyone that is capable of the least reflection than the existence of God or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, quote, in whom we live and move and have our being, end quote. That the discovery of this great truth which lies so near and obvious to the mind should be attained by the reason of so very few is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem as it were blinded with excess of light. 150. But, you will say, hath nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But if by nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresent and infinite perfection of God, but it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to nature. Quote, the Lord he callseth the vapours to ascend, he maketh lightnings with rain, he bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures. End quote, Jeremiah chapter 10 verse 13. Quote, he turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night. End quote, Amos chapter 5 verse 8. Quote, he visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers. He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with his goodness, so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn. End quote, C. Psalm 65. But notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind and thinking deputy in his stead, though, if we may believe St. Paul, quote, he be not far from every one of us. End quote. 151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an almighty agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated, and superintended by a spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from section 62, it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner, which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature, that whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. Quote, verily, end quote, saith the Prophet. Quote, Thou art a God that hideest thyself, end quote. Isaiah chapter 45 verse 15. But though the Lord conceal himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind, nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an all-wise spirit who fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear from what we have elsewhere observed that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose. It were even impossible that there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See section 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may then arise? 152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence to the author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed, a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains in industry may be esteemed wisdom. But we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machines of an animal or vegetable cost the great creator any more pains and trouble in its production than a pebble does. Nothing being more evident than that the omnipotent spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fear or act of his will. Hence it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of his power. 153 As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world pursuant to the general laws of nature and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensable necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take for instance the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts and account it evil. Whereas if we enlarge our view so as to comprehend the various ends, connections and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom and the design with which we are put into the world, we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good when considered as linked with the whole system of beings. 154 From what has been said it will be manifest to any considering person that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of atheism or the Manichaean heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity or will not be at the pains to comprehend. But those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought and are with all use to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of wisdom and goodness that shine throughout the economy of nature. But what truth is there which shine us so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought a willful shutting of the eyes we may not escape seeing it? It is therefore to be wondered at if the generality of men who are ever intent on business or pleasure and little use to fix or open the eye of their mind should not have all that conviction and evidence of the being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures. 155 We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth, and yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure who live in Christian countries are merely through a supine and dreadful negligence sunk into atheism. Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness and justice of that almighty spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of his laws, we ought therefore earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points, that so we may attain conviction without all scruple, quote, that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good, that he is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on, end quote, that he is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts, and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on him, a clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to virtue and the best guard against vice. 156 For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of God and our duty. Which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual, if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the presence of God. And having shunned the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature. The end of a treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part 1