 We'll talk about why the Russians like Putin. We'll talk about the legacy of Madeleine Albright. We'll talk about why study history. And it's the third show with my new friend, Matthew. So he's a PhD student at the London School of Economics in history. So Matt, let's start off. What are your thoughts about the ongoing war in Ukraine? Is it entering coming up on seven weeks now? Well, I just have to say, and people who are curious why this is can go back to our previous show, the second show. I'm not going to detail it again, but I have a personal interest in the Russian people. That's kind of my way of putting it, but I have Russians that I often care about. So this is not merely abstraction to me the way some people treat this as some kind of football game or some kind of sporting event. Let me first say my first, the first obvious thing is banal, but I think it's important as a throat clearing also conceptually, not just in terms of morality. It's around what Putin has done. It's morally wrong and illegal. In addition to that, there are highly legitimate interest Russia has in Ukraine grievances Russia has that are legitimate. For instance, since 2019, Russia has attempted through this oppression, pardon me, Ukraine has attempted through the suppression of the use of the Russian language in Ukraine to control the population. So essentially to crush and stamp out the Ukrainian identity, probably the Russian identity of a significant minority of Ukrainians in pursuit of a homogeneous nation state. These laws violate international law, which provides a right for indigenous minorities to use their language in commercial life and educational spheres and so on and all of this is is not prohibited except in very limited circumstances. And this is what Putin means by genocide. He's exaggerating. He's lying you can say, but this is what he's referring to it's a real phenomenon and a concerning phenomenon, namely trying to stamp out the heritage and identity and stories if you will this Russian Ukrainian minority. And of course we've heard a lot about NATO NATO membership and I agree with those concerns I think the analogy to the United States is is apt that we would be concerned if Russian military alliance were on our border. And furthermore, this neo Nazi element in Ukraine a small minority but a vicious minority and one that has been empowered by the state and by pro-western forces since the Maidan Revolution. These people have committed terrorism against Russians and people who are pro-Russia most notably a 2014 incident where dozens were burned alive and Maria pole. And they were not brought to justice by the government because the government has used these people as kind of cannon fodder against Russia. Obviously, most Ukrainians are not neo Nazis overwhelming majority or not. This small minority is a is a is a security risk to people who are pro-Russia or Russian in Ukraine so I think those are examples of legitimate interest Russia has and hopefully those could be part of a peace agreement. Obviously, any revanchism which Putin has talked about is completely illegitimate and immoral and doesn't belong at a 21st century I'm not excusing the invasion, the invasion was illegal crime. The revanchism is part of the motivation but they're also were legitimate interests. And that's important, because satisfying those interests could lead to a peace agreement and that's what I hope we're going to see in the coming weeks and days. Now, why do you think that put invaded it wasn't to maintain the linguistic integrity of oppressed Russians in Ukraine. Well, I think it's I don't know why he invaded I think there are many motives he stated and we have to look at those motives. He talked of. He spoke of revanchism we mentioned that that's not a legitimate. He also spoke of what he calls genocide and that is what I described the suppression of linguistic rights of Russian minority and Ukraine human rights violation attempt to basically wipe them out, not to kill them of course, but to assimilate them into Ukrainian identity. Okay, wipe out their identity. So I think he is angry about that because he sees that as an attempt to shrink the Russian sphere of influence and to shrink the tradition to shrink the traditional like gross realm of Russia, you know. I think he is concerned about that and concern, but I think we should just look at what he says he's talks about revanchism we reject this and he needs to know that this is not going to happen. He's also talked of this denazification thing and this genocide thing and I think we should do what we should have done with this woman lot and frankly before September 11 then read what he's saying and see if there's any way we can adjust our behavior and prevent. And in this case Ukraine can adjust its behavior to prevent further. I think many of these legitimate grievances are legitimate and serious, along with the war in the Donbass with NATO membership and again could serve as part of a peace agreement. So, so you make put sound a lot more reasonable than he's being portrayed in the Western news media. He is a revanchist to he wrote an article. I can't remember whether this is 2020 or 2019, or even 2021 I can't remember the year but he wrote an article. Very odd for a head of state I don't know if you're familiar with this loop but on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, where he's essentially Asian revanchism and even go so far to say at one point that in sovereignty is only possible the exercise of it with in partnership with Russia. So I think he does have revanchist and if you will like imperialistic aims as he wants Ukraine to be a kind of Belarus right so I don't think it's these two things. There can be multiple causes there can be rational causes as there are, and there can be imperialistic causes so I think it's a combination of those most likely just based on what he said, and also based on, you know, Russian public opinion Russian public opinion is was is very exercised what happened Mario Poland 2014 for example, this instance I referred to the burning alive of people by these neo-Nazis they're also concerned about the Ukrainianization Ukrainianization I don't know how the Holy Sand English of ethnic minorities there so I think he is concerned about all this he's concerned about the legitimate things and the illegitimate things and the hope I have is that legitimate concerns he has could be satisfied as part of a peace agreement. And of course that peace agreement would have to also respect, give Ukrainian some security assurance is this will happen again. I'm not blind to that concern. So, you seem to look at this invasion primarily moral terms is that there. I think there's two dimensions to it I think there's the moral terms, which I am sympathetic to what people are saying in this regard, kind of normie discourse about these suffering Ukrainians. And then I think there's a realism. And also a question of rationalistic motivations of motivations that could be could be satisfied as part of a peace agreement so I would say I have the moralistic we but I also want peace and I think the current discourse is highly destructive. And so far as it's, so I'm kind of contradicting myself a bit but the discourse and so it's so moralistic, Putin is Hitler right. Yes, common media trope that this is actually an impediment to peace. I think Biden President Biden has not been productive in this and I'm disappointed actually because on foreign policy at least he seemed to me so far to be a less kind of moralistic, more balanced character. Like, out of control essentially. I mean, he's talking about regime change and so on. I think the print French President Macron, and also everyone of Turkey have provided much more constructive diplomatic roles, trying to bring about a peaceful solution. And I think more or less and can get in the way of that because diplomacy involves respect diplomacy involves pragmatism. You can't be highly moralistic and be an effective diplomat. And there's no rational reason to believe that if there was a regime change in Russia that the new regime would be more pro-western and more peaceful. The geopolitics of the situation lends itself to to Russia that has serious complex of interest with the West and with Ukraine and with many of its neighbors. I understand to the 1990s was the era in which Russia had the most pro-western presidents, basically handed over their economic policy to Western economic ideologies, and with privatization schemes poverty peaked around 40% of the end of the 1990s GDP This was a much less prosperous Russia. I'm not talking about the Soviet Union because that's obviously bigger. I'm talking about just the land of the Russian Federation, much less prosperous in the late 1990s, then under communism in the late 80s, and also much, much, much less than under Putin in the mid to late 2000s. I think that segues into one question into two issues. Why do the Russians not like America? They don't dislike Americans, why are they skeptical of the United States and why is Putin relatively popular? I don't know how popular he is now. I think the war probably has to damage his popularity because it's obviously not going according to plan. Why has Putin been a popular figure? And the reason for that is very simple. I mean, the country is much more prosperous, has much less crime, and has much more of a sense of identity and pride. Now that did, when he started. So that's why. And the reason for this is of the West, in addition to history of the Cold War and so on, historical grievances related to World War Two, how they don't feel as if they've been given credit and so on. Well, the biggest reason for contemporary skepticism of the United States is, I think the 1990s being such a disaster through privatization schemes endorsed and developed by Western institutions, Western economists and so on. One thing I found surprising is how the Biden administration has had no interest in achieving a peace deal. They could have sent a letter to Putin before the invasion stated saying that there was no intention that the guarantee that Ukraine would not enter NATO. Then once the invasion started, they never talk about trying to achieve a peace deal. They're not doing anything to achieve a peace deal. They want to see Russia bleed. So it's realism, but it's very risky. It's very risky realism, because you're multiplying the chances of some kind of nuclear cataclysm. Yes. So I think the moral case for sanctions is profoundly weak. Even if you have a moral case for, let's help the Ukrainians, I agree, let's help these refugees and so on and help the country rebuild and help them now and all kinds of things. But the case for sanctions I find weak because it's collective punishment. I suspect I don't know, because Russia is taken at such a vitalitarian turn since this war began that we can't really know. But I strongly suspect most Russians are skeptical of this war. I don't know. But that's my suspicion. There haven't been credible polls done and probably aren't permitted in Russia right now given the laws and so on with going to jail if you oppose the war. But you're punishing people who oppose this, first of all, so it's collective punishment. You're punishing people who are completely innocent or anti-war. Even if you say someone's guilty, if they support the war, well you're punishing tons of innocent people because there are a lot of them are against it. And second of all, they're not going to overthrow Putin. They're patriotic people. Russians are. They're not going to overthrow the head of state if they dislike him to blanket the West with who they believe hate them rightfully so I mean look at how they're being treated Russians, but how they're being canceled. I can say it but Putin was right in that most recent speech about the canceling of Russians. No Putin supporter. I would be happy if he decided to retire tomorrow as it were. It's not going to, but I'd be happy. But he was right about that. There is deep animus and there's also the Cold Bear show, right? The Cold Bear show, the audience was like, you know, kind of trained animals almost in their reactions to things that seems to me. The Cold Bear audience was like cheering for what they believe to be bread lines in Russia. There aren't bread lines in Russia actually, but they thought there were, Cold Bear said there were, and they were like clapping, you know. That's Stephen Colbert, which show are you talking about? Stephen Colbert, yeah. It was kind of the king of the normies at this point, you know. Yes, but which show in particular are you talking about? His night show, right? Oh, you're talking about every night. Yeah, okay. Like he told his audience, his Russians are struggling economically and are in bread lines and they were like, yay, you know, like kind of weird shit live, say it is, let me know. Right, yes. Yeah. Russians are not even who are anti-Pudin to assist Western policy of overthrowing their leader on behalf of a West that hates them, that they perceive as hating them, and there's plenty of truth to that perception too. And they perceived as having stabbed them in the back many times over the decades, particularly the 1990s, you know, there was a thought that Russia would be integrated into Europe, perhaps Russia would be integrated into NATO, and that if Russia was not integrated in NATO, NATO would not expand. And also there was a thought that if we liberalize, meaning we not me, but Russia, if we liberalize our economy, our markets and our culture and our politics, it'll bring prosperity and all these promises from the West seem to have failed, you know. So there's a lot of skepticism toward the West and Russia and I think quite rightly. And where is Turkey at all this? Where do their interests lie? I just drew the Richard Spencer connection, which is rather humorous. So it's good that Richard Spencer didn't take over, didn't become the dictator of the United States and commit genocide against them because they are committed, they are engaged in a constructive role. I think they're the chief, along with the French, they're playing the chief negotiating role right now, because I haven't heard Israel. I think Turkey has a more substantive relationship with Russia and with Russia and Ukraine than Israel does. What's in Turkey's best interest, though, is a weaker Russia in Turkey's interest? Are they incentivized to crush Russia or what's in their interest? I think Turkey views both nations as important trading partners, as nations that are not antagonistic to a Turkey under Erdogan especially views its sphere of influence as the Middle East. Turkey is the only Middle Eastern country with a large powerful economy, I believe top 20 in the world, that is not relying on oil, right? Obviously Saudi Arabia, I believe, is top 20 economy in the world, but they're heavily relying on petroleum. So Turkey is able to flex itself as a Muslim country without simply being a product of one particular industry, right? Turkey has an imperial history, yet it also has a modernizing thrust. So I see Turkey as wanting to be kind of the leader of the Middle East, especially under Erdogan where they've kind of looked back toward the Middle East rather than looking at Europe, where they're kind of torn between these two poles of identity, are we European, are we Middle Eastern or whatever. But I think right now the trend is, especially under Erdogan, to concede with themselves as a Near Eastern nation, and probably the leader of the Near Eastern world, the only country with a credible economy, not totally based on petroleum, powerful military and so on. And I think they would see their prestige enhanced by broken peace agreement. Over, I think they see both nations as non antagonistic, as not in their in their desired sphere of influence, right? So they'd be happy for a piece to break out and it would boost their other ones prestige tremendously if they played a role in this. Today, I believe they were diplomats meeting and I don't know if it was anchor or Istanbul, but they were meeting in Turkey from both ends, so. And what do you think about Turkey joining the European Union that they're a member of NATO already but what about Turkey joining? I don't think the EU that is dead, I think under Erdogan, they have moved toward, they're not an Islamic country, but they're a Muslim country, if you understand my difference, they're not, they're never going to ban drinking, they're not going to ban wearing sexy clothes if you're a woman. They're never going to ban brothels even, right? They have legal prostitution in Turkey. They're never going to ban Bikini. They're not going to become Islamic in this sense, but they're, there's kind of a normative Muslim identity that could have a secular valence and could have a religious valence, but is there with Turks in general, it's in the majority under Erdogan. So you may be secular, but you still have a sense of yourself as Muslim, as a Muslim heritage of having certain Eastern sensibilities, even if you may not be super religious but you don't like the idea of insulting Islam in the public square, right? For example. So you maybe live and let live when it comes to people's personal decisions, but you know you don't want to see the denigration of religious symbols in the public sense and you see yourself as part of Ottoman Turkish civilization, so I think, you know, the EU bid is unlikely. I don't think they want that even at this point. I think there has been for a century kind of a struggle in Middle Eastern country, are we a European country and I think in the large majority they see themselves as a modernizing powerful Middle Eastern country, near Eastern country. That's how I see Turkey right now. Everyone has changed the country quite a bit, you know. Okay, what do you want to say about the death of Madeline Albright and the legacy of Clinton's foreign policy? Well, I think Albright represents an era in which liberals, kind of baby boomer liberals who grew up posing the war and loathing the military even in many cases. Bill Clinton in 1969 letter to his draft board spoke of his loathing for the military. To an RTC, he had applied to be in the University of Arkansas. He said, I can't do this because I despise the military. His anti-war, not just anti-war, but anti-military sentiments were very common in the baby boomer generation. However, and these policies persisted, albeit in diluted form, they weren't like openly anti-military and so on. You know, Jimmy Carter published, pardon me, pardoned. They have a broad amnesty to draft Dodgers, for instance. Throughout the 1980s, many Democratic governors prevented US military training drills done by the American administration from occurring in their territory, Democratic governors did. There's a skepticism of the military and war and so on. Persian Gulf War of 1991, I think really undermined this war skepticism that had emerged in Vietnam on the left, because it seemed as if it was quite justified. It was naked aggression and that occurred, meaning Iraq and Britain, Kuwait, and that the war, the actual course of war, had been relatively clean, namely the coalition expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. So I think, you know, you've got a lot more Democrats voting against this war, Joe Biden voted against this war, for example, the first Gulf War. Got a lot more Democrats were against the first Gulf War than the second Gulf War, even though the second was obviously unjustified, like insanity, you know, like obvious aggression, you know, and the first Gulf War had a pretty clear justification where there's aggression against an ally, right? So I think the first Gulf War really knocked, I think even George Herbert Walker Bush said we licked the Vietnam syndrome. And then the Clinton administration kind of finished off anti-war since abilities in the left through its extraordinary record of just the scope of the interventions they engage in was extraordinary from the Balkans to Somalia and bombing, you know, bombing campaigns of Sudan and so on. I think that the foreign policy, the aggressive foreign policy, and kind of this humanitarian liberal foreign policy, if you will, this Hopkins humanitarianism that Albright represented and Clinton represented meant the end of any kind of anti-war left, the residual anti-war left that had been so powerful in the 19th in the Vietnam era, and even persisted, as I say, in the 80s and through even the large skepticism of the first Gulf War. But by the time of the Iraq War, the second Iraq War in 2000, I can't remember where the vote was, I think the vote was 2002, the vote for the resolution. But I'm not, maybe 2003 was the vote, I'm not sure. But by this time, I think the anti-war left had been effectively liquidated thanks to Albright and her co-ideologues. So she represents in my view a kind of a kind of neocon light foreign policy where America aggressively intervenes on behalf of humanitarian causes around the world militarily. Yeah, it's from a realist perspective, it just seems so weird that Albright and the Clinton administration would be very proud that they're militarily intervening all over the world in things that are not in America's best interests. You know, they're intervening for these humanitarian ideals rather than for the country's best interests. They see it as altruistic and I see it as bad policy. And the strangest thing is, again, there was a deep skepticism of war and not just war, but the military as well among Democrats for decades and it effectively ended with the Clinton administration, the anti-war left. And there was a brief kind of rekindling of it in the late 2000s, mid to late 2000s, because the Iraq war was so painfully unjustified. I don't even think Clinton would have done the second Iraq war is insanity. Like, I mean, there was no ongoing humanitarian crisis. Of course Saddam Hussein was a monster who gassed Kurds and so on and had invaded neighbor, but this was many years ago, right? You can't just, you can't just bomb a country because the leader did terrible things, you know, a decade and a half ago doesn't make any sense. So, I mean, there was no, it was just aggression, right? The second Gulf War and the fact that, but the fact that you had large majority swimming for and so many Democrats swimming for shows I think that the anti-war left was destroyed by that because the justification for this war was so weak. The first Gulf War actually probably was the most justified war the United States has had since World War II, where you just cleanly have aggression against an ally and you expel the aggressor. It's not particularly bloody and so on. But even with this, where you had very large numbers of Democrats were against it, I think the vote was 52 to 48 for the first Gulf War. Let me look it up. And Joseph Biden, going against the first Gulf War, voted for the second, which is just bizarre, isn't it? Yeah, one of those he wrote for the first. Second one is just aggression. Yeah, and the overwhelming victory that the American forces had and the overwhelming popularity that HW Bush got from it taught Democrats a lesson so that they then were very eager not to be skeptical when the Iraq invasion came along 12 years later. Yeah, I'm just looking up the but it was 52 to see this number. It looks like 52 to 47. All right, so very close though. And again, the justification was much more compelling and still they're very strong Democratic ascent you still had this anti war. Democratic sentiment and it's having the Gulf War kills it and Clinton, you know, stomps on the corpse, you know. Now, you briefly mentioned chemical warfare Saddam Hussein gas the Kurds. I don't get why so many people think that chemical warfare such as gassing is a worse way to kill people than shooting them. I really don't see the difference. Um, you know, I think that the reason for this and I'm no expert whatever on this matter I've no I actually I don't really know why it's so particular sense of the first of all the historic memory of the use of chemical weapons in the field of the first World War involving mass extrication, I think has had a kind of salient effect in terms of people's historical memory. I also think that there's even a sense that it's on chivalrous you just did discriminately releasing gas and you're killing sold in terms of a weapon of war right in terms of a weapon of killing civilians I think it's it's the reason it's so sinister is it's it's quite efficient, and also difficult to much more difficult to track and say like like the perpetrators and say um, if you send out a squat killing squad a few people, you know. But yeah actually, I wondered about this too though I don't really know why it's considered so so much worse than you know like barrel bombs right why. It's like a red line, it's supposed to be a red line, you know, chemical weapons as opposed to using machine guns. So, right I mean like, like, like, I also did in Syria, because some are people with civilians with bombs and starvation blockades in Aleppo, then he has with with chemical weapons. Yeah, you're the 1% of Syrians have been killed by chemical weapons. You know, other means of killing them. So, yeah, I don't get why chemical weapons is a red line it just doesn't hold up rationally. Before the show, you mentioned something about the history of the Russian Federation so post Soviet Union was there anything you wanted to talk about with regard to the history of the Russian Federation. Yeah, I mean it's it's pretty vast history but in what respect, you mean like in terms of the 1990s, you talked about we can talk about why put this popular and history of Russian Federation. Yeah, the history I would just point to without getting into into to a penantic of detail is simply just that shock therapy as it were privatization the creation of the oligarch. Capitalistic institutions led to social chaos and fear and crime. And inefficiency that the Soviet system actually worked much better in the 90 if you just compare it and any macroeconomic indicator the 1980s, the Soviet system was more prosperous or efficient and so on than the kind of capitalistic if you will or corporatist Russian Federation model in 1990s. So, I think that this historical memory is important, because it articulates why there is a skepticism of Western solutions, and also why there's some nostalgia for the Soviet Union. I spoke to last summer is in Russia to a physician who said all the institution even now she's talking all the institutions ran run better now, compared to compared to the Russian compared to pardon me. All sorry all institutions ran better in the Soviet days compared to now. So, I think it also explains why Putin's more corporatist model if you will kind of authoritarian capitalism where the oligarchs are in some sense and mesh with him but some appeal to Russians. First of all, his economic pro his just the country right now is much more prosperous than it was before he started as I mentioned, poverty is way lower it's a fraction of what it was crime is way lower and so on. But secondly, I think that the kind of wild free market capitalism of the 1990s and privatization, sort of, there's a sense that this is an archic in Russia. And therefore the idea that we have one national policy yeah we have rich people these rich corrupt people people know they're corrupt obviously who are engaged in capitalism in a technical sense at least. These oligarchs. But, nevertheless, there's one broad policy, one body cannot policy determined by Putin. I think this authoritarianism is attractive to people because they see unregulated capitalism is the 1990s is an archic and dangerous, you know, and he stabilized and there's a lot of reasons they believe that if you look at simple statistics like GDP shrinking so much in the 90s poverty skyrocketing and so on unemployment, you know, you there look, Luke can't hear you. Oh, we are the room or something. No, sorry. Sorry, I don't know what happened there but You're good bro. Okay, so we're back. So what do you think Russians the least successful white people in the world. Well, I wouldn't say they are I'd say Well, they're the poorest, the poorest white people in the world. Well, Ukrainians were poor before the war. Well, dolphins were poor. Many of Eastern European countries for the Russia before the war. So I question I question the predicate the premise of the question. Okay, so why are Eastern European and Russian countries so poor. Well, ask us National Justice Party I mean they they're neo-Nazis or maybe they believe in that these are not white people at all that they're not you mentioned. No, that's not widely held. So why why Eastern Europeans and Russians, where do you think I honestly, I think institutions matter more than You know these these people on the outright say all white people be prosperous. I mean it's just not true empirically right I mean there are plenty of so called white countries in Eastern Europe that are quite poor. Ukraine, Moldova being remarkably poor, or than many Sub-Saharan Africa, the multiple countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and a per capita basis, not Russia, but Moldova and Ukraine. So I don't believe it's racially deterministic. While I don't think that it's empirically support it's not some political correctness thing I don't think it's true. I think institutions matter tremendously and liberal democratic institutions are the best for producing wealth. So pretty banal answer but I think that's what the evidence supports. Incidentally, Russians are, they're about 25. They have about three quarters of the per capita GDP of Ukrainians. Per capita basis I think you're incorrect about that. That's just what I looked up. So, I mean those are the those are the figures. On a per capita basis, Russians are. by Europe I guarantee Ukraine is poor then. I mean you're looking at are you looking at PPP or nominal GDP. I just looked up on Wikipedia. So, in this per capita GDP in Ukraine as over 14,000 in Russia's this is just 6 11,000. Okay, well, that's not nominal that's PPP, I think you're looking at because I'm looking at Wikipedia to understand to you. Like, Ukraine is definitely poorer than Russia. Even before the war. Even on a per capita basis. I mean, I'm looking at IMF, UN World Bank that this Wikipedia link has, you may be looking at PPP but that takes into account like the price of goods in a country. So, okay, yeah. Yeah, so that's that's that may be true. I'm talking about like wealth of people. I'm talking about domestic. So the problem with PPP, I don't like PPP as an indicator, because, like, simply, but I think in a globalized economy, the wealth people have is more important than how much they can get for their wealth at the local market, you know, I think PPP was more relevant 70 years ago. But if you look at just per capita GDP Russia is much higher than you're right. Yeah, yeah, you can see this but PPP may be I haven't looked at the PPP data. But, you know, I mean, if you're Russian and you're buying, if you're buying a Netflix subscription or you're buying something from Amazon, you know, very globalized economy obviously the fact that the wages are a lot higher than Ukraine or multiple, you know, that's going to be relevant right. Right. On the other hand, if you live in a poor if you live in a poor country with low prices, I mean, subjectively it may feel like you have more money now. So, why, why is the alt right so in love with with Putin, my, my, I have some theories one theory is that it just shows how out of touch with reality. People are they think that that Putin is a savior of the West or a defender of Christianity. Second, it shows people are so alienated from their own country, that anyone who's the enemy of their country is very likely a good person it's like I hate America, Putin hates America. There are many, there are many humorous parts of this so. What's funny is that Mike, Enoch, and Eric Stryker, I mean, I don't know what I think Stryker to definitely Enoch has made this point are now in fact we're saying Chessians are white. And what's funny about that. Are they why I mean I don't really care whether what the answer the question is sure they're light skin, but what's funny about that is in Russia, racist refer to Caucasians being people from the Caucasus, not like white people refer to Caucasians as blacks, like in Russia. So that is like what racist in Russia call not people in general. Sorry, racist in Russia called Caucasians blacks. It's like the slur for them. So it's just rather humorous that they're anachronistically applying their own categories of ethnicity and race to Russia was a vastly different society in the United States. One of the things that's humorous is that Putin is not a racist. He made he sees Russians ethnic Russians as we saw a public race I don't know what he believes I don't care particularly but his public statements. He does not engage in race hatred. I mean, here's what he says, essentially he conceives of Russia as a multi ethnic empire. He believes that many different ethnic groups can become citizens of Russia, which is a very different conception a more universal conception, not probably the United States, but it's a much more universalist conception of what it means to be Russian than what it means to be Polish, for example. I mean, there is a sense of which you can become Russian, you can, and immigration policy is quite liberal as well to Russia. We can be part of the Russian Empire, I think he sees it, you know. So, he's not a racist. He doesn't attack most he doesn't attack Muslims as large Muslim minority never doesn't attack I mean forces hate speech laws actually against people who demean Muslims or Caucasians or whatever. He's invested after a very bloody civil war in Cheshire he's invested disproportionately in rebuilding Grosny, which now looks like Houston. And if you look at pictures of Grosny the capital of Cheshire looks a little Dubai, but it kind of evokes to. And, you know, he also has reaffirmed a core identity of Russia is being anti Nazi anti fascist as having defeated the Nazis playing the role in defeating the Nazis. So, he would essentially be criminalizing people Nick Fuentes and, and my keynote. That's strange and he's actually going to jail for publicly espousing these views. Right. The only thing where he is, I guess, where he's sort of lines up with the far right would be the homosexuality issue right. He's actually, if you're saying oh I'm so obsessed with homosexuality I want to go after them. I guess yeah okay he, he has made it like difficult for homosexuals Russia. And he's not sympathetic to LGBT that is true. But the other stuff is just projection and wishful thinking, because again he's not a white nationalist or racist. That's a fascinating quote. I only know if he sees himself as white in some sense I don't even think he sees himself as white there was an interesting quote from the Washington Post, and that was reporting on an interview he did with discussion he had with John Kerry, and he pointed to his scan his white scan, and he said, you like you like you Americans are you Europeans because of this I'm different Russians are different. So I mean obviously he sees himself as white skin, but I don't think he sees himself as a European, you know. So this is all projection and anachronism and misunderstanding, I mean people will be imprisoned by Putin. I mean necessarily imprisoned, but they would certainly be censored, you know, far more than the world people are censoring here Seriously, like Joe Biden is not is going much easier, unlike enough and Putin goes on Russian neo nazis way easier. You know, that's, that's a quite an irony. Global Homo, as they call it right not my term, their term is way easier on them is way more respectful of their rights than Putin would be. Look, Putin has a multi ethnic multi religious empire, and he understands that the meaning sectors of the population is not an effective strategy. He's not the head of Poland, he's a state of the Russian Federation which has all these ethnic groups and religions. I mean you have Tartars Muslim, you have Caucasians mostly Muslim, you have, you know, Koreans in the Far East, you have so many different ethnic groups you have immigrants from Central Asia, who are, who are mostly Muslim, you know, Caucasians, Kazakhs, etc. Like, you cannot and they have a pretty, they also have a very liberal immigration policy. Again, I think because of their sense of themselves as an empire, not an ethno state, you know. I've been surprised by this war in many ways. One, I've been surprised at how ineffective the Russian armed forces have been. Two, I've been surprised at how effective the Ukrainians have been in fighting up for themselves. Three, I think more than anything, I am shocked at the relative unanimity in the West and how the West has come together to impose sanctions and to do not get split off because they have such tremendous Europe. Germany, countries in Europe have such tremendous energy needs. They desperately need Russian energy, and yet they have largely stood united against Russia, which has, which has shocked me. NATO was a moribund institution until a couple of months ago, and now suddenly the West and NATO seem to be relatively united. There's, there's much less gratuitous hatred on social media. I think Russian trolls have probably been banned or dialed back. So there's more unanimity in the West. There's less gratuitous hatred. The West is a much more serious place. There's less interest or emphasis on workism. What do you think? Anything that you want to talk about? Yeah, so there's, there's a part I'm worried about. There's a lot I'm worried about right now, and there's some things that are good collateral consequences. So I'll start with the bad. What I'm the first bad thing I'm worried about is, I see on this Ukraine thing, a kind of new attempt to coerce consent, where people who have dissident views on like I have, for example, on well, Russia has rational interest in the state here are equated with apologizing for the whole invasion, justifying the killing the refugee crisis and all of it, which I'm not and most people are not. I mean there's some cooks who do as we mentioned, with all right but very few people actually are justifying this and yet there is a lot of pressure that conform to a very hard line stance so I think that's wrong. I also see a lot of Russophobia, a negative kind of ethnic xenophobic prejudice against Russians, which we talked about before I'm very concerned about that. I'm also concerned that this equation of Putin to Hitler and he's so bad is a barrier to peace because if he is Hitler you fight Hitler right you don't make peace with Hitler, you know. History people read history know that. So, this I worry this level of rhetoric is instilling in Western leaders and so on, an unwillingness to negotiate because he's Hitler so he has his aims are conquest and subjugation, therefore we fight to the death. You know, he very, he very likely does have some rational aims here as I discussed, and we should at least give it a chance if you, if you had a supposed doesn't work. If there was, if you knew you're dying of cancer there's a 30% chance that some experimental procedure would cure it of course that's that's a relevant consideration you take that 30% chance. We should take a chance here and make peace here I feel like the current environment that you've referred to is a barrier to that. All that being said, one happy collateral consequence of this is that woke has been marginalized like I'd see less white man bad stuff I see less kind of extreme you know ideologies being thrown around. I'm kind of a focus on more substantive issue so that that is good but there's a lot to be concerned about to I would much rather have a revival of live the kind of liberalism we had 11 years ago Luke, as opposed to a new kind of highly, if you will, regulated discourse that isn't about woke concerns isn't about this group of people are bad because of their ancestors which is kind of walks out isn't about that stuff, or like weird cultural appropriation just things that are totally fake. So there's less of that which is good but I see us as moving toward another paradigm of highly ordered and regulated discourse to, and I see that as bad. I want to go back to a freewheeling liberalism that we had Luke, not too long ago. Well, I think from the perspective of most Westerners who pay attention the enemy has come clearly into site, particularly with with Putin talking about the use of nuclear weapons when the the enemy comes clearly into site and using the front enemy distinction in the sense that the enemy is someone who is existentially a threat to kill you. The enemy comes into site. And so that leads you to unite with your group and to to be prepared to take on the enemy and so the unity that we're seeing and the the strength and the cohesion. The, of course, the flip side of this is going to be to castigate anyone who does not fall in line. So you can't have unity and, you know, openness to free speech and free expression like each one takes takes a toll on the other the more free speech and diverse opinions you have the less unity you can have the more unity you have the less realm you have for free speech. Right. But I'm concerned about the intensity of this I want to return to a liberal dynamic as an organizers that may be that is what I think is is more conducive to innovation and dynamic and interesting society, as opposed to highly regulated discourse. I also just reject the premise that Putin is on the verge of attacking former Warsaw past states I think that's quite absurd if you look at the interest he has in Ukraine and the revenge for the terrorism he has right the idea that Ukraine is a key especially and you know balsa parts other parts of Ukraine is the key you know being the cradle of Russian civilization in his view. This isn't applied to Warsaw, right, or Lithuania or Stonia. So I really don't. I think this is just absurdly unlikely the idea that he would extend any threat to former Warsaw past it's only there's any interest and I think he's a Russian. He views Russia as the empire doesn't view. He isn't pining for a restoration of the Soviet Union and the and the block states, you know, as well. Interesting character with the National Justice Party named Charles Bausman editor of Russia insider and the the Southern Poverty Law Center did a long essay on him that he's he's part of this network of extreme far right websites that operate primarily in the United States. And he's a pro Kremlin propagandist and he's pretty, pretty close with the National Justice Party, promoting the United the right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, he seems to be on board with Mike Enoch and Eric Stryker. What do you think about this Charles Bausman character. It's a strange thing, because, look, we now from. Well, I think the Russia gates stuff has been tremendously exaggerated. We do know that the kind of Duganist ideology, promoted by networks like our team is to enable extremes in the United States, that create social division in which our politics, right. Yeah, so that's why Russia supported not Russian society I mean that's why RT gave voice to the wrong hall movement, right. That's why RT gave a platform to the all right and that's why RT gave a platform to like far left and also like black lives matter, Sean King, these people were promoted not by RT but by Russia I'm not sure about shocking specifically but black lives matter personalities were their interest is promoting extreme ideologies that undermine American cohesion. So, in terms of Enoch and Stryker I think that is probably, if there is any connection that is probably the basis of it that they see them as, if they, to the extent they become the mainstream pull as undermining the United States, right. And it's not very strange to understand why I mean they promote racial hatred against so many people in the country they demean the country regularly. I think that if Russia is through some backdoor promoting these people they're making a mistake is they're not going to go with you. Right. The Gropers may be a better target. In terms of Baozman we're speculating. He's one of two things is true he's he's either wants to be a Russian asset or he is right. If he is an asset, he isn't, but if he is an asset, he is being used to undermine the United States he isn't being used to promote neo-nazism because Russia likes it. I mean Russia lost tens of millions of people in World War Two. They don't like Nazis. Nazis are banned there. So it's not as if Russia wants to promote Nazism as an ideology. It's that they want to promote stuff that undermines America. So if there should be investing the NJP should answer questions about now is this guy just somebody who lived in Russia for a few years and then likes this extreme politics. I don't know but he has a website called Russian Center. Are there Russians funding that and then you have to ask the question, why would they fund this when Nazism is illegal Russia, right. And when, as all Russians know, as all Russians know the Nazis deliberately starved to death millions of Russian POWs saw them as racially inferior. Russians aren't their neo-nazis in Israel for guns like Russian Russia is not a country where there's sympathy to Nazism, any kind of remotely mainstream level that's why Putin is using Nazism as a propaganda. But are they promoting it here maybe but if they are it's to undermine the United States, right. That's why. Yes, I mean, I think it's fair to say that probably both the the alt right and the alt left have received some some funding from Russia because they eat. Right. Yeah. And even in the old days at the beginning of our key you may recall they always platform the Ron Palmer. Yeah. I think the idea that Russia is interested in anarcho capital it's just so laughable that they saw this as a strain that is against that is very morally opposed to US foreign policy right. So that's why they were useful. It's not that the movement had no merit, necessarily but that they were promoted because their interests coincide with Russia, and you saw that too with the alt right and and and alt left but in terms of this guy and JP that should answer the question is this guy paying you and who is he right because we know he at least asked oligarchs for money. That is established fact we don't know whether he received it. Again, if he has received it, it's, they would not pay him, because oh I'm so glad Hitler starved my grandfather to death because he thought he was so human. That's not why they pay it. They pay it because it's like oh good you're going to undermine the United States. Here's the money. So what's it like being back in the United States. I am going to have to do the rest of it just. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, take a break. Come on. Come on back and let me just play a little something here. We wait for you to come back here. You know what Tucker Carlson has to say. So for the human rights campaign, this should have been a moment of unbridled celebration. A dream come true. But it wasn't. It was a crisis. And if you don't understand why it was a crisis, then you don't live in Washington surrounded by nonprofits. So by this point, the human rights campaign had evolved from a scrappy little lobby into a prominent arm of the Democratic Party. It had a huge annual budget, an enormous headquarters building run on 17th Street downtown. So the human rights campaign may have outlived its reason for existing. On the other hand, it couldn't just disappear. There was a party to help, but there was a fundraising problem. Why would you give money to a group whose purpose has become obsolete? That was the dilemma. And they're not the first. The Women's Christian Temperance Union faced the same problem after prohibition passed in 1919. And you don't hear a lot about the Women's Christian Temperance Union anymore. HRC desperately hoped to avoid that fate. And here's the point of the story. Amazingly, through clever rebranding, they did avoid that fate. So in 2014, just before gay marriage became law, HRC's annual budget was about $57 million. That's a lot. Listen to this. By 2021, last year, that same budget had expanded to $65 million. In other words, seven years after reaching its stated goal, its reason for existing, the human rights campaign was raising even more money. A lot more. Let's get back. Let's get back down here. How they do that. Okay, just while I was in water. So what's it like being back in the United States? Well, I'm currently in College Park in Maryland for the National, the Visit National Archives for my doctorial thesis. One of the most charming aspects of being a doctoral student is the opportunities, you know, many funded to travel the archives. And I have to admit, I'm very impressed by the University of Maryland campus. I'm going to be here to look at State Department records, basically, you know, pre CIA intelligence gathering of Nash about nationalistic movements during the Second World War. So Americans were collecting intelligence about nationalistic movements in North Africa and how they had been impacted by the shift from French rule from third Republican rule to VC fascist and Nazi in the case of Tunisia rule. So I'm trying to see how this impacted nationalistic movements and the American sources will hopefully be able to shed some light on that. In addition to of course, primary Arabic sources, which I've read already, but in terms of being back in the States, I have to say it feels somewhat different. Is the feeling different for you? Like it feels a little less woke. Maybe that's because of the Ukraine thing. You have that feeling in the air? Yes. I noticed distinctly fewer homeless people when I got back from two months in Australia in the middle of January. Oh, wow. Yeah. And you're in California, right? Wow. You're in the belly of the beast. You have no civil rights if you disagree with the governor or anything, as I understand it. Life is fine. Life is good. I mean, it's got problems like everywhere, but no, it's not some totalitarian. I'm joking. I'm exaggerating to make a point. Of course, it's not a totalitarian society. I mean, the situation Russia does remind us that, yeah, we may be fired for having dissenting views. It's really the worst that is likely to happen. We're not going to go to jail, right? Yeah. And, you know, it sucks to be fired. Even there, you could work at a gas station, right? I mean, there's never been a better time to look for a job. So you really can't be complaining now. This is a fantastic time to be out there looking for a job. And every moment in history, you've had to watch what you say. There's never been a time in history where you could just say anything you wanted to and not pay a price for it. So if you recognize, I would say the United States is much less liberal than it was 15 years ago, let's say. Yeah, as much less classically liberal, but yeah, but still people pining for free speech, they confuse that with no consequences for what I say. And there has never been a time in human history where there are no consequences for what you say. But the consequences that have attended just like the statement of banal truisms, that kind of does disturb me, right? It's always been that way. There's never been a time when what you would say like, um, you and I would regard as banal truisms. There's always been times when banal truisms would get you burned at the stake. That's true, but I feel like, you know, I play poker from time to time. And I feel like these woke people are basically saying that if I have a pair of kings, and they have a pair of Queens, and I say kings are better than queens, kings win the hand. But that I can't say that, you know, it's as if I'm playing poker and can't say, well, aces be deuces, right? So the level of absurdity you're required to affirm, this strikes me as very different than recent history, you know? I mean, is it any more absurd than the teachings of the major religions for someone who's got a non-religious perspective? I mean, they don't know more, but, you know, there isn't, there hasn't been, I think the last few generations at least, been the level of pressure to espouse these doctrines in the United States than there has been recently to espouse woke doctrine. Right. There are certain absurd things for which there's much more pressure to say now. But if I thought deeply about it, you know, 30 years ago, 40 years ago, 70 years ago, I'm sure there are all sorts of absurd things that you're expected to go along with as well. I mean, I agree with this, even though I'll be called a shitload by some, many would say it's absurd that if you just were a man who wanted to have consensual sex with another man like 70 years ago, like that you were treated as if you're some serious criminal, you know? Like, and again, like, let's just the only thing this individual does them hypothesizing is he wants to have sex with another man, a doll consensually, like, and that's treated like serious criminality. In the past, at least not today, obviously, but yeah, but yeah, I just think relative to my childhood I'm being made to affirm absurd propositions at a growing rate and I'm, I'm disturbed by that. But I feel as if if you to go back to the question that the power of woke, woke tyranny, if you will, is weaker. I think the Ukraine thing has weakened it. Yes, I mean, the President Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, they both took down their preferred pronouns from their Twitter bios. Yeah, I mean, that's why would they do that other than the virtue signal? But in the fact that they did do it is disturbing because no, they're not clarifying that they're women. And the Karris is not clarifying she's female Biden is not clarifying he's male. They're just showing they're kind of bending the knee before this ideology, right? Right. But now they're unbending. Yeah, it is interesting that more serious times. I agree with you. This interesting. Now, you turn me on to a great book by Richard Evans. I didn't realize he was such a great writer. I mean, he's just he has a great writer. I mean, I read him before. I mean, just knew him from the Irving trial, but he's a great historian. He's a he's a great historian. He's a great writer. I mean, this book is a terrific read in defensive history is the short little read. It's great fun. It just packs so much into it. And I'll just start with I just selected various paragraphs. I love this book. So tell me when this seems to be true. Virtually all historians assume that the nation state was the primary object of historical study. The emerging historical profession was dominated by the view that the historians task late principally in the study of the origins and development of states and in their relations with one another. When did that cease to be true? Well, I think that cease to be true probably in the 20th century. The 19th century people believe that. Right. So maybe after maybe the 1920s is that when it started to cease to be true. Well, it was certainly not nobody would have thought in these terms by the 1950s or 40s. I think probably by the 20s and 30s. Yeah. I think by the 20s and 30, I think probably by the 20s. And again, I'm not an expert on this on like the history of historiography, if you will, but I can certainly say by the 50s and 40s nobody was thinking in these terms, very few at least so we a fringe. They're probably by the 20s. I think probably, you know, I want to say that post World War one, that the horrors of World War one probably caused a revision, a kind of moral questioning of this romanticizing of the nation state, and ethno nationalism, if you will, that had been so paramount in historiography. I think that the British especially probably rejected this earlier though, because of the, the commitment the British had a beginning in the late 19th century British scholarship philosophy to plain empiricism and banishing like sentimental ideologies, which would include obviously romantic, romantic ethno nationalism. Now, when did history cease being a very significant tool to promote ethno nationalism so I assume again 1920s in the West post World War two in Germany. Of course, I'm, you know, Germany you still have, you know, you have this through through the second world and actually during the Weimar public years you have this, I'm trying to. By Otto Brunner, a land and lordship at which I believe was which was certainly published before I'm not sure when in the Weimar years I read this book as you know master's program, but this is kind of. This is kind of asserting that implicit in medieval institutions and medieval Austrian institutions was the contemporary nation state was a contemporary German nation state this was a very famous book and I believe it was written in the 1930s when the Nazis came to power, but you know. So, the state is kind of a natural institution doesn't emerge, you know there's no emergence moment that, you know, this kind of scholarship is not going to be found in Britain in the corresponding time or the United States for example. The rhetorical use of history as a source of ethno nationalism I think you get that today in most countries outside the West certainly probably almost all right, you get that in Russia for sure. Right. And what does epistemology, the study of how we know what we know what does epistemology have to do with the profession of studying history. And I think the first epistemic challenge you have with history is to is one of classification, like what type of brand is this a branch of knowledge is a branch of humanism. Is this just a literature as postmodernist suggest. And I think the answer evidence dang gives is quite centrist, as it were. He recognizes there is a look he praises the value of craft and literature and history right and this is actually quite unique to history the idea that to write in a vivid and compelling and humane style makes one a good historian, you know, it's widely held, even if historians don't live up to it very often. And no one holds that for writing up academic paper on chemistry right. Yeah, so there are humanistic elements. It's a craft. Nevertheless, Evans wants to defend I would want to defend a scientific element to history as well in so far as, despite the power of narrative and rhetoric. There still is a veto power that the documents must have, right, your narrative is going to shape your history it's inevitable postmodernist are right about that. There should be the documents should at some point have a veto power over your narrative. Evans believes that I believe that as well. You see that in the case of David Irving, for example, with his hypothesis a Hitler is reaching out his hand to protect to protect the Jews, you know, there's just too many vetoes as it were of that view by the documents for to be credible. Let me read a little bit here from Richard Evans said already before 1914 the ability of the scientific method to deliver a neutral and value free history was under doubt credibility was even more severely shaken by the events of 1914 to 18 and their aftermath. Professional historians in every country rushed into print with elaborate defenses of the war aims of their own governments denunciations of other great powers for having begun the conflict. Substantial collections of documents on the origins of the war were produced, though the usual scholarly paraphernalia and edited by reputable professionals, but on principles of selection that seem manifestly biased to colleagues in other countries. So the rigorous scientific training which they had undergone seem to have had no effect at all in inculcating a properly neutral and objective attitude to the past. The view was underlined as the 1920s progressed by the continuing violent controversies between extremely learned and scholarly historians about the origins of the war. Any thoughts. And I also think that the reaction to the First World War and historiography shows that the power of narrative right because it presents a challenge to history because you have so many different accounts of who is responsible. This Fisher, and the Fisher I'd still kind of a very politically if you will, powerful normative faction in Germany saying no Germany is to blame for the First World War Germany must be because of the Sondervegg theory of history that the German state was inevitably leading to the crimes and aggressions of Nazism. So I have Sean McMeek with a more recent polemical treatment with some with some kernels of truth, I'd say, even though I'm not a fan of his work attributing the war or guilt to Russia to the Russian Empire. Christopher Clark's recent book saying sleepwalkers like broadly attributing blame so you don't have excellent book by the way by Christopher Clark called sleepwalkers about the origins of the First World War. So it does seem to illustrate power of narratives and call into question the role of documents and such a seminal event with so much data that we can't come to any kind of consensus. Although I think there are some consensus is that Britain in France were not the primary guilty parties. Maybe it was Germany, maybe it was Russia as well, maybe it was Serbia as well. But even here there are some limits right so I think the the record of historiography shows that consensus is often hard and narrative is so powerful. Politics is so powerful, but nevertheless documents do should and do have a sort of veto over historians. Can that be overpowered politics not always, but if the data is compelling enough, it often can. And I think the historiographical record shows that. I mean look at the second World War there isn't really dissent. There isn't significant dissent although you had Sean McMeek and the guy just mentioned he blames the USSR for the second World War with very absurd book and several of the icebreaker hypothesis. Which was that Putin was just itching to invade all of Europe. Stalin was yeah. I mean yeah it's a very bad book. I mean the Germans the documents of Hitler, first of all goes back to mine conference vitus book is Quaving for Laban's realm. There's zero evidence like I mean zero of the general staff of the very much and Hitler believing that the Russians are about to immediately invade. Maybe said that publicly but no private statements and in 1940, a year before Barbara Rosa, he's already asking his generals to draw up plans to invade Russia so it's a silly basis. I think that shows that there, you know, there is a sense in which the documents can overcome prejudices. I think conscientious historians have that. Now, in cases where the evidence is rather ambiguous I think narrative does overpower evidence, I do. Yeah, I think evidence is right like the evidence matters but narrative matters to the challenges of postmodernist cannot be literally dismissed we can't go back to Leopold von Ronke who Evans mentions a lot in this book is kind of the founder of the modern historical method, which places so much emphasis on documentary evidence and the authentication of documents you know and the evidence in the context like Rocky and methodology is still roughly what historians do, right. But we certainly reject Ron cause certainty, if you will, about the value of historical methods, right. We know narrative matters to tremendously. Go ahead. Yeah, I was just going to read a little bit more from Richard. Oh yeah. Most historians have always believed the establishment of general laws to be alien to the enterprise in which they are engaged is clearly differentiates them sharply from natural scientists. So occasionally you run into historians who try to establish general laws of history and how people operate but that tends to be inimical in general to the profession of historian. Yeah, it's a very fringe view that they're like the Hegelian view of history is rather fringe. I think Ronka is sometimes who did believe in these universal laws and who Evans mentions. I think Ronka and I think Evans has a kind of charitable and accurate understanding of Ronka Ronka wasn't saying that their universal laws apply to each epoch of history he basically is saying that there are there's a site guys there's a spirit of times right there are what we call universal principles or tendencies relative to a time and a place so abstraction shouldn't dignify necessarily the term law but abstractions like this is the age of XYZ can be useful analytical useful but they have to be provisional and local they can't be universal right. But you can say this age was tending toward that value. This age was tamed toward liberalism right or industrialization I think, I think Ronka is often kind of strong man, if you will. And I think that the laws is much too strong. Yeah, he's correct. Law is much too strong of a term. Although I think tealows, you could apply a kind of reformed Hegelianism in a local time space limited sense, and it can be useful in this way. But in terms of universal laws that I think hardly no one believes that. Yeah, anyone. Yeah, there's a little bit more from Richard Evans. Nor does history enable one to predict revolutions historians notoriously failed to predict for example the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. History's role was to understand the past. Very few historians have shared this idea that you can then shape and predict the future through through the study of history you can't really use the past as a basis for concrete predictions you don't find historians making many predictions. History differentiates history from, you know, many sciences where the deductive method is that in science is courts, a core application of it is being able to predict future events right so much of accuracy in history. History can't do it although I think history doesn't part a certain wisdom, I think. Here's what I'd say and I can't quantify this I think Evans agrees with this, when he says in the book that knowledge of history can give someone a kind of prudential judgment that can lead to predictions of what is possible, you know, I think likely is too strong but what is possible I think is is a good thing to say. The term he uses is warnings, historians can give warnings under X conditions and Y can happen. That's probably a sufficiently humble term but I do think knowledge of the past does give insight to the future I think that's true I think human events are so complicated that the knowledge is crude and limited but I want to think there is some practical ability for history to predict the future, although that's questionable where history is most valuable is actually understanding the present right, understanding the present it's highly useful. If you're trying to understand, you know, why Russians, why Russians don't like Nazis. That's something you look at history like the genocidal policies and Nazis had against the Russians. So I think understanding history helps to understand the present, but to predict the future. It's dubious, but I think, I think he gives insights but I can't be sure, and I can't quantify that either. And so social scientists generally speaking they they frequently they form hypotheses, and if the hypothesis is useful, it has explanatory and predictive power for example. So Kevin McDonald said about his own hypotheses about the Jews that didn't really have predictive power which which it didn't it didn't. His his cultural critique analysis didn't have either predictive or analytical power. But for example much of the international relations theory propounded by a John Miersheimer is incredibly useful for understanding events going on around us and also understanding what's coming down the pike. But the fact is that while a chemist knows in advance the result of mixing two elements in a crucible, the historian has no such advanced knowledge of anything. And he's not really trying to gain such knowledge. No, I mean the aim of it, and I don't think ever makes this point what is the aim of history second, it looks kind of epistemology history, but the aim of history in my view is artistic. The methods are both artistic and scientific. Right. So the method like observation source criticism. You can even look at videos and so on. There's a method is empirical and artistic and humanistic. The aim is is mostly artistic, I think that there's some kind of aesthetic value and humanistic value in understanding what happened to prior and telling the stories of prior generations of human beings. On the other hand, I think, as I say, knowledge of history can provide us lots of insight for what's going on in the world today, because narratives about history and history itself do affect the present world quite profoundly. I remember in 1988, whereas heading off to UCLA, and there was this book that was just widely, widely discussed, and it was all over the newspapers and the magazines, it was called the rise and fall of the great powers by Yale historian Paul Kennedy. And this was a profoundly researched, carefully argued study of the great powers over the past 500 years that argued there was a patent in modern history according to which wealthy states created empires, but then eventually overstretched their resources and declined. And the book had a wealth of historical detail, but it attracted attention, not because of its learned demonstrations for the reasons for the failure of the Hubsburg Empire to achieve European domination the 16th and 17th centuries. But because of its conclusion, the United States would be unable to sustain its global hegemony far into the 21st century. So this is 1988 time when US President Ronald Reagan was about to ride off into the sunset. So this gloomy prophecy struck a deep vein of anxiety in the American people, and the book became a best seller overnight. So it was written in 1987. The book also made the point of arguing the Soviet Union was not close to collapse, and that Japan was on a trajectory to overtake the United States as the most powerful nation in the world. So within a few years, all of his prophecies were completely confounded. The Soviet Union had collapsed, not in the international war, which Kennedy had argued was the inevitable trigger for such processes. But because of internal disintegration, the war hegemony of the United States was more assured than ever in the economic boom of the 1990s US showed a few sides of suffering from the imperial overstretch which poor Kennedy prophesied. So in the first seven chapters of his book, this historian writing is a story and produced, you know, interesting instructive workable generalizations about the rise and fall of international superpowers in the relationship of economic and military strength. So if Kennedy had stopped there, his book would not have attracted the attention it did and it would not have sold so many copies, but it would have been good history. As soon as he turned his generalizations into laws and use them to prophesy the future, he ran into trouble. Any thoughts? Yeah. I mean, look, what I, again, what I think, look, what Kennedy did is he essentially was operating in the vein of this rather odd book was operating as a 19th century historian, right. He was, he was operating deductively, right, he was deducing these grand abstract historical laws and have deductively applying them to contemporary contemporary nation states and making sweeping predictions about them and he looks quite silly in retrospect. The, I just think he is overstaying the predictive power of history and greatly exaggerating it. The predictive power, I think it's some enhancement, if you will, of one's predictive powers, as I said, through knowledge of history, but this must be presented in a tepid way, in an equivocal way, in a bashful way, and that's not what Kennedy did in his book, certainly. Now, this is also a rule for life. Much of what will get you success and attention is not true and not valid and not good. So this, this dilemma of, you know, saying things that are nonsensical will often bring you attention and an audience and more income. I mean, like you mentioned McDonald, no one would know what McDonald was if he hadn't written about such a provocative topic. Right. He makes the living off of Jew theories, I suppose, right. So I mean, as a live streamer, you know, I love having 1000 live viewers like I've had that and it's absolutely intoxicating. It's fun. I love, love making money from doing this. But I don't get 1000 live viewers having this sort of discussion. I get 1000 live viewers having. If you talk about McDonald's nonsense, you get far more. Yeah. If you just, and more still if you pretend to believe it, you know. Yeah. Yeah, I mean, the type of material that attracts a large audience to a live stream is not usually based on the quality of the show. Simple and far reaching. I think I think the best appeals people is something simple, but that is far reaching implications. And McDonald is an example of that. So the two thing is absurd but simple. And it has far reaching implications that explains the demise of Western civilization history right. It explains the social acceptance of homosexuality of liberal immigration policy. So, yeah, I mean, and it doesn't have all of these qualifications. And reservations and insecurities, you know, and Richard Evans quotes three American historians saying history is much more than a branch of letters to be judged only in terms of its literary merit. I think that's a good point. I agree with that. The accuracy of historical of historical arguments matters as well, the possibility of them and the ability of the unconsciousness of the historian matters and so far as he is abiding by the field standards of source criticism and the use of sources that for example, David Irving, he writes in a very vivid, compelling fashion. He's a great writer actually. He doesn't divide by these norms. So he writes exciting books, but he doesn't write, at least as far as Hitler's concern, he doesn't write good history, you know, or Holocaust concern. He doesn't write good history because it doesn't it doesn't abide by the well defined fairly well defined standards of document review in the discipline. He writes a, I mean, for example, if you're if you're basing a claim on only one stray source that doesn't have echoes and other sources one primary source. That's not good history right that doesn't that violates the objective if you will methodology if you base your argument on a linguistically improbable misreading of a source that's bad history. If you base your argument on a source that doesn't have any original technique it does this in his book Stalin's war, by the way, and trying to argue that Stalin was playing attack Germany he bases the claim on a source that has no original copy he just finds a alleged description of this speech in a French newspaper, but there's no original speech or discussion of this original speech in these terms and so on. So yeah, there are objective standards of the field, and that differentiates it from literature, right. Here's more from Richard Evans you know it's few historians right competently few are still display any real mastery of the language in which they publish their work. So it's such a delight when you encounter the historian who writes well but it's by no means the dominant thing in the profession. Certainly not the norm. And it's gotten worse over time if you read. If you read these 19th century guys. You know, the writing quality is much higher. Unfortunately, like we make scoff at their lack of empirical rigor at their belief in teleology at their nationalistic romanticism. The caliber of their prose is just so much better than what you get today. Unfortunately, you're getting a very jargon laden kind of dummy like prose and so many modern history books. He's kind of old school like it's also a research if you read a book by like you Trevor Roper for example, who is a famous historian who was did lose credibility over the Hitler Diaries incident. But you know famous historian who, you know, was widely read in the 40s 50s 60s the quality of prose just so much better if you read like Hitler's last days by Trevor Roper just just much better writing the stuff that gets published today. What can we learn from the Hitler Diaries in fiasco we we had I think the Times of London and Newsweek, you know, paid paid this forger. Norma sums of money to publish the reported Hitler Diaries and David Irving initially signed on with the Hitler Diaries and then he was among the first to denounce them as fraudulent. He initially he initially that he was one of the first to denounce them as fraudulent. And he actually did it for good reason because he Irving had he's kind of obsessed with Hitler he has like a personal obsession with Hitler. And he hadn't his house like it's bizarre but it's actually it's actually what I was trying to do at some level right. He had like a calendar of like all the days during World War Two, and what Hitler schedule was he like had this in his house right. So he, and this was based on primary source dark. And so he, the reason he knew the diaries were fake, and I'll get to the story which just quits Irving unfortunately for him. The reason he knew the diaries were fake was because there were many accounts this diary that didn't match what he knew from primary sources what Hitler's actual schedule was. But then Irving realized I think there's a speculation but the diaries had mentioned the extermination the Jews. So, then he got like oh I should I should pretend these are real. That's what I speculate. Because I don't know why he would have changed his mind when this argument remained right that there are many contradictions in Hitler's what Hitler was doing in the real world based on the sources, and what Hitler said he was doing in these fake diaries. And as Evan says I mean, it was kind of embarrassing for Trevor Roper because simply you just tested the paper. And that is creating these diaries. The paper didn't come out till the 1950s. Right. Yes. There's a little bit more from Richard Evans he says most history books are hopelessly unreadable. And for this situation the dominance in the past 30 years of social science models bears a lot of responsibility. Do you want to talk about that the increasing dominance of social science on the field of history. Well, I just wanted to put a button on the Hitler diary thing for Irving Irving actually kind of really had a PR crew for himself. If he had just stuck by his guns which were based on the sources, but he, he was defending the diaries after the after people were saying because he wanted to be true because there was no mention the Holocaust, the extermination of the Jews. So, despite the fact that he was the first kind of well known persona to say these are fake. And here's why he was also the last or one of the last to defend their authenticity. And we he that we need whenever he talks about this he never mentions the fact that he was defending their authenticity after mainstream historians were not just rather fierce really. Yeah. So, I think these methods are highly useful, but can sometimes attract from the craft of history from just document the core methods of document of documentary criticism of going to the archives of finding a wealth of documents, and and also of writing clearly and vividly frankly, I find that these are some of the most without name authors in particular, but these are I have a couple in mind but you know they're alive and maybe I want to, you know the recommendation from their faculty at one day. I find that these are often some of the most boring books to read. And one of the reasons I like history and got into history is the literary quality of the best historians. I think these are highly useful methods but we have to make sure as historians that we're not abandoning the core principles of our craft, while we embrace tools of social science, like econometrics, for example. I think Evans mentions one book in particular that tried to show through econometrics that something about slavery was highly productive or something like that. Yeah, the slaves were quite well benefited from slavery and I just think. Yeah, I just think that you've evidence ridicules evidence is not like politically correct. He really kills us not a great fully so this isn't the job of the historian to make a judgment like this, and it's a kind of a political political judgment. And second of all, you're just invoking all kinds of neoliberal economic criteria to make this where the vulgar judgment that really shouldn't be in the province of history. So, I think this was rightly, rightly mocked. One of the key references about trying to let the reports demonstrate that the slavery increases the well being of increase the well being of the slaves in the American context. And Richard Evans writes history in the end may for the most part be seen as a science in the weak sense of the German to reason shaft and organized body of knowledge, by through research carried out according to generally agreed methods presented in published reports to peer review. There's not a science in the strong sense that it can frame general laws or predict the future, but there are sciences such as geology which cannot predict the future. Right, right. And he also mentions that if you want to talk about well history is the science because it can't. There's no controlled experiments well there isn't an astronomy either. You know, he mentions, he mentions that I think in the book that example specifically. I agree with that. And as I'd say though it's a it is a science infused with humanism and the motive for it should properly be artistic and humanistic in my view. And I think one, one very interesting illustration of that is how good history is well read, even bad writers will admit this. And that doesn't make sense in the context of other sciences right. You wouldn't say oh, you know, Einstein's theory of relativity is bad because he didn't expound it in the most eloquent way. Right, right. Right. Richard Evans makes a point that language and grammar are not completely arbitrary signifiers they have evolved through contact with the real world in an attempt to name real things so historical discourse was also evolved through contact with the real historical in an attempt to reconstruct it language is not in the end purely self reflective experience tells us that it mediates between human consciousness and the world it occupies. Yeah, I certainly agree with that now we're getting very much into the weeds of philosophy of language. Physics really right because you're like to what extent is what we intersubjectively use these symbols and metaphors language or whatever that we intersubjectively use to signify real world phenomena to what extent does that reflect the phenomena in itself the real itself it's like Kant. If you break up your reason that Kant's differentiation between phenomena and Newman and human being like the things in themselves the things in the world themselves like that football feel I'm looking at right now University of Maryland that in itself versus my perception of it and then it's filtered through language and so forth. But yeah I certainly think that that sort of qualified realism in this domain is what is kind of default assumption of most people in the real world, right, and also, and also a sense that the language is signifying the things in themselves to some extent. So philosophical realism in the way you're using it now means that the things that we see do correspond generally speaking to something that is real is not just our perceptions. Yeah, I mean, I kind of take Kant's view that we can never know the things in themselves, because they're always filtered through our particular biology and cognition. And the view Kant expresses a critique of your reason but nevertheless, the phenomena are not arbitrary. Right. Like the phenomena of walking out the window without any technology here whatever will be me falling to hurt myself right or die. You know that's arbitrary right. So there's something there's some causal chain here, even if they're also it's also filtered through the prism of my senses. So, I don't take a relativistic view of of metaphysics. And I think most people don't intuitively and if you don't, I think there's something to language, right so I think the hardcore postmodernist arguments pretty bad honestly. I think kind of soft core postmodernist arguments are interesting and Evans agrees with that like the power of narrative is something that Foucault and others do have a point about frankly. I mean, narrative is tremendously important in filtering how we see the world, right. So how dominant are postmodernist in the history profession these days. There's a lot of them. But I think here's what I think a lot of them. So it's their hypocrites so a lot of people will say, I had a professor correct she I have a great deal of respect for her she's very intelligent. What am I letters, she's now in Oxford for my PhD application. She said, she basically expressed a postmodern view at one point in class, but then if you were to tell her that the Holocaust is fake she would say that's vulgar and stupid. So I feel like they're or that slavery didn't occur or whatever so I feel like people aren't really postmodernist they use the rhetoric, but they don't. You know, they don't really, they contradict themselves right. Because if there are some things that we know to be true. And you have this strange kind of merger this awkward merger in the Academy with like highly moralistic rhetoric on race and colonialism and whatever, along with postmodernism, which is strange, because postmodernism would say this is just objection to racism or whatever is just a discourse and is as good or bad as any other moral discourse. Yet they don't act like that they act like it's a, this is the truth right, the moral truth. Yeah, people can't live without belief in objective good and evil. Right. I think I think that they're not they're not really postmodernist is my answer they they say they are but they are but a lot of people say they are they give lip service to it. By the way, they don't they don't say their methodologies are postmarine they accept that their methodologies are ranking right they're late that the that in a broad sense Western historians use and frankly Eastern historians use the same methods of documents having a high and criticism of documents and Providence and so on. They're similar methods right, but they would say all this is I'm using this method but it's just arbitrary, you know, I'm using this method because of social convention right that's what they'd say. They contradict themselves. So I think they, they say they are but they are, I think strong postmodernism is very silly and easily discredit I think the more serious claim is kind of wired down postmodernism, which I think actually has to be taken into account as partially true. And I think Evans agrees with that like earlier historians their pretend their pretense to scientific objectivity was greatly exaggerated and even looks rather silly in retrospect, and to this extent, consciousness of, as I say the power of narrative stuff that the power of language stuff that Botox about and others is valuable, I think. But I think in the strongest form postmodernism is pretty easily discredit. Yeah. Okay, I think I might want to wrap things up there we've got a lot more to talk about on another show but for this evening do you have any final words. I do not how have you been lately Luke. I've been well, I've been very well but I'm going to end the show and then I'll chat with you a little bit after the end of the show. Okay, everyone. Let me see if I can find the button.