 Welcome to day two of the Future Security Forum 2021. I'm proud to introduce our first panel of the day, US Leaves Afghanistan What Next? We're joined by Ambassador Roya Rahmani, former Afghan ambassador to the United States and a non-resident senior fellow at New America, retired Colonel Gianni Koskines, senior fellow at the International Security Program at New America, Shamila Chatteri, senior South Asia fellow in the International Security Program and former director for Pakistan and Afghanistan and the US National Security Council and Fatima Ghilani, president of the Afghan Red Crescent Society. The conversation will be moderated by Candice Rondeau, who directs the Future Frontlines Project in New America and as a professor of practice at Arizona State University. Thank you so much to you, Candice. Thanks, Daniel. And thanks also to Dean Madavi for her excellent comments sort of setting us up. We have a illustrious panel here and a lot to get into, but first let me just start by reminding the audience that we will get to Q and A. We really want to encourage you to be part of the conversation. In order to submit your questions, we'll be using sly.do to submit questions and the sly.do is the box located at the right of the video. If you have any issues, just please contact the events at newamerica.org and somebody will help you get sorted out on your questions. So let me begin, first of all, before opening it up to the panel here by setting the scene a little bit. I think we all kind of know what has happened over the last three weeks. No surprises for many of us who've been tracking events in Afghanistan. We I think would have expected that there would have been a challenge in the US exit no matter when it was timed for or how. However, the scale of the chaos that met the exit, I think surprised many people. The rapid fall of Kabul to the Taliban within just the course of basically three weeks also was very surprising to many. And yet some of those signs were there early that the bargain that the Trump administration had crafted and the Biden administration decided to execute on with the Taliban was far from perfect, was deeply flawed and still was only partially baked. We're gonna talk a little bit about that, but also just noting that we are still hearing from Secretary of State Anthony Blinken about his interpretation of events and how the State Department responded to the exit in Afghanistan where there are still notably thousands of Afghan Americans and green card holders who are stuck looking to get out, trying to navigate a very chaotic and very dangerous situation. And of course, there are a number of Afghans, untold numbers really who are eligible of course for special immigrant visas or P2 status who are still trying to figure out how best to navigate a very thorny, complex, challenging situation on the ground and when and how to get out of the country. But let's most importantly remember that this is a country of 35 million people plus that is sandwiched between two very difficult neighbors, Iran and Pakistan. We have to take Afghanistan, not just in the context of US policy, but regional policy and we'll be turning to Shamaila Choudhury to give us a little bit more perspective on that, but of course a question on everybody's mind right now is how did this happen? How did we get to this point where the US exit after 20 years of investment, many lives lost, much sacrifice, much money spent, how did we reach the point where we ended up with the Taliban back in power again? I think, I heard that Anthony Blinken made a comment in his testimony about his interpretation of events and particularly referenced a call with former president and Afghan president Ashraf Ghani that between himself and Ghani on August 14th in which Ghani said he would fight to the death to defend Afghanistan against the Taliban at the time. So that was only literally 10, 12 days before the collapse of Kabul, that Ghani was making this apparent passionate plea for the United States to stick it out, stick by him. And that makes us all wonder, I'm sure. And in particular, I wanna talk to Fatima a little bit about her inside view on what transpired. But of course, everybody is wondering, why did Ghani leave? Why did he exit so quickly? What were the motivating factors there? And what were the signs and sort of signals that he was interpreting at the time that made him think the Taliban would not act responsibly? And then also what was the impact of that psychologically? Were there tremors? Were there hints that perhaps things would go as badly as they did earlier in the negotiation process that perhaps we were not aware of? Fatima, let me turn to you to get your perspective on negotiations with the Taliban in the couple of months leading up to the US exit and then the fallout with Ashraf Ghani. What's your take? Okay, thank you very much. It is very important. Although it's very late for these talks, I wish we had talked about this. So many things could have been prevented. But still, it is nice to know what had happened. First of all, from the very beginning of the talks, yes, the Taliban were very, very difficult. But our side, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan side was not realistic at all. Several times in our meetings, our internal meetings, I asked our colleagues to put it on record that I had said that even 50% of our desired situation is better to be signed and sealed than coming out with nothing at all. And we did come out with nothing at all. And the reason was that, unfortunately, our government, especially the president, was living in a total bubble. I don't know what he was counting about. I mean, even when my colleagues sometimes were saying that, look, the country is falling one, I mean, one's place after another. He said, oh, no, no, no. We are going to get it back. Oh, no, we are getting it. Four months we wasted that bad Trump will go, good Biden will come and a miracle will happen and everything will change. And that change never happened. I knew it does not happen. Again, I told him that I put it on the record that the president who won as the vice president was encouraging President Obama to get out of Afghanistan. Why wouldn't he get out when everything has started by President Trump? And why wouldn't he have a good excuse to just finish it? So it was a difficult situation. One side was in a total bubble and the other side was Taliban, very stubborn, and they knew that they are going to gain terrains and eventually they will have it. And then the most important thing that I felt at that time that the message which comes to us and the message which goes to Taliban from the American side is not really the same message. Because in the conversation that I could see that we are not in the same page at all. So all this made the negotiations very, very difficult. And I could see that from the republic side, the feet were dragged and looking for excuses, a mistrust on the Qatar involvement, the Qatar mediation that I thought would have been very good if we're from day one. We did have a mediator. I've never seen ever in my life that you have such an important peace talks. Let alone peace talks, even if you have an ordinary political negotiations, how could it go on without a mediator? And our president had decided that we should not have a mediator. But these are the things that the conversation didn't happen properly and the mediation was not there and the negotiation absolutely went badly. But then at the very end, when we saw that everything is gone and the country is falling, one after another province is falling in the hand of Taliban, then two of our, especially one of our negotiators, they talked to the president face to face and the president two months before the end, say that yes, the time has come that he has to step down and a peaceful transfer of power should happen. And this was happening. This was happening when we were working on the list. The last list came, the name of Mr. Mohib was on the list and we told the president that the president, Mr. Mohib will never be accepted by the Taliban. But now we know all this was just act, all this was act, just the killing times. The airplane was ready to go and fetch Dr. Abdullah Abdullah president Karzai with a group of important, I mean politicians to come here. So we will have the end, at least we have it, in a regular proper way. So the transfer of power will be regulated not just in a chaotic situation. And we were just on this calling who's coming, who's not coming, the airplane, what time the airplane come, then all of a sudden, oops, the president has run away. And this, in matter of hours, according to our two colleagues, the palace was empty. That story that people were at the door of the palace, these two people left the palace nearly two hours after the president, there was no one at the door. So much no one at the door that they got worried that the looters will enter the palace because there was nobody. So our colleagues, ex-president Karzai called the Taliban to come and take the security. So where were those people that the president was scared of and run away? I believe that when ship is sinking and the captain will sink with it, not to put other people in panic and the lives. If they die, they die together. And this didn't happen there. And the chaos that you see until now is because of that. The police disappeared, everything. And then it took a long time for the Taliban to enter Kabul because they were not familiar. Actually, our people were guiding them, go left, go right and how to go there. So you're saying that ex-president Ghani told the foreign secretary that he will be fighting till last minute. He had also told some other important people that when it comes to a very difficult situation, some of his guards has the order to shoot him. So that brave guy, what happened that all of a sudden became so scared that went? I don't know. So this is gonna be a question for the ages. Thank you for that. I wanna drill down a little bit more before we turn to some other folks here because you've really painted a very harrowing narrative in which as early as April it sounds like of this year when President Biden made his very firm announcement, in fact, that the pullout would occur, that at minimum it would occur by September 11th. A very strong sign, couldn't be more strong than that. Ashraf Ghani was in a mindset where essentially he was thinking new guy, new chapter, turning the page, rewriting the bargain essentially, rewriting the deal. But the deal hadn't even really been fully inked as you're describing it. It sounds like there were a number of issues still in the table that needed to be resolved. There's a sort of 50% that you needed to get one way or the other. What were some of the sticking points that you think might have been movable before this kind of collapse? While we were still at a point where it was still possible to talk to the Taliban and negotiate, what were some of the big obstacles that you saw? Well, first of all, I want to say that President Biden, it was a not a new guy. He was a guy that we knew as the vice president and we knew very well his view that he was very much against the presence of American troops in Afghanistan and they wanted them to go home. Why we all of a sudden wanted, we created a new face and new set of mind for him, I don't understand, because all along, all along I had said it, that a person who wanted the American soldiers out as the vice president, what would stop him not to do it when he was the president? This is one thing. I think it was not just the president, few people around him. They had no experience, they had no experience whatsoever running a country. They had no business to be in that important jobs. They were just few, I don't want to use the word cowbys, I mean, a few people that they enjoy, that gondor and being in control and just doing things and they had no recognition of the people of Afghanistan. They were totally disconnected from the people of Afghanistan. While the Taliban very skillfully negotiating, surrendering of provinces, after provinces under their nose and they were acting like they know everything, they didn't even feel it. So this is the job of the government. I have nothing to, I'm not governmental, I was not governmental, I was neutral for a long, long time as the president of the Afghanistan Christian Society, which I'm not now, I'm just in the board. But what did go wrong was that peace talk here was not taken seriously by ourselves. It was taken seriously by the international community. It was taken extremely seriously by the Qataris, but it was not taken seriously by our government. And I don't think it was taken seriously by the Taliban because they knew that they are going to win and the demands they had were the demands that was absolutely taboo for the republic. But we, as the negotiators, we did send the message to the president a good six months before the end that we think that we should be flexible. We think that we cannot carry on without a mediator. We thought, yes, the mediation of the United Nations is very important, but even the mediation of Qatar will be good enough. Qatar will not put the name of such an important country in a stake and take side, this side or the other. So all these suspicions, I mean, suspicious acts and all that, if I had known I wouldn't have landed my name to that process, I really did. But I want to say one positive sentence that peace negotiation is not finished. Now Afghanistan needs inside the country to have the ownership of peace negotiations between all people of Afghanistan. And they should restart it there. The Taliban could start it there. Everyone could start it there. The peace ministry exists. And I think it is extremely important that we should do it our way this time. 100%, I couldn't agree more that this is just the beginning of a new chapter in a very long conflict that has been ongoing for almost 50 years, unbroken. And there's still a lot left on the table to negotiate and navigate. Let me turn to Ambassador Rahmani because I think you'll have some take on that issue, which is what is left to negotiate right now. And also kind of get your read on, just from a kind of foreign ministry point of view, kind of the impact of the Taliban's takeover on the regional relationship, but also what the UN should do there from your point of view, Ambassador Rahmani. Greetings to all and thank you for your questions. So what is left to negotiate? There is one thing for sure as a fact that whoever and whenever tried to rule Afghanistan by imposing their views by being exclusive, by forcing people one way or another, have never succeeded. The result is this unwinding conflict that people have been bearing the brunt of. The real losers of all the entire situation is the very people of Afghanistan, whether they are on the ground or trying to flee or some who have already fled. They are the losers and the rest have been hedging and will continue to hedge in order to ensure their national interests one way or another. So what can be negotiated? The very immediate thing is the inclusivity. If Afghanistan's new government does not recognize that, does not recognize that, it will not succeed. Like every other government, there would be resistance, there would be conflict, there would be insurgencies one way or another. This place is geographically conducive to continuation of such issue and problem. Unfortunately, the presentation of the, at least the interim government that they have announced does not indicate that we are going to that direction. Women have already become completely absent from this scene, that is already a problem because it is not only a moral or ethical issue or an issue that they can bank on in terms of their relationship and popularity with the rest of the international community. But it is actually a economic and security issue which will be missing. It is like neglecting 50% of the potential right there. And then also in terms of the reflection of the diversity of Afghanistan, including all different ethnic groups that makes Afghanistan, that is the entire mosaic. You cannot neglect that. Then from a regional perspective and the United Nations potential for intervention, what I would say is that the region from what I assess is taking two modes. One is starting to hedge and invest that their resources in terms of having a good relationship with the Taliban for their own sake, but at the same time looking at what are the other options. And then the rest of the regional countries who have been less directly involved, they have adapted at this point at least the wait and see strategy. And that basically that wait and see is about how the Taliban are going to contact themselves, who is going to recognize them first and whose steps they are going to follow. Can the UN help? The UN could have played a different role all along. And even at this point, there is a number of different possibilities. But whether we are talking about UN or international community or any groupings, what is required is really both steps, commitment, patience, perseverance, and care and wanting for Afghanistan to become peaceful. The question is, does that exist? This is the question. And it's a question that has been asked and never fully answered, unfortunately. Let me turn now to Shamila a little bit to give some additional perspective. Shamila, you have been working on this challenge for a long time. We've known each other a really long time. You've worked in the US government. Most importantly, the NSC at a time when the conversation about negotiating with the Taliban was just beginning. Give me a sense, first of all, when you kind of sit from that vantage point at the NSC, what is missing from the picture in terms of interpreting the regional politics? How should we understand now Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban and then its influence over the regional and regional dynamics? How do we understand and interpret Russia, Iran, China? When you're at the NSC level and you're having that kind of conversation, how much do those things factor into then the minutia, as it were, of navigating negotiations with all these different characters and players? And how should we be thinking about this in the long term in light of what Ambassador Rahmani said in terms of, and Fatimah said about that the need to continue negotiating towards some sort of peaceful settlement. First, thank you, Candice, and to New America for hosting this really important conversation. It's really important for me to be in this group with many people who I admire and I followed your work and your insights are so valuable. And so I'll speak from this US government angle, which I think I would like us to just take a step back and not think of it as just the Biden administration or the Obama administration or Bush. I see it all as a continuum of one policy that did, of course, evolve, but it's helpful to start by looking at it as the United States, because I think our, the central challenge for the United States in approaching the war in Afghanistan and then solving it was that we, it was never believable to any countries in the region or in the world that we actually had long-term skin in the game. So meaning, obviously we were threatened by the security challenges in Afghanistan and had to go in quite swiftly to take action and to show strength after 9-11. And even when we put in so many troops and then followed that on subsequently with development and economic assistance and more diplomacy, I just, when I was at the NSC and even before that, we would talk to our foreign partners and no one believed us that we actually were gonna stay the course, right? Because the kind of skin that we had in the game was so fleeting and temporary. And I think we felt that every step of the way as we were, those of us who are bureaucrats working in the churn of government policy, which is, can be very mundane and also quite urgent at the same time. So urgent that we don't have time to think through in the nuance and thoughtfulness with the thoughtfulness that you all think about these issues. And you all know, because you've been in these situations too. And so as I look back over the past 20 years, I see the United States in this role of trying to behave like a regional actor and trying to convince people that we care and we're gonna follow this through. But at the same time, when I was at the NSC in the Obama administration, one of the critical kind of moments or departure from that narrative that we're gonna see it through was when we started trying to socialize our own folks about the negotiations, like it's okay to talk to the Taliban. It's okay to talk to people that are bad and that you disagree with and that are looking to hurt you. I have to say that that was one of the most difficult policy situations that I'd ever experienced. Like just in my short two-decked career, it was astounding at the kind of the divisions in the US system. And I think some of that was just because of this confusion of what kind of skin do we actually have in the game? Like, do we care about women's rights and human rights intellectually? Yes, but then how can we actually guarantee that? You can't guarantee that unless you're on the ground and you're there for life. You have to be a lifer for that. So there's this bigger existential dilemma and conversation I think that continues today. And we are observing it now and kind of the dismay and sadness that many of us feel having worked on these policies and just to fall kind of flat on our feet, it feels like, okay? So that's one aspect from the US perspective. Now, to your points, Candice, about the region. This is where, when we look at the countries in the region, these are countries that actually have skin in the game, right? So first and foremost, obviously the people of Afghanistan, the Taliban, the government that has fled, the people that are still there running things every day. I mean, those are the ones that have real skin in the game. And I'm thinking of in terms of the regional actors, I'm thinking of Pakistan, China, and there's Russia and there's Iran, okay? And in Pakistan's the big, always the elephant in the room. And what we see happening in Afghanistan today is partially the result of decades-long Pakistan policy working with the Taliban, nurturing it, providing it safe haven. Pakistan's not the only kind of facilitator of the Taliban's sustainability in this war, but it has played a significant role. And if it's looking at the situation today in terms of any wins, I would say that Pakistan is probably like very pleased that there isn't a pro-India or an India friendly government in Afghanistan right now. That's obvious given their heavy focus on India and their national security policy. They do have some leverage over the Pakistan or over the Taliban in terms of, should the Taliban become a legitimate recognized government? There are important routes to the sea for trade and economic engagement that are important for the Taliban. There's also a lot of illicit trade and back and forth on that border, which is important to both sides. So that will kind of factor into how the relationship becomes stronger. And then a lot of the Taliban's money is tied up in real estate in Pakistan and just things that they own. And so this is not something that's been reported widely. So there are these like linkages, I think that sustained some leverage, which Pakistan might think it can take advantage of. Now, any of those wins, they pale in comparison to the risks in fact, because the Taliban is very close with the Pakistani Taliban, which is anti-state and even the fighters that were released by the Trump administration, like a lot of them are anti-Pakistan. So there's a concern that there's going to be this revival revivalism amongst the Islamists in Pakistan who are against the state. And so the fear of Islamist rebellion is very much on the minds of the Pakistanis. It was just so ironic, right? Because this has been a factor of state policy for decades that they've been fomenting this. And now, and we keep saying, oh, it's coming back to bite them. But this is, I think, very different. And it's a bigger cause for concern because the US doesn't have the presence that it had for the past 20 years. And it doesn't need Pakistan anymore for the air routes or the rods on the ground. And so there's the way we frame that dynamic between the US and Pakistan. Vis-a-vis Afghanistan is going to be very different. And it puts Pakistan in a very vulnerable space, okay? There's a lot of unknown regionally if you think about how the US and Pakistan are going to engage on Afghanistan or any other issues. And so naturally that leads to things like furosanctions in Pakistan by the US or the international community for its relationship with the Taliban. And so they're going to, the Pakistanis and others are going to be watching very closely how the international community legitimizes the Taliban government. If the Taliban government is legitimized and it's stable and it receives all the funding that it needs to run a proper government, that's the best case scenario for the Pakistanis, right? Because then their whole legacy of playing both sides, it's not forgotten, but it hasn't kind of gone up in flames the way that a lot of us anticipate it too, okay? So that, and that's so complex and I'm simplifying it, but I wanted to make sure I painted that picture. Now, then you throw China into the mix. We all imagine like China and the Pakistanis and the Russians like high-fiving each other and kind of like taking great joy in the collapse of the US war in Afghanistan and how, right? And I think that there is a little bit of engaging in shock and void and seeing the US loss as a symbolic win. But again, I think it stops there because the Pakistanis or the Chinese like the Pakistanis are very concerned about spillover into their territory of, again, Islamist rebellion, right? And the influence of the Taliban and their defeat of the US. This is the complete defeat of the United States by an Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan. Can you imagine how that inspires all of these other groups that China and Russia and Pakistan and others have to contend with for just to strengthen their sovereignty? So I think there's a lot there that the Chinese aren't stating out loud, obviously. And that's why we see them as Ambassador Romani mentioned like these states are going straight to the Taliban to protect their interests. And so the Chinese very much fall into that. And same goes for the Russians. And I think that they have similar interests as the Chinese in terms of security. The Chinese probably have more economic interests in Afghanistan, mainly in the mining sector. So that's something that we should watch. And then with Iran, it's a little bit more nuanced like the Iranians are concerned about the way that the Taliban government might treat Shia minorities. But I also think that the Iranians are looking at how the United States and President Biden in particular dealt with Afghanistan. Like we've talked about this that, you know, Biden has always wanted to leave and he came in and he left. And he has shed any responsibility of like what happened in the aftermath as something domestic and civil. Now Iran is likely watching this and thinking, okay, so point taken, let's take some notes on this. When the United States comes to us to start talking about their Iran policy and talking about JCPOA, like we should probably believe him that he's gonna do what he's saying he's gonna do. He's been very consistent. So I think there's an interesting dynamic there to observe. And likewise, like a little bit further but still related are the Gulf countries and kind of how they're watching the issues in the region and how they partnered with the United States. That partnership dynamic is going to change. We likely will need them more because we have a presence in the Gulf and we're using that presence to watch Afghanistan. But at the same time, we're gonna be pushing the responsibility to them more because we really don't, the United States does not want to focus on Afghanistan anymore. I think that's what I've learned from all of this is that they wanted to be done with it yesterday, unfortunately. So let me stop there. Well, they wanted to be done with it yesterday but we've also been to this movie before, right? I mean, if we remember George H.W. Bush, when he first took office and the insurgency was still happening against the Soviets, he asked, oh, is that thing still going on? So as much as current administration, maybe the next or the next after would like to move its focus away from Afghanistan, it's unlikely that they're gonna be able to do that so quickly and I think so cleanly. But I wanna make just to tack on to your point in Iran before I turn to Gianni here. I think it's an interesting observation that the JCPOA negotiations in some ways are made more credible by Biden sticking to the deal. What was key here, and I think we missed this. Unfortunately, Fatima very well pointed out, Biden was clear in his commitments even before he took office, he always had the same line. He wanted a CT policy, not a coin policy as far as Afghanistan goes. He was very clear that there was really no nation building to be done in Afghanistan as far as he was concerned, but more importantly, from a continuity of policy perspective, the signal was the US made a deal, it's gonna stick to it. Unlike the previous administration, which basically seemed to break with that entire tradition of sticking to the deals and the principles that you have publicly said you're committed to. So in some ways for Iran, big signal to take away in terms of not just JCPOA, but also frankly, for all of the players, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, China, one big important takeaway for regional players should be attack the United States again and you might count on another 20 years of chaos. And you might come out with an outcome just the same, just as chaotic, just as costly, and just as sort of nonsensical. Gianni, let me turn to you because you've raised in our conversations questions about kind of the regional impact as well, considerations about Kashmir and how for instance, this Islamist victory might play out in a place like Kashmir, but also regionally, but also you were on the ground in Afghanistan in the time. How should we interpret events, but also how should we think about the way resistance to the Taliban might play out over the next couple of years? Yeah, thank you. Thank you, Candice. I honestly, I feel like I need to work backwards from some of the conversations that we had. I'll start with a JCPOA. If I was the Iranians, I'd be doing dances about the way we keep deals because quite frankly, I personally would not want to get in a negotiation with an Iranian because they are far better negotiators than any of us. They're gonna walk away with my trousers by the end of the deal. But I think that if you look at the way we've signed up for a bad deal and kept to it is sort of the most disturbing. I think one of the biggest takeaways even from this conversation, and Fatima mentioned something that I think is incredibly important to highlight. The only people who actually believed this negotiation was somehow gonna work was the international community in the US. No Afghan I talked to, although I believe Fatima and her colleagues were there with the best intentions and trying to work something out. I don't think that anybody I ever talked to had any high aspirations about this ever, ever working out. In fact, if you look at it with what Shamaila mentioned in the continuity of our engagement rather than one president at a time, you'll see a continuity of good ideas, experimental plans, silver bullets, things that are gonna get us out of whatever mess we're in in short term and somehow it's all gonna work out. Now, the good thing about video or DVDs or I'm dating myself, you know, cassettes is that you can actually roll back the tapes and see a lot of stuff. And I think one of the issues that New America has done over the years and I've lost track, literally lost track how many of these conversations we've had over the years where we've literally outlined exactly how this thing is gonna pan out, exactly how dangerous these experimental things were gonna be and somehow we're the outliers, you know? And now you see everybody with a great opinion, some of these individuals who have literally been at the wheel while this train wreck has been happening, coming up with commentary on somehow it could have been prevented or yeah, well, you didn't do it back then. And I find it disturbing, absolutely disturbing. And quite frankly, intellectually numbing that we would say something to the effect of nobody could see this thing coming. Like we didn't actually pay attention to the 1990s and how this thing came apart. Like we didn't see how Najibullah gave up and within a month Kabul fell. We didn't look at how the Taliban actually entered Kabul in 1996, you know, all these things. I mean, it's impossible. And then on top of it, if you look at what President Ghani was doing and his advisors, I think Fatima is being very generous and in her commentary and I'm sure Ambassador as well but I won't be as kind. You know, a lot of the people that were around him were changing, shifting the decks of the Titanic, you know, shifting the chairs on the Titanic right until the end and making it actually incredibly difficult to fight the last few provinces on the way to Kabul. And also when you assign so many governors that have no business being governors to begin with and then assign them to some of the most important provinces when you see them abandon their post and only make deals that get their families out, forget anybody else. I think that that's how something falls apart. And if you can't see that, then I question our integrity of the system that doesn't tell, you know, our senior leaders, this is happening because, you know, it's easy to see. It's not as difficult. So fast forward to today and where we are. I think that if you look at what, again, we've talked about over the years and if you look at what has happened, I'm not convinced that the killing is done. I'm not convinced that the merciless policies of the Taliban are gonna get any more moderate. I'm not convinced that the, there's no risk that there's gonna be intra-Taliban fighting. Between different factions and certainly the genocide and cleansing that's going on in different parts of Kabul, Pansheer and other provinces is not being documented quite frankly because we even took out the journalists, you know, in the first bunch of airplanes as far as I'm concerned. There's some brave people reporting right now and thank God for the people with their phones and thank God for every brave Afghan that pulls out a phone and reports the atrocities. But honestly, I find it disturbing. And then the last thing to answer your question, again, backwards, because I don't wanna take up too much time, is look, the Taliban came to power in 1996. Yes, there were some Arabs and different groups that were there in 1996, but most of the terrorist enterprise and Al-Qaeda Inc. moved in afterwards. We don't have to wait long until those terrorists take action. They're right now, they're right in Afghanistan. They're taking part in the fight in Pansheer. And quite frankly, they are gonna take their action and their act to other countries and export it. And we're gonna be staring at this problem set for a long time. So whether it's Kashmir, whether it's, friends of mine have been telling me, some of the special forces, the Taliban special forces are not, they don't actually speak Pashto, Dari, they speak earlier to each other, or even with some North Waziristan accents and dilates. So there's a lot of people in Kabul right now and in the provinces that are not Afghan and this is very disturbing, honestly. Totally disturbing. I think some really important points here. I also just wanna remind the audience that we're gonna take some Q and A here. So if you've got questions that you're thinking about, if this is provoking thoughts, please get them in there on the right-hand side of the video, there's a little box where you can answer your questions. We're not quite there yet, we're gonna kind of, I think with so much to unpack here, but Johnny, you pointed out two things that I think are critical to understand. First of all, let me give a shout out to some of the reporters out there who are just doing amazing work. Obviously, critically in these two set, a legend out there, still on the front line, so many Afghan reporters with Tolo, with Pajwok News, who are really out there doing the brave work of trying to document what's going on in the country at a time when there is actually a lot of violence and a lot of fear, especially pan-share. We have not really kind of unpacked the pan-share piece. We know from social media reporting that there are reports of mass graves, wholesale slaughter in the valley, still no verification. If there's one need out there right now, I think it is for some sort of ability for Afghan journalists, if they speak Pashto Dari or otherwise, to be able to document, use social media, use what's out there to document what's happening, because clearly the violence and the killing has only just begun. And we are in for a long haul, as you just pointed out, Johnny. To your second point about these reports of foreigners, speaking other languages, potentially affiliated with different branches of the Haqqani network, coming primarily from Waziristan. Again, that still needs to be investigated a little bit more. I think we need to see some more proof, but I certainly have been hearing some of the same things that you're hearing. Now, obviously that's troubling. Here are the two reasons it's troubling, and I wanna turn to Fatima and Ambassador Rahmani to talk a little bit about this. One is that we have, clearly we do not have an inclusive government in Afghanistan right now, but we also have an extremely factualized Taliban government. I may be wrong in perceiving this, I'd like to get your perspective on sort of the Haqqani network versus the old guard and versus the rank and file, how we should interpret these kind of emerging rumors of splits and factionalism within and how that might play out for the regime going forward, let's say over the next six months to a year. Fatima, what do you think about some of these challenges in terms of the Taliban itself and factualism within? Quite frankly, it is very difficult to talk when you're outside the country. You see things, controversial things from every side, and it is very difficult to see. I'm always an optimistic. I was called a crazy woman who taught the Soviets will get out of Afghanistan. People have been in this game for two decades. I have been in this game for four decades. Exactly 43 years ago, I was in the politics of Jihad and then Mujahideen and then till today. When Taliban took Afghanistan after a very bad Mujahideen's inter-fighting and Afghanistan in a chaos was a different country. Anything would look good in a few days, everything. Afghanistan is not that Afghanistan anymore. This is Afghanistan of all Afghans, all ethnicity, all gender, men and women. And this is an Afghanistan that we learned in spite of bad governance and corrupt people and all that, but there were lots of good things in this country. What women achieved in Afghanistan for the last 20 years, never in the history of Afghanistan, women did achieve such a thing. Freedom of speech, involvement of everyone, equality of all ethnic groups and all that. This is the new Afghanistan that Taliban have taken over. And it is not easy to do that. Have taken over. And it is not easy to dismiss these people. It is not easy to ignore these people. It is not easy to shove them under somewhere and thus forget about them. No one will be silent. So it is for their own good. It is for their own good that they will take all this seriously. If this government is not inclusive, they have to think very harder and have the next step inclusive. Now they have to run a country. They have to feed people. They have to give salaries and they already have a problem. They will understand that it is not an easy thing to run a country. Taking a country is much easier than running a country. My hope is that they will open their eyes and they will be more realistic and start being inclusive. Very close to what we were trying to achieve that the 50% that I was talking about, that we wanted to get 100% of what we wanted and the Taliban wanted to get 100% of their desire. But I always believe that this 50% or 40% that as long as it's inclusive, it should be good enough for us. I think we have to come to that. We have to, we simply have to help Afghanistan, people of Afghanistan to come to an understanding that this country, this nation, cannot afford another war. They cannot afford a civil war. I mean, enough is enough. 43 years is absolutely enough. We woke up every day with a new idol created for us by the foreigners. I remember during the Jihad time, the Guru was Mr. Hikmatiar. No one was allowed to talk against it. Your country, if you talked about Hikmatiar, you were labeled Gucci Muge as we were. Or I mean, everybody was labeled, no, this is good, this is good. Then someone else's turn came and that other person, but then Taliban were good and everyone had to get rid of the Mujahidin. Then the same Mujahidin were brought back to get rid of Taliban. We are confused. We really need all of you, the whole region, especially by the whole world, the international community to help us to find our own path and we have to find a way to negotiate ourselves. The country cannot go on like that. It simply cannot. The rule of the region is extremely important. If the region think that by mischievous behaviors, they can use Afghanistan, I will assure you this fire from Afghanistan will burn the skirt of each and one, each one of these countries around us. A peaceful Afghanistan will be good for all of them. For all of them. That's why I would like to go and see that what could be done from within the country. Hearing something from outside and seeing things from inside is two different things. Over different things. I believe very much in social media, I believe that everyone has a camera in their pocket and they will inform the pocket. Most of the time I'm grateful for that, but sometimes it becomes confusing. So we have to see, we have to see what is happening in the field. So I see Shumaila, sorry, I apologize. I wanna just, cause I see Shumaila nodding her head a little bit and I also see Ambassador Rahmani. I don't wanna interrupt, but I just, I wanna give them a chance because you hit on a lot of points, Fatima that are really important, which is there have been idols in the past, right? And the risk here is that there will be idols again. The Taliban might try and elevate themselves once again as the idol that cannot be touched and yet. An outsider will create idols for us too. That's right. And also an outsider will come and create another idol. And we'll say that this is new idol, follow this person. Exactly. This should not happen. In fact, and in fact that, let me open this very important question, which for me, I'm really struggling with. You have a constitution in Afghanistan. It's an imperfect constitution. It's essentially a rebaked 1964 constitution. You have a kind of political dispensation and institutional structure. If the Taliban abandons that, what can we look forward to in terms of just the structure of decision-making? We have no way of knowing, we have no way of understanding what's coming simply because it's not clear at all. That there is any intent to create that structure beyond kind of regionalized councils that would ostensibly be under the control of the Taliban. So let me turn first to Shamaila and then get to Ambassador Rahmani for quick takes on this. And I also want to just remind you that we're going to try and open up to Q&A in a little bit here. Go ahead, Shamaila. So I just, I wanted to make a comment just that I think that it's a very natural worry to think that what we did in the past will repeat itself. But I do want to recognize that after the 9-11 attacks there were all of these different multilateral frameworks and regional groupings and consultations that were put into place that fostered greater communication between the international community on things like terrorist finance, for example, or the movement of suspected terrorists between countries and the surveillance of those groups and individuals. And so the ability of the transnational terrorist networks and groups that Gianni was mentioning in Afghanistan, like the concern about that, I think it's very valid. And I myself, like I think about it all the time, but I also know that in terms of the policy infrastructure that's been built up, although it's imperfect, that there are systems in place that can continue to kind of monitor and observe those kinds of dynamics, right? So, but my worry is that they all become all these groups and individuals that are bad for Afghanistan just stay in Afghanistan because of the, you know, the regional partners don't want this spillover to go in their countries and the United States is kind of washing their hands of it. So it's still very much a question of insecurity, but I just don't want to discount all these mechanisms that we have developed. And we also, on top of that, the other point I wanted to make was, you know, I agree with Fatima in her remarks that, you know, the international community still needs to be involved. Like we should absolutely not wash our hands of these questions of governance and legitimacy and helping Afghanistan. And so this is where all of these regional groupings that you see, you know, Tony Blinken is going to all these meetings. And, you know, it's interesting because they weren't going to these meetings before, right? It's only in the kind of once this all unfolded. And if United States had been pursuing such aggressive diplomacy before, I think we might have been in a different situation. It's something that we did try to do during the Obama administration with the appointment of various, you know, senior officials and principals. It was hard to do. But that's really the only way that this is going to sustain itself, right? If you have countries that don't see eye to eye, like Russia, Pakistan, the United States and China, like sitting down and having very uncomfortable conversations and then bringing others into the fold as well, right? And right now, I think the uncertainty was making me uncomfortable is there's not one dialogue that I can point to to say, hey, that's the one. And they're all talking about it there. We're not there yet, right? But I would hope that after two decades of funding counter-terrorism and military hardware capabilities and surveillance that we would actually start putting our efforts and focus into diplomacy and all the good things that come with diplomacy when you really focus on it, like, you know, humanitarian assistance and economic assistance, all of that. For the, so again, thinking in the future. Let me stop there. Yeah, well, listen, a very good point on diplomacy. I'm going to turn to our chief diplomat here in a second, but let me just tell the audience, you know, we were scheduled to close out at 145, but this conversation is too important. It's too rich. So we're going to try and extend a little bit. If you have a question, I just remind you once again, comments, please drop them in the right-hand side of the box here. And we will get to those very shortly before I turn to Ambassador Rock-Mani. So we're going to extend a little bit, try and go to about two o'clock so we can keep the conversation going because I think as Johnny very well pointed out, the people on this panel, and I think New America writ large, all the different fellows who've worked and reported on the region in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I think we've been saying, you know, we've been kind of shouting into the wind for the better part of two decades that we need a different approach to Afghanistan generally into the region writ large. And I'm hopeful that now with the kind of the din of, you know, the coinistas and, you know, the naysayers now kind of starting to be a little bit quieter, our voices will start to reach the right ears. And on your point on diplomacy, Shamaila couldn't agree more. I don't know where Zalhalilzad was. Maybe he was just overtaxed. Maybe we needed two envoys. I don't really know. But it seems like one of the bigger failures was the lack of robust engagement with regional players in a very visible way. Also, that would send the signal about the U.S. seriousness to move beyond just a Taliban dispensation. Ambassador Rahmani, your thoughts on that? Well, there is a few different segments to it. Let me start first with the one in terms of the negotiations. The negotiations, while I was not a part of it, Ms. Galani was actively there and she can tell us all about it. But it was flawed because it was entered under the circumstances that there was a time limit for one side. Number one, the strength was growing on Taliban's favor. Second, the third one, it was continuously a shifting balance in favor of Taliban. So that was not a very realistic negotiations. Whoever conducted that, given that, as Ms. Galani explained before, there was this dragging strategy that was adapted by the Afghan government. The Taliban did their part. In the middle of it, what we lost was getting to a solution. We did not get to a solution because both sides were dragging. They both felt that they had some advantage in that. And who lost? The people of Afghanistan. So now moving forward and with the United States diplomacy, while I agree with much that Shmiela was sharing with us, I would also like to play the other side and say that while we did not succeed, with your troops there, with the attention there, with the funding there, how we could possibly do it without them? Not even having the journalists there to report. So like it was said before, it seems to me, and Shmiela said it too, that it seems like the United States at this point says, okay, I am washing my hands off, let the others deal with this. And the issue continues as following. When the war was continuing or the conflict was continuing for the past 20 years in Afghanistan, we all knew where the roots were and how it could have had a game-changing impact, denying Taliban the sanctuary they had in Pakistan. That could have had a game-changing impact. Now it would be another shift, meaning Afghanistan probably would become this source and hub for the groups to return and be trained and establish themselves and be financed and whatnot. And then the symptoms of it would be treated wherever else that they are going to spread from Afghanistan too. So I am not completely discounting the importance and the power of diplomacy, but what was already said here in terms of new approaches, courageous steps, bold decisions need to be taken if we really want a different outcome. One of the things that they have been repeating at least over the past couple of months that if we are trying the same strategy that has already failed, trying it one more time is not gonna make it succeed. So I would leave it at that. A lot to unpack there. I mean, Ambassador Rahmani, you make a really important point about the safe haven in Pakistan. The challenge I think, and I think, Gianni, I'm gonna turn to you for some perspective on this since, you know, of course, you know the terrain very well, but the challenge of course for the United States always was, it was a tough neighborhood and it was always the ugly kid in the classroom. Essentially, you know, there was, there were very few actors in the region that didn't welcome the opportunity to beat up on the United States and its NATO allies over the last 20 years, not just out of Sean for you, literally by, you know, supporting safe havens for Al Qaeda and for the Taliban. And of course kind of fueling this discord even within the coalition itself, right? So, and I just want to also point out we have not once only glancing we mentioned India here. We keep talking about Russia and China and Iran as the kids on the block who have to be helpful in making the decisions. I mean, I think we kind of know that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan are kind of side players in this show that are mostly directed by Russia. But it's interesting to me that after all these years, we're not talking about India as an influencing factor, although it still could be given its positioning with China. But let me start answering, asking, answering some of these questions that are coming to us from the audience and trying to you, Gianni, one for some comments on what we've just heard from Ambassador Rahmani and Fatima, but also lots of questions here about the future of over the horizon counterterrorism. And I think you're probably pretty well positioned to answer that. Is that, you know, is that realistic? I mean, what are the what are the prospects for the success of over the horizon counterterrorism operations from your point of view? Yeah, I mean, first of all, Ambassador Rahmani was exactly right in highlighting that with all the resources on the planet effectively focused on Afghanistan, let's admit that the first eight, nine years of it was not exactly well focused. In fact, we went from, you know, famine to feast in essence, putting, you know, 100 plus thousand troops, you know, after we don't we do nothing with with Afghanistan for six years, you know, I mean, this is incredible. You know, you can't even comprehend the waste. I keep using the term we tend to overspend and underthink Afghanistan. And it's unfortunately, you know, true. But when it comes to the diplomacy, honestly, I don't want to be the naysayer here, but I don't feel very comfortable with the fact that we are using hope as a strategy. You know, we hope things are going to work out. We don't necessarily plan for them to work out. We don't put the parameters or the plans in place to work out. And I'll tie that into the over the horizon. Look, the military didn't train me for a lot of things, but they spent a hell of a lot of money to put me through schools to be a strategist. And strategy is, you know, kind of working different means that you have available with a plan to kind of come to a conclusion that you want, but you work backwards from the objective. So if you want to have an over the horizon capability, you'd want to have bases in the area. You want to be able to have the ability to conduct both reconnaissance surveillance and the intelligence that you need, which a lot of it has to be on the ground. And you need to have the ability to conduct operations in this. However, we did this, you know, right now we don't have any bases in the area closest bases, you know, in cutter for UAVs to fly there, have to fly, you know, seven, eight hours and then have a few hours on station and then fly back. If you, we saw the strike at the airport just prior to the August, you know, the end of our commitment there and evacuation, I think at a minimum that, you know, although an investigation is going on and I'm sure some things are going to come out, the New York Times and Washington Post and a bunch of others have pointed out that, you know, you can't quite see exactly what you need to see from just above. So having the presence on the ground is important. We sort of have torched that right now. Having a base like Bagram airfield in the region and being able to monitor activity, we gave up the greatest treasure, you know, the greatest gem of U.S. national security and giving up Afghanistan as far as I'm concerned in Central Asia. That is a strategic problem that we're going to have to live with for decades. And over the horizon, again, to just, you know, for people that are well-versed in military affairs, I don't think that it's going to come as a surprise, but you can have different intelligence mechanisms, but if you don't have a ground perspective, it's like, you know, basically operating in a two-dimensional sphere with not the ability to see what's going on and understand what's happening. You may think something is happening. You may think this is a group of people that are military-age males, but unless you have somebody on the ground that can tell you, actually, you know, they just came from an NGO and they're carrying water. They're not carrying explosives. You may actually come up with the wrong solution. So, again, all that stuff is going to come out, but it certainly doesn't bode well for any over-the-horizon capability that we have built. All very good points. And I just want to remind folks, we only have about eight minutes left, unfortunately. We could go on for hours. Clearly we're going to have to start our own show. It's going to be sort of the what-if show for Afghanistan. So let me just pick up on something you said and then also turn to some more of these audience questions. Clearly we have an intelligence failure problem when it comes to Afghanistan. We're relying on the kind of interpersonal relationship between Anthony Blinken and Ashraf Ghani to determine whether or not we have confidence in the Afghan government's staying power. Clearly we have a problem when we're not reading signals like the lack of a mediator on the Afghan government side as a sure sign that there is something wrong with the mechanics of the orchestration of our exit. And to your point, Gianni, whatever the outcome of this investigation into the strike in Kabul, clearly there are indications that something went wrong there. And another sign that over-the-horizon might be a bit of an overboard fantasy that we'll have to question and challenge now for the next decade or so. There's so many questions here. Let me try and get to at least a couple of them and wrap them up together. So from our colleague, Mia Bloom, she has kind of two questions that I think are interesting and somewhat interrelated. One, we want to talk a little bit about the rule of corruption, but she has a very provocative question that I think is not asked enough. What is the possibility? What is the prospect of Afghan women taking up arms to defend their rights or to change circumstances on the ground in the construct that we have today with the Taliban government? So I'm going to turn to our two Afghan colleagues, first to Fatima and then Ambassador Rahmani, but just remind you that we have to be short and sweet because we want to get two more questions in. Fatima. I have always been in the humanitarian field. For me, it's very difficult to encourage anyone to take arms. I am all for having Afghanistan back to peace. And I think the other question, the corruption, the corruption was the mother of all the evils which happened in Afghanistan. And unfortunately, especially the U.S., but most countries closed their eyes when it happened at the beginning. If they hadn't closed their eyes, most of things would have changed, would have been different today. Definitely, if we had not been having $10,000 top-ups a month for certain ministers for years, we might be... That's nothing. That's nothing. I'm talking about single-sourced friends to give contracts of millions of millions of dollars. Yes, one of the ministers I saw that had a salary of, I don't know how many thousands, I nearly had a heart attack because I, as a president of the Afghan Red Christian Society, worked as a volunteer for 13 years. So for me, it was a shock. But that was nothing. I'm talking about contracts which were given to friends. That was the American money, it was the foreign money, and those countries closed their eyes. That was the mother of all the evils. Millions, tens of millions, hundreds of millions. You're absolutely right, 100 percent. Ambassador Rachmani. Well, on the first question about women picking up arms, I would say let's not please encourage women or use them as now perpetuating conflict and war. They have suffered the most from conflict in more ways than anyone else. And then by thinking that they can pick up arms and kill more people, I think we have had enough killings. Enough is enough. And they have been the victims of it in way more ways than anyone could possibly imagine. It is not, in fact, imaginable unless you have lived in conflict, unless you have experienced that close up. And you have been close enough to think that I am next and my family is next and continuously worry about your family coming back home or not and in one piece or not. Second on the issue, I think women can play a major role. And they are absolutely necessary in security field, but not necessarily to pick up arm and make another insurgency or resistance or something like that. And we have played these games for way too long. In fact, all of my life. On the issue of corruption, I can't agree more. It has been the mother of the evil. I'm intentionally repeating the same words Ms. Galani said and given your example about the ministers having like very fat salaries. I think that was a good thing. That's a positive example because it's at least at the book. It's a salary. The reason that the country is where it is, is because of the many examples of the corruption happening through a chain from the contracts coming from its source. In fact, never leaving the countries that contracted them all the way to the way that millions and hundreds of millions of contracts or sole source. It was just a friend's club. And again, I am emphasizing the point that Ms. Galani raised that the international community overlooked, continuously overlooked, and stability was the pretext or the excuse for it. And that was a problem. The lack of rule of law, in fact, that dysfunctional justice system has been the core of misery for Afghanistan for many, many decades historically. And it will continue to be the law only applies to the powerless. To scapegoat them, not for those that do the real deals because they are all friends. They all benefit from one another. And those are the ones that wouldn't speak up because they all have something that they have shared in these deals. A special club. Well, I'm afraid we are really very close to time here. So I want to, first of all, I want to thank you, Fatima. I know it's late. You know, and you've joined us here at a time when things are chaotic. I appreciate you staying up and sticking with us and joining us. Ambassador Rakhmani, I want to thank you for your continued courage and speaking out about what you know, what you've seen. Shamaila, I mean, just no words. We've been around this bed so many times. I'm getting dizzy and you too, Gianni. I think we're at a point now where as much as, you know, the United States would like to wipe the slate clean, forget about its focus on Afghanistan over the last 20 years. I have a feeling we'll be back here at the what next for Afghanistan show in no time flat. And unfortunately that is the legacy that the United States leaves behind. But there's also another legacy here, which is the bonds between us all that bring us together to reach across borders and all of our differences and all the losses of lives. These bonds are unbreakable and I'm glad to know you and to keep this conversation going and hope for the best and pray for peace in Afghanistan. With that, I'm going to take it over to Peter Bergen, who's going to join us in just a few seconds here and let us know what's next.