 So, ladies and gentlemen, you are all very welcome to today's lecture given by Dr. Neter Weber as part of the Development Matters series hosted by the Institute and sponsored by Ira Shade. We're delighted to be joined by Dr. Weber as the EU's special representative for the Horn of Africa. She'll speak to us for about 20 minutes or so and then we will have, as usual, a Q&A session partly questions from within the room and partly online questions and we will finish roughly speaking around two o'clock. Just some housekeeping points first. For those in the room, if you'd like to ask questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you with a roving mic. For those of you taking part online, you'll be able to join using the Q&A function on Zoom which you will see on your screens. Today's presentation by Dr. Weber and also Q&A are on the record. Feel free to join the discussion on Twitter or X using the handle at IIEA and the hashtag Development Matters. We're also live streaming today's discussion so a very warm welcome to those who will be following us on YouTube. Now to our guest speaker, Dr. Neter Weber was appointed as the EU's special representative for the Horn of Africa in July 2021. She is already an outstanding expert on Africa going back over many years and she is particularly an expert on the region which she now covers having had over 25 years of experience with it and its challenges. She was engaged in mediation in Sudan and Ethiopia as a senior advisor for the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which is well known to us here. From 2010 to 2012, you worked as a consultant in residence in Addis and Dr. Weber has also lectured as a professor of conflict studies of international relations and of African international relations at various universities in Germany, Austria and Spain. And you published extensively on peace and security issues in various security issues in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area. Finally, I should say that earlier in your career you were a senior fellow on Africa and the Middle East at SWP, which we also know the German Institute for Security and International Affairs and you worked for a period with Amnesty International and with, I think, Human Rights Watch. That's a quick overview of your illustrious career. Dr. Weber, first I'd like to ask Michael O'Toole to say a few words on behalf of Irish age. Welcome. Yeah, thanks, David. I'm Michael O'Toole. I'm the Africa Director in the Department of Foreign Affairs. I'm delighted to be here for this talk by the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Dr. Annette Weber. At first of all, I'd like to thank the IIEA for hosting this address as part of the Development Matters series sponsored by Irish Aid. David, as you were saying, Dr. Weber has served as the USO for the Horn of Africa since June 2021 and she's been extremely active across the range of complex and interlinked challenges and crises affecting the Horn of Africa. Today's talk is very timely. In the recent past, we've had the conflict in Northern Ethiopia, followed by the cessation of hostilities agreement of November 2022. We've had the outbreak of a full-scale conflict in Sudan since last April and we have the ongoing security crisis in Somalia and other linked challenges across the Horn. But all of this is taking place also against the backdrop of a severe drought and humanitarian emergency affecting almost everywhere in the Horn. And then, of course, in the recent weeks, to add to this difficulty has been the crisis in Gaza and the resulting rising tensions in the Red Sea, which provides a frame for Dr. Weber's address today. So I think we're all very much looking forward to hearing how the EU and Ireland can help address some of these very complex challenges. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Weber. You have the floor. Thank you. Thank you very much. I'm delighted to be here and, Michael, Ambassador Dono, thank you so much for the invitation. I think it's great to be back here. I was here roughly two years ago and it was very different circumstances back then. And I think we had a very different exchange when I had the pleasure to address you in two years ago. It was September 2021. It was a month before the coup in Sudan. We were still very hopeful on the transition in Sudan. We were still working with Prime Minister Hamdok to move to a completion of the civilian transition and now, to use later, and I will come to this. Of course, we are in the most devastating brutal war on the continent. I think Ireland back then was in its first year, whereas Brian, in its first year of a very successful UN Security Council tenure. And we've been working there together on Somalia and other issues. But of course, your focus was on the war in Ethiopia as well. But again, during my address back then, I focused on the themes of transition. Transition was really the core topic. The need to support these transitions, the political transition in Sudan to come to an end of the war in Ethiopia, back then it was the most devastating war on the continent. And trying to get the positive trajectory and getting to this end, I think, was still very far away two years ago. In the short time since then, it's two years, the region has witnessed tremendous and profound changes. And it's clear from where we're talking right now that there are moments that we can look back and learn, but that there are moments that feel like we have lost them and we have lost the positive momentum on the transitions. And we stuck again in a very volatile situation of more and more complex problems piling up. We have, of course, the war in Sudan. We have the potential conflict that is culminating on the basis of a potential MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland. And yes, we have a transition in Ethiopia. We are out of our, Ethiopia is out of the war, but of course, it's a shaky transition. And let me give you a bit of the context of what I'd like to talk about today, the overview of the present situation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, as you know, EU is going to have an operation for freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. So also the bridge and the divider between the Horn of Africa and its neighborhood in the Gulf is boiling, is heating up. And it's also showing us how very close this Horn of Africa is, you know, to us as our neighbor, but of course, also very connected in terms of our need for trade, you know, 24% of our trade to Asia go through the Red Sea, you know, energy diversification, we need the Red Sea more and more notches for the oil coming through from the Gulf, but LNG tanks and the like. So it's becoming more and more a close connector, notches between the Red Sea, notches between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf, but also for us. The challenges I think is, you know, I've already spoken about what are the implications for peace. And I think this is, of course, our job is not just to analyze the conflicts, but it's also how do you get from the current conflicts to potential mediation and to potential settling of conflicts. And I think what we see right now when I compare it to the situation in Northern Ethiopia, we see a plethora of initiatives. We see a huge fragmentation of mediation efforts. And of course, the question is how do you coordinate, how do you bring these efforts together rather than how do you put one effort in the move? And I think this is also very different than two years ago. And then, of course, the way forward that I keep to the last, because I think the picture right now is very gloomy. It's not indeed a very positive picture, but I think there is potential. The region has huge potential, not just because the region is rich enough to feed itself, but the possibility of the region in terms of keeping channels of communication open in terms of having the ability to have cross-border exchange trades, to have cross-border engagement. This is rich in the region. The region is also rich in its capacity for an engagement in multilateralism that is very different, for example, to the Gulf region. The Horn is known to, they have EGAD, they have produced EGAD. They know how to do multilateralism, but are we using it? Are we engaging on this? But let me come back to really just paint a bit of a picture of the situation in the Horn of Africa today compared to when we last, not all of us, when we were last together a little over two years ago. I think, as I said, Ethiopia was being consumed by a devastating war in the North and Tigray. Sudan was still on a very welcoming, very optimistic track of, you know, it can be done. You can overrule a dictatorship, you can have a civilian-led transition. You can even have an engagement with the military, and you can start doing trust-building. And I was just over lunch, started talking about, I was there in Khartoum two days before the war started, talking to Burhan, talking to Hamedi, you know, about the potential, about the potential of an integrated army, what the army could do if it can be professionalized, looking at the army of Ethiopia and other armies in the region. What this united Sudanese army could do also in terms of building trust to its citizens, and now, you know, two years later, we're in a very, very different situation. I think in Somalia two years ago, political and constitutional crisis risked Syria's internal conflict. And of course, Al-Shabaab was present then, and as it is present right now. South Sudan, we sometimes forget about South Sudan when we talk about the Horn of Africa. But again, South Sudan was in a difficult situation two years ago. It has not changed. The global situation, I think, was a very different one. It was before, you know, it was before the Russian War of Aggression. It was before the war in Gaza. We had a very different positioning of a multipolarity. It was not a reality. The BRICS assessment, you know, the ascension to BRICS for some of the countries in the Horn, as well as the Gulf countries, was far away. So I think we had a very different composition of the global world situation. Now, of course, you know, the Horn is not, of course, the only region that is in a difficult moment. If we look at Sudan, if we look at the region, you know, besides the overarching problems of food crisis, of climate change, of, you know, the political environment that is heated up by inflation, that is heated up by critical and very difficult economic situations in all countries, not just across the Horn, but mainly across the Horn. If we take the overarching challenges, let's go into the more detailed situations in the countries. And so down the war broke out, you know, last year, basically around now in April, 15th of April. And it was prepared for, I think it was very clear. You could, you know, you could go to a cartoon. It was clear. It's, you know, it's militarized. Every corner had its technicals. It was clear that the two sides were less and less interested in talking to each other. Wuhan blamed Hometi, Hometi blamed Wuhan. But I think we were still hopeful that there is the chance to get back to, you know, getting back from the coup, getting back into civilian transition. That was clearly not the idea of the two belligerents. And I think what we've seen, of course, since then, you know, Sudan armed forces and the rapid support forces of Hometi, the two sides of the same coin of the coup, started to fight each other. And it's a relentless war. And I think, you know, just two days ago, we've heard the announcement by Wuhan. And the same goes for Hometi, that even humanitarian aid, even access for humanitarian aid, they won't allow because if it's getting to the places that are controlled to the population in places that is controlled by the other side, they will not allow this kind of humanitarian access. And you see 11 million people in Sudan being displaced. I mean, it's the highest number of displaced population worldwide. We know a hunger crisis is coming. It's coming in April, May. But the two belligerents are not ready to discuss humanitarian access. They're not ready to give, you know, a chance to COA to a succession of hostility. They're not ready to even start negotiating ceasefire. However, both sides are saying, you know, in principle, they're ready. However, the preconditions for this kind of ceasefires are so tremendous, or basically the preconditions are the other side needs to stop. And then we can talk about a ceasefire. So we know we're near a ceasefire. Meanwhile, the population is suffering. The neighboring countries are affected. And I think if you look at Sudan, you know, we do not look at a country that can be, or a conflict that can be contained. We look at a conflict that is already connecting the Sahel to the Red Sea, that is already connecting Libya to further south in the Horn of Africa, that is connecting, that is bringing fighters from the Sahel up to 45,000 fighters from the Sahel into Sudan, that is connecting the Red Sea, heating up the Red Sea in a way where we know the current foreign minister was in Tehran last week, reaching out to Iran in a very heated situation where we have the war in Gaza and Israel, where we know both sides are working with Russia. So even for us from the neighboring Europeans, this conflict is already a regional conflict that implicates the region in terms of the people moving to the neighboring countries. But of course, it's also a conflict that already has direct implications to the politics of the neighboring countries. Looking into Eritrea, for example, we know that Eritrea is helping some of the armed groups training their people. We know that Hometi's forces are reaching out into the Sahel, into the Central African Republic. We know that the conflict is implicating the situation in South Sudan. Now South Sudan, of course, being very volatile itself, cannot add another conflict layer where we know that the movement of RSF towards the oil fields are putting this additional layer of conflict into the neighboring country. And of course, we also have an understanding that there are countries very closely connected to the two sides of the belligerent sides, trying to help their side to win the war. So we have a conflict situation where both sides are still hoping that they can win militarily. My assessment, our assessment is, even if they can win militarily, it's not the end of the war, it's far from the end of the war, even if RSF could push through to port Sudan, it's not the beginning of a new Sudan. It's the beginning of a new phase of a war. And I think this is really where all of these initiatives that we see right now working on Sudan, we had Chadda where the Saudis and the Americans were working together. We just had an initiative in Bahrain where basically the same composition with the two sides who have maybe more influence or leverage on the two belligerents, the Egyptians and the Emirates were part of the initiative. We have the African Union, of course, we have EGAT, we have an EGAT plus engagement. We had the neighboring states engagement by the Egyptians. So we have a lot of actors and I think everyone is doing the right thing but we need to bring these actors together. And I think that's really the challenge we face right now because what it allows for the two belligerents is to go forum shopping, to go to the forum that they most like, that they feel is more sympathetic to their cause, but of course that cannot bring a solution and we need this solution not just because of the suffering of the people of Sudan but also for the stability of the region. The region cannot allow Sudan to disintegrate and I think when we're looking into different scenarios, we're looking at scenarios ranging from a Libya scenario where we have a split of Sudan where basically the East and the North will stay with South and the West and we don't know about Kordofan but the West and part of Khartoum will stay with RSF but maybe the more likely scenario would be a Somalia scenario where you have a lot of pockets of warlord rule because the question of, is the leadership of RSF, is the leadership of SAF really in control of each and every field commander? Do they really have control of each and every pocket of Sudan? Is there actually a territorial control? I think that's a very big question. As EU, of course, we very much engaged also in keeping the momentum for the civilians. To us, it has been, since the revolution in 2018, extremely important to support the civilian front. As in our understanding, it's also important to reflect that Sudan is, you know, as most of our countries has very wide and rich political landscape. It's not just one group, it's many groups. It's many political aspects that are reflected in the political landscape of Sudan and how you bring these groups together because, of course, you would sometimes think a war brings people together and you would agree on one point that is to end the war, but that's not true in no country in the world. Of course, the political landscapes keeps fragmenting more and more, but I think there is momentum and I think this is also, you know, due to the support of member states, Ireland, other countries supporting track two initiatives, supporting small groups to start talking to each other, so supporting, let's say, the resistance committees helping to distribute humanitarian aid, but also the resistance committees being part of a landscape and having a voice, supporting women's groups, supporting, I mean, you know, various groups from various regions in Sudan to at least start talking about how do you get to that next stage? You don't need to agree on the political, you know, future of your country. You can have very different political views on how you want to run this country. I think we all have this. We all have, if we like it or not, more or less coalition governments where you have to talk and work with your adversaries, but I think this is something where I see a bit more, let's see, let's say, I see a bit more light at the end of the tunnel. I think there is, and this is, you know, it's a wonderful political culture in Sudan. Everyone has a political opinion. Everyone speaks about politics. It's a very rich culture. It's not a silent culture, and I think this gives hope that people can find a way through communication, through, you know, discussing, even if they don't agree, but it's keeping the discussion, it's keeping the channels of communication open. Very different picture, of course, in Ethiopia. That's a very different culture of communication. It's a very different political culture. I think, yes, on the positive side, we have the secession of hostility is holding. There is no war, at least not in between Tigray and the center, but of course there are conflicts. There's a contestation of state, and that's an ongoing contestation. It's not, you know, after the war has ended with a secession of hostility agreement. It's not, you know, that the center is gravitating, that the center is holding. You have a lot of contestation from the Aromiya region. You have contestation in the Amhara region, and what we see the center trying to do is basically balancing all these regions and trying sometimes to play them against each other, sometimes to consolidate. And I think that's, you know, that's a bit of the big challenge we see in Ethiopia. And of course, we see Ethiopia, a very powerful country in the region. We don't see Ethiopia and Egypt getting along. We don't see the bridges build on the girt. We have been quite surprised, let's say, about the announcement of Prime Minister Abi about access to the sea, or the right of access to the sea. And I think this is where, you know, a bit of the critical engagement comes in right now on the MOU that so far no one really has seen, but the MOU that would entail an agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland on access to Barbara Port as in commercial interest, but also to build a naval base. And talking to the Ethiopian authorities, but also talking to the president in Somalia, what I see there is a potential, actually, for the Somalis to take a leap and say, okay, what is it we need to reach in the coming years? What kind of agreements on commercial interest do I, as a president of Somalia, as a president in Mogadishu, need to agree with my federal member states, including with Somaliland? And I think this is a discussion I would hope that this can happen fairly soon without this MOU leading into another crisis that could culminate into another conflict. I think it would also take, you know, the Ethiopians to understand that having an agreement with Somalia, you would need to include Mogadishu. You can not just sign a deal with a federal member states or with Somaliland, but I think it's possible to find an overlapping interest where everyone can benefit. I think the question of a naval presence on security is a bigger question. I believe this requires much more of a discussion in the region. I would hope that EGAT could lead on this discussion because at the end of the day, you know, you cannot just sleep on it and then hope it's not going to happen. But I think it also needs a discussion, how does the region see itself as, you know, interconnected, not just in terms of regional economic integration, but also as a region that could build a joint regional security architecture? And this is, you know, this is for once, of course, the question of access to the sea, but even more importantly, and, you know, immediately, what is the regional answer to the post-Atmos scenario in Somalia? Because we know that it will be, you know, facing out of Atmos in Somalia. What is the region's idea? Because the region will be affected. Somalia will be affected, of course, continuously affected by al-Shabaab, but the region will be affected, you know, by reaching out of al-Shabaab. What is the regional idea to have a regional security architecture that can bring the region into an engagement but in a close coordination with the Somalis? If this is with assessed contributions through the UN, if this is, you know, purely AU, if this is EGAT, that should be up to the region, but the region needs to have a coordination mechanism to really come to this kind of conclusion. So, because now today it's Somalia, tomorrow it might be a different country where you have a conflict in this region, and you need, we need the region to have reactive mechanisms that are, you know, that are bringing the region rather together than fragmenting and putting the regional governments apart. So I think this is really where I would see a potential, actually, you know, on the basis of what we see at the moment, even if it's a critical phase on the MOU, if it's a critical phase on the facing out of Atmos, but it should be a potential for the region to really come together and have this conversation. I think, you know, to step a bit back, looking at the Red Sea, but looking at the broader question of geopolitics in the region. We see, of course, the BRICS, for example, becoming a reality of multi-polarity. It's a reality for Ethiopia, it's a reality for the Gulf States, for UAE and the Saudis. It's a reality for many countries and specifically for Ethiopia playing, you know, not playing, but engaging with different actors that we have not yet fully understood how we should integrate this reality of multi-polarity in our engagement with the region. I think we're still very good in, you know, support for the African Union, we're very clear in our support for IGAT, but the question is, is that going to be enough? We see the Gulf States moving very bilateral, very transactional. I don't think that's our DNA. I don't think we should try to compete on this, but how can we convincingly be better in coordinating, you know, on multilateralism, on multilateral engagements? On a long term, on a medium term, but of course also in a reactive short-term mode. And I think this is where I would like to end on maybe a positive outlook. The potential that we see in the region is a potential that I think and hope that we already support with the Horn of Africa Initiative as part of our global gateway focus on the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa Initiative brings together all the finance ministers of the region, including Eritrea, which is different to all other multilateral engagements in the region. And it brings them together in an attempt to see what does the region look at when they look at connectivity? What do they prioritize? What kind of infrastructure do they prioritize? And by infrastructure, I do not just mean roads and trains. I mean, that's where the Chinese are much better at the moment. But where we should also think much more connected. But it's also connectivity in terms of energy connectivity where it's, you know, it's internet. It's all of those things that we see as where we have strength, where the region has a lot of potential. If you look at, you know, the mobility and the, for example, the internet connectivity in Kenya, I'm based in Kenya, the internet works much better in Kenya than in parts of Germany. I mean, you know, you have mobile banking in Kenya that you were dreaming of five years ago in Germany and you still dream of in Germany. So it's, the region has a lot of potential. It has potential also to mitigate, let's say, parts of the shocks that we see coming on climate change because the region has the potential to feed itself if there would be a better connectivity of, you know, getting the goods from the producers to the markets, from the markets to the consumers. What we see in the region right now is the region is producing. It's extractive to, you know, other regions like the Gulf for their food and photo security. And I'm not saying that shouldn't work. That, of course, you need cash, you need money. So you need to continue this. But I think the region could be much better if it has a circular understanding of getting the region working for itself, including, for example, fertilizer. Eritrea has fertilizer. It's exporting the fertilizer to China. The region needs fertilizer. As you know, since the war of aggression, Russia and Ukraine fertilizer is exorbitantly expensive. So it's almost impossible for the region to buy enough. So having a much more regional integration, I think would be, you know, would be helping the region in the true spirit of our EU DNA. This is how we built, you know, trust where there was, you know, no trust politically, but we started to build trust on economic integration. I think this is really something we can be better. We can be stronger, and hopefully, you know, this can also lead to a more integrated region. And if you have a more integrated region, I think this is what we know from our own experience. The tendency to go to war against each other if you have, you know, everything connected, your economy, your thinking, your trade, your people is much harder than doing it when you disconnect it. So I think that's really ending on a positive momentum. But thank you so much. And I'm really looking forward to the discussion. Thank you. Thank you very, very much, Dr. Bebo. You've given us a huge amount to reflect on a fascinating presentation. As you know, the region is an extremely important region for Ireland, both the government, but also our civil society. We have a certain presence in the area. And the countries with which you are grappling are ones which mean a lot to us in terms of Ireland's own engagement with Africa generally. Let me now open the floor for questions. Can I begin with just one of my own? How would you assess the immediate impact of the Gaza crisis? I mean, do you notice in the Horn sort of a rise in militant activism or warnings? I was struck by the remark by Al-Shabaab recently where they, in effect, wanted to have complete solidarity of not unity with Hamas. I mean, how are you experiencing the Gaza crisis and its immediate impact? I think that's maybe the most obvious impact. I think I took Al-Shabaab two days to respond with a four-page letter to Hamas. That was quite surprising because Al-Shabaab normally doesn't send four-page letters in such a short time frame on solidarity. But of course, they knew how to ride that wave. And it was clear that you don't know that Al-Shabaab so far has not really done anything for the Palestinians. But of course, they use that right now. How far this is really actually an issue for Somalis is a bit lost to me because, of course, the Somali population will be pro-Palestinian. There is no difference before the war or now. So they're not changing the general support or the situation. However, what I think what we see coming right now is what is observed is that there is a heightened trafficking between the Houthis and Yemen and Al-Shabaab. So there is more weapons going across the Red Sea. We don't know how far this goes beyond weapons. If there is an exchange, I do not have the information. But I think that's the likely next step. Of course, we see a potential risk of Iran coming into the Red Sea. I mean, I mentioned the Sudanese foreign minister traveling to Tehran not to shake hands there but to get weapons. Now we know that there is an Iranian spy ship docking off the shore of Djibouti. That, of course, is of huge concern. The expectation by the Americans in Djibouti is that this spy ship is helping the Houthis to find their targets for the attacks. So if the Iranian issue would move further up the Red Sea closer to the coast of Israel, and in other places, for example, by docking into the port of Sudan, that would be a serious red flag. It's not yet there. But I think one cannot overlook what's boiling up and the risks. And I think the risks are really increasing. Thank you very much for that. We have a question from Brigadier General Jair Rahern, who is a former commander of the EU military training mission for Somalia in Mogadishu. Jair recalls that since 2007, the EU has paid just under 3 billion euros to fund the deployment of AU soldiers in Somalia. In fact, that's the full cost. The current force is due to withdraw completely by December of this year. Two connected questions. Has the EU had value for money for this 2.8 billion euros in operational outputs by the EU forces? And who will fill the security void when ATMIS withdraws? Good question. I mean, value for money is hard to judge. I mean, yes, we are all there. We can all operate in Somalia, our mission. I mean, our embassy is there. The Somali government can operate from Mogadishu. That's part of value for money. I don't know how to operationalize value for money in this. I think it has been clear. For the majority of EU member states, let's say six, seven years ago, there was a beginning of a bit of a fatigue to just continue with the same. And I think we had a momentum at the beginning of the current government of Hassan Sheikh, understanding that there is a more comprehensive understanding of how to secure Somalia, how to have a political alignment go for the outstanding issues of the Constitution, realign and unify basically the relationship between FGS and FMS. So I think that was a more optimistic approach from our side, supported by our side thinking. And we had a joint roadmap, basically, for policy for Somalia. And part of the roadmap, so it's a political, economic, but also security roadmap. And we made it very clear last year in May, together with the Somalis, we need to see a transition. We need to see a transition plan that is a realistic transition plan where we need to have an understanding how far are the Somalis ready to go in leading the Somali security, not just in terms of capacity of SNA and police, but also in terms of, do they have the political will? Can they move basically across clan borders? We need realism here. Because it's clear the Atme's mission, as it exists right now, will phase out by the end of the year. We don't want to end in a void. We need to have now a very constructive and swift engagement on what could be a follow-up mission. Our hope is we could have a follow-up mission that is a totally different mission that would be a mission financed by assess contributions where, and this is becoming a bit complicated, where we would hope the AU could chip in up to 5%. We would cover something, and then 75% would be covered by the contributions to the UN. Now, assess contributions that would require a totally new mission. That mission, in our understanding, would be a mission supporting the Somali security sector, being protecting critical infrastructure, protecting Villa Somalia, protecting the airport, more in a protective engagement, rather than in the kinetic outfit that we see right now that is maybe also not fully used. But we need to have this transition plan. We need to start discussing it. We need to start discussing realist financing opportunities and possibilities. Because I don't see under the current circumstances EU member states being ready to just continue what we've done so far. Because as you said, I mean, it's a different ballgame. But Somalia is the second after Ukraine that EU invests in, including specifically on the security side, 17 years. It was basically the EU financing utmost. We do want to work and continue working with the Somalis on the security. But we want the Somalis to take a lead. Because at the end of the day, it has to be a Somali-led security. It cannot come from outside. But what I said before, I think this is where it's important for the region to also have an understanding what is the region ready to communicate, to engage, to bring also in terms of troops to the fore in having a conversation about a regional engagement to protect Somalia. That is also important for us to give. You talked earlier about the humanitarian crisis, which is threatening to engulf the region. And the hunger crisis in particular will hit by May. There's a question here from Solania Maetra. In the wake of the conflict in Ukraine and the situation Gaza, what steps, if any, have you had to take to fight for policy space, as we're in, in order to highlight this humanitarian challenge? I mean, obviously, there's potentially going to be donor fatigue, in a way. How do you keep the attention firmly on the humanitarian plight of the horn? It's becoming more and more difficult. And I think you see this in the big frustration of Ocha, of Eko, of all the humanitarians right now. I mean, it's underfunded. It's not even 40% funded. And we talk about immediate humanitarian engagement. We're not even talking about reconstruction. And I think I mentioned it before, when we talk about, for example, the figures, what would be necessary to reconstruct Northern Ethiopia, Tigray, we're talking about billions. No one has these billions right now. And this is really, it's such a disservice to the people who have been suffering through the war, who need to come back to normality. And the question is a very real question. It's becoming more and more difficult to get humanitarian funding. It's easier, actually, to get funding for investment, for example, in the Horn of Africa initiative. Because that is something you can build on. It's something positive. So the spin is easier than the funding on the humanitarian. That shouldn't be the case. I mean, people who are suffering from a war shouldn't suffer because we are fatigued. But that's massively a reality. We see this everywhere. And of course, we see it also in the case of Sudan and the Horn of Africa in general. It will increase even more if we add to the conflict related hunger, if we add to climate related. So I think we really need to have much bigger discussions about what does it take to keep regions secure? What does it take to keep people alive, rather than just the funding cycles that are getting less and less and less. So we need to have more robust discussions on that. Any questions in the room? Yes, please. My name is Maurice. I'm one of the Sudanese community in Ireland. My family is personally affected. My brother and sister ended up as refugees in Uganda right now. I just want to bring back to the rule of the EU in the current disaster that's been inflicted on Sudan. Dr. Weber talked about the expansion of the RSF militia in the region. But the first step, which marks the transformation of Hemitis militia from a local militia operating and the Sudan regime to a transnational mercenary group, was actually the implementation of the 1.2 billion euro EU immigration policy, the so-called Khartoum process. Despite multiple warnings from think tanks, the South London University, the lack of Oxfam, Amnesty International, multiple activists, they warned that this policy doesn't only come at high human cost because it push refugees into taking more dangerous route. But it will strengthen the border of the militia in the region. And down the line, it will destabilize the region. And they were absolutely right on the money about that warning. That policy started in 2014, 2015, and now we are seeing the result. The militia is so strong, waging war. It's not a war against the Sudanese army. It's a war against Sudanese people. And it's sadly funded by us Sudanese who are working in Europe paying tax given to the EU. The EU used it to fund and train. The last one was in February 2022, where Hemitti himself secretly, that visit was hidden even from the Italian parliament. He visited Italy and had a deal sanctioned by the EU through the same process. A deal involved training of his troops and provision of drones to his troops. So if Dr. Weber would like to comment on that, thank you. Yeah, there is no money. There has not been any money going through the cartoon process to Hemitti. And of course, there are actually no existing European drones. And nothing is provided to Hemitti. You are right in terms of that there was a full acceptance of the government of Burhan and Hemitti. But that was not coming through the EU. It was an acceptance of a government that was a self-installed government by the two, being number one and number two, before the coup and after the coup. And I think this is, of course, you can criticize that we have been dealing with both as a counterpart to discuss, but there was no money going to Hemitti before on the cartoon process. If you follow his communication, he was always complaining that he's acting as front-text, but he's not paid as front-text. So he wanted to see his troops as basically the gatekeeper to Libya, which they were. But there was no front-text money going to Hemitti. I think the question right now is, and I totally agree, the war is not against the South. The war is against the people of Sudan. The question right now is, how do you get out of this? You need a region that is also having an understanding that a takeover of a military win of Hemitti is not the end of the war in Sudan. It's not a consolidation. That requires the region and beyond to also see that, you know, if you look at the reception of Hemitti in the last couple of months by all neighboring countries, including Rwanda and South Africa, he's becoming, and this is not just up to him. It's also up to Burhan, because Burhan had him as number two. The two of them wanted to be seen as the legitimate leaders of the country. As EU, we have stopped all money after the coup. And we constantly, I was interacting with them, but we were always clear. You're not the legitimate leaders of this country. You are cool leaders, but you're not leading this country. You're not elected. You're not elected by the people. You disrupted the civilian transition that started in 2019. So the EU has stopped, and of course, many Sudanese were very bitter about this, that we have stopped. You can talk to, you know, Jibril Rahim and others. We have stopped all the money that was going in through the government. We had continued with the development corporation, but there was no money going to neither Burhan, nor Hamedi, nor to the finance ministry. So I think you're right in terms of there is too much acceptance of the two as leaders, as legitimate leaders. That has been the case. But let's move on to it. Please, guys, you ask for the floor. Thank you very much, Dr. Webb, for your presentation. And it's very extensively talking about the Horn of Africa. My name is Suleyman Abdulahi, a Somali origin, lived here in the island for the last 18 years, nearly 20 years now, and I'm watching it as what happened in that country. And the question I want to ask you is that the European Union initiative of the Horn of Africa, how long do you think the situation, how do you think there's a high risk the decision made by the happy Ahmad to have access for the Red Sea and agreeing with the one particular region in Somalia, which is the Somali sovereignty, is one at risk, number one. And that impacted how the Al-Shabaab can get the recruit for the young Somali brainwashing them and say, like, we are defending the nationalists. They come up with the nationalists. So I was looking for this morning, saying, like, they get over 1,000 young men and some of the boat is defected from other side, like a government side or Somali, like a nationalistic to now join the radical. So what are the... How can we refaint it that Al-Shabaab not get this time to decision time where you say that the Atmos peacekeeping force will live in Somalia at the end of the year. And then the Ethiopian initiative come through Somaliland regionally. How volatile that is, that's the one question. The second question is the Emirates influence in the region, in Ethiopia, in Somalia, in Sudan. And is that deregulated or that they have no any kind of a free ride for the whole region and how that positive or negative and the opinion of the European Union. Thank you. If I can start with the second question, because I think it's quite obvious that the reach of the UAE in the Horn of Africa is growing. I mean, the footprint is massive. And there is a lot of influence. And I think there is a lot of influence that is also positively perceived by the leadership of the countries because they do sometimes prefer very bilateral transactional engagements. This is much more what the UAE does than in comparison to the EU. We're not transactional. We're not so quick. We'd rather do multilateral than bilateral. So I think many leaders in the region prefer the Emirates style, let's say. What does that result into? I think that's a different question. But it's also a question that needs to be discussed with the leadership in the region. I think we have overlap on interests with the Emirates in terms of climate change prevention. We have overlaps in investment in green energy. But for example, we don't have necessarily an overlap in what we would like to see, oh, sorry, in the political future of Sudan. For us, it's very important that it's a civilian led government. Maybe that's not the same necessarily for the Emirates. But I think to me, the question of the Emirati footprint is much more a question of, is that an engagement that is much more appreciated in the region because of their style of doing politics than our engagement? So I would like to bring the question back to the leadership in the region. The MOU that you mentioned before and the mobilization of al-Jabab, I think this is really varying right now, of course. I mean, we see al-Jabab being strong, mobilizing on the background of fighting against the Ethiopians. That will not just bring more problems to the current leadership in Somalia, but also, of course, more problems to the region. Because if al-Jabab is reaching out, if they reach out, as they have done in Kenya before and now increasingly, potentially also in Ethiopia, it's a force you can hardly stop right now. So yes, it's a problem. I think what I said in the beginning, I would hope that there can be a solution where basically President Hassan Sheikh can play a proactive role in shaping negotiation on, for example, commercial interests. And I think that could be a solution that can bring the tensions down. If that's not possible, I mean, I think another conflict in this region would really be not just devastating, but it would be a total destruction for what has been slowly, slowly, slowly rebuilt in Somalia, but of course, also in the neighboring countries. So I really hope that there is enough wisdom to prevent an eruption of war. But yes, I think the risk as you laid out is really there. Thank you. Thank you very much. My name is Adik Mlegumes. I'm from Ghana in West Africa. So like everybody else, I'll probably be looking at the Horn of Africa as an outsider. I'd like to thank you very much for your presentation because you finished, as you said, on something positive. Now, my, well, I've also taken an interest in the Horn of Africa, as I say, especially Somalia. And last year, for example, sorry, the rule of, from what you said, it looks like the EU is dealing with the governments. Now, people usually ask, when something happens to a country, what are the people themselves doing to resolve it? Now, 40 years ago, last year, I came across the work of, sorry, not 40 years ago, but last year I came across information that the late Dr. Howard Abdi established Hope Village 40 years ago. Now, one of the programs is the reconciliation, peace and reconciliation resolution. Now, another information I came across is the Somali Institute for Peace. So my first question is, does the EU deal with only at official level or the role of civil society? What are they doing with society? Then the second question is, when you made reference to the humanitarian situation, now, yes, we see news of the full situation. At the same time, you go to a supermarket in Europe and you see food from the Horn of Africa. Now, people have different views about that. But my question is that are there efforts even to put that on the agenda? So, for example, if you take Kenya to ask them, why is food going out of the country when people are starving? Thank you. Let me start maybe with the beginning because, of course, I think member states, Ireland, and you can speak for Ireland. I think most of us focus much more on civil society and supporting civil society than just focusing on states. I think the peace organizations, the reconciliation organizations in Somalia but also in Sudan and other places, I spoke about the civilians in Sudan that we support to basically come together because we do strongly believe that they should build the government coming from civil society organizations. So I think this is where the EU is maybe the strongest supporter. Do we always put our flag on it? No. Should we do this? I think that's a discussion we're currently having. No, so absolutely not just focusing on governments as such. There is a lot of engagement on civil society and massive support for civil society because we see that in our own countries, of course, you need an active civil society to be able to have a strong coherence and a link between citizens and state and accountability without a civil society. This is lacking and then you don't go far. And I think this is really where it's not just a token. It's really out of being convinced that civil society is the core element for a functioning country and relation between state and citizens or government and citizens. Maybe the last question, can you remind me on the last question? We saw in the media about the humanitarian, especially food crisis. And at the same time, food from the Horn of Africa is sold in swarming markets here. And I was wondering, does it make sense to appeal to the European public to say, give us money to send food when they go to the swarming markets and they have their own food? And the question is, can the Kenyan government, for example, not be confronted and ask, why are you sending food out of the country when the media says there is farming? So we just signed a preferential trade agreement with Kenya and to do exactly both. And I think this is really important. We want Kenya to sell products, including agricultural products, so they can have cash returns because Kenya needs cash. That doesn't mean that Kenya should only sell to the outside. But if you look at the complexity of a country, you cannot just produce for the national consumption. You can produce for the national consumption if you have a regionally integrated economy. A country like Germany, for example, we cannot produce our own food. We need neighboring countries. We need trade agreements. And I think the same goes for Kenya. But of course, the question is, is it basically the supplies coming in for the regions in Kenya that are suffering currently from either drought or flooding, that again is more the question of humanitarian aid. Kenya in itself is not food insecure. Kenya can produce food and Kenya can have food produced in the region. But of course, Kenya can also produce food for the export to basically gain the money that they need to invest in industries, in investments, in energy that they choose to invest. So I think it's, I'm not an expert on agricultural trade agreements, but I think this trade agreement for Kenya is quite positive. But of course, it really takes the region to be better integrated because otherwise, and you will see this right now, it will have a massive impact what we see in the Red Sea, food prices will go up exponentially because everyone needs to go around the continent, including the food exports Kenya to Europe, but of course also the food import from Ukraine, grain to the Horn of Africa. So it's not a one-sided issue. I don't think it's just one aspect, but it's definitely much better if you can produce and consume in your more immediate neighborhood than a very, very far away. So thank you very much, Ajiva. In fact, we've run out of time, unfortunately, and we could talk quite some considerable time. You have a gigantic portfolio really between one thing and another. I'd like to thank everybody online, everybody in the room for taking part in this event. Most of all, I'd like to thank you for having been good enough to come here to make a fantastic presentation and to answer some challenging questions. We wish you all the best back in Nairobi with many challenges that you're facing and you at least managed to strike a couple of positive notes. But it is, as we can all see, it is a particularly difficult time and in the region at present, and we wish you every success with your efforts on behalf of the EU. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you.