 Felly, rydw i, i'n dechrau'r panlwst hwn. Rydw i, mae'n gweithio hwnnw ddod o'r panlwst hwnnw fel ym mhwylwch. Felly, o'r ffordd, o'r brosl o'r rhaid mewn, a'r dublyn, o'r cadmian o'r busnes, o'r sgfaith. Felly, i'n rhaid oedden nhw'n rhoi'n bwysig o ffordd o London, o'r carol o'r gwaith. A wneud i'r bwysig, mae'n gweithio'r troi. Felly, rwy'n credu i chi ddim yn dechrau Catherine Day, fel yna y 2015 yw'r Llyfrgell Cymru yn y Cymru yn Brwsol. Yn amlwg ymlaen i'r gwaith cymdeithasol, ac mae'n rhan o'n gwneud i'w rhan o'r ymddiol. Cynl MacDevit yn Y Cymru, ac mae'r cymdeithasol yn Y Cymdeithasol yn ymddiol. Mae'r cymdeithasol yn Brexit, lle mae'n gwneud i'r cymdeithasol yn ymddiol, ac mae'n ddechrau yn Ffynor. Mae'n ddim yn ddechrau yn Y Cymdeithasol, mae'n ddweud yn y Cymru, a'r ddweud yn ymddiol yn ddweud yn y Cymdeithasol. Mae'n ddim yn y cwestiynau. Mae'n ddweud i'r cymdeithasol yn ddych chi'n gweithio'r cymdeithasol, yn mynd yn gymweithio'r cymdeithasol, roedd grab jodol, dim i ychwanegu yr urithio cyrraedd, i omeid hyw sy'n cyf aerial saved viaill! A cymdeithasol yn defnyddio groes garnisiol, a chyflom sydd am bod ni'n digwydd. Rwyf yn ôl yn 60rhydd, doedd nhw ynoly hechoi yr olygr y corth serviceoli tivehydd pen90 ar gyfer 하겠습니다 ofnig frydyr.ёт Logurea, I ddim yn mynd i ddim yn cwydio'r cwaith a theoryr ytodol yn Jewsen. ar y ddyfodol yn fwyaf i'r ddigon i gael y llwyddon. Gweld y cyfnod o'r cyfle i'r ddyfodol, a chwych i ddweud eich cwmwylliant a chyfodol i ddweud eich rôl i'r dweud i'r ddweud i'r ddweud i'r dweud eich ddweud eich ddweud i'r ddweud. Tysg yn ymgyrch gyda'r cyfnod o'r gyfnod oedol, oedd yn ddweud eich ddweud, ac mae'n ddweud ei wneud, Byddwn i ysgrifnwyd y Prifysgwyr etoeddiad. Yn yr Eogol, iawn o'r iawn ydych chi'n gwneud, ni'n mynedd i fynd i'r cyhoedd. Mae Eogol yma yn ystod. Mae wedi erbyn erwod o'i finfeld. Oni'n ddim ddiwethaf sy'n credu ar y system Unigol sy'n credu yn iawn i'w cyfreitio. Mae'r bwysig yna oedd yn ymateb o bwysig. Y Unigol ar ôl i'r cyfrifwyr sy'n bynnig. Ond rydym yn ein dwyddaeth i'r bwysig o'i dod o'r hyffordr. felly mae'r cyfnod o'r llwydd Ffforddon yn ymdegwyd yn meddwl i'r cyflwydd. Yn gwrth gwrs, mae'n them ni'n arall y fawr o'r cyhoedd yn y gyhoedd, a'r cyfnod o'r cyflwydd yn ei brif. Mae'r cyflwydd yn fwy o'r cyflwydd yn ei wneud yn rhywbeth yn y ddalig. Mae'n gweithio'r cyflwydd yn cyfrifol. Mae'r cyflwydd yn ei wneud yn cyfrifol o'r cyflwydd. Mae'r cyfrwdd yn cyfrwyd yn cyfrwyd yn cyfrwyd yn cyfrwyd yma. I think some sort of grandfathering is obviously the solution, but I think we will get stuck fairly quickly on how to make sure that these rights continue into the future and the question of whether there's an independent legal body that oversees those rights because if the rest of the EU is asked to accept that the British government into the future will guarantee those rights and it would have to be a pretty strong guarantee that they won't just be overturned by a new government down the road and the second issue that they will come to on looking at the financial liabilities of the UK as it leaves the EU will also be difficult so we will get into I think rather difficult negotiations fairly quickly but nonetheless my fundamental point remains I don't think the British system has yet focused on the compromises that they will have to make because their negotiating position seems to be we want everything we like and we don't want anything we don't like and you cannot send people into technical negotiations with that as a mandate you have to decide this is more important than that and it seems to me that the British really have to assess the value of negotiating their own trade deals versus the inconvenience to put it mildly of leaving the customs union and where did they put that on the scale of their priorities of the things that they don't like about the EU and I don't think they have begun to do more than scratch the surface of that yet. Secondly on timing it was always going to be tight not because two years isn't long enough to negotiate a divorce arrangement or the fit the way in which the UK will leave but because it's difficult to conclude on the divorce settlement until you see where you're going next and that includes going through the transitional arrangements and we will get some clarity from the article 15 negotiations if the UK continues to say we will leave the customs union then we will know we're into a different scenario if they say well after all having looked at it and now seeing what we see we will stay in the customs union then I think that will resolve a lot of issues and make the subsequent arrangements and the negotiation of transitional arrangements much easier but still all of that will take a lot of time. It's tempting to say that the time period of two years provided under article 50 will be extended it can be if it's provided in the article itself that if everybody agrees the time period can be extended and given the difficulty of making predictions at the moment and seeing how the world changes from one hour to the next I would think a possible extension of the time period could be a good way to smooth the transition from one region to another but as always has been for a long time it will depend on the politics of the Tory party and not anything else when the moment of taking that decision comes. Without wanting to sound like Andrea led some over the weekend I do want to say something about the role of the British media in all of this because for a long time they have taken a very confrontational approach to Europe and have always seen it as win-and-lose so which is not the way most of the rest of the EU looks at negotiations it's about coming to an agreement that everybody can be more or less happy with and you saw that right at the beginning the UK was considered to have conceded and caved in by accepting the sequencing that the EU had already decided in April now I think that is not a good sign of things to come because these negotiations will be very detailed they will go on in very different sectors things will be negotiated to a certain level and then parked and compromises will be made across the whole range of things so if you have a simplistic mentality that says every negotiating session Britain has to win otherwise it's losing it's going to make the mood music and the actual handling of the negotiations much more difficult I think and and by the way I think and UK is going to have to get used to accepting that the bigger partners with whom it will be negotiating in the future will cause what call most of the shots that will apply in the trade deals that they're hoping to do as well as in their dealings with the EU so it seems to me that yes we have we have finally had started and there is a lot of exasperation frustration I think around the EU 27 and certainly here that people still don't know what it's going to be like when you're after photos taken I think it will take quite a bit longer before we actually can get clear answers to the questions that people are asking because we have to go through some of the issues like the citizens rights and the financial liabilities before we get to discuss the trade details which is what I think most of Ireland wants to hear answers on so it's going to be a long-hauled exercise I think the politics has changed in the last few weeks it could change again in this long-hauled exercise it could change several times in this long-hauled exercise so we just have to and have the patience to stick with it and go through it and I'll stop there because I think there will be plenty of time for discussion after this. Good thanks captain. And over your calls. Thanks morning everyone maybe to pick up on Catherine's point about the Conservative Party I guess this starts in the British Conservative Party, a middle end in the British Conservative Party we're only here because of its dysfunctional relationship with Europe going back since forever and it is it is the ultimate case study in the tiny tale wagging a huge mammoth dog of the European Union so the first question I'd like to pose is this can this British Conservative Party deliver a settlement and the answer to that is clearly no you know you may run a government on a confidence and supply agreement absolutely there are plenty of really great examples in this jurisdiction Scotland elsewhere around the world of minority government's ruin to an agreed problem for government on domestic agenda and doing so quite well but can you negotiate the exit of a member state of the European Union a confidence supply agreement to the DC you cannot I think that's the first reality check we all need to accept it just cannot happen it is just too complicated and if it can happen then we will be really really really fundamentally rewriting the books of our democracy and the way governments have operated over the past past 50 odd years here in here in Europe and elsewhere in Syria what's known as the the democratic work and the second point I'd like to make is is is related which is when you come to negotiations Seamus Marlon told me when I was a very young man you need to ask two basic questions the first is you need to ask yourself whether the individuals on the other side of the table are willing to do a deal so is there a willingness to actually achieve an outcome and that I think talks very directly to Catherine's point about the fact that an outcome by definition will be a consensus it'll be a win-win or a lose-lose it can't be a win-lose so is there a willingness I sense a reluctant willingness on behalf of the remaining members of the European Union it's a reluctant one they do not want to be in the situation I'm not certain there is a willingness in the United Kingdom because if there were a willingness then no deal option would be off the table let's think about it just step back from a second you would not be saying no deal is an option if there was actually a fundamental willingness to reach a great and the second criteria that James used to always talk to was the ability to do so at which point I used to get asked to leave the room and that is you know is the capacity there within the system on the other side of the table to actually do to have any lifting that will be needed in order to reach an agreement and there's several types of of individual several types of skill sets that you need on the other side of the table in order to reach the agreement you need excellent technocrats and white all is brimming with X no technocrats it's brimming with individuals who have led the way in shaping structures of permanent government of accountable civil service and they if left to do their job will do a fantastic job but you also need the big thinkers you need people have a vision beyond the supplement they need to be able to be able to actually clearly explain and clearly advocate and convince all those technocrats of the merits of what they are doing all this work for in other words that what will happen after the supplement will be better than what we have today and the third thing is you need the critic in the room you need the you need the contrary and the skeptic the one that says are you able what about and I think at best in the UK today you have two out of those three you might have the contrarian and you certainly have the technocrat but you do not have the big thinker so that's the second hurdle that I think we have to consider and all of this I think is important in the context of brexit because we know brexit is a bad process and we've got a lovely poster on the wall and studying the house I was meant to try and get my kids who are all sort of in their secondary school years now to try and embrace the process and it says embrace the process I turn up every day into your homework it'll come good in the end Europe is very good at embracing the process here in Ireland in our relationship in Europe we have always embraced the process that's why we've got such a good outcome from article 50 that's why the directives are disproportionately advantageous to us as a very small member state at the United Kingdom learned a lot about embracing the process through the peace process they came to the peace process as bilateralists they did not particularly understand in my opinion how to leverage process to achieve an outcome but is that learning still there and will they apply it to these negotiations to find those Catherine point I'm just not sure I have the benefit of the privilege running a company that is people who sit in London 25 of them people sit here people sit in Brussels people sit in Frankfurt in Paris in Berlin and at nature and you know they come back having spoken to ministers he's a great anecdote this is what they come back to you with when they spoke to ministers and this Sunday after the general election before at the day after Downing Street have put out the statement saying there was a deal with the DUP and then the DUP put out a statement saying there was no deal with the British government two of my senior colleagues both of them were active active in in the Conservative party and very well connected came back to report a conversation to different members of the British government in which those individuals expressed total confidence that the DUP would be over the line by by basically lunchtime on Monday and that there was nothing really to worry about that just doesn't display you know a very worrying ignorance of northern politics and the dynamics of northern politics and the fact that every political party and everyone who's been forged in northern politics comes to negotiations as a marathon and a and a war of attrition and it's a simple rule it's the rule of last person standing and you've given nothing until you've got everything but it also displays a fundamental ignorance of process of basic process in that you don't enter any negotiations in a predeterminist mindset you don't do not brief during negotiations that things are over when there's still stuff on the table because the reaction that that generates is only ever one and that is for more stuff to be put in the table and for the negotiations to try get and I guess I feel about brexit and three things one is I feel a deep deep sense of uncertainty and it's not uncertainty because of the consequences of withdrawal and what we do on a technical level after the point and how we reorder Europe around ourselves it's uncertainty about the ability to even get there and how much damage could be done in the next two to three years as it unravels further maybe to eventually reach a final destination but definitely tomorrow and the second thing I feel is I feel quite depressed and down about how we ended up in a situation where a political party that represents a very noble and long-standing tradition in British politics but in the grand scheme of Europe is not the determinant of our future has been able to create a situation where we are who we are today and thirdly I fear for us here in Ireland because it is well documented that we are the most impacted and exposed peoples we have the most impacted and exposed economy and we have the most complicated set of outcomes to negotiation to achieve with regard to maintaining the integrity of the island and the integrity of the good Friday institutions and the integrity of consent it is it is I spent 20 20 years and I still live about fast passionately advocating the case for constitution nationalism it was never in the rulebook on the script book of constitution nationalism that we've exploit a bad decision to accelerate an exercise of consent on this island and any exercise of consent that is brought about as a consequence of a crisis elsewhere may achieve something that would be very beautiful for many people on this island too but it would not be the way to achieve it so the stakes could not be higher and and to be honest with you you know the probability of it all falling apart before we get even to third base in one dimension or another in my opinion are exceptionally high good thanks we'll certainly pick up on that and get everyone's views on that David okay thanks thanks for the invitation to be here and pick up on a couple of the issues which have been raised by both Katherine and Colonel on the first one capacity I think one of the things we really got to appreciate is the sheer scale of what is a multifaceted brexit a brexit negotiations and we've heard about the article 50 withdrawal negotiations there's been an allusion to the trade dimension as well I think we have to be aware there's a transitional dimension there and also the domestic questions about repatriation of power repeal legislation plus the devolution dimension as well and all that's happening concurrently and then we've also got to think as part of that what the British government trying to do in terms of delivering on the freedom to secure his own external trade agreements so all the work that's going on in a new replacement trade agreements with the third countries and that's all compounded by the fact that you've got to shrinking civil service plus a very weak minority government continued uncertainty and that's to my mind is before the realities of negotiation negotiating with the EU at home so complexity is amazing and there must be questions as to whether the resource exists to deliver on any one of those let alone all of them and I don't think there's been sufficient appreciation in the British system of the scale of the task ahead second point I want to make is about the EU position which in many respects has been very impressive in terms of unity and also struck by the fact that the article 15 negotiation the mandate I think only had to be a qualified majority given the way the outcome is going to be qualified majority the stress has been on that being adopted at unanimity and in a very very short period of time okay that's important I think because it is going to be the EU position which determines the possible outcomes for the negotiations and when we think about the EU position we have to think not just about what's coming out of Brussels but the fact that each of the member states operate under their own domestic constraints we've got institutional preferences coming through from the Commission and from the Parliament as well and we throw in the council I think as part of these one aspect of the negotiations which isn't necessarily appreciated is the fact that whatever the EU does or includes in the agreement with the UK does set precedence precedence that if the EU is going to be very wary about setting not just in terms of potential state leaving but also in terms of trade agreements those sort of concessions which might be made on agriculture are going to be poured over by a whole host of states outside the EU and this is going to constrain the EU in what it's going to be willing to do the type of institutional relationship the UK may set up the EU may set up with the UK it's going to be looked at by other states who are in a very very close relationship with the EU but don't have access to institutions don't have this decision making making role I think that constraint exists on the EU so there's a shadow of relations with other states which is going to influence the EU's position as well final point comes with just looking back at the history of EU external relations and what the EU has done over time and I think we can identify a number of under underlying principles which the EU has adhered to consistently over time and I don't think are going to be broken in this instance firstly is that balance between rights and obligations if you want to have any particular access to the EU you want to have any sort of engagement it comes with obligations this goes back to the cherry picking the having a cake needing it but I sometimes think in the British discourse about Brexit about the future relationship this fundamental principle is not sufficiently understood even though it's there in the treaty the secondly there is decision making autonomy of the EU whatever relationship you're going to have with the EU in the future is going to be one where you are outside the EU you're outside of decision making at best you're going to get decision-shaking when we think about many of the obligations which the British may have to take on board I wonder whether they're going to accept that position but that's going to be the position it has and then the third principle which comes out if we look back the history of relations is the prioritisation by the EU of the internal over the external ultimately the EU's interests are its own and its own integration process and that's going to trump any desire to make any significant concessions to the British I'm not particularly optimistic when it comes to how these negotiations may actually proceed okay good thanks look if I could start with you as a UK national I was some British people I spoke to reasonable people feel that they're being treated unfairly the the ymker the leak of the the Downing Street dinner with you between ymker and may the money issue the sequencing issue that was a vote they voted to leave and the nothing treated fairly do you think there's there's any how do you view that position as a UK national if you're coming from the context of a very naive debate about Europe which has characterised British discussions of membership over the last 43 years I can see why you will see that EU is presented as being unfair towards the UK is not taking the UK's position into consideration but if one understands the EU comes back to the point made earlier does the EU does the UK understand the EU the position which ymker the others of the doctor should not come as any surprise whatsoever at all and I think this is actually one of the big problems we have in the British debate and this interview was said media later is that is it actually capable of reporting on a process which is going to have to involve compromise and concession in a context when there's a lack of understanding of how the EU actually works I say it's one of the biggest failings of the British whole whole debate which is now to the referendum and the position where it is the British are still coming to terms with actually what 43 years of membership means and if they don't actually understand that it's very difficult and do really appreciate the difficulties of actually unpacking that relationship hence the negative reactions towards ymgyrch ymwntwsg ond the others. Colin you said you thought there's a big risk that the drugs could break down just that issue do you think people in the unionist community because the unions apparently are a much bigger vote to leave amongst the unionist community do you think there's an alienation towards the EU in the unionist community? An alienation towards the EU? Well I mean it's a whole different topic Northern Unionism? Well the way it will be could be into the UK government position. So you have to come up from the point of view that Northern Unionism will still default to believing that any situation outside of its continued membership in the United Kingdom is disadvantageous to Northern Unionism so that is what gets in the way of making Northern Ireland work as a region because it involves compromise around the regional status de facto or implied and that in itself causes enough of a crisis within Unionism to cause it to default. So I think Unionism has ended up here with regard to Brexit on default setting but what I think needs to happen and this is why Declan's point about the importance of the restoration of devolution and developed institutions is to move the debate beyond that and to start creating the space where Northern Unionism has literally got enough of a comfort around it to be able to explore what the options might be. If that doesn't happen so if there is no restoration of devolution in Northern Ireland and if there isn't stable government in the United Kingdom and if government is beholden to an orange cart then Northern Unionism will not be able to develop a sophisticated, no that's the wrong word, develop a mature attitude towards these talks. It will by virtue default into having a reactive attitude towards them and that would just be adding to the first complications within the UK and for us on the end of the moment. Could I come to maybe Declan, Catherine, on just how this whole thing works? Barnier is negotiating on behalf of 26, 27 countries. He's negotiating with the British and the 27 have to try and influence and keep an eye. Could you just explain how that, you know, how you can look over, how you look over his shoulder, how you influence the position, how that, you know, how that actually just functions on a day-to-day basis? Well, I think it's worth just making the point that our core issues are a special set of issues. I mean, there are three priorities for the first phase. Citizens, the financial settlement and Ireland and the importance which Barnier and his team at Asked to Ireland, the intensity of the contacts we have are quite unique. Barnier has said that he wants a unique settlement and he is very, very close to the thinking of the Irish Government. He's been to Dublin, he's met the previous Theisha several times, the current Theisha met him last Thursday, he meets ministers, I'm in regular contact with him and his staff. I just want to emphasise that point that this is not, you say EU 27, it is not ourselves looking in on this as an outsider. This is something we're deeply and absolutely woven into. I would make that point. Obviously, citizens rights and the financial settlement were like the other members of the 27, but the Irish issue is an issue of such capital importance. We are deeply woven in and that is fully understood and accepted by Michel Barnier and his staff's force. One other point I would make is that this again emphasises the importance of being a full and active member of the European Union. That we do, and we have had extremely close relations with the institutions, with the Commission. Catherine can talk more about that with the secretariat, with the European Parliament. Going back to something David said, the psychological shock, the visible psychological shock that the British delegation had in Brussels, when they suddenly realised that they weren't part of the project anymore, they don't leave until they leave, but things have changed fundamentally. This would have been in the run up to the European Council at the 29th of April. It was quite noticeable. I just want to put that in context, but you asked Catherine too. Catherine, from your experience of the way the Commission operates negotiating with Canada or other countries, to what extent is the Commission acting as a co-ordinator for the 27, and to what extent is it an actor feeding back? Just explain that dynamic of the role of the Commission. The Commission is negotiating for the Union, so it's not the Council negotiating under the instruction from the 27 member states. I always describe the Commission negotiations as having 27 mothers-in-law, because there is not a single second that the 27 are not calling on over the Commission, phoning in, seeing people. Declan talked about four times a day contact. You multiply that by 27 plus regions, plus Senedd, plus everything. The Commission doesn't have a minute to itself. The Commission has decided, I think, wisely and inevitably to go for full transparency. It has a website. It will put up all the papers that it sends to the member states and to the British, 24 hours after it sends them to the member states. The Commission has very little, if no one were proper. If the member states say, what the hell are you doing? Change that. The Commission will change it. It has to look after what's defined in the treaties as the European interest, but, of course, who is the European Union except its member states. The relationship is very closely interwoven. Cora Berr, Declan's committee, is a key player, but there's also a working party. There's the General Affairs Council. Every meeting of the European Council will devote what some member states will consider as too much time to the Brexitations from now until it's over. Who's on the working party? The member state representatives. The Commission will report regularly in the beginning to the Council, to the member states and to the Parliament, but I think it will end up being daily at certain points, or half-daily even. It becomes a logistical problem for the Commission and that's why it's decided on full transparency because it's almost impossible to keep everybody simultaneously informed. There's a lot of suspicion, so everybody thinks somebody else has the inside track. The Commission is driven demented on the one hand trying to deal with the negotiations, and on the other hand trying to assure everybody that it is telling everybody everything and that there are some things that nobody will know until they happen. The mechanics are complicated, but this is standard Brussels business. It's why you have a permanent committee of ambassadors in Brussels. They have a difficult job of always reporting back home to people who are following it less than full-time and still wanted to get the nuances and all the rest of it. So the act of gathering the political intelligence from the capitals is important for the Commission through the core repair as well as through its own services. That's the ambitiveness of the core repair. David, anybody have questions if you want to indicate an interest in putting a question to any one of the panelists? I'll take up a number list. But David, that mentioned that suspicion thing, the issue of suspicion. Do you use a long history of the member's dates on the disagreements about different things? It's been quite surprising, I think, for 27 so far, don't seem to have been arguing amongst themselves about the exit so far. Do you see that being maintained? Do you see the risk of the different countries within the 27 having open disagreements about how to deal with Britain? I think you're definitely going to have disagreements and they will come to the fore. I think one of the problems you've got is in the absence of a clear British position, it's very difficult to really begin to be critical in terms of substance and for divisions to emerge. I think if the UK had been far clearer on what it actually wanted from the exit and what it wants from the future relationship, then you actually create more things on the agenda around to discrete at the moment. Very, very little indeed and so that I think allows the EU 27 to maintain the unity. Lot's going to depend on what the UK is going to be pushing for. Do you want to make up? I do, yes, because I think my view is the unity will remain very strong on things. So the principles that David was outlining, for example, I think we will see less unity when we get into the negotiation of the trade details of the future relationship because every member state competes with every other member state and I think there will be and there have been already UK attempts to divide the union and there will maybe be other attempts to divide the union for different reasons. But I think it's both a question of understanding that the EU has to stay united and again a recognition of inevitability that any deal has to be agreed by a qualified majority by the member states and they will try to do it by consensus if at all possible. So in the end, even if you are tempted to cut and run and do a deal, a side deal, it will have to come back to the main table and everybody watches everybody else. So I think that steadying effect of being condemned if you like to staying together will keep the unity on the EU side. Are you being watched particularly closely, Devin, because obviously Ireland is a closer interest in all of this. So are other countries looking at you a little suspiciously thinking maybe you're a bit too close to Britain to be there? I think that, look, we have a kind of a geographical situation, Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom is on the island of Ireland. This is one of the reasons why the approach by ministers and officials is going to capitals and a kind of an educational mission several months ago was so important just to explain what the Coacarantor status was of the Good Friday Agreement, to explain how the North South Ministerial Council worked, to explain how the British Irish Council worked, all of that and to distinguish that from the question of negotiating before notification or negotiating on our own. That point I think is fully understood now and certainly is understood to a much greater degree than it was a year ago. So I think to answer your point, no, I mean of course I'm paranoid but I don't necessarily, just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not all after you anyway but anyway. But no, no, I think we've gone past that and I think we've explained our particular set of circumstances very clearly and by the way one of the positive effects of that Dan has been that there is now also a much greater grasp on the part of our partners about the unique set of challenges, the absolutely unique predicament we have on this. So that's been a positive outcome of this pedagogical exercise if you like. Good, Alison, you wanted to commit, there's a mic there. Listening to the panel collectively, there's obviously a high level of respect for the British Civil Service but I can only, my own conclusion listening to what has been said about Conservative party politicians and their approach so far would be to use the word damning, you know, their ill-preparedness unwillingness, apparent unwillingness to accept reality and even as they now are in negotiations still in that place. So is it wrong of me to sit here and feel utterly despairing as to how the negotiations are going to go or how there could be any level of a successful conclusion if that remains. Even I think it's Catherine who said that the Conservative party politicians didn't even know their way around the EU and I don't know whether she'd say they do now or not. Do you want to start? On the Conservative party, well I would make two points on that. One is that you are now, I'm not an historian but I think it's pretty clear that what we're seeing with Brexit is the third great split in the Conservative party going past that's nearly 200 years. The early 19th century it was essentially over the Cornwalls, it was essentially the new mercantile Conservatives outweith the old land only Conservatives and the early 20th century is about something which had some echoes in the May government through our advisor the notion of imperial trade preference which again has echoes even now is some of the things you hear about going back to be a free trader and having deals with India and whoever. But I think the interesting thing though is that and it's a point that I think was raised earlier about the lack of a big idea, the lack of big thinking in the current British debate. When you consider one of the most profound moves forward in the EU during our time as membership and something of huge benefit to us it was the creation of the single market in 1992 and the British were in the sense, and Mrs Thatcher played a very important role in that and this was something which was a huge benefit for Ireland, was a big benefit for the UK, was a great move forward for the European Union, but if you say that now in a debate that's that's just not taken account of, it's seen as you know, elitist special pleadic. I mean there is a problem of big thinking, there's also another issue I've noticed to myself traditionally the British argument for keeping a seat of the table in the European Union was you have to have a seat at the top table, we're a permanent member of the security council and nuclear power, we punch above our weight. That kind of argument doesn't seem to cut it anymore in the British debate, certainly it isn't as persuasive as it was. So are we deluding ourselves is what I'm wondering if that's the attitude that has been and that appears to remain to think that there can be anything other than a goodbye we're out of here in maybe two or three years? I think all of that, I think Europe generally needs to needs to think a lot more about what's happened in the United Kingdom in the past 25-30 years, needs to understand them, that's our great lesson from the peace process is that we had to understand where unionism had come from, where it was and where it was heading to and we needed to remain able to understand as we did Irish republicanism in its physical force form and we are now able to and think about how we have changed all of us for our ability to do so. So three things about the UK, one is this was the perfect storm of post-war Britain coming back to haunt itself. You know there was all the stuff that Deccan's just referred to the fact that Thatcher actually was one of the great globalisers. The city of London today is the most amazing place you know and you don't have to be a diehard capitalist to appreciate that. It is their most global small part of the world and I can say that from direct experience of having teams in all the big global cities it's incredible, that's because of Thatcher and the London as a whole as a metropolis is probably the greatest global city in the world and that is a consequence of the mid 80s, early 90s and Britain taking a very progressive very very open attitude towards towards the world and its vehicle with the European European communities that were then and now the European Union. And against that you had post-war industrialisation you had the growing cost of the world for a state and you had all those chickens coming home to roost and they have now conflated in this moment. And Connell can I just you mentioned with three things technocratic ability of contrarian spirit and a vision and the big picture do you see in either of the two big parties very quickly run out of time it just do you see any sign of vision no the two big parties in the UK. What we have at the moment in the United Kingdom is politics that is reacting to one thing or the other in terms of reacting to one thing Labour is reacting to another Catherine you want to come in. Yes I don't think we need to fall into despair my experience of the British is they're very pragmatic I just think it's taking them a long time to get to the point where their normal pragmatism comes into play and my working assumption is they will leave I would love to see it different and perhaps you know time will tell but I think we have to work on the assumption they're going to leave. They will not want to just crash out of the European Union and we won't want that to happen either which is why I think the time factor and adjusting the time factor may be the way to get to the point where where their pragmatism come into play and there and we can reach a deal. It's interesting to me that the EU has very often solved its problems by time giving people more time taking more time that's why it's criticized for being slow and cumbersome but sometimes it's worth taking extra time to get to a great outcome. Firstly is it possible to have to have Northern Ireland retain a link to the customs union if Britain withdraws given the complexities of all that and secondly would Europe be on board with that would you would you accept a sort of a solution that would see a tweaking of the rules slightly thank you. Dagelaw. In a speech to at Lentzra House Michelle Barnier said I can't do the accent I will work with you to avoid a hard border and he also said we have a duty to speak the truth customs controls are part of EU border management they protect the single market they protect our food safety and our standards. I'm a bit confused now about customs control sounds like a hard border. Is that a totally bad thing I mean I imagine that the Irish farmers in the Republic wouldn't want a very cheap Argentinian beef being slipped across the border without any checks so on the other hand they would probably like free access to the UK market. So can somebody clarify this for me because the more I hear about Brexit the more confused I get. Paul. You referred to the three aspects on Ireland being a fundamental issue and at a higher level and is this dialogue being set up as I understand it between the main British and the commission? How do you see this working at a higher level? That process will continue right through the negotiations as I understand it. Do you think imaginative and flexible solutions can be brought by the British and Irish governments to that process? Having done the exploratory work and having established that you're not trying to do with scientists how do you see but that mechanism being used at that dialogue? First question from Colin I think you asked it to both Catherine and myself. I mean you mentioned Catherine at the start that if the British basically reversed the position in the customs union it would solve many many problems and also let's be frank the one thing the British would lose by saying the customs union is the ability to cut trade deals around the world but I cannot think of any trade deal around the world that's going to take place within the next 10 years. I mean I know for example that the British have already run in trouble with the Indians the Chinese I know fairly well their prime interest in the UK was the assets the UK could deliver as a member of the European Union. This will be lost so I think this notion of some kind of bonanza of a kind of an East India company revived is simply not going to happen and in objective terms one could make I think and I presume there would be officials in Whitehall thinking this through looking at a cost-benefit analysis the costs of staying in the customs union are considerably less than the benefits so that that's one point I'd make that also goes I think to your question and Jaglan's question too about you know the kind of we don't want a hard border the customs union issue would address that certainly for goods including on phytosanitary and agricultural issues you could kind of put in an add-on services there's a kind of elegant way forward on that and even in terms of what the British have been saying depending on who you listen to you get a different kind of volume in terms of this custom union point on Paul's question about the handling of the Irish issues in the first phase again I think the point there is you know not to go into a freewheeling working group again the important point about our issues is which end of the telescope you look through the political the high level the strategic has to drive the technical not the other way around I think that's that's the fundamental and important point and again Paul that goes back to the wording of the guidelines of the directives of coming up with flexible and imaginative solutions so I think you know as Michelle Bannier has said himself it's a unique situation it will be a specifically tailored set of solutions and I think the approach that's being taken is should be seen in the perspective of that objective throughout and the other point here finally and I apologize for hugging the the floor it's been mentioned already by other members of the panel that at the moment there's no clear indication of what the coordinated British position is thanks just on the customs union I don't see how a part of a non-member state could be part of the customs union I don't politically that would also be difficult for London I think so that as a an option I don't see it existing but I my hope would be along the lines that Dachlan has outlined that as we get into the negotiation of the details that where the border can where the checks happen is something that can be discussed and I think without I mean I'm not an expert in customs myself so I will speculate but I think how and where you do the checks is eminently open to the flexible and creative solutions but just to explain why you couldn't have a partial customs union let's say the British League the customs union and in 15 years time they do this I think less attractive trade deal with any other part of the world which rules would then apply in Ireland the EU rules are the British rules it just doesn't work and I do myself find it hard to imagine how the UK even as a developed economy but a smaller economy in the modern world could cut better trade deals with international partners than the EU with its sizeable market has already achieved not to mention how long it takes and the capacity negotiating capacity that you need so I would hope that as the political and the ideological level becomes more familiar with what is the reality on the ground that then perhaps staying in the customs union would become an option and in her first speech where Theresa May said out of the single market she didn't say in exactly the same firm terms out of the customs union so there is a bit of wiggle room there that could hopefully be expanded in the future good okay I know there are more questions but we're really out of time and a bunch of editors are under extreme time pressures here so we'll keep it on on schedule and just ask the other two panellists if they have any responses to those questions to just final wrap up yes I think visually the border I think yeah there's flexibility where the border is going to be that border is still going to be hard it's just the harshness of it it could be dissipated across a number of different locations there's going to be controls they're going to be exercised in different locations and I think the customs union could could have part of a non-member state be part of the customs union broken should I have said associate membership of the customs union something they want to explore I think we've got to put something like that back on the table I think in terms of flexing and imaginative solutions I think we're at an unprecedented stage here and I don't think the EU's ever adopted such language in a set of mandates for negotiations with the third country the scope is there we're unprecedented times I think all various ideas have got to be put on on to on to the table and I think there will be considerable flexibility shown towards here on the north but not to London so I think on one hand it could be a very harsh set of negotiations with London but there's flexibility for some sort of arrangement being put in in here I think just going back to an earlier point I think the capacity in London to really understand the issues is very very high within the civil service I think there's some excellent work on going the big problem is that all the various solutions they tend to come up with run up against the political acceptability of them particularly amongst a set of politicians who have become wedded to a concept conceptualisation of the future which I think bears very little bearing on reality and of those politicians the UK saw from their stance over the past years they've learned more about the process they couldn't have not learned more I think given the low levels of understanding on the part of many and come I guess I guess to to sum up where I started like everything is possible in the European Union that's why it is the European Union so what are the conditions that we need to achieve for everything to be possible and for us to have the solution on this island that we need well we need cohesion within the United Kingdom simple there needs to be a consensus at Westminster level as to what the negotiating priorities are and our ability to make sure that Ireland and Northern Ireland survives this process without damage there needs to be consensus at a regional level in Great Britain that there will be a different arrangement for Northern Ireland then for Scotland and Wales and that that doesn't cause a political crisis and of course for all that to be possible there needs leadership and that is the one thing that is absent so I'll bring us back to where we started until you see clear and definite signs of leadership within the United Kingdom this ain't going to go well at all for anyone. Tegrin, do you want to talk again about the whole thing? Just one thing the context is changing too in the EU Draghi was at the European Council on Friday and he said we've had 16 quarters of average growth now this is this is interesting because you remember one of the great rallying cries of the Brexiteers not only will we get out of the union but the whole miserable elif is would collapse and that's not going to happen and in fact there are some quite profound changes going on in the background as I say the EU 27 and Ireland in particular were on a growth path things are starting to hum we're making good progress on completing the digital market the digital single market issues the tradition the British would have been totally at the forefront and I think that's an irony too as we look at this now this is something again that's going to take time to filter through but I just think it's something that should be kept in the background of our minds.