 Thank you very much. John, you have the floor. Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank the organizers, Terin, the organizers for the opportunity to attend this meeting and participate in such a distinguished panel. The risk at this coming toward the end of the second broad panel on governance is to find that everything has been said, but not everyone has said it. So I'm going to limit myself to some broad points that I think are important from a systemic point of view, linked especially to the financial system and the linkage of the trade and financial systems. And my principal conclusion, unsurprisingly, is that a more cooperative and coherent multilateral approach to setting macroeconomic and financial sector policies will be required in order to achieve shared economic success. And in my view, whether such an approach is possible will be a defining issue of the coming years and decades. And in many ways, what I'm suggesting is not an impossible dream, but rather a return to the much more cooperative environment that animated the response to the global financial crisis leading to the formation and early success of the G20 leaders process. And I'm going to suggest three areas specific in which will be either viewed as tests or opportunities for progress in the near term. Two will be familiar to you. One will not. It's important, I think, to remember that the post-World War II Bretton Woods system was intended to create a rules-based monetary system that was flexible, both in terms of policy setting, and that would quote from the Articles of Agreement, facilitate the expansion and balance growth of international trade, and also would be flexible in terms of governance in which voting power in the newly created multilateral institutions was to be based on members' relative economic weight, a measure that was to be reviewed at least every five years. There are issues we could discuss on that, but it's not wanting to sound defensive. But at this time, the top 10 voting members of the IMF are the G7 plus the BRICS minus Canada. So I think it would be hard to deposit a replacement among that top 10 and improve the representativeness of the or legitimacy of the institution. That's not to say that what we have now is either adequate or ideal. But my basic point here is that the shared intention of IMF members to boost global growth through expanding international trade originally produced a parallel agreement to radically reduce barriers to cross-border international financial flows. And so the current trends toward increased geopolitical friction and new trade protection threatens also to disrupt the international financial system and to undercut the prospects for sustained global growth. Now, it's also worth remembering because the primary post-World War II economic challenge was seen on restoring the international trade system as well as the necessary financing channels. No serious effort was made at that time to create a framework to govern cross-border capital flows. After all, such transactions hardly existed in the immediate post-war era. But as we all know from the mid-1990s to the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, gross international capital flows grew much more strongly than underlying international trade. However, it was systemic flaws in the operation of global markets, including poorly drawn perimeters of regulation and inadequate supervisory oversight that contributed directly to the crisis and these ensuing great recession. So, recognition of these flaws among other systemic weaknesses motivated the formation of the G20 leaders process into the creation of the Financial Stability Board in order to promote financial system resilience and reform. Now, 14 years after the first G20 leaders summit, progress has been made on enhancing banking sector stability through the cooperative work of the FSB. However, the same cannot yet be said for capital market regulation. In broad terms, the growth of new forms of non-bank financial intermediaries suggests that both the perimeter and form of financial regulation needs renewed attention. And that to me represents a test going forward. Can progress be made on reforming the regulation and the very perimeter of regulation to encompass non-bank financial institutions? In addition, there has been extremely limited progress toward establishing the G20's common framework on debt treatment as a successor to the Paris Club, despite the imminent threat of a new wave of debt defaults among vulnerable emerging and developing economies. And most importantly, the international political arena, we all know and have already been discussed, has become dominated by new geopolitical frictions. At the same time, these frictions have been reflected in measures that have resulted in new trade restrictions and new financial sector sanctions. And this is at a time when global growth is slowing and the risk of recession is rising. So, I hope that it's made clear, I've concluded that a renewed focus on a more cooperative and coherent approach toward setting macroeconomic and financial sector policy is needed to avoid creating new risks of protectionism and reduced efficiency of international financial markets. Such negative developments inevitably would reduce potential growth and increase economic volatility. Now, two more specific tests looking forward, or tests or opportunities that I would point to. One, as I've just alluded, making the G20's common framework for debt treatment, perhaps with some modifications, a success in providing needed debt restructuring is absolutely critical. It's possible, it would require a more cooperative approach, but without it, trouble is on our doorstep. Second, in the medium term, an area that is almost unknown and unmentioned, the G20's framework for strong, sustainable balance and inclusive growth, which is the principle, albeit little known, G20 forum for a green, appropriate economic policies in a cooperative and coherent fashion, needs to be far more forceful and effective than is the case at present. None of this is unimaginable. All of it is possible. And as I've said, the FSB needs to make new progress toward more effective capital market rulemaking. Now, whether all this leads in the long run to new and effective forms of finance, including the possible emergence of a multi-polar financial system, should and will be decided by market forces. In sum, since the desire to expand global trade on a multilateral basis was the inspiration for strengthening the global payment system, new trade protection and the proliferation of financial sanctions and other arbitrary barriers threatens to undermine the economic foundations of the rule-based systems' historic success in producing global economic growth. Not to be too trite to end, in the words of the great American frankophile, Benjamin Franklin, who told his colleagues drafting the U.S. Constitution, we must all hang together, or most assuredly, we will hang separately. Thank you. Thank you very, very much indeed, John. And again, I take it that you are asking the world to continue to go in the direction of shared rules, shared values in the economic front. And you seem to be quite confident that we can continue to proceed, which in a world which has never been that challenged is again a demonstration of confidence.