 Our next speaker is Artyom Malgin, alongside Wydlis Savolik. Those are two people who will take it from us, all people, into their hands and carry Russia to victories and brightened heights. So he represents, he's the first vice-rector of one of the best universities in Moscow, which is Mgimo. And a good friend of World Policy Conference, please, Artyom. Just two remarks to the pros. The title of the session sounds really very sad, because neither me nor my colleagues will be, let's say, at the climax of their life activities and professional activities in 20 years. I will try, I will try, with all this intellectual, artificial intelligence. We all do our best. And that is why we could be a little bit irresponsible. Second, when Tiri was in Moscow in March this year, he, I mean Tiri Dementbryal, he invented this subject, and especially resorted for the politicians. Because one of the two Russian politicians, they promised him to come if he puts the subject as it is. So they promised to him to tell truth, but the truth, which will happen in 20 years. Because they said that they want to be really very brave, but they don't want to cover contemporary developments in Russia. Generally, they're not here. I mean, these two brave gentlemen. And that is why we can talk more truth on even contemporary things than they planned to do. I'll follow much Michel Foucher example, because even some thoughts, they are much in parallel, they resemble. And I guess it shows that analysis, form policy, first of all, because I consider myself much more specialist on form policy than on other issues. Form policy analysis is much like in France and Russia. First of all, on the same guidelines and trends high as C, which will result in 20 years. So for Russia in 20 years, I guess will be much more self-centered, self-concerned with policy and ambitions made by measure. Because we still feel ourselves bigger and stronger than we are. And that is why we're going to be, let us say, less interventionist in 20 years, I hope, because we will realize our scale in global affairs and our resources. Because many of the problems which we face now, they're because of always estimation or just simply wrong estimation, wrong appraisal of who we are. Second, I guess Russia will be more open at least towards its neighbors. Since by that time, we will manage to build this Russia-centered integration, which brings together our Eurasian neighbors, as well as will manage to find models apparently with EU and EU-led countries. And to have, let's say, immediate geographic resource, these two parts of Eurasian continent. I don't mean Eurasian politically, which are often somehow linked by the former borders of the USSR. It automatically makes Russia more open. So I guess Russia will be more participative, more multinationalism devoted, and much more sort of. Limits of extensive growth by that time, they will be clear, already achieved. So Russian presence will be, let's say, probably better seated all over the world. But it won't be, let's say, this political presence, the state-run presence all over the world. It's rather Russian companies, Russian investments, Russian-led but multilateral initiatives, which will be better presented in other parts of the world. And I guess, thanks to that, we will find more Russian presence in Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central, Central, and Eastern Europe, which are rather immediate neighbors, and natural neighbors to the greatest extent. Then fourth, I guess Russia by that time, and no one, I guess everyone agrees with that, it's more developed. Probably slightly, here I should stress this was slightly less resource dependent, and clearly more digital. Russia will be on a steady track, steady path towards an old European state standard. Here I completely agree with Michel Foucher that it's to the greatest extent will be France-like country. Rather big, with relatively big but not enough to fill the territory properly population, with strong cultural, but not in terms, as they say, of this bazaar culture influence around the neighbors. Here this diaspora helps us ensure the Russian language itself. Once again, it's comparison with nowadays France. It's about 300 million people, those who have good command of French language, and those who have good command of Russian language. So the model is clear where we move to, though in country population is going to be bigger than in France. Also another comparison, sometimes comparison helps, it's a talky, it's talky. But let us say, not nowadays talky, but talky, talkish model, talkish size, talkish trends as they were 10, 15 years ago. Because now there are too many uncertainties in nowadays talky, and it's not yet clear how it will develop the trends which are present in nowadays talky. It's the first portion. The second portion, I want to say that trends which I've already listed, they are already set, or probably not of them clear, but they will be shown to the public, they will be evident to the public in the year 2018. And I guess, Russian presidential elections of the year 2018, will somehow stress many of these trends, they make them evident, and most of them, they will result in specific steps, in specific policies, in specific actions after the presidential elections. The result for these elections is clear, I mean, when it comes to personality. Putin will say in power, since he has no competitors, because all those who want to start in the elections, they are not as strong, not as smart, not as experienced, and it's clear who will win elections. But President Putin already proved many times that he is one of the, let us say, most, how to say, it's not about secrecy, and surprising representative of the nowadays elite, who has a very strong quality to change, to start a new policy, to simply be a new man. Do compare his first term, the years 2000, 2005. It's the best period, the most EU-propelled Russian foreign policy, achieved by the year 2005 in, if we compare with nowadays situation, it looks like it was completely another country. It looks like it was completely another president, but still it's the same man. And now I'm very pessimistic about some policies, some steps. It sounds probably a little bit patriotic, but I believe in this president and I believe in many changes. And these changes, they already started. First of all, it's a stronger shuffle in public administration when it comes to the Russian regions. More than a dozen of governors, they were removed from their posts and newcomers appeared. Some of the newcomers completely unknown to the general public, both in Russia and surely abroad, changes in the cabinet that will proceed after the elections because elections will give simply a pretext to make these changes. Because in Russia, we always need a pretext. We need to do this or that. Then last three years, and it's not because of sanctions, it's because of this objective in total development. New branches, new industrial policy, I guess already approved its results. Here I always compare with some from Eastern Europe because we started from the same point where we have nearly the same GDP when it comes to capital GDP. We're nearly the same when it comes to mentality, but look at the economic discussion, social discussion in Poland, Hungary, Czechs, Slovak Republic. The discussion somehow surrounded about very minor things of the 1990s. Here, I guess, Russia goes much ahead, and now it's propelled by the idea, probably simply blown up idea, but still it propels a digital economy. And I guess this artificially invented thing moves the Russian economy and the whole Russian economic regulation mechanism towards something new. And also, here highly estimate Russian financial policy of the central bank, which already somehow overcomes standards of central and Eastern Europe. And here the size means the effects of these changes, they multiply faster, they multiply it on a bigger scale, and I guess these technical changes will bring democracy. And here I nearly quote the first Vice Prime Minister Shuvalov, who we mentioned yesterday in a private talk, who stressed it twice once. It was in the Far Eastern Economic Forum, and a few days ago he repeated it again, because democracy in Russia, I guess, is very much linked with economics reforms. And economics reforms, they go first, and only then goes to this traditional portion of democracy. Then what is also sometimes not so much remarkable from outside, it's inter-elite divergences, and I can call it even a kind of growing pluralism within Russian elite. When you absorb the country from outside you can say that it has really very weaker position and structured with no chances. But the real political life, real political discussion happens within those who are considered as a ruling elite. Sometimes the divergences there, and the divergences, it's a source of change, much stronger than between ruling elite and those who pretend to be in opposition. And when they stand inside country, who is who? Who belongs to what grouping? Whom you should talk? Whom you should not talk if you belong to this or that grouping? And it's evident nearly to everyone who is probably not even at the top, but somehow approaches towards this. And the thought portion of what I want to say, it's simply form policy key points and changes. How I see them, which could happen under the next term of the president, put in at least at the first part of this term. First of all, yes, we need and it will happen in the realization of our relations with EU. There will be slight reshuffle when it comes to hierarchy of bilateral relations. France goes first, I guess we could await return of Britain up to Brexit. Because they, I mean British, they simply need additional room of maneuvering and simply activating Russia's policy. They will have this additional room of maneuvering. And then many other trace, even under this sanctions period, they show that the Brits, they look more and more carefully at what's happening in Moscow. I guess we'll have less of Germany, a finalist strong role for Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Because now there is no more emotions when it comes to the Russia's policy towards Balkans. I guess we should get rid of what we previously had to have ours and not ours in the Balkans. Yesterday's session, the first one with two Prime Ministers of Serbia and Albania, I guess should be shown on the Russian TV to the general public just to stop saying that Albanians and Serbs, they somehow destined to kill each other. The reality shows that they start talking and those who still continue thinking that all these divisions somehow could be used in the Russian foreign policy for the best of Russian foreign policy, I guess it's a strongest mistake. The life showed to us that last 27 years we somehow tried to find out the vergences and to play upon these divergences, I mean all over the world. Permanently we failed to use these intra-imperialist morals, how it was called under the Soviets. As well as under the Soviets, I guess we always also somehow had too many ambitions about this and to prove results as they ended their ambitions. Then I guess we'll find how to deal with integration challenges that derived from EU and how to re-approach both of the integration, Russian-led and EU-led integration. The Ukrainian crisis at the very beginning, I mean these climax facts of the crisis, I mean the year 2014 showed a very remarkable thing, a very outstanding thing which was not so much remarkable. Probably you remember that we started finally these consultations between EU and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development as well as the subsequent Boris in Ukraine, how to put together Ukraine specializations in terms of economy with Russian, in terms of economic trade because at that time all these ties still existed and how to add to this their thoughts and their policy which somehow moved them towards European Union. These consultations ended in nothing but the fact that they started, that they waged, it's a really very promising thing which should be repeated in a new situation. Then it's, and I will finish, I guess we will face strong and fast development in Russian-led integration thanks to the smooth relations with EU, I hope with Ukraine, thanks to eventual changes in Belarus and thanks to a newcomer to the Russian-led integration Uzbekistan, the country which opens, the country tremendously rich both in natural resources and what you said in intellectual resources. It's out of comparison with other Central Asian Republic. Uzbekistan under the Soviets was always intellectual leader of the region. Somehow it was overshadowed by Kazakhstan's goals, by Kazakhstan's ambitions under the resolution of the Soviet Union. But those who know Uzbekistan, they understand that it's outstanding resource of initiatives, outstanding resource of modernity and new positive challenges. And two last points. Absolutely key point for the next storm is appeasement with Ukraine, normalization of relations. Crimea will stay as it stays now. It should be said clearly no one will make any specific moves there. But Crimea should be open towards Ukraine. Three years proved that 50 years of the Soviet time somehow linked Crimea to Ukraine at least as tight as it was linked with Russia. And Crimea could be a starting point for better relations because of its transport dependence on Ukraine, economic dependence, social dependence. But sure the conflict in Donbass should be unconditionally stopped and these territories, they have no way to stay within. I wanted to say about states but I don't want to dominate the discussion. The role of the states will go down simply because we don't need so much each other in everyday life. Then those who won't ask me why I will explain.