 Good morning, everybody. My name is Nancy Lindborg. I'm the President of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the U.S. Institute of Peace was founded by Congress a little more than 30 years ago, dedicated to the proposition of a world without violent conflict, and that peace is very possible, it's very practical, and it's essential for global security. So this is the right place to have the conversation that we're about to have today, and I welcome everybody. I'm delighted that we're able to host this conversation, and most of all I really commend the World Bank and the UN for a truly landmark joint effort. They have produced a much-needed report on how to get ahead of violent conflict, how to break out of these vicious cycles of protracted conflict, and how to think about doing business differently. And importantly, they've pulled some of the core precepts of peace building into the development world, an emphasis on addressing grievances, an emphasis on inclusion, an understanding of the importance, particularly in countries where governments are not paying attention of nonviolent civic action, of the power of communities to make a difference. It is clear that the international community is less successful currently at preventing conflict, and we rely over and over again on reaction, on deploying troops, peacekeeping troops, large humanitarian efforts, and it is very clear that we have to change that. And if we don't, the consequences of failing to act and to prevent violent conflict includes more deaths, more displacement, more incidents of violent extremism. So some of you may have been with us in the fall when we previewed this report, and I can say that the preview of that report has already provoked a lot of good conversation, and we look forward to continuing that conversation. I'm looking out, I see a lot of people who have been engaged in this issue, not just from this fall, but for, in some instance, several decades. So this is an important moment in a changed environment for us to collectively look at the business case, the evidence case that this report makes. I look forward to today's discussion, and I invite you to engage on the conversation on Twitter with hashtag Pathways numeral four piece, hashtag Pathways four piece, and now I'd like to welcome two of the lead report authors to present the main themes and findings of the report and really help frame and set the stage for the conversation. Alexander Mark is the chief specialist for fragility, conflict, and violence of the World Bank, and he oversees support and advice to bank country teams in more than 30 countries affected by conflict and fragility. And I also want to welcome Jago Salman, who is the advisor to the UN World Bank partnership on fragile and conflict affected situations at the United Nations. And Jago has more than 15 years of experience in doing this kind of work in really tough places around the world. So please welcome to both of them who will give us an overview of the report. Thank you, Jago and Alexander. And thanks to everybody for being here. I want to particularly acknowledge a number of contributors and authors to the report who are in the audience. So Seth, Chuck, Georgia, who I can see, I'm sure there's others here. I think Theresa Whitfield from DPA in New York is also in the audience, as well as a number of the contributors who supported the Bank in the UN coming together to deliver the report. Norway, Sweden, the UK, France, Germany contributed in kind. But this was really a collective effort. I think there was a recognition that the Bank in the UN coming together to say something, even if not, or everything we say is new, the fact that we say it together matters significantly. That means work. So how did we get here, practically and also sort of conceptually? The practical side of this began in a conversation around 2016, essentially where the UN was going through the major reviews of peace and security. So the sustaining peace reviews, advisory group of experts report on sustaining peace, the high level panel on peace operations, women peace and security, all of which pointed to a number of core challenges in the international peace and security architecture, but also highlighted and underlined the growing importance of prevention for the success of that architecture. On the parallel side in the development processes in the Bank was the IDA-18 replenishment round, which has significantly scaled up the support through development instruments to fragile states, moving to $15.1 billion over the next three years at this point, but four years at that point. And the convergence that you saw between these two major processes was on two sides. On one side on the peace and security side, you had a very clear statement that there are very few problems of peace and security that are entrusted to the multilateral community to deal with today that are solely peace and security problems. Much of the instability that we see around the world is rooted in domestic instability. This is not just interstate competition. And on the parallel side on the IDA-18 discussions was the point that development aid needs to prove its relevance, not just in recovery from conflict, but also preventing conflicts from breaking out. And this began a conversation between the Bank in 2016 and the UN about trying to push forward a policy agenda that brought us together collectively around shared ideas on what prevention would actually look like. The original idea was from the Bank, who invited very bravely the UN into the conversation. Those of you who know the WDR 2011 will know that it was a report written by the Bank with heavy consultation from the UN, but it was not a co-owned report. And I think we've both, all of us, learned an enormous amount in this process. I personally learned that I don't want to clear a report through the Chief Economist Office, the UN legal department, the Bank legal department, and the Secretary General's office. Again, never. But there are many other things that we've learned as well, substantively. Now, the pressure on this, on the pressure that pushed us together, so if I can get this to change, can you change it? This is also rooted in context. So I'll go through a series of slides quite quickly to present some of the main ideas. We won't dwell on them. There's much more data in the main report, which is available on this. But this pressure that was coming from the policy processes was coming out of a dramatic shift that began around 2010, or the acceleration of it began in 2010. You can see the curve begin to change earlier in the 2000s. But what you saw was a very worrying change. Every quantitative indicator that we have, essentially, on conflict began changing direction in 2010. The number of conflicts, terrorist attacks, numbers of forced displaced populations, civilian casualties, battle deaths, essentially any quantitative indicator that we collect began to change direction at that point in time. On top of that, you saw a qualitative change in the nature of conflict or the direction of conflict. You saw some of this was a continuation of trends that were already picked up earlier, five years earlier, six years earlier. Some of them were relatively new. In terms of the continuation of trends, you saw this continuing spread of conflicts becoming more protracted. Even when interrupted by a peace deal, the chances of relapse remain very, very high. So either very long protracted conflicts or repetitive series of violence that held the country back in any development pathway. You also saw that in continuing cross-border dynamics of conflict, the regionalization that was picked up in 2011 in the WDR was absolutely transparent and, of course, in the Middle East. But you also saw it in the Lake Chad Basin. You saw it with the spillovers from Somalia. And you saw increasing dynamics of conflicts spilling over borders to affect neighboring countries and much further away from the battlefield than that. Not beyond the other numbers, one of the other disturbing numbers here was the number of countries that were affected by violent conflict. It was the highest in 2016, was the highest in 30 years. So individual violent incidents that were taking place far from any battlefield. Qualitatively, you saw two shifts that I think were less expected. One was the proliferation of non-state armed groups in these conflict, both fighting each other and fighting states. And you saw the internationalization or a dramatic return of internationalization of conflict defined as foreign troops fighting in another country. So this isn't just indirect support. This is deployment of active personnel into combat. One caveat, the data behind this is, what you also see behind all of this is an increasing complication of the legal definitions of conflict and the data on conflict, which are pulling to some degree in different directions of the growing complication and proliferation of different forms of non-state conflict, while the legal definitions and regulation is still quite based around rather simple categories. The other caveat I mentioned here is not all of these variables correlate with each other. So, for example, the spike in non-state armed groups is not correlated with the spike in battle deaths, for example. The large rise of battle deaths is driven very much by use of state militaries against non-state armed groups in urban areas. So you see that the proliferation of armed groups or the internationalization of conflict has made it much harder to resolve conflicts, not necessarily driven the increase in battle deaths. The other trend that lay behind this, and this is why I think really the push on the prevention agenda came for the international community, is this very disturbing graph that you see here. The decline in the numbers of conflicts in the world that have been achieved since 1990 or 1994 was not one war that was defeated, it was not one peace agreement. It was a system of engagement over at the international level, at the regional level, that over 30 years have progressively ended more conflicts per year than had started that year, which meant over time, you incrementally were bringing down the level of conflict. What you saw in 2010 was both a dramatic increase in the numbers of conflict, the quantitative indicators, but you also see much more worrying a drop in the ability of that system to sustainably terminate or end conflicts at that point in time. The reason why this graph is so disturbing is any conflict that we have, if DRC continues in a direction of destabilization, if other countries joined it, it will continue to add to the orange bar there without the chance of it necessarily being resolved. The second point of that is the cost. The costs are fairly well known, I won't go into them here, but what you see is that what was, in many ways, a crisis management architecture, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, the refugee system is different, but the costs of that crisis management just continuing to trend upwards with very few signs that we're going to be able to withdraw humanitarian assistance or peacekeepers from many of these conflicts. Behind the numbers, these are per annum costs. If you take the graph on how protracted conflicts are becoming, you're talking about these per annum costs on a recurrent expenditure basis. Is this one? Ah, it's the wrong button, let's just see. The other key finding that came out of this after looking at the context is there's very few conflicts that we could see in the cases that we were looking at that were purely local anymore. We heard this in every regional consultation that we undertook, we can go into the methodology of it, but again and again, actors were saying to us, you can't talk about these conflicts in isolation from what is going on at the global level or at the regional level. And when you step back from that, what you saw is in an increasingly independent world, these structural changes that were happening in the world that are having a direct impact on the conflicts themselves. I mean, the one that we talk a lot about at the moment, of course, is ICT. Some of these were taken as opportunities, pure opportunities for development. And we're now seeing the underside or the dark side of some of these processes. And they impact not just the Western world where there's been a lot of focus, they have huge impacts on the developing world if we're going to use that word. Migration, we talk a lot about migration coming into the DAC countries. A lot of the migration has been internal. Rapid urbanization, rapid moves away from agricultural subsistence farming. And with the increase of global risks and opportunities, again, causality gets very difficult. You see a growing lack of consensus politically around what the treatment regime for conflicts might be. What is the correct response to the growing instability in various parts of the world? I say causality is complicated because you can't say one is directed to the other, but most clearly you see this in Security Council decision-making, essentially. The difficulties of agreeing what a standard treatment regime would be. Now, behind that, the one thing that you get is a clear commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals, which is the most comprehensive set of universally agreed goals that we've ever had for agreeing on people, planet, peace, prosperity and partnership as the basis for the next wave of future development, a wave of development that cannot afford to leave people behind. And what the study pulls together is you take the numbers on the response side and you look at the trend lines of what crisis management costs. And then you look at the costs of being incurred in a rapidly developing world where many of the conflicts are now occurring in middle-income countries. Quite simply, the cost-benefit analysis of prevention versus response has shifted dramatically, where once upon a time it may have been cost-effective to simply contain a conflict and manage its fallout. That cost-benefit calculation has begun to change dramatically in the other direction. And what you see is in a scenario analysis, if you had a preventative system that was able to respond to conflicts and contain conflicts, but was only successful three out of four, one out of four times and cost over a billion dollars per intervention, the savings would still be at the level of around five billion dollars per year. If you have a much more optimistic scenario, you would be looking at a saving around 70 billion dollars a year. And the numbers aren't arbitrary there. A billion dollars over is roughly the cost of the annual cost of deployment of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission. So if you were to deploy a peacekeeping mission to every conflict that you saw emerging and it was only successful one out of four times, you would still be making enormous savings at the international level. So just to wrap up to say sort of where this took us, what we saw ourselves on the final analysis of the material was looking at the cases of countries. You took 15 cases of countries that had a sustainably exited pathways of instability. And all of those cases, what we saw is very rarely, certain key messages jumped out at us. One is although there's been enormous focus on institutions over the last six, seven, eight, nine years, what we saw is many of those countries, it wasn't just reform of institutions by a long way that enabled them to sustainably exit from conflict. What you saw was a large amount of focus also on the socioeconomic drivers of violence. You saw them reinvesting in communities or in geographic areas that had been the source of conflict. You saw them opening up more passivatory pathways into politics. The second thing that jumped out at us a lot in this was sequencing, and Alex will come to this, is states engage economically, they engage through security, they engage politically throughout a conflict cycle. This is not sequence, the way that the international community sequences its interventions. You saw that in some cases there were very prolonged engagements, 30, 40, 50 years engagements, investing in areas, adjusting institutions, opening up reforming some of the governance systems, infrastructure, so on, before peace was sustainably reached. And that the sustainable dividends on prevention came from a less sequence way. And the third thing that we saw, which is particularly pertinent when we look at the data on conflict and how much of it is non-state today, is the state was really one of many actors in this process. The state was an important actor, an essential actor, but it was really coalitions that drove forward the agenda on prevention. It was never a single leader that had the capacity or the power to adjust these three big variables in society and lead it to a more sustainable peace. Not all of these messages I think are new. I think they're reminders of things that we knew actually before. But they matter a lot in how we engage in this business case at this point in time and how we revisit some of the lessons that we had already, perhaps, but that we now need to look at in terms of our operations. And I'll hand over to Alex on the... Thank you very much. So, you know, we use this old approach that we are two institution working, and we're always next to each other so that we check on each other when we present, right? So, this, I'm going now to talk a little bit about what do we do with all those findings that we have there, and as Jagos said, one of the most interesting part of the study for us was that we worked on those 15 case studies of country that have successfully moved out of fragility plus had a lot of number of analysis in case study of what worked. So, if this report is a bit different, a lot of those reports in this area are usually about what does not work. We try to focus really on what worked. And we came out with three principles that you are not going to be astonished about, but I think they're really, really important. The first, prevention needs to be targeted. That means it's not by doing more development that you do prevention. It's not by doing more poverty alleviation. You really need to target the sources of grievances, the sources of conflict. It's not just doing more of something. It's about really targeting what are the issues in different specific contexts. With the targeting comes also this issue of comprehensiveness. It's not by doing each things individually that we usually do in those case, is by really doing them in a coordinated and comprehensive fashion. The second thing is the inclusive aspect, and this has really two very separate things. One is that inclusion in terms of the way we approach the development policies of country and the way successful government have approached it is really about inclusiveness. Trying to understand what are the different groups in society and how you bring them in. And it's not always the poor that do conflicts. It's actually rarely the poor that go into conflict. So, inclusiveness is more than poverty reduction. It's about bringing those different groups that are in society inside. The second place where inclusiveness is needed is really between the different actors that work on peace building. They need to come together, and as Jago said, coalitions are really central in this field. Finally, it's sustained. And we know that this has to be sustained, and we know that that's the big problem, right? One of the big problems is we're not managing to sustain our attention to conflict. Sustain means three things. It means four things, actually, and that's the difference maybe with the usual approach to it. It's much earlier than the crisis. It's when we see the first appearance of risks. Secondly is when crisis looms. Thirdly, there's prevention also during crisis to avoid escalation. And finally is long, long, long after the crisis stops. And I think that's the difference of this report. It brings this first part that is very early on that you don't see in many other literature on prevention. Now, in terms of the actions to do, we see in this report that grievances are very central. That does not mean that you don't have war economies, that you don't have leaders that manipulate for their own interests, people's motivation for violence. But one thing that is sure with grievances is that we have, it was difficult to find only one conflict that didn't start with an element of grievances, especially around exclusion. So, focalizing on grievances is very important. We've seen that the geographical aspect is really, really important. So, a lot of grievances around what we call horizontal inequality, discrepancy between regions, between group, that's very important. But also, the geographical tells us that marginalized areas, border areas, areas where state legitimacy is not projected are also a real area of risks. So, this focus on marginalized area is really, really important. The second thing is we thought that there were a number of areas where we needed to target risk. These were the area where the risks were the highest, but also the opportunities were the highest. And these were power. Power takes many different form. Power is not only election. Power is how people control their own resources. Power is citizen engagement, is about power. The centralization is about power. We just don't have to see power as a purely issue of political control of the state. Natural resources are still very, very important. Most of the conflict we have reviewed. And then security and justice. That's a message directly from the WDR 2011. Finally, the reinforced participation. That's really the answer to power. And participation has to talk. There's not a silo of political and a silo of development. People leave that in the same way. I have access to resource. I don't have access to power. I have access to power and resources. All this is one. It's not things you can separate. And therefore participation is a very important aspect. Finally, the exclusion of service is really important. That's something that was not so much talked in the WDR 2011. It's not, we didn't see a direct correlation between lack of exclusion of services and conflict. But where you see the correlation is because without legitimate service delivery, you don't build up the legitimacy of the state. And then the state is not able to actually be a legitimate actor on conflict resolution. So that's the trick. Now there are a number of really important part. We looked quite a lot about issue of gender and issue of women. That's a focus we had. And it was very clear that first of all, society where there's more equality between men and women are more resilient to conflict. We have all the evidence that are described there. But also that when you engage women group in peace process and all that, there's a lot of benefit. And actually you're more successful on preventive activities. So I'm not going to go into detail. We have quite a lot in the report on that. Then on youth, of course we all know youth. What we want to say very clearly is that youth is not only a problem of jobs. The youth really today is a problem of unmet aspiration. And this problem of unmet aspiration is many things. Is a projection of what you want to be that you will never be able to be. Is to be able to do better than your parents which you cannot do anymore. It's a lot of things that are much more complex than job. And therefore that's a complex also things to impact. Now the shocks are very important as triggers. And that's something that is important to say. Now not that shocks automatically create conflict. Shocks can also create peace, as we know, like in Ache, but the management of shock is not something we're doing sufficiently well with an understanding of what it can do on conflict. And finally, the strengthening the ability to deal with all the global and regional risk that Jaggo has mentioned that are really fundamental in conflicts today. So another big discussion we had throughout the preparation of the report is the problem of the siloed approach versus a much more connected approach and interwind approach between the different actors working on prevention. Mostly political, security, humanitarian, and development. What is really interesting is that when we looked at the successful case, we saw that government were actually much more working around this element. So countries that were doing successful prevention had much more dialogue between their military and their development. There were all sorts of platforms for military to discuss with others, for humanitarian to be coordinated with the political. There was a lot of connectivities. We as international community are much less good at doing that, and therefore much less good at helping those countries that are doing the right thing. And we're still very siloed. We're still, we see development are not effective once you have a crisis. So we see development coming before crisis and much after crisis. And then we see the political coming much too late when crisis are already there. Well, crisis takes a very long time to build. And then we see the issue of security also very narrowly dealt with. So one of the big recommendation, and we have some pretty specific ideas on that in the report, is about building all those bridges. Finally, just a few ideas because we have 40 pages of recommendation. But just to give you what you actually want to do, and I'm just going to identify a few things here that I think are very important. Develop shared analysis for understanding of risks. Very, very evident. Everybody would say it's normal. Nobody does it. So we don't share our analysis with government. We don't share our analysis between ourselves. We all have our different systems, and we are very secretive about it. That's not how you do an open dialogue with the government around the risks. That's really not how you do it. You need to establish project and planning framework. One real problem of prevention is the fragmentation of the activities. This is really what works because each individual approach to prevention actually work. So there's good practice on mediation. There's good practice on certain development intervention. But they are fragmented. They are not brought together. And so we really need to move inside such a sort of planning process. And you know, we have to learn from countries. Niger has a really interesting program, a planning that has security, that has humanitarian assistance included, that has a lot of the political negotiation included into this planning process. But when we ask our organization if we can do it, they say, no, no, that's not feasible. But countries do it, right? Some countries do it. And then we really need, there's a huge issue of consolidation of financing. Again, this fragmentation is really terrible and really plays again the efficiency of the system. So just a few ideas here, and we go into the report in much more detail. So I hope we're going to have interesting conversation and that we've stimulated you a little bit. I want to invite our panelists to come up. We have a terrific panel here today. We'll have a conversation that we're going to open it up. I know a lot of folks have comments and questions. We have with us today her Excellency, Dika Yasin, who's the Minister of Women and Human Rights Development in Somalia, Frank Busquet, who's the Senior Director for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence at the World Bank, Oscar Fernandez Teronco, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace, Building Support at the United Nations, and Kate Sanvongs Siri. Kate, how'd I do on that? Perfect. Who's the Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID? So we have here representatives of three of the largest institutions working on these issues in conflict-affected areas. So this is, you can feel the needle moving just by having the three of you up on stage. But I want to start your Excellency with you, because Somalia has been an area that a lot of people have put a lot of heartbreak into, most especially the Somali people for several decades, trying to move out of conflict. And you've made incredible progress, heartening progress over the last few years. So tell us what do these concepts look like on the ground and how have you and your government really tried to work in these issues of inclusivity and what we heard is especially important are women and youth, which are directly in your portfolio. So what does that look like on the ground in Somalia? First of all, good morning to everybody. I'm glad to be here. And I, you know, in Somalia, despite the immense challenges that we face, Somalia has achieved significant progress in increasing inclusivity and addressing grievances over the past year. A good example is the political process, processes that happen in Somalia as an example. Somalia political leaders have shown how group grievances can be addressed by adjusting how we, you know, adjusting the institutional framework. We came up with the political power sharing model that has been established to ensure that all clans in Somalia are included in these processes. And basically this was a way to make those processes included so that all clans that were not part of the decision-making now are included. So one good example is the 2016 election. I think it's good that we also give examples on the ground so that the theory then we can... So for instance, in 2016 election, I had the opportunity to be the deputy chair of the indirect electoral implementation team at the federal level. And we try to make that process as inclusive as possible compared to the 2016 election. If I may, to show exactly how it worked. In 2012, we had 135 clan elders that were selecting the 275 member of the parliament of the House of the People. In 2016, we tried to make that process as inclusive as possible compared to the 2016, 2012. And what we have done was that the... At the beginning in 2012, the 185 elders, they were alone selecting who they wanted, basically. Now we try to make them consult within the clan members. So the power was taken a little bit back and they resisted a lot. But then it was a good process and they understood. How did you get to that understanding? When you say they resisted, this is often where the process stops. Of course they resisted because in 2012, they were alone deciding who will be the MP of that specific clan. Now we said if this seat is shared, let's say by five subclan, we will take five also clan elders for those subclan and then it becomes a joint decision. So change is always... I mean, when you introduce, you brought the level of inclusivity. These are the things that happen on the grounds because people are used to make their own decision. Now they have to consult. So that was the first allowing other clan members to also make a decision on that seat. So that was the first one. Now secondly, in 2016, we came up with 51 delegates that will then elect the seat. So again, you bring a small constituency. And we made a regulation in which we were saying from those 51, we want this amount of youth, this number of women, clan elders. So we try to make the delegates as broad as possible. And that was again another example of broadening and making the process inclusive. Then in 2012, election was only happening at the capital city of Somalia, which is Mogadishu. Now in 2016, we had five member states. We had Garowe, Puntlan is the federal member state, and the city is Garowe, Kismayo, Beidoua. We had Adado and Kismayo as well, and Johar. So five cities plus the capital six. So again, we brought the election to the rest of the country. So that also, the result of this broadening inclusivity was that in 2012, we had 14% female MPs. In 2016, we came all the way to 26, combining, and then we introduced the upper house that we didn't have before. So I think this has been a major leap for women in Somalia and for moving towards a more inclusive society. So this will also allow, we had more young generation, young MPs coming on board. So I think we need to build on that. But I think we had a good example. In 2020, we are aiming to have one person, one vote. So there is an opportunity for us to build on and keep the gains we have made in terms of women representation. My ministry is eager to support this. And in particular, we have an ambition to organize a national conference in Somalia that will, that can allow different Somali women to develop their shared position on this roadmap. If I can give another example on human rights. Why don't you hold on that and we'll come back to you. But that was a terrific example of the power of inclusion. And we will all be looking for 2020. Yes. Me too. We also heard from Jago and Alexander and thank you for a terrific overview that one of the other key recommendations was focused on grievances. So Oscar, I want to go to you. And what are some practical ways that the UN is thinking about how to address grievances as a part of these strategies going forward? Thank you. So first of all, Nancy and to everybody here, thank you for this very welcoming and this opportunity actually to come back this time with Frank. And to be able to actually say that we are resolving our grievances, land standing grievances between organizations. And it does speak, I think, fundamentally to the importance of addressing issues in a collaborative manner. This new way of partnering I think is quite crucial to this whole agenda of prevention and getting the thinking and the targeting and focusing on the actors, on institutions and structural factors. It is what has been missing. Our institutions, unfortunately, have been siloed in the approach and the way we undertake our responses, certainly within the UN. This is one of the top priorities of our secretary general, is to break the silos and to have much more collaborative efforts between humanitarian actors, human rights actors, development and peace and security actors. And it's this notion of addressing the grievances as very well spelled out in the report. I mean, the issue of grievances is not new, right? I mean, there's been a lot of studies about grievances. The issue is how do we deal with them, at what point and in what manner. And I think this is quite important because the report actually makes a very compelling case, provides a lot of data, a lot of empirical evidence that for prevention to work, I mean, we do need to focus on these grievances as they are expressed both in geographical spaces, as they are addressing specific communities, specific identities. And ethnicity here many times is one of the many important factors to be addressing, as we see in many parts of the conflicts that we are addressing. So the issue, again, is that grievances don't just happen overnight. This is not a 24-hour thing. Grievances take a long, long time, and I think the chart that you saw is actually a chart that usually spans between 10 and 20 years. And so the issue is what do we do well ahead? Well ahead that these grievances become mobilized, that we have a narrative that starts building either because of the actual facts and statements, or because of perceptions, the perceptions, issues of access to power, issues of how security is provided, issues to justice, issues of governance, natural resources. I mean, all those examples are important categories around which we need to actually redirect and prioritize resources, because the way the resources are under prioritized on prevention, the way we have such a hard time prioritizing prevention, and doing prevention in this new integrated manner where mediation efforts, preventive diplomacy, the political solutions that many times are at the heart of, if you will, de-escalating conflicts needs to come, needs to be supported. Primarily by development actors, many of the key drivers, the root causes of conflict are in the realm of social and economic, if you will, factors to which, of course, all those other that were in that circle, climate change, migration, et cetera, are sort of, you know, propellers. Concrete examples just let me tell you, because in the case of Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, a lot of what we're doing has a lot to do with working with local authorities, is creating the capacities of local authorities to actually create that space for inclusive dialogue for participation in the design and implementations of programs that are very much addressed to improving the way social services are equally distributed among different ethnic groups. This is, you know, it sounds easier than fact to do, but it comes with the prioritization of the resources, how you get the voices of women, of young people, how you address issues of exclusion on political, security, and justice mechanisms. And the reason this is important is that you see that if you do local surveys, you instantly see this notion of trust and confidence between citizens and, you know, governments, improve quite dramatically in a space of just two times, sorry, two years, and with minor investments, I would say, in the order of $10 to $12 million, we've seen in some of the worst affected areas of the conflict that happened in Kyrgyzstan actually diffuse the type of tensions and start addressing issues of inclusivity through the curricula in schools for the participation, the economic participation, and again, this notion of a comprehensive approach to the type of solutions that we're trying to do. And, you know, some of these are really good ideas that are not necessarily new. They haven't been done in such a cogent way, in a cogent-based way, with, I think, particularly the really excellent case studies. But what's really, I think, important is also the business case, because these good ideas are often not funded for reasons. You know, we are very reactive. And so, Frank, tell us a bit more about the business case. How do we use this report to help really make the case why it's more cost-effective to do it this way, upstream, not just be reactive? Thank you. Thank you, Nancy. And very happy, actually, to be here with colleagues, with our client, who is really always on there. So I'm very happy to be the next minister, our partners. And it's true that this report is quite important. I mean, for me, I summarize it by saying it's acting early, acting jointly, but also staying engaged, which is super important, by focusing on the drivers of fragility and risk of violence. That's the report. So it's just a question of, so what does it change? First, I'm very happy that the case, business case, or economic case for prevention, if it was ever needed to be done, is made. When you look at the report, the review of the 19, 15 countries, showing that clearly the case for prevention is that, well, on average, violent conflicts cost $13,000, which is about 13% of the world's GDP, but the net savings from prevention average between $5 to $70 billion per year. For me, the most important reason is... $5 to $70 billion, that's what you have seen. So I think the business case is there. We forget one element which is even more important is that it saved lives. That's, for me, the most important point. So it's not a question too much about justifying why prevention is so important. I think it's more about how you do it and you have some good cases. The study is actually looking at some of the good case and success and trying to draw some conclusions. For the World Bank, clearly we are really changing the way we see the partnership with many actors. In fact, today, as you know, we're in the middle of a fragility forum, having more than 1,000 participants, 47 sessions to discuss fragility, which is really the issue of our time. Now, three-fourth of the sessions are not organized by the bank. They're organized by academics, university, by UN, by other private sectors. Because for us, it's very important to realize that to get to our objective of eradication of poverty, you need to focus on fragile states. You need to focus on fragility. Business, as usual, is very clear. By 2030, between 43% and 60% of the poor will be in fragile states. So it's not anymore the debate about 20 years ago should we focus on fragile states. You have issue of governance. I'm so happy that's over. I'm happy to do it. This report is so important by saying, listen, it's not a question there. There are four remarks that are important, if I may. First one is you need to get early on. Have a better assessment of the risk. It's not a story of having a crisis and you maintain actors stepping in and then later on having developed actors. So that's why we are more and more engaged in the middle of the crisis, but also before. And I can give a number of examples. For instance, the joint, what does that mean? There are four concrete cases. We are developing with the UN and the EU under the leadership of the government in many countries what we call the recovery peace building assessment. Recovery peace building assessment. Fine, you could say it's another assessment from Washington, New York and so on in Brussels, but it's actually very important. You look at what happened in Mali, in CR, those types of assessment under the leadership of the government, which is very important, allows not only to prioritize the type of investment, but also help the government to engage with those parties that have been excluded in the process so that we can actually get from those plans a real program of the government in terms of addressing the grievances. So I think having the type of analytics is very important and we can join. Secondly, in terms of financing, you could say how do you provide the incentive? The key point is how to avoid CNN events. Everybody loves to step in when there is already a picture on TV when there is already a crisis. How can you make sure that you put the financing two years in advance? And what we are doing at the bank for the first time, we have a specific window for the poorest countries that is dedicated to prevention. So basically, we are telling, we are starting with four countries, Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan and Guinea. And we are basically providing up to one-third of the national IDAR resource to those countries, but with one caveat. It has to address the specific root cause of fragility. It would be like in Niger, we are looking at mining sector, we are looking at all the pastoralist issues, the management of land, which is very critical. And if those countries decide to re-attack on those issues, we are then providing additional resources. This is a concrete example under the IDAR resource window that we provide financing. So changing the way we do analytics, we do assessment. We are also doing risk-raising assessment. We are saying, okay, it's another assessment for the World Bank, not at all. We are doing it jointly with the UN, such as in CER, in Guinea-Bissau. And that helps us to design the operation so that we can focus, not business as usual, but specifically on those grievances. So new assessment in any fragile states, we have to carry out those risk-raising assessments that inform the type of operation so that we don't put all on fire, but we are specifically addressing the root cause of fragility. Secondly, financing, where there is a clear incentive to borrow or to receive grants for prevention. And the last point is actually to engage in with peace-building actors, with humanitarian actors. If you are looking, for instance, I was in Kinshasa last week. I mean, I spent a lot of time with our UN colleagues. We are looking at having a new program in Kasai, one of the poorest region, lighting regions, to ensure that we can work at the time of the famine with both humanitarian actors and community actors. Is that something new? Yeah. The 10, 20 years ago, it would have been well. It's a crisis. We'll see at the end of crisis how development actors can come into place. They were looking about how can we make sure that the system of delivery, the cash transfer, the focus on services are going to provide it, otherwise there is a risk of escalating of violences. So I think, yes, my main message is to say we have a business case for prevention, but more importantly, we are really operationalizing it and I agree with also many other actors. And the last point, obviously, is the importance of the leadership of the government. At the end of the day, they are the one who have to take responsibility for actions and be willing. We are just there to provide a framework, to provide the incentive that it's true when not necessarily in place. And that financing is only available to those countries whose leadership commit to this kind of framework? So we just started. The four countries that I mentioned are the countries that have already followed a long analysis of the different risks, but clearly that are in the risk of potentially getting into a higher level of violences. And obviously, you need to have commitments from the countries while benefiting from the funding. But it's not only about this window. What is very important for me, senior director of the Fragiti Group, is that the bank is going to double the resource from 7 billion dollars to 14 billion dollars. Does this never happen over the next three years in fragile states? But financing is not all. The whole point is that if it's financing, you can do not necessarily the optimal way. It's actually making sure that those programs are designed in a way that they address the grievances. That's the most important point. Thank you. Thank you, Frank. I want to move to you, Kate, because as we know, USA established what, 15 years ago, or so, the Office for Conflict, Management, and Mitigation, which was an early effort to try to infuse some of these concepts into the development activities. How do you see that effort going forward with this kind of wind in the sails, this kind of uptake from major institutions like the World Bank and the UN? What do you see as the major barriers that USAID has thus far encountered in really moving that through the development efforts? Thank you, Nancy, for the question, and thank you for the invitation to be here alongside the partners. As you noted, we have undertaken, and our presenters noted it as well, many of these concepts and ideas are not new. Many of our institutions have been grappling with these issues for a long time. You say specifically, we established the fragile states policy in 2005, making a very concerted effort to look at the targeted interventions to mitigate and manage conflict specifically. A lot of these ideas we've all been working on, and some I think with some success over the years. I think the idea of inclusion has been infused into the work that we do. A lot of what we do on the conflict prevention side aligns very well with good development practice, and those are the areas I think that have gained the most traction in terms of working closely with local partners, having a field focus, the inclusion angle, et cetera. I think some of the challenges in what these efforts now may help us break through to the next step. I think in terms of working jointly, as noted, there's been a lot of early warning efforts, but does early warning actually lead to early action? I would say in the USAID's case, from a development perspective, in some cases it does at the activity level. We have great examples in terms of conflict analysis in places like Kenya and then integrating programs to mitigate violence for elections, et cetera. But does that working at the development level acting early translate to working jointly and acting early? I think that's one of the biggest challenges that hopefully this report and all the actors in the room can help move forward. Because as we all know, development actors as big as we are are just one of the many actors in the room, the development side, the diplomacy side, security, interagency, overlaid that against the international community. And the ecosystem is bigger and bigger. It's not just donors, it's the non-stake actors, the business sector, et cetera, and the host country government. So how do you get all those actors? I think what we often find in cases of trying to act early is that people have the time and the luxury to be thinking and acting early are not the ones with the money. And when you're in the middle of a crisis, that's when you have the money and nobody is thinking thoughtfully about these things. So I think that's one of the challenges hopefully this brings forward. The other one I would note in terms of I think sustainability is the other challenge. I think as a development agency and what CMM, Conflict Mitigation Office and others have been able to do is to help link the conflict mitigation angle to the longer-term development trajectory. And we have with our administrator in place now a big focus is really you've heard him talk about the need to end. The purpose of development is to end the need for foreign assistance itself. So how do you work that over the long-term? And I think trying to work in looking at how you do that within a conflict setting and realizing that the ability to actually affect and break the cycle is key to that in the long-term. And when we talk about sustainment and the other parts that came up in the presentation, I think we've done a good job with the targeting and the inclusion as far as the principles go. The sustainment of resources over the entire cycle I think has been a challenge for us. So I think we've been able, we've been successful in getting some attention to the issue, getting resources in early but trying to get all the actors involved and then sustaining not just early I would say in some ways it's much it's even harder for us. So I think we've been able to get a lot of attention to the development level. In the middle of a crisis you have a lot of attention, you have a lot of resources but then a year out, two years out, five years out, ten years out, all of everyone in the room knows what the pattern looks like for a recurrence, for conflict and how long it takes to actually be out of that zone. But in terms of trying to get resources to a conflict five years that was on there, the military campaign was deemed successful and there's this crucial need for sustained engagement where I think there's a danger that there'll be a drop off. We're going to see that pattern. If I could just one short point and plug in in terms of what I think we're doing well and I would really encourage in terms of moving forward is not just the practice and changing the culture but enshrining it in policy. I think having our new national security strategy now for conflict prevention is a step towards that. I think really enshrining it is key. For the last four national security strategies have enshrined it and so it's how do you move evidence and policy to action. We're going to open it up for questions. There are mics on either aisles here and I'm going to I wish that we could keep going with these great panelists but I do, I know there are a lot of people in the room with lots of expertise so if you want to go to the mic Michael it's right behind you or here it's going to come to you and Michael if you want to say your name for people. Michael on MSI thanks again for this really impressive joint effort to put conflict prevention back on the international agenda I think the report and everybody should read it in depth. I've read it three times and there's a lot of nuggets of empirical wisdom in it so it's well worth studying. I especially like the bringing out of the research on elite political settlements the importance of narratives and perceptions the ambivalent effects of political openness and economic growth that they're a double edge sword but my question is on Nancy's final point in a way specifically how do we activate all these good ideas and all these actors and all this evidence and all these prescriptions in particular places at particular times that need the attention. Who takes the primary responsibility for catalyzing, for activating a process of strategy development in particular places where the risk factors are emerging. I mean one result of this event and your subsequent rollout events around the world apparently would be that various organizations, NGOs and new groups that are being tapped by the report corporations for example go back to their desks and figure out how they can tweak their existing programs and projects in this sector or that country and in that sense there probably will be some improvement overall in conflict prevention. But that doesn't capture or address what have been typical situations where major catastrophic conflicts have emerged such as in Syria that have had reverberating effects in particular places at particular times so how do you kick start a process of convening meetings across not only individual organizations but among organizations. Now let me just make one example Ethiopia. Right now it's exhibiting a lot of the crisis risk factors some violence it's got a lot of things going for it but some threats on the horizon and presently. Who should take the responsibility for addressing a situation like that that fits exactly your analysis. Great thank you Michael that's a great example of Ethiopia and Madam Minister I'm going to look to you welcome responses from the panel but the report talks a lot about the importance of leadership local leadership and your example was a very compelling and powerful example. In the example of Ethiopia where does the action begin? Who catalyzes bringing people together to implement these kinds of recommendations? If I can just use an example in Somalia for instance which is I think then can answer to that question when a major crisis happens we had in October the bombing of Zop which is the city of Mogadishu it's with a lot of people over 300 people lost their lives one of the things that we were really struggling was how do you get coordinated support from the different stakeholders and the prime minister has established a group of ministers from different the internal security women and human rights to come together and address the issue and coordinate but it was a challenge at the country level to have all the stakeholders coming together and respond to our needs so what these reports I think highlights is the importance of not working in silos and in a coordinated manner because at the end of the day countries that are experiencing fragility what they need is response to the need in a collaborative manner from from our end these reports really help I think the different international whether it's World Bank international NGOs for them to really come together and help because these reports help us now to come together and continue a dialogue of how to do it how we can put in mechanism and the leadership of the different governments then can use that platform and then engage and respond but at the end of the day you know coming from the reality on the ground what we need is a coordinated support for this government whether it's responding to a case like what happened in October in Somalia or when conflicts are arising so it's also important that at the country level we have expertise with the UN or World Bank at the country level to really help respond and continue the dialogue because it's sometimes what happens is that there is this disconnect from what happens on the ground and at the Washington level so I think we need to really work how to really make use of this report but at the implementation level others want to come in on that does this change how we do planning both within the specific institutions or within and among institutions just very quickly an excellent question Michael and I think it's very pertinent in terms of the state of affairs of the world today and the paralysis that we do see in terms of how do we bring the different institutions to collaborate and work across the different dimensions of conflict prevention of violent conflict so first and foremost I think it is a crucial I think to state here that the report actually makes a very important case about how important the issue of the role and responsibility of the state as the first actor who is responsible for prevention of violent conflict and here the notion of national ownership and inclusivity is fundamental here and I say this because literally prevention in some circles or it can be also to be foreseen as intervention and here I think it's extremely important that what this report actually points to that prevention is fundamentally a sovereignty enhancing mechanism we are talking about building rebuilding institutions that reflect a social contract that builds social cohesion that brings trust and confidence that perform and support development practices of inclusion in nature etc the report gives a lot of cases to this extent but something that I think is hugely important is this notion of how we interlink preventive diplomacy efforts and here speaking on behalf of the UN I mean the important role that the secretary general good offices can have for mediation efforts that the department of political affairs can undertake to get to the politics of the resolution of the conflict because again there's a lot of movement in that direction that needs to happen but again because of the changing nature of conflict and the big challenge the UN is not alone here and we do need and the UN needs to work across this notion of partnerships, partnerships I mean certainly in the case of Africa the secretary general has made the partnership with the African Union sort of a cardinal strategic partnership of sorts and the sub-regional organizations ECOA, SADIC etc how we jointly perform mediation efforts jointly extremely important but then the big gap here is this distance between mediation efforts and then the financing of many of the proposed solution or opportunity entry points if you will and here this I think challenges both the bank and the UN in how to be much more flexible, much more responsive and how to work with new partners and here civil society has been mentioned I think the last time we were here we were talking to this notion about involving not just government actors but civil society actors women and youth in particular and targeting this in marginal areas I mean I think a lot of the conflicts that we see today and some of the countries mentioned here the origin of these conflicts usually come from the periphery towards the center here we have the vulnerability of big spaces in national territories that is suddenly the big challenge across the Sahel and in many regions of the world so here this interlinkage between diplomatic efforts the way security is being undertaken and provide this issue of citizen security access to justice and the linkage with human rights I think are extremely important factors we're unfortunately running tight on time so I'll take a couple of questions and then we may have to roll into our wrap up but there's a question right there go ahead good morning my name is James Turfin I work at the office of the High Commission of Human Rights in New York and I just wanted to pick up on the last point that Oscar just made about the link with human rights this is a fantastic study very detailed study of the links between development and conflict it's being published the year that the UN is celebrating the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration which the SG actually has called one of our best prevention tools if you look at the preamble of that document it's very clearly framed as a conflict prevention tool it also comes on the 20th anniversary of the adoption by the UN system of rights based development as an approach to development so in some ways it's a bit perplexing the report which actually uses a lot of the rights analysis if you like of inclusion of addressing grievance of participation of inequalities and so on keeps human rights at some arms length it's careful about human rights and I just wanted to to get a sense of the panel's sense of how human rights actually contributes and specifically the normative framework the legal framework which I think can help open space for prevention got it, pass the microphone behind you to the woman in the green shirt and then we'll go over here over here next thank you very much but I'm going to ask everybody to be very short very short, I would like to thank you for the I mean on our constate there is need for agile and flexible consolidated financing solutions and I would like to ask the esteemed panelist how do you strike the balance between that, the need for that and the need for institutions and bilateral donors to be accountable to their own backyard in terms of parliaments and all that because I feel a bit of tension in that good question thank you, okay over here thanks for the great report my question is primarily to the UN and World Bank members of the panel you mentioned demographics and with this emphasis on prevention wouldn't, if you take more of a 20 year time frame wouldn't helping countries provide reproductive health services and working on reducing the rate of population growth especially in some of the sub-Saharan countries with very high population growth rates all of the drivers of conflict easier to manage 20 years out youth aspirations youth bulge, migration climate change, all these things okay, if you can hold those in your head, I'm going to take one more and then that'll, and down here in front no, no, right here at the, yeah gentlemen with the tie hi, my name's Julian Ng and I'm from International Alert I'm wondering what do you do as international actors when the state is fundamentally a part of the problem when it's a key driver of conflict yes, that's the heartbeat okay, I want to start I want to start with Madam Minister because earlier you started to give an example of human rights and it's, so if you could start us with this question of how do you see the human rights as woven through this and we'll ask additional responses but and if you want to challenge any of these other or address any of the other questions as well please do so the gentleman has asked how human rights could be if I understood you correctly conflict prevention, right an example and then that links to you know, have more inclusivity in the process so one example is that my ministry has the mandate of human rights development in Somalia recently we led the development of the independent human rights commission in Somalia which is constitutionally mandated and we went through an inclusive process in which unlike other commission, independent commission that happened in Somalia this specific law that was passed it gave a specific direction on how this process should be and you know, it took power from the ministry actually to come up with a panel rather we came up with 19 people who came from the federal member states so this was the first time that we had actually a federal member state sending their representative to this panel and the region of Bernadette as well so 19 people and the law indicated specifically that each member state had to send two people and one was to be a woman so 19 people in that panel we had 10 women and that was the first time it was close to 50% and this 19 technical summation panel went through an inclusive process and we had people applying online giving also an opportunity to the diaspora Somalia diaspora to actually apply online and send their CDs and all of that we received over 600 requests for nine positions and the panel went through we had also observed international observers we had the UN the Human Rights Protection Group in Somalia after that we came up with nine commissioners we had also EU observing the process we had nine commissioners and out of that nine women and one with a person with disability so sometimes processes like that can also allow people who were feeling excluded to be part of the process but you all embraced the idea of human rights that was in your mind a driver of moving with peace absolutely and we used this process actually to and it was a big milestone for Somalia first to establish the independent human right but the process in which we went through and the outcome which is for the first time to have four commissioners who are women and a person with disability for the first time strong on inclusivity Kate how do you see this balance accountability to capitals this is one of the core drivers this is a big issue I think for all of us to deal with and I think part of what's so helpful with the report is key to this and it's building the evidence base you cannot argue for more resources until you have that evidence base and you cannot you cannot be accountable to your own government and congress unless you demonstrate the effectiveness of what you do so I think that's critical to that period if I could just briefly touch on the human rights point I won't touch on whether or why how it's read in the report but these guys do that in terms of I think human rights is a critical issue in terms of the government's ability to protect human rights leads directly how it's viewed as whether it's legitimate or illegitimate and the other aspect for it for us is we look at as we talk about early warning as we look at early warning signs you look at human rights abuses you can see directly the path from escalates, escalates, escalates gets to a situation conflict so I think central to that the way you just laid it out it's very linked to the question about what do you do when the state is the problem and the report actually does an interesting job of identifying the role for nonviolent civil movements so that you truly have bottom up change driving a more peaceful way forward as a means of pushing for inclusion are there other ways that the report looks at how to deal with the issue of not having a state partner and then the demographics and the whole link to human rights and I'm gonna say take it away Frank and Oscar to close us out as we're right at the end of time here so just on the human rights because I know this is always a difficult discussion that we talk about the discussions that happen in New York and Geneva and in Washington since because we're in Washington let me just say because we're in Washington I think it's important that the assessment methodologies that we're using have elements that ascertain how much the civil political, economic, social and cultural rights are being manifest in a given circumstance as we are assessing precisely this notion of grievances how they play out on the different on the different scales if you will of response the strength of institutions, the voice and participation of civil society the capacities of governments to actually undertake a lot of their national obligations this is all part of assessing the capacities of the counterparts in terms of how the United Nations actually performs and designs its own programs how we deploy expertise how we mobilize resources to address the gaps that could be manifest as a result of this assessment the importance about the jointness of the assessment is that we bring the different comparative and collaborative advantages of each one of the institutions and I would dare say very strong and keen analysis on economic factors social factors coming from the World Bank complemented with the political dynamics assessments the security assessments I mean interestingly that on security increasingly we are doing public expenditure reviews jointly and the recent case in the Gambia actually involving other partners the regional organizations the bank the European Union the UN and doing these assessment jointly because the way security is handled and performed and how it's reformed has a huge bearing in terms of how this is perceived and how it impacts and two member state institutions which is an important feature exactly exactly so and in terms of because I know we're we're just hitting the 1030 mark here just to stress that how Frank actually started his whole statement about the importance of this report is almost just to echo in my own concluding remarks that this is now about translating a lot of the empirical the business case has been made I think a lot of the capital somebody was asking about the Parliament I mean we have been asked repeatedly over and over and over what is the business case what is prove the counter factual what is the cost benefit analysis so for once we have a report that needs to be read and interpreted because if we keep asking for more evidence it's a good excuse and this is the problem the excuse is a little bit what we have not addressing the excuse not to act early when the cost of addressing the grievances is much much lower the cost of managing the crisis in terms of humanitarian response in terms of political security responses of peacekeeping operation in terms of refugee insertion cost in some particular parts of the world over the past 10 years alone a loan cost over 240 billion dollars this is all resources that are not going to development that are not going to inclusive peaceful societies these are all resources that are not delivering more health education and inclusivity these are resources that are being used to manage a crisis not to resolve the crisis so this is about prioritizing prevention is about using our instruments of analysis of joint programming and leveraging I think extremely important I mean Frank just mentioned 40 billion dollars of IDA 18 resources going to fragile states requires a comparative response from the part of the U.S. system to help build the capacities of many governments to absorb and deliver this aid and to complement it with the other critical aspects which is good governance which is respect of human rights which is a security and justice system that responds that we learn from these studies to know what type of policies we should not be pushing for and what type of counter you know and the evidence is coming from this report so for us the imperative word to conclude here is operationalizing this report across within the U.N. across you know the humanitarian human rights peace and security and development actors thank you Oscar really short because we're over time I just wanted to quickly say that the women and youth the report says that women and youth inclusion is a conflict prevention so I we welcome you know this my government strongly welcome the message that investing in inclusivity and making women and youth participation it's a conflict prevention it's however it's our hope that this also will translate into development partners to apply the same level of consistent focus and support to these issues as they do with other issues so it's very important what the the report says to really actually make it happen great great and you have a powerful example of what's going on in Somalia Frank thank you in order just to build on what Oscar mentioned I think what making the case for prevention I hope we'll never hear any longer about justifying why we need to focus on prevention I think this report also is looking at the way we do business differently the type of program development assistance we talk about inclusive approach we talk about lagging regions we talk about youth expectation we talk about is it something new well we had the Arab Spring a few years ago and we realized I mean it is on the World Bank side as well it was a completely different way that we need to think about support to the Middle East and North Africa regions you have actually the World Bank strategy in a manner which is contributing to peace and stability which is so therefore recognizing the importance for development actors to work with peace building actors and to support government towards addressing those grievances and to build a social contract I think we have moved away from institutions and different institutions operating in silo, not necessarily focusing on those grievances not necessarily having a local approach but also we have also moved away from having in terms of having new instruments financing what do I mean we mentioned just a few minutes ago the fact that we have new dedicating window to support fragile states that are actually adding financing for countries that are focusing on prevention that's actually a clear example about how we move the needle in terms of financing we talked about the analytics the fact that with the UN with the leadership of government more and more systematically Mali, Ukraine, CER we are conducting those joint recovery peace building assessment it's very important because it helps actually to put all the stakeholders under the table now who takes the leadership it's the government but sometimes the government obviously needs some support, neutral partners to build all the parts of the conflicts and different groups under the table so uptake by local leadership I think what is important for us on the World Bank's side we are working with all the countries that are partners with the World Bank that's very important at the end of the day you heard Oskar saying it rightly prevention is not interference prevention is to ensure that you are going to strengthen the social contract and you are going to make sure that all the voices are being heard whether it's about women, youth or all the different parties so I think this glue is very important and the whole point is to ensure that those grievances are being met my very last point on this one so my point is that you cannot bypass and you need to work with partners and making sure that you have the evidence that you have the assessment and that you provide the incentive that's new provided incentive so what I'm saying concrete example we have worked with Jordan Lebanon Jordan Lebanon are hosting a capital by the way 90% 90% of refugee in Jordan Lebanon following the conflict in Syria are not in camps they are living in Jordan Lebanon what we have set up is actually recognizing the public good by opening their borders that Jordan Lebanon were providing we provided for the first time ever constitutional financing to middle income countries and not only for the World Bank for all the other MDBs working in Jordan Lebanon again that's a way that you can incentivize and recognize that countries are contributing to stability and there is no more spillover so I think it's very important through our instruments assessment tool financing that under the leadership of those governments we actually provide them the support needed to focus on prevention early warning but also contributing to pathway for peace at the bank honestly this is critical number one priority is we're looking at fragility as I mentioned not only in terms of doubling the financing which is important but the way of doing business differently and partnering with institutions with which we are not necessarily partnering or with which we are partnering but in a sequence manner today when there is a peace building efforts during negotiation in a country you are going to see the World Bank through development and also all the development actors providing the type of programs dealing with land management dealing with mining which are critical as part of the negotiation so who's doing negotiation with the development with the key counterpart with the support of the UN peace building however development actors have a key role to play at this stage and I think that's really what the report is about many thanks again for we are so happy to be the institutes for peace I think it's fantastic to be here for the launching of this report and we are going to focus big time on the operationalization I think that was my main message and the partnership with the UN those are terrific solid messages please join me in thanking a terrific panel minister Yasin good luck in Somalia thank you to Frantz and Oscar to the World Bank and to the UN thank you for joining us great to have you in dacha thank you everybody and obviously a conversation that we will no doubt all continue but this has been a terrific opportunity to move us forward