 Okay. So, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming on this wretched day to hear what I hope will be an enlightening lecture lecture of opportunity by Daniel Juergen on the future of energy geopolitics. Daniel Juergen is a Pulitzer Prize winner. You know, he's created one of the world's foremost energy consultancies. And he's the author of most recently of the new map, Energy Climate and the Class of Nations. I'm going to spare talking about any of the other accolades he's won and relate to your very personal anecdote about Dr. Juergen. So this is the first time that I actually met Daniel Juergen, despite the fact that I've been working on the oil industry for over 15 years. And so when I first came to Georgetown back in 2006, my advisor, who's also here, David Painter, had been teaching for over 20 years. And although he had supervised numerous PhD students, as far as I can tell, none of them had actually decided to write about the history of the oil industry despite the fact that David Painter was one of the foremost experts on oil and U.S. foreign policy. And I came to Georgetown expecting to write something else, completely unrelated. And Dr. Painter spent the first semester just sort of giving you a very sub-soft sell that you should consider writing about the oil industry. But I was reluctant to devote my life to studying this. And finally, just before the winter break, he told me, here, I want you to read a book. It's called The Prize by Daniel Juergen. Read it over the break and let me know what you think. And now the funny thing is, I knew who Daniel Juergen was, but nothing to do with oil. Because when I was a senior at Cornell as a history undergrad, you're in my Cold War history class, a professor talked about something called the Yalta and the Riga axioms. These different ways in which American foreign policy makers looked at the Soviet Union. And the Yalta and the Riga axioms was this concept that Dr. Juergen sort of pioneered in his first book, which I've read and I love and I commend to all of you. It's called Shattered Peace. And it's about the formation of the American National Security State and the origins of the Cold War after World War II. And that was how I knew Daniel Juergen. I knew nothing about Daniel Juergen as the oil historian. And so I decided to humor Dr. Painter and I decided to read The Prize over the break. And all I'm going to say is, when I came back in January, I was hooked. I decided that this was what I was going to devote myself to studying and it's what I have done in some way or another for the last 15 years. So even though Dr. Painter made me the scholar that I am, Dr. Juergen inspired me to be the sort of scholar that I am today. And without his influence, I would never have chosen this path. And so I'm grateful to him for his inspiration. And I invited him here precisely because he is such an inspirational and insightful figure and I hope you will gain as much from hearing his words as I gained from reading his book many years ago. Dr. Juergen, welcome to you. Thank you very much and on for those very gracious words. It's a heavy responsibility you put on me that I had something to do with your career path, but clearly it's worked out very well. So I appreciate the invitation to be here and finally to be able to meet you in person and to join the others, your colleagues and of course the students, and also of course to welcome Professor Painter from Georgetown as well. So I'm really glad to not only to be even though it's virtual back at the Naval War College but to be back there because I spoke in 2014 at the International Sea Power Symposium. And it was a different time. It was much more an era of globalization. My focus was about where globalization had come from where it was going. The crucial role that the US Navy plays in basically underwriting guaranteeing how the world economy works. And you know, and it's a much more interconnected world and people think one of the chapters I have in the in the new map is about a man named Malcolm McClain who invented containerization. Basically because he was trying to figure out how to get his his his trucks from New York to Texas faster. And of course the significance of that without containerization China would not play the role in the world economy that it does today. But times change. We have a risk of fragmentation of globalization. Deng Xiaoping famously said, has an ironic tone today that Hong Kong would be one country two systems. Questions are we now heading for one world two systems, and a non talked about my first book which was on the origins of the Cold War. And I have to say that I never expected to be writing another book about what might be origins of a new Cold War. And as I was writing the new map, that's what I felt I was doing. I hope I'm wrong, but that's the way it seems to me. It was very significant that I was there in 2014. I wrote a piece of some of you may have seen called the four ghosts who haunt the South China Sea. I was inspired by being there be by being in that house that may have my hand built by a scene Admiral who shun Glee was the head of the Chinese Navy at the time there, and just kind of having the sense of how the past haunts the present in the future. Now, let me turn to the new map which brings these things together. We have starting a new map with a little write up about the oldest map in the world about 4300 years old that was found near Kirk Cook in Northeast Iraq, and about 1930, and about how maps tell stories wherever they're done. But my publisher said no no you can't do that just get to the start of your story. And the start of the new map is about how we have a new map of energy and geopolitics. That's what I tried to tell, and to bring it together. And it is the sense that the terrain has just shifted so much. The shale revolution in terms of oil, transforming the position of the United States, raising questions about the US engagement nature of US engagement in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. There's a solar revolution and lower costs and wind. The Paris conference that was held in 2015. That has been decisive and one result of it was last week's announcement by Journal Motors no more gasoline powered cars after 2035 they're saying the world's changed dramatically in terms of US Russian relations. And I think just today made creative the former Russian President said talked about insulating themselves from the global Internet. And of course, the big issue which many of you are engaged in is the US China relations having changed so dramatically. I'm going to talk a little later about two specific things, the geopolitical consequences of the shale revolution and this question of a new Cold War with China. And how it's there and how it's unfolding. The idea from the book emerged looking at maps, literal maps, you know trade routes were changing pipelines were changing how relations were all of that. But it really became metaphorical for me, because maps as concepts of a way of organizing the world. The book is divided into six maps. America's map is a story of how the US went from importing 60% of its oil to being self sufficient and whether we're going to maintain that position. Russia's map is about this story about how how Russia, which is a country whose GDP is slightly smaller than Italy, somewhat larger than Spain. Under Putin he's made Russia a great power. It's a superpower in terms of energy and in terms of nuclear weapons and geographically economically though it's far from that. But energy figures in so much of the current discord, as do maps the unsettled questions about the collapse of Soviet Union, which I think is that really been at the heart of the growing tension particularly focused on the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. China's map is really about two maps. One is the map of the South China Sea which we'll come back to. And what that means in China's relationship with the United States. And the other is in the Belt and Road, which was really, it was an interesting map, literally to put together because it's really a whole. It's a map with a lot of vectors but it's basically China's drive to reshape the global economy and put the middle kingdom at the center of it with this phrase connectivity and involves energy and a lot of other things as well. It's very significant and something the US has been trying to counter, but it was very powerful because China was willing to give money without many strings. It just wanted to the debt that would give them ultimate control. The question about China I'm sure in the courses that you have you've been talking about it. It's the city's trap, which Professor Allison at Harvard came up with, which is really what what happens when you have a hegemonic or a major power and rising power and how do they adjust to the world. And it goes back of course to the war between Athens and Sparta. And it is actually a useful construction for thinking in a larger historical perspective about the US and China today. And we'll talk more about the South China Sea. But as I said, the question is, are we moving towards a new Cold War. You see it. The Cold War in terms of trade. There is a war going on in terms of technology for sure. Not an energy yet by any means. In fact, that was an area where we thought there would be inevitable zero some game between China, but it didn't turn out that way. And of course, in the posture of militaries as you, some of you know the doctrines of US branches the US military are changing and certainly the Chinese are very focused on one thing which is US power. I have a section called the maps of the Middle East. And I came across on the internet once and ISIS militants stomping his feet on this, what he said was the sand on the border between Iraq and Syria saying Sykes because dead Sykes because dead. By that he meant the map that was drawn at the 2015 and 1915 and 1916, which was meant to be create what the map of the Middle East would look like when there was no longer an Ottoman Empire. And really the origin of the state system and overturning that system has been one of the kind of major dramas go back to Kamal Abdul Nasser. That's what he was trying to do. Iran has been consistently trying to do it. ISIS and Al Qaeda are trying to do it. And it obviously the US as you all know a very big role there. My Dex Wilson just told me just finished his class seminar today on the first Gulf War, and it was after the first Gulf War in 1995 that the fifth fleet was reactivated and put in Bahrain, exactly because the importance of security of that region. And is, you know, as the picture changes there'll be question about the nature of our commitment. Two maps in the region. One is the eastern med, which was a dead sea as far as energy but it's now turned out to be a very big source of natural gas. It's brought Egypt and Israel closer together, as well as Cyprus and Greece, but it's also become a new frontier for hostility Turkey and the other countries in the region. And if you're looking at where there could be difficulties in the future. Certainly, Turkey's way Turkey's moving signals that with Erdogan claiming almost the president of Turkey claiming almost an Ottoman vocation diversification is a very important question for the countries in that region. Vision 2030 is the Saudi version of that. And it's not easy to diversify an economy that's heavily dependent upon oil. And it turns out, you actually need a lot of oil revenues to do that. And I think the countries in the region are asking what does it mean for the engagement of the US in the region over time. If the US is energy independent, which the United States has now become. And one of, I think an example of the new map was the deal that was made in really the treaty between the UAE and Israel, a much bigger deal. I think then maybe was recognized in the United States at that time, because we had a lot of trouble not including a presidential election. But obviously it's about Iran. It's about economic relations. It's about stability in the region. I think it's also about questions about where, what is the US role going to be in the future in that region. And in a sense, a hedge to bring together two very strong militaries in that region. In a more explicit cooperation than in the past. And I think a greater concern about the risk and danger from drones and the ability that Israel is established to to deal with that. Two other big maps in the book were sections one is roadmap of the future. And in it I have a conversation that the CEO of General Motors said, up 15 years ago saying, you know, most businesses. Business models don't last for a century and that for the automobile industry have lasted for a century. And would it change. Well now we're really seeing a change. You know, as in 2008 that Tesla brought out its roadster and it's kind of a novelty. 12 years later, look what's happening General Motors has said, no more gasoline powered cars after 2035. So you have a combination of a shift electric vehicles, a shift to self driving cars which by the way owes its origin to DARPA, the defense of advanced research agency, which financed the develop the competitions for self driving vehicles and ride and maybe we might be looking at a very different kind of automobile industry with different energy implications, about 40 to 45% of the oil in the United States is used for gasoline. But I'll say it will be a long time before our automobile fleet really changes the average car in the United States stays on the road at least 12 years. The final section I know we'll talk about it later is climate map. And there I think is really two eras the era before the Paris climate agreement, and after the Paris climate agreement. And now the objectives, which have become net zero carbon by 2050 have been really adopted around the world, including by the Biden administration. And you can't go anywhere in the energy world today without running in colliding with the phrase energy transition everybody talks about it, not very clear really what it means and how it will play out. I would just say energy transitions have been going on for a long time, putting on an economic historian hat. I say began 1709 when an English metal worker figured out, you can make iron better with using coal rather than wood. But these took a long time oil was discovered in Pennsylvania in 1859. It wasn't until the 1960s that oil overtook coal is the world's number one energy resource wind and solar. They're very competitive now, but they're 50 year old industries 40 years to become competitive. The shift of course that President Biden has said that climate is a national security issue. And big question for everybody is what will the energy mix look like, how much oil and gas and how much renewables, and the view I take in the new map. It's going to be a mix for quite a long time. And even in 2050, you don't see how the world works without oil and natural gas as part of the mix. What I want to do now is focus in on two topics that I think are highly relevant for you all. One is the shale revolution United States. This was basically the result of one person being obsessed. It's amazing that one person can have that impact but look at Tesla was one person being obsessed. There's a man named George P Mitchell who in the early 1980s 1980 1982 actually became convinced that you could get oil and gas from this very dense rock called shale. The petroleum engineer and textbook said not possible doesn't work. He controlled his company they spent 16 years, they were about to give up. And then these are the how the accents of history work and I think like people like and on and I like history partly because of the accidents. Some petroleum engineer goes to a baseball game in Dallas and sits with somebody who says, Well, try this technology we're using so this is the last well they're going to try it. They try it works. So shale goes from the US being the world's largest importer of oil in the world. 60% of our consumption in 2008 to now being an exporter of oil and natural gas we were going to be importing vast amounts of LNG. Now we're going to be one of the world's three biggest exporters of LNG. A lot of economic impacts from this millions of jobs has been a big deal for the manufacturing industries in the Midwest. It's been responsible for over $200 billion of investment in new factories. And if you go back to 2008 the US was spending almost $400 billion a year importing oil. Now we're not spending any money basically importing oil. So when we talk about all these stimulus bills $400 billion is a pretty significant stimulus to have that money in the US economy. It's important for instance the state of New Mexico which revenues one third of its budget come from oil and gas. And the two things that I think really concern you all is what does it mean for energy security, and what does it mean for foreign policy for energy security. The facility in Saudi Arabia called Appcake. It processes about 10% or can process about 10% of all the oil that's in the world trade every day. It's the single most important piece of hardware probably in the world oil industry. In September of 2019, drones allegedly first from the Houthis in Yemen but clearly Iranian rained down on Appcake and on another facility called Corace. If that had happened seven or eight years ago there would have been panic in the world oil market. I looked the other day at the daily prices. It hardly had any impact. And then because of the shale revolution United States had transformed the oil market and the thinking about the oil market and a sense of security that just was not there before. What does it mean for foreign policy. It's meant flexibility for the US and foreign policy, whether you're with Obama's approach to Iran, Trump's approach or what will be Biden's approach. And that would have worked if we were still importing a lot of oil. Uranium said you'll never get us to negotiate over nuclear, our nuclear program by cutting off our oil because the world can't do without our oil. It turned out it could because US oil was there to fill the void. In the book I describe a scene when I was at a conference which is Putin's version of the Davos conference called the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. On the stage was Putin and Chancellor Merkel, and you can see the iciness between the two of them. They told me that I should ask the first question and so I was going to ask the perennial question. President Putin how are you planning to diversify your economy and be so less reliant on oil and gas by accident. I mentioned the word shale and he started shouting at me and being shouted out in front of 3000 people by Vladimir Putin is not a happy experience. And he went on as I thought about it afterwards I realized two reasons he doesn't like shale is one it makes the US competitive with him for gas markets in Europe, and he sees shale as an adjunct to US foreign policy strengthening US foreign policy. I have seen that I work closely I'm on the energy advisory committee for the government of India, and I can see that the fact that we're exporting significant energy to India has become a cornerstone at that relationship. Obviously there are other cornerstones as well the Indo Pacific security, but this has become a very concrete thing. And I can see with South Korea with Japan that they're importing energy from us as their energy security, and is another way time is together. And I'll tell you China would be really jealous, or is really jealous of our position, China imports 75% of its oil, and it regards that as a strategic weakness. And I'll come back to that in terms of the South China Sea. So, there is, you know the question now what is the new Biden administration do on energy and they've taken some steps to at least somewhat restrict development of US oil and gas. But I think just to keep in mind, you know, I'd like to remind people that if you restrict. Or indeed ban fracking and some of the people in the Democratic primary said they wanted to do what that really is is an import more oil policy. That's what that's what will happen, because there are 280 million cars in the US roads that run on the oil or gasoline and they're not going to stay in the garage. But this question of China then helps us pivot to the nine dash line. I think, and I think I will get into discussion and I'll be very interested to hear what you all think. But I would argue that it's not only it's the most important body of water in the world today for the world economy, because one third of world trade passes through it. I would also argue and again would be interested to hear what you all think that it's also the most dangerous body of water in the world right now. So the new map is a book about the past, the present and the future. So in terms of the past I got really curious, how did the South China Sea become this issue where US and Chinese naval vessels come very close and dangers of collisions. And going back in the archives I found that one captain George Miser maker, a French captain set sail from Saigon in 1933, when it was Southeast Asia was French Indochina, and he had quite an armada. He had one gunboat, one fishing trawler, and one hydrographic boat. And they sailed to nine islands, whether allowing in the South China Sea and at each one, they read a proclamation of sovereignty inserted into a bottle, and then put it into a boundary market and claimed those islands as French territory. And by the way Vietnam would later say it's their Vietnamese as a result of that. This created when news finally traveled no internet of course to Beijing outrage and much discussion. But the Chinese Military Council said, we need to cool down the game with the French are Navy is weak and these nine islands are not useful to us for now. The geographers did not agree they were very nationalistic and there was a new geographer named a make you I have his picture in the book, who was at the forefront of this nationalistic geography. And already in 1930 had produced a national humiliation map to help the Chinese people to be patriotic. And this theme of the century of humiliation is central to Chinese policy today absolutely central to their narrative. In 1936, three years after captain mismikers voyage, they made true drew a map that showed most of the South China Sea belonging to China. That is the nine dash line was adopted by the communists when they took basis. And it is on that basis that they're turning tiny islands, or creating islands and making them into military bases and challenging us naval vessels and US military airplanes. To make sense of it for myself. And I hope for readers I said they're really three contentious questions. Who owns the islands. And that's contentious. Are the waters of the South China Sea international waters, or are they as China says national territory of China, and the extended economic zones. Are they only economic, or do they also mean that the country to whom they belong controls those waters, and the US Navy if it wants to pass through needs China's permission to go through that. Why are the Chinese so insistent on the South China Sea. So maybe some of you will have some enlightenment on that there is an energy component. There's a lot of notions that there are billions and billions of dollars of reserves under it. My colleagues in IHS market, who study the geology the region, do not believe that there are large resources there are resources that are significant for individual companies. They're not going to, they're not going to move the needle. And the international companies I think agree with us just that's the nature of the geology. It is significant because of Taiwan. If there's an incident involving Taiwan the Chinese worried that the US Navy would would block passage of oil through the Strait of Malacca and to the South China Sea. So, there is that there is just deep seated nationalism you talk to Chinese, they're taught in schools. I've asked Chinese from elementary school that this is Chinese territory, and it goes back to the century of humiliation. I have a scene in the book in which now President Xi when became General Secretary of the Secretary of the Party. The first thing he did was take the Politburo with him over to a museum and stand in front of the exhibit called the century of humiliation, and saying this is over now, we're now in pursuing the Chinese dream. In the, in a subsequent article that some of you may have seen I built upon the, this issue, really to just say, you know, how serious this is talked about the four ghosts who who haunt the South China Sea. And the idea for it, as I say, came from my visit in 2014 to the Naval War College and being there. And there's a general Zheng He, who was a great Chinese admiral who sailed as far as Africa. And that is kind of the claim. China's claim to South China Sea is based on history, not international law. And he proposed that to Hugo Grotius, the father of the law of sea. And it's interesting to know that the law of the sea that everybody talks about was a result of a battle between a Dutch ship and a Portuguese ship in the South China Sea. It was a century after Admiral, Admiral Genki, then of course is Admiral Mayhem, whose idea of sea power, totally absorbed by the Chinese. And then I talk about somebody and I don't know if you talk about in many of the courses, Norman Angel, who wrote a book about to call it a great illusion, and people always say God that guy really made a mistake because he said the World War one couldn't happen, because it was so economically interconnected. It's not what he said. He said if a war happened, the consequence would be very severe because everybody's so economically interconnected. And of course, that's what happened. And so I think that is all of this is very relevant today. Are we in a new Cold War? If we are, it will be very different from the Soviet American Cold War. It was about nuclear weapons was about ideology, but the Soviet Union was a minor factor in the world economy. China and the US are so much more interconnected than people realize in so many different ways economically. Both are so embedded in the world economy. But how do you, but I've seen the language change. I looked at, but was it five US presidents from Reagan onward. No, more than five talked about how engagement with China constructive relationship. That language is gone now. Now it's about great power rivalry, strategic rivalry, peer competition, and the Chinese are the same way they talk about that we're trying to contain them. And so it does get back to these questions of intentions. But it's a more calm, much more complicated picture. It's not clear to me what the resolution is. This new administration is going to make an effort to these stabilize or make more predictable US Chinese relations. But there, but this administration is also going to put more emphasis on human rights, which is going to raise questions about Hong Kong and the Uighurs. And so, and of course, the South China Sea is the cauldron where the risk of an accident of some kind of invent happening when communication just and the other bonds are less tied together. Five or seven years ago would have said trade tied into nations together. Now that's a subject of intention. So, I'm very interested to kind of move from this now to the question period, but I hope that there's not only a question period because I'd really like to hear from you all with your perspectives and experience on these questions in the time that we have. So, and now I turn it back to you. And thank you. Talk about the new back today. All right, thanks, Dan. I've asked certain faculty to who are experts on on on different relevant subjects offer comments or ask questions and so I thought we'd start with our China experts and the first person who would like to offer a comment would be Peter Dutton, who is a former director of our China Maritime Studies Institute. Yeah, thanks very much. I appreciate it and thank you for the talk, Daniel. It's a pleasure to see you again. I think you spoke at our energy conference of 10 or 12 years ago and I'm glad to see you back virtually at the Naval War College. You asked a question that I'd like to reflect back to you on and that is why is the South China to see so important to China, given the fact that I and I agree with you that the energy resources are are not substantial enough to make a difference other than to as you as you point out to individual companies and some of the Southeast Asian countries. To my mind, it comes out to two things, right, and I'll come back to the to the energy. The first is the relationship between geography and security. I think historically the Qing Dynasty incorporated large land buffer areas into the Chinese Empire system right so Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet came really under formal control of China during the Qing Dynasty. And they were able to create a buffer between a continental buffer between China proper and the expanding great powers of the time Russia and Britain actually coming up from the south, but they never managed to do something similar at sea. And I think the Chinese view the ocean space in there, what are usually referred to as the near seas, essentially is completing that arc of buffer buffer zone between, between the, you know, China proper and encroaching great powers. And so I think probably the single most important thing for the Chinese is to establish a maritime security buffer zone between between between continental China and maritime powers like the United States and others who might cause cause trouble for them. The second big issue I think is China in the regional hierarchy. China uses the South China Sea disputes in my view to to improve its position in the regional hierarchy politically and otherwise but to give it status in terms of the local to regional status in terms of regional rulemaking and and the ability to set the agenda for for the region in many different ways. Recognizing that China's interest in the South China Sea differs from others. And so, coming back to the point about resources. The way that the Chinese use the resources is essentially as a tool to achieve the other two objectives, right it's the resources are that are instrumental. If it creates leverage against the Vietnamese it creates leverage against the Filipinos and increasingly now against Malaysia. So, so that would be my reflection back to you. And I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on that. I think, I think those are two very good points I do remember on your regional hierarchy. I remember once being in Singapore when she should think was coming to town. I was having breakfast with pretty senior guy from the defense establishment. And he said well I've got to leave now we have to go see the emperor. And so I think there is, there is a historic. You know that there's a historical mindset that plays into that. So I think those are both true and I think, as you're suggesting that the energy side of it is the transit of energy that's really important to them. And, but that concept of the buffer zone. That makes a lot of sense and I do have a scene in there when there was like 2012 an issue with the Chinese and they said to one of the other countries, you know, their big powers and small powers. And it is. And I think the only thing I kind of would add to that is that I think nationalism is really this nationalist spirit is what really ties it ties ties the country together. I remember once asking the senior Chinese economist, what does socialism mean for China today said it means whatever is good for China. So I think I think you make two very important points and then if we wrap this sort of national is that the sense of the century of humiliation, which seems to be just just so deeply ingrained in their narrative today. And the fact that China is I think did not just mention this is going to overtake the US in the size of its economy. And maybe one other thing about the relationship I think, looking back to financial crisis 2008 was a turning point. Because up till then it was the United States economic model telling everybody else how to do things. And then we really messed up. And so I think that is fed into so I take both I think both your points are very helpful and putting it in that historical sweep. Thank you. Good to see you. The next person I wanted to ask another China person, another China scholar, we have plenty of them at the war college is next Wilson. Yeah, thank you. Thank you very much. I mentioned the container. And the, the fact that oil will be still be a dominant fuel well into the well into the 21st century. What is that boat for the infrastructure aspect of the Belt and Road Initiative in particular, the rail and road lines stretching through Central Asia, potentially all the way to Europe. You know, in a world of oil and the limitations of rail and road traffic, it doesn't seem to be a winner for China, at least economically. You mean the Belt and Road strategy or the continental arm arms of the Belt and Road. Well, I think maybe that ties in. That's done this comment that in a way that first of all, I had thought about that way it makes those countries more of a buffer zone to it is search Chinese influence particularly over the Central Asian countries. I think there are many motivations for Belt and Road. I think when it started. It had to do with this surplus that Chinese manufacturing. They'd overbuilt capacity and they needed markets, but I think it is taken on a much more geopolitical significance now, and they do see it as as a way of part of their effort to create an alternative to us dominated international order. Obviously it's run into some pitfalls and so called debt trap, and kind of resistance to what some seem is Chinese colonization, but China has the reserves to continue to do it. They say that they don't want to waste money, but and I think it's also a way of being less dependent on the Malacca Strait, actually for their goods. It's a way to the scale of the of container ships, probably not, but it will certainly provide an alternative. And it's a way of extending their influence right into Central Europe. Right. The next China scholar is my fellow Cornelia and Dr. Isaac Cardin. Is he here? He did send me a question. I'll look up the question. In the meantime, is Dr. Becca pink is here. Oh, sorry, Laura, can you unmute Isaac Cardin please. Sir, I'm going to. I've got it now. Thanks. Thanks for for a stimulating talk. I'm wondering if you could reflect a little bit on the China Russia energy relationship, and particularly on sort of the interaction between the economics of it and the geopolitics. Obviously China as a huge net importer likes prices low, likes approximate neighbor with huge energy resources, whereas Russia strongly prefers prices high and probably wants to find ways to use this to leverage China. How do you understand that dynamic? Interesting. So, in the book I described the scene. The US put its sanctions on the Nord Stream to pipeline for those who don't know it's a Russian oil pipeline that runs under the Baltic Sea to Germany and we've put sanctions and stopped at about three weeks from completing this $11 billion project. Within about two weeks of that. There was a ceremony with Xi Jinping in Beijing and I think Putin in Sochi and then the guys on the Chinese Russian border, integrating this power of Siberia pipeline which is a huge pipeline. And basically, Russia has been doing is pivoting its energy towards Asia, and in particular to China. And it hasn't been easy for the reason you say I remember talking to some Russians, after they negotiated this tremendous huge natural gas deal that became power of Siberia, and describing there like three Russians on one side of the table negotiating about 25 on the other. And it was the negotiation I think I quote Putin went to like three in the morning because they agree on price was really tough, because the Chinese and the Chinese kind of prevailed because they want it. You know, Russia needed them. This was after Ukraine. That's right it was after the Ukraine annexation of Crimea so Russia really needed to deal with China. So I think it has become a much more important relationship that goes beyond. I think energy is a very important foundation that goes beyond it. I remember when I was at a more recent St. Petersburg economic forum. You had on the stage of Putin and Xi and Putin said to Xi. You know I'm sorry I kept you up till four in the morning your time talking so late and she said, no problem. We never have enough time to talk. Those guys have met about 30 or more times. And they can talk about energy, and they can talk about their common antipathy to a US but they see as a US dominated international order. So I think it's become very much a personal relationship between the two men. I'm an important geopolitical relationship in the in the new map I mentioned that the Russians are now apparently willing to sell their advanced weapons to China, which I didn't want to do before because of reverse engineering, but it's now part of the relationship that they'll do. So I think that geopolitical connection between those two. I mean, I think that's become a very important geopolitical fact in the world and there. They have a lot in common, including liking authoritarian systems. All right, next up should be a doctor think is who should be able to unmute herself. Hi, thank you. I'm going in a different direction. I'm wondering what you think the implications for US China competition are of China's dominant position in the green energy industries of the future, including solar panels, wind turbines and also rare earth elements, which are vital components of advanced batteries as well as solar panels. Thanks. You nailed it with your with your question that the Chinese very early. So made this commitment to what they call new energies. There is an article in the Times pointed out which I talked about in the book, GM's turn towards electric cars is not just because of Biden administration because of what's happened in China, which is a more important market to them in the United States right now. So I think the Chinese do have a study. I'm co-heading a study in art and I just market called new supply chains for net zero carbon economy. And I think this is a really serious issue. We talk about green jobs. So you can create green jobs in China is what we can do. And so, and we say, well, we should have mine in the United States. Well, try and get an environmental permit to build a mind in in the United States will be pretty difficult. So I think, you know, over here were supply chains, which were kind of about efficiency technology economics over here is geopolitics. And I think your question is exactly on target because I think these two things come together. And we're not going to build a solar panel industry in the United States, because we can't compete with them. When I did my previous book called the quest. At the beginning I interviewed this guy who headed what was then the largest solar company in the world. The time is finishing the book you go bankrupt because of Chinese competition. So I think, I think that it's pretty formidable. Let me turn the question around, what do you think it sounds like you do research on this. It's, it's a really interesting topic because I think you make such a compelling case about the ability of the US to have some more latitude in foreign policy because of our oil and gas production. But you know when we think about sort of the next wave of green energy, it's less portable. Right, you know, solar and wind are in situ energy generation types and it's much more about the technology and less about sort of shipping oil around the world and it's interesting to think about how we could build on our gains in oil and gas and, and maybe claw back some of the losses in the industries and there may be some trade solutions perhaps you might have run across I mean that you've got such a sweeping view of all these issues right it's it's so interesting to hear your thoughts. I think that I think solar is kind of really locked in Chinese manufacturing right now. And I've never really found a good answer to how much is it just that they're really good at building big efficient factories, and how much is it that there's subsidies that we understand on wind, I think, much less dependence obviously rare metals and things are important. But when machines are built in Colorado so it's it's we, but you do need certain components and inputs including rare earth and so forth, and the same for for EVs and electric cars. I think the Chinese want to dominate electric cars, because that's the way they can dominate the world oil automobile market. So, I think we're going to see this much more address now over the next four years than it has been but there's there's a reality there. That's a little different than some of the rhetoric there. And I'll just say, even like wind towers need plastics and here's something that may surprise people 20% of an electric car is plastic. And, by the way, so you've got to get the plastic for somewhere so how these things flow together is more complicated than people recognize so. So, I think that's going to be a topic of discussion as as money gets poured into that sector. Dr. Pincus did us a real favor by allowing us to seamlessly transition to other parts of your book and other areas of expertise among our faculty. And obviously that has to do with energy transitions and the role of climate in shaping future geopolitics. I wanted to ask Dr. Andrea Cameron, who's head of our colleges climate security and human security group to ask a question and offer a comment. I would like to ask about Russia in particular so Russia is a signatory to the Paris Climate Accord, but many scholars perceive that the Russian energy market will kind of be counter or actually act counter to climate change goals and I was just wondering what your assessment was about Russia and the energy transition. I think that oil and gas constitute about for these prices back to normal about half the Russian budget, and that economy going back to my exchange with Vladimir Putin sessions it was, is no real shine, sense of diversified. I think they have appointed a climate envoy to go head to head with John Kerry. But I think they would like to see, they would be very happy to see the US for climate reasons, pulling back from oil production because they'd like to fill the market. So, don't see them hastening to make the same kind of transition. I think everybody though in the global energy industry is sort of grappling with what does energy transition mean and how does it unfold and how quickly. It's interesting if you look at the numbers to where people be really surprised because we all go to the gasoline station fill up our cars so. Cars and SUVs probably account for only about 8% and CO2 emissions, which is a much smaller number than people people think oh it's 50%. And so, there are a lot of other areas like agriculture, and of course power sector coal generation that are there, but I don't see Russia having any more lip service at this point. People might be all angry or do you have any more to say. I'll give someone else a chance and then if I have another one I'll take the opportunity. All right, sticking on the sort of big picture about transitions and the future of energy. I think here's a good time. Here's a good moment to ask Dr painter to weigh in with with this question. Okay, thank you. I'm glad you brought up a shattered piece. As Dr urban mentioned I just retired and I was cleaning out my office and I found 25 handwritten pages of notes on shattered piece. I used to take a lot of historic document. That's why I want to preserve it, get a new scanner and preserve that. And then also remember the transition from shattered piece to energy future where you get started in energy thing and one of the things that stood out to me with energy future, possibly because at the time I was working in the world and conservation and solar division of Department of Energy is that the energy is being at the demand side, as well as the supply side, and the supply side is so much more interesting, and many ways about it's more in geopolitics, but the demand side. I think a very loving used to talk a lot about the most important source of energy is in your attic, you know, putting in another words conservation, and what what do you think is there still a good potential, especially in the United States for conservation as energy policy that will also enhance us geopolitical power because we're not using as much. And in regard to conservation we just throw one other extra thing and make it more complicated. How do you achieve that. Each course is on whirling work power and always run into Jevons paradox that you drive the prices down and people, you know, efficiency can lead to actually greater consumption because prices go down and people use more. Thank you, David, of course, glad you're on and respect for your work, after which I benefited. I actually got into this whole field. Because of conservation just thinking well why can't we just be more efficient. And the truth is, we actually have been a lot more efficient at, you know, probably use half as much energy per unit of GDP as we did in the past, but our GDP has grown, but our cars get more efficient so maybe people drive more. But I think we have a whole set of tools in terms of information controls that we didn't have before that enable us to continue to be more efficient. And it is, you say it is too bad that people kind of, I think the thing is, it's hard to have a visual image of conservation. You can sort of see graceful wind towers. You can see sparkling solar panels, but tell me what conservation looks like, what efficiency looks like, but it's there. And you just achieve it incrementally and you achieve it with information control advanced information technology that can do things in the past so I think that probably that is, if you don't hear much about that even in the Biden program, but actually it'd be pretty darned significant going forward. I mean, if you look at per capita consumption, the US is still consumes a lot. Right. Yeah, on a per capita basis, especially though, so does Canada and Australia. Right. And then what I do say, in terms of energy transition, working with the Indians, I see it different. They see energy transition very differently. We have hundreds of millions of people who are getting sick, cooking with wood and waste products, and we want to get them commercial energy. So they, for them, energy transition is not only a big commitment to wind and solar, but also big commitment to natural gas, building a natural gas infrastructure and importing natural gas from the United States. One of the sides, I mean, I'm obviously teaching cycle through the prize, the quest, and as soon as it's in paperback, the new map. What do you think of Paul Stevens work? I noticed the economists had this special issue on industry back in September, just as your book came out. And it looked to me like their whole article was based on his work. He's got this piece on the geopolitics of future oil demand, saying as well, the man goes down, that's going to have an impact on geopolitics. I'm not. My issues with the economist pile up. His work. So I can't comment. Sorry. That's okay. Okay. Sorry. So the next question is going to go to Dr. Sam 10 ready. And then we'll be also here from some of the students. Yes. He'll be the final faculty member to comment and then I'll go to the general student body. Okay. Sam. Thank you. I want to know your comments on the two energy industries that seem to have effectively died. That's hydroelectric power and nuclear power. It's interesting that some years ago, both were seen as great alternatives to the carbon energy, and yet to both through a number of circumstances have are no longer seen that way. Did you comment about kind of why that happened and if there's any lesson. Hydro power. Some will say they're not a lot of recent places left and high large hydro projects are, you know, generate a lot of opposition. You, you had three gorges and China and so forth, but a lot of environmental opposition. And I think people who might fund it like the World Bank, I believe have really backed away from, from hydro. You just can't. I mean, some places you can do it, but, but not in any large scale nuclear. You're quite right. I was. I mean, it's been done in by cost really their their new power plants that are being built in Georgia and they're just so over budget. And now in China, they build nuclear power plants pretty quickly, and they continue, you know, they're really stepping up their role of nuclear in their, in their energy supply. But in most of the advanced industrial countries just there's a few projects left, but the two things I'll say that one. Gates has a book coming out on climate, and I'm going to interview him in about two weeks about it. So I was reading advanced gallery. He makes a big, a big argument that you can't meet climate goals without nuclear. And I was surprised to find this research is a new map. And this is the updated number now there's 62 advanced nuclear companies and projects in the United States. And the idea is, is about small nuclear, small modular reactors that would be built in a factory, and then be installed and not have huge construction projects. So, but they take time and it's complicated because I've got to go through licensing Bill Gates has his, he was called terror power company that he's been putting money into. So, there's a commitment and, and as Bill points out in the book, solar wind take up a lot of land, a lot of territory, small modular nuclear reactors, not so. I'd like to say that it's got it really to really have an impact it has to go to a next generation nuclear power, no longer Admiral Rick Over's clear submarines as the as the origin, which was in the in the in the quest I was very interesting to just how Admiral go was both ahead of the Navy's nuclear program and ahead of the atomic energy commission at the same time so he would write members to himself and then approve it and send it back to himself and got things done. You can't do things like that anymore.