 Nancy Lindborg, I'm the president of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and I'm delighted to welcome you today to our first virtual bipartisan Congressional Dialogue series, and I'm especially pleased to welcome back to this series two congressional leaders, Congressman Rick Larson from Washington and Congressman Darren LaHood from Illinois, for what I know will be a very lively discussion on the hot topic of U.S.-China relations. We all read the news, and it seems like unity and consensus are hard to come by these days in politics, but from our experience, bipartisanship is absolutely essential to solving the toughest foreign policy challenges, so we especially applaud the commitment of our two guests today in doing so. USIP was founded in this bipartisan spirit in 1984 when Congress charged us with the mission to reduce, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict abroad, and we do this as an independent, nonpartisan, national institute. And so this is what, for this very timely and critical discussion on the current state of U.S.-China relations, and it seems by all accounts that U.S.-China relations are at their worst point in decades. Most official lines of communication have ground to a halt, and there seem to be few, really, if any examples of successful ongoing cooperation between the two countries. We've seen over the last few months that China and U.S. have condemned each other's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. There's been this tit for tat against journalists and media operations, and of course this is against the backdrop of so many other issues boiling the relationship. The trade relationship, Beijing's imposition of a controversial new national security law in Hong Kong, human rights concerns in Xinjiang province. So these concerns have taken center stage after a decade in which China has expanded its presence, its influence on the international stage, investing heavily in countries across Asia and Africa, and we've also seen a more active role in regional and international conflicts from North Korea and Burma to Afghanistan and Sudan. So this is one of the reasons that USIP has a significant focus on China, and of note we lead a series of bipartisan study groups to better understand the impact that China's growing engagement has on conflict dynamics around the world. And we've released three senior study group reports. The most recent examined China's impact on the Red Sea arena, which includes the Horn of Africa, Egypt, and the Arabian Peninsula. And we've also published reports on China's impact on nuclear and peace negotiations in North Korea and its role in Burma's internal conflicts. All of these are available on our website. I encourage you to check them out after today's conversation. I think many of you know that Congressman Larson and LaHood are co-chairs of the US-China Working Group, a bipartisan group founded in 2005 to build diplomatic relationships and educate members of Congress about US-China relations. It's become an increasingly important working group over the last few years. We were very happy to have a chance to host them back in our headquarters building in September 2019 for a discussion on US-China relations as a part of this series. And since then, I think we'll agree the global landscape has changed a great deal. So I'm quite grateful to have them back for this conversation. As longtime followers of US relations with China, Congressman, we look forward to your perspectives on the shifting congressional attitudes towards China and how you think Congress will address these concerns. Congressman Larson represents Washington's second district, which includes San Juan and Island counties, as well as other communities in Northwest Washington. Congressman LaHood represents Illinois' 18th district, which includes western parts of Illinois and the greater Peoria area. Each of them brings deep experience, lots of expertise to the US-China relations and broader arena of international affairs. They have served their constituents in US national security interests with vision, commitment, and extraordinary leadership. So Congressman Larson, Congressman LaHood, thank you so much for being here with us today. In today's especially divisive times, your commitment to bipartisan problem-solving stands as a really important example to future foreign policy leaders, and we have a lot of them watching us online today, both from your home states and from around the country. I want to invite our online viewers to participate in the live Q&A. You can use that YouTube chat box function on the YouTube page, and please join the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag BipartisanshipUSIP. I'd like to invite Congressman Larson to offer remarks first. He'll be followed by Congressman LaHood. After that, we'll have a short moderated discussion, and then we'll take questions from all of you watching us. With that, Congressman Larson, welcome, and Flora is yours. Yeah, thanks. Thanks for the time, the opportunity to speak to USIP again and to be with my good friend Darren LaHood. We get to see each other in Washington, DC now only every once in a while as we are now out of session for two weeks, but I will note, Congress being out of session doesn't mean we aren't working. When we're back home, even in the pandemic era, there's a lot of work to be done at home because our communities are all responding to COVID-19, as well as responding to all the other work that is going on in our districts, and that relates to the work we do in Congress on transportation, on education, agriculture, trade. There are a lot of issues that we have to stay on top of, so even though we're not in session right now, I know both Darren and I are working quite a bit, and I should let folks know that we're doing a lot more Zoom calls than I've ever thought I would ever do, because what else would I be doing? I tell folks, I can't miss my meetings because I was 10 feet away from my dining room table over on my couch. I only had to walk 10 feet to do the next meeting on Zoom, so our time has even filled up even more with doing outreach events like this. But again, it's important that we do this because even though a lot of countries, including the United States, we're dealing with a pandemic, all the other things are happening still. All the other work of Congress is happening. All the other relationships that exist between countries are happening, and the relationships that exist between the United States and China are still happening, and it's important that we stay on top of those as well. And that's in part a little bit why the U.S.-China working group got started now 15 years ago last month, is to stay engaged on this variety of relationships that exist between the United States and China. I've always said it's not one relationship. We don't have, there is not a U.S.-China relationship. There are many U.S.-China relationships based on the subject, but I would agree with Nancy's assessment that despite the fact the U.S.-China working group was created to improve the dialogue between members of Congress about the United States and China and improve the dialogue between the U.S. Congress and the National People's Congress in China, the relationship right now is really at a low point. And it has always been a bit of a roller coaster relationship, and I would say right now we are in a deep, deep dip in that roller coaster. For a variety of reasons, and we can probably address some of those during the Q&A. But I've always, I have said, I try to characterize the groups of members of Congress and how we approach China. And there have been kind of three groups of China hawks in Congress, the human rights hawks, those who focus on human rights issues, the economic hawks of folks who focus on trade mainly, and the national security hawks, those who look at this relationship as largely a zero-sum national security issue. I've changed my analysis a little bit now, and I said that there are still three groups, but they're the punishers, the decouplers, and the salvagers. The punishers are those members who sort of look at the role of Congress is to try to punish or make China pay, if you will, for actions it has taken. They're the decouplers, those who think about the economic decoupling, that's part of the, I think, the trade approach. And then the salvagers, I put myself in that group, I'm going to put Darren in that group. Those who recognize there are areas of true competition between the United States and China, but there are still areas where it is important to cooperate, thinking of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula, thinking of climate change, thinking of other areas. So it is important to identify those areas where we still do cooperate and should be cooperating and try to salvage those, despite the fact that this, and I think it is a fact that the relationship is in a pretty low point right now. I've laid out some of these ideas. I think I talked to you at the last time we did this about the white paper done and that's available to folks. But there are some things I think that recently that we've done, but I will focus just for everyone, the National Defense Authorization Act, the Armed Services Committee passed last week, which will be on the floor in a couple of weeks has several provisions related to China. One is the, I'm looking at notes here right now, but the committee passed the NDAA, it includes a bipartisan provision to improve our own Pentagon's ability to develop its 5G infrastructure. It also includes legislation from another committee that addresses the broader private sector 5G infrastructure in the United States. Because I think it is important that we have a 5G infrastructure build out in the U.S. that that we can feel that is digitally secure, that it is secure in terms of privacy. And there are serious and legitimate concerns about the use of Chinese company-based 5G infrastructure in the United States. So it's one example of legislation that's moving forward in Congress and I expect that to be part of any final final legislation as well. And there are others I think we're going to get some of that in the Q&A. So I think if I could just leave folks with, before we go to Darren, just that there is, the relationship right now is in a very low spot and that's the reality of it. And I think there are serious legitimate concerns that we need to address here in the United States about that relationship. And I think China needs to take some steps as well to address that. If in fact we want to move towards, want to have further cooperation on the issues where we do need to cooperate, because the two largest economies in the world are going to have to find ways eventually to cooperate on issues while recognizing there are areas where we're competing. And with that, I'll turn it back over to you, Nancy, to turn it over to Darren. Thanks. Perfect. Thank you. You've given us a good framework to come back to on your three types. And Congressman Hood, over to you. Well, thank you, Nancy. And I want to thank the U.S. Institute of Peace for putting this on today. I think it's vitally important to have conversations and dialogues like this as it relates to China and appreciate all the good work that the Institute does. And Nancy, I want to thank you and your team for organizing this today. Very, very helpful. And it's always good to be with Congressman Larson. I've really, really enjoyed working with him on the U.S.-China working group over the last four plus years. And as Rick articulated, the working group has tried to serve as a mechanism in Congress in a bipartisan way to have discussions and dialogues and to really work on the relationship with China where we can on the economic side of things and also work through some of these thornier issues. I'm coming to you today from my district office in Peoria. You can see some caterpillar tractors in the background there. And John Deere, you know, when people ask about my interest in China, I like to tell them that when I think about the district I represent, which is central, west central Illinois, mine is the eighth largest ag district in the country. And so we produce a lot of corn and a lot of soybeans. And 25% of the soybeans that the farmers in my district go to China that they grow, they go to China every year. Whereas caterpillar, which has the largest concentration of workers anywhere in the world is based here in Peoria. And caterpillar has 29 manufacturing plants in China been there for 40 plus years, they have for research and development facilities in China. So you may not think a district like mine is tied to China, but we are in terms of opportunities and jobs there. So I just wanted to mention that. And then looking at the work that we've been involved with in Congress, Rick touched on a number of different issues. Obviously, when we were with you last time Nancy at your at the Institute there in September, a lot has changed. And obviously, COVID and what's happened post COVID is affected the relationship with China. I counted up the other day, there has been 350 pieces of legislation or resolutions introduced on China in the Congress since COVID, bipartisan and bicameral, obviously. But we have moved into a different stage when it comes to relationship with China. Some people have said all we're moving into a cold war mentality. I'm not sure we're there yet. Some may describe it differently, but there is much more animosity and anxiety and it is palpable. And I think Rick and I have both seen that from our colleagues and you see that in the legislation. A lot of the legislation obviously goes after China as it relates to COVID and arguably the deceitfulness that China engaged in the lack of transparency related to COVID. And so you see again bipartisan legislation holding China accountable. We hear more and more about how do we punish China? How do we again hold them accountable? How do we teach them a lesson? This is the language that you hear a lot more of again directly related to COVID. And again, we can talk more about how that's going to affect the long-term relationship. But of course, that is bled into a lot of other issues related to national security. The U.S. focused now on everything from Confucius institutes in the centers there in the U.S., looking at Chinese students that are in many of our universities and colleges has become a big issue. And then on the economic side, lots of discussions about moving supply chains back to the U.S. Clearly, I think we saw vulnerabilities through COVID as it related to PPE, as it related to generic drugs, as it related to pharmaceuticals. And so a lot of discussion going on on moving supply chains back, also on decoupling, as Rick mentioned, and on Buy America provisions. That is a common theme that we hear, I think in our elections here between now and November, but also in the Congress. And so we are in somewhat of uncharted territory with China as it relates to a number of these both economic issues. And then, of course, what's going on in Hong Kong is really distressing for many of us when you look at the law that's been implemented there and what it does to punish people for exercising their freedom of expression. Very concerning, not only to the U.S., but to other democracies around the world and our other partners around the world. And obviously, what's going on in Xinjiang and with the Uyghurs and the forced labor camps is a big issue too. So a lot going on on the economic side, on the human rights side, and on the national security front. And of course, Nancy, as you referenced, we have a phase one China deal going on right now. I serve on the Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction over trade. And trade is important as I articulated earlier to my district. But the phase one deal with China went into effect on February 14th of this year. China is obligated to buy upwards to $200 billion in products from the U.S. between now and the end of the year. And there's been a lot of talk about pulling the plug. The administration has talked about pulling the plug. I frankly think that would be a mistake. You know, the farmers in the U.S. are on track to have about 50 or $60 billion of that $200 billion to be bought by the Chinese. So, you know, and then of course, looking at phase two, that really gets to the enforcement mechanisms that with the working group, Rick and I in our trips to China have tried to obviously convince the Chinese that they need to take more action on the enforcement side of things as it relates to technology and forced technology transfers and all those issues. So a lot of issues there to be dealt with in phase two, but you don't get to phase two unless you complete phase one. And so, you know, there continues to be divergent opinions on China, both in Congress and in the administration, but particularly in the administration, you have some real anti-China folks there that would prefer to move into a cold war mentality there. So a lot going on. I would just point out one thing on the economic side. When we talk about decoupling and we talk about moving supply chains back, those are, they're difficult problems. When you look at the supply chains that we have with China, they're complicated, they're nuanced, there's many third-party vendors that are in use there. And so, those things become problematic when you talk about how do you implement them, when you talk to companies and businesses on how intertwined they are with the Chinese and the two largest economies in the world. And that is much different than the cold war we had with Russia 40 years ago. In some ways, that was more military and national security-based and strategic-based than it is now with the economic relationship that we have with China. So a lot of issues to dissect there and deal with moving forward. But again, Rick and I, through the working group, continue to be engaged on these issues and continue to find a path forward where we can, again, try to put America in the best position we can be on the economic side and on the health side as it relates to COVID. So again, thank you, Nancy, for having us today and look forward to questions and the dialogue. Excellent. Thank you both. That was an extensive laydown of a very complicated problem. So I appreciate it. And of course, this is all happening against a backdrop of rising partisanship here in our own country as well. So I want to ask both of you, given how partisan so many issues are in Congress these days, have you been able to maintain bipartisanship on this set of very complicated China-related issues? And do you see this interesting basket of punishers, decouplers, and savagers as a typology? Does that fall across partisan lines or is that a bipartisan grouping among your colleagues? And I'm going to turn it to you first, Congressman Larson, for any reflections on that. Yeah. First, I want to be sure that folks know that not that I'm taking total ownership, but I did come up with a typology and I don't want to make Darren responsible for something that I came up with. So folks don't like it. It's me. It's not Darren. If you love it, it's me and not Darren. No, I want to be sure that more about I'll take responsibility for rise. I don't want Darren to be responsible for what I say. I think that it is bipartisan. I think that's an interesting question, Nancy, because before things are really bad, and this is my assessment again, before things are really bad in the U.S.-China relationships, the three hawks, the national security economic and the human rights hawks, that was largely partisan. National security hawks were largely Republican, economic hawks were largely Democratic, and human rights hawks were kind of all over the place. But I think that they all found each other in the last several years, and I think that under this different typology, there's bipartisanship. There seems to be, I guess the point is, there seems to be bipartisanship in wanting to take a tougher stance against China. There was never a lot of bipartisanship in trying to take a more cooperative stance with China. But again, we are where we are today, and I do think that it is important we find ways to work with China, but we also need to be sure that Congress speaks with the collective will on areas where there's serious concern, and that ends up being bipartisan too, and I'm just looking at some of my notes so you might want to get to this, but the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act passed the House by a vote of 417 to 1, and I don't know who that one was. It wasn't me, and it wasn't Darren LaHood. There's bipartisan legislation, as I noted, on 5G that was included in the National Defense Authorization Bill, because they do think there's even more room for bipartisanship for Congress to go more on offense, not so much against China, but to be sure that our own House is in order on infrastructure investment, on education, on skills development, and workforce development long term for the strength of our own economy, and there's more room for bipartisanship there as well. It just can't be focused on being against China. We need to be working for a stronger domestic economy and domestic institutions as well, so that we can hold our own as we move forward in whatever relationship that we have with China in the future. Well, thank you for that, and let me turn to you, Congressman LaHood, and ask you to react to that, but let me also add, since you brought up the question of this push to reshore some of our industries and the complexity of doing so, and whether that can be done in a way, what I heard you mention, Congressman Larson, is that there's a robustness that needs to be shored up, but it doesn't necessarily have to be total decoupling, and do you, is there a middle way there in terms of not fully decoupling, but not having such a reliance on China's supply lines? Well, Nancy, just on the first part of the question about how we're both able to remain bipartisan on China, well, I think there continues to be a bipartisan anger on behalf of Democrats and Republicans related to what happened in Wuhan, or what didn't happen in Hunan, and obviously I don't think the Chinese response to what happened with COVID has been a good one, and I think that's continued to cause a lot of anger, and again, in a bipartisan way, as I mentioned earlier, those pieces of legislation and resolutions, almost all of them are bipartisan in nature, in going after China, and the other thing I would just reference to, obviously the Trump administration has taken a hard approach to China, right? Listen, I'm generally not a fan of tariffs. Tariffs are taxes, they're taxes on business and consumers, but this administration has used tariffs to get into a tariff role with China, and go after them, and they have some real hawks in this administration that kind of said enough is enough, and, you know, those are positions that in a lot of ways Democrats in the past have had towards China. I know Chuck Schumer for a long time has been China hawk, and many of the same positions he's had in the past are similar to what the Trump administration has now, so it's interesting to see how the approach to that some of the Trump administration have taken are traditional positions that Democrats have had, so you have a blurring of the lines in some respect as it relates to that, but again, moving forward, I think as long as China continues to kind of put their head in the sand as it relates to COVID, you're going to have, again, bipartisan animosity towards China on that, and I think in some respects, that has spread around the world to other countries. That's the first thing that they think of now is, oh, this virus came from China, and they haven't done a very good job of dissuading people that that's in fact what happened. I think that's the reality there and what happened with the World Health Organization. So again, I think that collective anger is bipartisan. On your second point, Nancy, on the decoupling and finding that balance is I think what you were saying is how do you find that balance between not being reliant on China as relates to PPE or generic drugs or other medicines that clearly we were during the COVID crisis, it gets complicated. And are we willing to subsidize U.S. companies to come back to the U.S.? Because in my view economically, you're not going to do it with tax incentives or tax credits. You're going to have to do it with resources and money. Now, some will tell you in the administration that you do that with tariffs, right? We pay for it by implementing tariffs. Again, I don't think that's the right approach, but those are things we're looking at. And I think it'll depend on how far we want to push the reshoring back to the U.S. because it's going to cost a lot of money. The other part is if you talk to the business community, whether it's the Chamber of Commerce or the, say the business roundtable, why are they in China? Well, they're in China because they have a middle class of 500 million people and it's a growing market. And if they pull out, there's going to be other companies or entities that are going to move in there. So, again, these things get complicated. I think it'll depend how much the U.S. wants to invest. Where do we get that money to do that? To incentivize the reshoring back to the U.S. or going to other countries in Southeast Asia. And the last point that I would make on this, it would be nice if we could build up some bilateral trade agreements with other countries in the region because, for instance, Australia has spoken out very harshly on China. And if we could remember TPP, which, of course, this administration was not supportive of, but that was a way to isolate China. And if we're not going that route, well, let's build up a bilateral relationship with India and Singapore and Vietnam and other countries there. But those things are, they take a long time to do, unfortunately. So, those are a few of my comments. So, let me pick up on your bringing in the rest of the world. Obviously, this is happening in a global context. We are seeing that other countries are becoming a bit more skeptical of China's behavior. I'd love to hear from both of you a little bit about the role that allies and partners play in U.S.-China relations. And what do you see as the importance of these relationships and how do you see them evolving? Rep Larson, would you like to? Yeah, I'll give it a start, I guess. One, I think that what I would like to see is the this administration and subsequent administrations do a better job of reaching out to our natural partners in trade, our natural partners on human rights, our national partner national partners on security issues and work with them on these issues of concern that we have with China. I think, you know, Planet TPP was strategically a bad move. I think it would have put the U.S. in a better economic position in the region to work with our natural partners or friends and allies to try to create the environment to create pressure on China to at least consider changes in how they're approaching trade relationships with us and with many others. And I think we need to rebuild those relationships. The example, the most recent example is the withdrawing from the World Health Organization. Hey, we got problems with the World Health Organization. It's not going to help us to deal with those outside of the WHO. It'll only be able to deal with those problems inside the WHO. So, you know, I think we have to get back and we will be back on the WHO eventually because there's no other option for us. We're not going to deal with global pandemics on our own and no matter where they've started, and this one started in China. But that's an example of, you know, what I put it is, it's like if you're golfing, this is a one-foot putt and we're missing it. You know, it's an easy shot and we're missing it. And so I'm frustrated with this administration's approach on how we approach our allies and our natural partners to solve global problems because those global problems don't go away even if the United States backs away from them or takes an approach where only the U.S. is trying to address them in a U.S. only way. That's frustrating. We need to do a better job of working with our friends and allies around the world. And that's my view of how things look today, and I hope that changes. Do you want to add to that? Yeah, I would just, listen, I think engagement is a good thing, but obviously this administration has taken a different approach. And I think there are the going out of the loan approach, which arguably this administration has done. There are consequences to that, and I think we're seeing that in some of these instances where we need our allies. Now, one example of working in a, again, a multinational realm would, I mean, the USMCA, which we passed, which of course is just Can-Man, Mexico, but it's an example of putting together a trade agreement that benefits all three countries. And it's comprehensive. It was passed in a bipartisan way. We ought to use that as an example, and it's kind of the gold standard as we look at other countries in particularly Southeast Asia around China and use that as mechanism. But again, these trade agreements take a long time to work through the nuances of how those things work. But again, if engagement is important, particularly with our like-minded allies that, again, many of the countries in Europe share the same concerns with China on human rights and on national security issues and not following rules that every other industrialized country in the world has done. And we all remember that when China was brought into the world trade organization in 2001, the argument at the time was bring China in and they're going to abide by all the same standards and be compliant like every other industrialized country in the world. Clearly that hasn't happened. And so again, getting with our like-minded allies to have a concerted multinational effort against China, I think could be effective, but you've got to have that engagement. Do you think, given the concern about the national security law in Hong Kong that both of you have now mentioned, do you see a role for the international community in joining us in that concern? And how do you see that playing out? How can we collectively address that very concerning development? You're going to have to prompt one or both of us. Okay. We can mix it up a little bit. Rappler Hood, you want to answer that first? Yeah, sure. Well, listen, I think we were all surprised, I was at least. I think many of us are surprised that the route that China took here with the proposed law in Hong Kong. After all the protests and all the disruptions and everything that happened in Hong Kong, they took the opposite route. And I think there has been collective anger from around the world at the new law in China. But how do we capitalize on that? How do we come together? How do we work in a concerted effort? I mean, I think the US should be leading on that in terms of getting our like-minded allies to do that and be engaged on that issue. But that hasn't happened as of yet. And there's a number of reasons for that happening. But I think it presents a wonderful opportunity for us to be engaged. I mean, China had to have known this was going to happen, but they were forceful. And again, any democracy, whether it's the G7 or other countries around the world, is appalled by this law. And we ought to figure out a way collectively to come together on this. I think there are two ways to address this or two prisms to look through. One is the prism of the 80,000 plus Americans who are in Hong Kong and ensuring, first off, their safety. Ensuring that they don't get caught up in the arbitrary decisions that are surely going to come out of the implementation of the security law. And related to that is the US companies and ensuring the physical security of the companies and the digital security of these companies. We need to be very clear we're going to be monitoring the implementation of this law as it applies to US citizens who are there and US based companies that are there. So that's one prism we need to look through this. The second prism, and they're not exclusive, but the second one is obviously that looking at the prism of how it's implemented and its impact on Hong Kongers. We, in March of last year, it's 15, 16 months ago when we were in Hong Kong, we met with four leaders of the democracy movement in Hong Kong. Two of the newer younger leaders and two of the more experienced leaders. We had a round table. I said there were six members of Congress. The US Consulate hosted us for this meeting. And I'm not sure that if we went back to Hong Kong that we could do that again at this point. I'm not sure that the people active in the movement would want to. I would want to, but I'm not sure they would want to. I just don't know. I think they might feel they're putting themselves too much at risk. And this is exactly I think what the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party wants to happen. That is that we don't seek out these meetings. I've jokingly said the next time I go into Hong Kong, I will bring my umbrella as a metaphor. Just because China wants to suppress human rights as a matter of policy does not mean either the US or like-minded countries have to accept that. And we shouldn't continue to find ways to highlight when this law is implemented, how it is implemented, and whether or not it meets even basic standards of human rights that most countries, most modern countries accept. Well, and of course the other human rights issue that is commanding a lot of attention is around the Uyghurs in Xinjiang province. And we saw just recently, I think it was last week, that President Trump signed into law the Uyghur Human Rights Act that enables or policy that enables the government to use sanctions against Chinese officials. How do you see that playing out? Do you think it'll make a difference to use sanctions being enacted and will it interact with some of these other critical trade supply line, you know, other ways in which the relationship is trying to be salvaged? Going back to Rep. Larsen, your three buckets. I think on the challenge of sanctions regimes is that you can't do them alone and expect them to work. Expect them to have an impact. I think history shows that. And so the success of this legislation that has strong support, bipartisan support, will be on the ability of the United States to get other countries to do the same. It also, as targeted as it is, you know, question of whether or not the individuals that would fall under it were planning to visit the United States or be involved otherwise that would even get into the way of the sanctions regime is questionable. So, you know, I think that we need to take these kind of targeted approaches, but also work with the broader international community so that it is not a go it alone, a go it alone approach. So an echo of what we heard a moment ago from Congressman Lohut, do you want to chime in on this? You're muted. Yeah. Nancy, just the only thing I would comment when you ask about the legislation, I think it's more symbolic than anything else. And I think China in some ways is used to these symbolic measures that pass overwhelmingly and have no teeth to them. And they've almost gotten used to that. And again, it's hard enough to get China to change their behavior. And so you're not going to be able to do it by something like this. You're going to have to have, again, a concerted effort with other like-minded countries and prioritize this as an issue. I know the Trump administration has talked about this issue, but it doesn't seem to me this is an issue that they are willing to really put some muscle behind it, so to speak. That's just my sense. And every administration has different priorities. I mean, in the last administration, obviously the South China Sea and the security issues were a big issue there. And Uyghurs were more of an issue. And those don't seem under this administration to be that big of a deal. And so you wonder whether, with the agreement on the phase one deal, whether there was kind of side agreements that address some of the Uyghur issues in the forced labor camps. I don't see this administration going to the mat, so to speak, for this issue. And the other thing that just as an aside that is troubling too when you look at the Uyghur population is that the greater Muslim world has not stood up against the repression in what's going on in China. Where is Saudi Arabia? Where are the other countries from the Middle East? Why aren't they speaking out? Why don't we build a coalition with other Muslim countries to talk about the atrocities? None of that has happened, which I think is troubling. And why do you think that? Can I just add on that? I'm glad Darren went that route with the answer to that question because the religious freedom question is an issue, is an important one here. And it's not just important in China where there's a lot of talk about religious freedom, but it's important for the United States as well to as we look at democracy promotion and human rights promotion that included in that is religious freedom. And the US may not necessarily be the right country to lead on religious freedom when it comes to Muslim minorities, but if these other countries aren't, then we ought to be doing that. And that is as important in thinking about natural partners and natural allies on issues as anything else. The other thing I think the Uyghur, the reeducation camps, these labor camps really underscores is the development and use and proliferation of the Chinese technology model for social control. One thing that reeducation camps have really underlined is basically China developed an incubator site for how to use facial recognition technology, social control technology as a model that they are now packaging and using to export. It's well documented. There are plenty of writings on this. And therefore, there is something that we ought to be learning and encountering in that regard as well. Something that we ought to, one more avenue where we ought to be out there in the world talking to our friends and allies about. So it's more than just the sanctions issue on people involved with the reeducation camps. There are really a lot of other issues tied to it that are important to. We have a terrific audience of more than 300 watching right now. A lot of questions coming in and I promise to get to audience question to one now. And that is a lot of debate about the question of Chinese students being able to study in the US. I mean, let's decide the COVID part of that, especially in the STEM fields. And this goes to your point about the technology question. So the question for you all is, does this pose a national security threat? Or is it important for deepening people to people ties? And do we miss out if we cease that flow of students? Does welcoming Chinese university students help persuade them of our values? Or does it give away our intellectual property? Can I start there? A lot of questions we get are not zero-sum questions. Like this one isn't. The question is really, the question person proposed give us the bookends. But sometimes the answer to that question can be yes. That is, the ability for US universities to attract the best and brightest from the United States and from around the world is extremely important and has been extremely important to innovation that takes place in the United States to the economic growth that comes from that, to the intellectual exchange that comes from that. And universities can do a better job than they do now of vetting students and ensuring that, and it's not just Chinese students that should be vetting, I will note, there are others, in vetting and universities who better have a protecting the information that the IP that comes from the research that they're doing. So it's not an either or, and we can do a better job in the United States. We have had this debate in the Armed Services Committee. I think we're going a little far in the Armed Services Committee shutting down nearly, probably if we might shut down nearly all research that's done by international students who are part of a Department of Defense grant. I don't think that's the right approach and this would include US students who are part of a Department of Defense grant. I don't think that's the right approach, but we can be more nuanced about our universities can do a better job as well on vetting and on protecting IP than they're doing today. Nancy, I would just follow up and couple observations. You know, in my home state of Illinois, the University of Illinois, which is our flagship university, about 20% are foreign students and maybe two-thirds of that is Chinese. And so this has been a topic that we've looked at obviously at lots of different levels. And if you talk to the State Department, and I know Mike Pompeo has talked a lot about this, is the issue of reciprocity and the fact that China does not allow at the same level or at the same standards that we allow Chinese to come into this country and have allowed that, whether it's research, whether it's students, whether it's doctors and engineers and others to come into our country is the issue of reciprocity. And why doesn't China reciprocate the same way that we do? And if they do want to continue to have that relationship with our universities and those opportunities here, that there should be, again, reciprocity. But they haven't done a very good job, I think, in answering that and responding appropriately on that. So I think you've got to find the balance. But clearly, there have been examples of espionage and engagement on technology that have given this program and this ability for the Chinese to come here a bad name. And you're going to continue to see that, again, particularly with where we're at right now with COVID in that relationship we're in. This is going to get a lot of scrutiny. And there are lots of members of Congress that are looking at this. And so I'm not sure how all that ends, I think, or how we kind of hit the restart button on this. But this is going to be a focus in Congress for the next year or so. I would just say that FBI Director Ray gave a speech at Hudson Institute yesterday that outlined a lot of the concerns that FBI has and encouraged people to read that. You can argue with some of the points in this speech. But overall, I think it's worth everyone going through that. And the conclusion of that speech is very interesting. He does go through the list of horribles. But at the end he does say, look, does this mean we shouldn't trade with China? Of course it doesn't. Does this mean we shouldn't have Chinese students in our universities? Of course it doesn't. Does this mean we shouldn't have Chinese folks come to the United States to travel and learn about America? Of course it doesn't mean all that. So there might be a different balance. There might be a new balance. It won't be what it was. But a balance nonetheless. I'd also note, I don't think we should be looking at China to define what our standards are going to be. And that's my beef with the reciprocity argument. To me, it sounds like we're looking at China and say, well, those are the standards. We're going to go to those standards as long as we need to. I think that's not the right approach. But it is something that we are certainly trying to work through in Congress. Well, it raises the question as well. I mean, the Trump administration has made a significant effort to differentiate the government from the people of China. And as we look at the difficulty at visas, the reduction of students and all the ways in which ties have been cut between Americans and Chinese people, there's a whole new risk that enters the picture. I'd love quick reflections because we have a big list of questions here. Where do you see the people to people ties into the future? My view is that you're right and you're accurate in describing the administration's approach. But I don't think there's that big a distinction between what the administration says and the approach to taking on visas with regards to people with people exchanges. I think that's rhetoric and I don't think they do make a big distinction. Carl Smith Hood, you want to comment on that? I don't really have anything to add on that. I don't necessarily disagree with that. Okay. So another audience question is, can you talk a little bit about the Hill's perspective on Taiwan? We haven't actually raised Taiwan yet. Given China's violation of its commitment to Hong Kong, among other egregious acts, is it time for us to restore full diplomatic relations with Taiwan? Well, I think you'll find some in Congress that want to do that, but I don't think that's high on this administration's priority list. That's just my sense. Now, it'll be interesting to see, you know, and Rick will know more about this because in the military aspect he serves on armed services, but I know that we're set to deliver them a whole fleet of F-16s, I think, that have not been delivered yet, but the Chinese are very, very concerned about that. And whether, again, whether it's the Trump administration that ends up delivering those will be a source of provocation in my sense, is my sense on it. But to me, right now with this administration, I don't sense that this is something that they are going to use as leverage or engagement with the Chinese. Rick? Yeah, I agree with Darren on all those points. First off, that there are different views in Congress on this issue, for one, there's not a view. Second, from my perspective, the three communiques, the One China Policy and the Taiwan Relations Act form the basis for the U.S. approach to Taiwan. The only difference between the U.S. position, formal U.S. position and the formal PRC position is that we throw in the Taiwan Relations Act and the People's Republic of China hates the Taiwan Relations Act. Well, it's our law and it provides opportunities for us to continue to support the sale of military equipment for defensive purposes and we take those actions underneath under the rubric of the Taiwan Relations Act. But, you know, moving beyond that full recognition of Taiwan, my personal view is that's throwing a gas on the fire between incarcerated relations and it also ignores the broader issues of if we do that, what does Japan do? What does South Korea do? What does North Korea do? What does Russia do? This is not a question of U.S., China, Taiwan. This is a question of regional security and any actions have to be, in my view, have to be considered underneath that umbrella. You know, I hate to say this, but we are out of time and we have a whole list of unanswered questions and a lot of other complicated issues. You just touched on a few of them. We didn't go into more detail on North Korea, for example, but so I guess that just means you both have to come back and do a of this conversation, which we invite you to do. We have had an extraordinary set of viewers. I want to thank everybody for joining us today and please let your members of Congress know that this is an important issue and if you're in these districts, thank them for both for coming and urge them to come again. I want to thank you, Congressman Larson, Congressman LaHood. We are honored to have you here with us today and we're very grateful for the kind of extremely knowledgeable, thoughtful leadership that you provide on what I think we've just further understood to be deeply complex issues. Thank you very much. Thanks to the USIP for the invitation. I appreciate very much. Thank you, Nancy. You and your team really enjoyed it today and look forward to coming back sometime soon. Hopefully. Yeah, but if not in person, we'll get you back virtually. Thank you, everybody. Thanks a lot.