 And I turn to my neighbor. What would you say? How would you send your messages? I know that you have slides, and I thank you for that. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Jean-Claude, thanks for the introduction. Thierry de Montréal for setting this up. It's always a pleasure to be here, an event that I'm looking forward the whole year. My privileged honor this morning is to start the session off. And I'll do so with a number of slides. First of all, the state of the world economy summarized with a very Eurocentric view here for economists, the Eurozone, the United States, the UK, China. And what we see here is a state of fragility. We see that those bars go up and go down. The Eurozone's not growing. These are quarter on quarter growth rates. The third quarter is just in flash estimates, so quite fresh. The Eurozone is at the brink of a recession. The United States are surprising us with relatively high growth rates, quarter on quarter in the third quarter, 2023. The analyzed growth rate would be almost 5%. This is a lot. I'm not sure what you say, Jean-Claude, but in those times where we need to cool down, our economists are getting rid of inflation, this looks red hot too much and unsustainable. And China, the engine of growth for so many years is not growing steadily. It's up and down, and one of the major impressions that this slide gives to me is how similar the Chinese and the American experience look like if you look at those bars. And the United Kingdom here looking very much like the Eurozone. The world is such growing with a rate of about 3% in this year, next year, a little bit more, but certainly below the levels that we have seen over the last years. Now, that is not surprising given the shocks that we have been under. And I would say what we should take away from that is not only divergences across the Atlantic and across China and Europe, but a relative lack of collapse, because resilience is what we should see here. Even for the Eurozone, the feared recession, if it comes, will be a mild one and we're not facing big disaster here. The next year, some improvement in the Eurozone in our estimates, some improvement in the United Kingdom, decline in the United States and the shift side was in China. The big issue for us economists over the last two years or so, of course, has been inflation. The good news is that headline inflation is coming down on the right-hand side. You see the United States on the left-hand side, the Eurozone in both is coming down. Core inflation is very much the same now in those two areas. Surprisingly, something like 4.2, 4.1%. But what you also see is that the Eurozone has a larger trajectory to run through. We have been at higher rates than the Eurozone. And what worries me here is that the 2% target is still quite far away from us. If you look at the green bars in this picture, there's a services inflation and you see it's very high, both still in the United States and also in the Eurozone. And the services inflation, of course, reflects wage growth more than all the other categories. So I think we must say the job's not yet done. The central bankers are gaining back control. That is true. But I fear that we're really in a situation higher for longer, as the professionals say. And the fight against inflation will be finding the world economy for more than the next one or two years. My fear is that the strong increase in interest rates will feed into financial risks. And we have not seen everything yet. So on top of all the geo-economic struggles that we're facing, the climate disaster financial risks, I think, are high. The rates will be higher for longer, I've said so. But we know that monetary policy comes with a lag and that lag can be substantial. And my view is that a large share of what monetary policy will achieve has not yet visible in the data. We see that fiscal policy needs to become sustainable again. That's true in the Eurozone, but it's very much true in the United States. And that too will put pressure on growth and on the financial markets. Quantitative tightening has not really fully started and that will also affect interest rates, the long-run interest rates and the growth perspectives. Only 20% according to some estimates of the total impact of monetary policy tightening is yet in the data, so more to come. And what I fear is that the financial crisis that we have seen showing its face earlier this year is not yet over, somewhere all those fixed income assets must be that have come under pressure over the last years with the high interest rates. And we only need a big shock, you know, that forces insurances, for example, to liquidate their holdings to see more financial stress in the system. So I'm a bit fearful on this side and I'm also a bit fearful about the Eurozone. Inflation differential across the zone are huge in the October inflation rates. The difference between Slovakia and Belgium is something like 950 basis points. That's enormous and something that worries me quite a bit. We are far away from an optimal monetary area in Europe. This should not be possible if we were really having an integrated single market. And the interest rates spread across Eurozone is up, look at Italy with almost 150% of debt over GDP and the interest payments more than doubling. That puts stress on the system. Now, if I may look at the international arena, what we see is that the boom in use of economic sanctions is going on. This is the translation, if you like, in economics, what we see in the political world war by other means. This is the political science colleagues say, political conflict that's fought out with economic means. The trend's not good. This is data from the Global Sanction Database that I'm putting together with US colleagues at the exponential growth. That is certainly something that's weighing on the growth perspective of the world economy and shows that the political risks are, of course, translating into economic risk because sanctions mean disruption of global value chains mean decoupling, at least at the bilateral level. And so that's what we see here in terms of globalization. That's my preferred measure of globalization is just taking a quantity index of international goods traded divided by quantity index of industrial production. So we're hopefully comparing here apples with apples and not bananas. And what we see here is resilience on the one hand. So the world has not declobalized, but the hyper-clobalization here in blue has stopped and it had stopped like 15 years ago. But what we do see is at the newest data that the world economy is slowing down, a significant decline in this measure. So trades falling faster than industrial production. The World Trade Organization's trade reports relatively alarmist, not the latest version of it. And I think what we can say is that the decoupling is happening, for example, at the bilateral level between the United States and China is also eating into the aggregate data. Trade diversion can only go somewhere to mitigate the bilateral effects of less trade, for example, across the Pacific. And then something I would like to bring our attention to is the enlargement of the BRICS group, the two, six more members. I think this is significant. It's under discussed, as far as I can say. There are implications on the world financial system as the BRICS have their own bank, for example, setting up more autonomous currency systems. And the enlargement of course involves this country here, the United Arab Emirates. And so I thought it's important to bring it up. In terms of numbers, share of the BRICS plus six in global GDP or in global population, this enlargement is not making a big change. But what it does is it brings in countries that have been outside of the inner circle of policymaking, like Iran, for example, into the BRICS. And I believe that is the challenge for the world order, as we've seen it. The hope is that this does not lead to more polarization, but certainly this event tells us something about the situation that we're in in the world economy and we should take note of this. Here I stop, Jean-Claude. Thank you. Thank you very much, Gabrielle. You stick to the concept, which is give messages, short, concise messages. Thank you very much indeed. On the inflation, I will only say, I share entirely the views. That being said, I will strike myself that core inflation on both sides of the Atlantic is now exactly the same figure, which says something and gives credibility to the fact that they have the same goal, they have the same definition of price stability, which is reassuring, all taken into account, even if, as you said very wisely, the challenges are still there, of course. So thank you very much.