 will be Dr. Kathleen Hicks, who is the Director of the International Security Program at CSIS here in Washington, and she also served in the Obama Administration as the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Deputy's Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. So welcome, welcome to the panelists. Thank you so much. And so without further ado, I would like to open our conversation on the policy implications of the of the Japanese document, the new NDPG, and I'd like to start with Mr. Nishi. So Nishi-san, I have a few questions for you, for you to start your presentation. So from your point of view, what are the highlights of the new NDPG? And what are the regional and global factors that have driven such guidelines? What are the key challenges as well? And how well do you think these guidelines address the main challenges of the more environment described by Prime Minister Abe? Thank you very much, Sayoi. All very good questions. Thank you very much, Sasakawa USA, inviting me to this occasion. Thank you very much for coming. And also, thank you, General Isabel, who was very pragmatic and covered all necessary questions that I have. Me, too, officers are more pragmatic than civilian bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense. I rather stay there doing my type of things. So let me have an overview of the security environment where Japan is, where the United States is. The point is, the post-war system has lost its efficiency. The post-war system designed mainly by the United States. That is for the recovery from the war damage. Therefore, it's expected the expanding economy. Now, as you see, the last 70 years, we have done a very good, stable international society. And no G7 countries were devastated by heavy bombing. Therefore, the capacity of a supply side providing capabilities is getting more superior towards the demand side. That means deflation is inevitable in the near future. Or, already, the deflation showed its sign of appearance in Japan and Europe. Fortunately, the United States is rather outside of this deflation or impact of people. Those of its expanding economy, expanding people. But, the sign is getting near because you wage rate stayed constant in the last almost 30 years due to the appearance of cheaper labor all over the world. Therefore, the difficult thing is we have two remarkable issues in the past 30 years. That is one, this oversupply of currencies, to oversupply of materials. And therefore, now what we see is almost every 10 years, we see bubble economy and its past started from late 1980s. Somebody may say the new one might come in the near future almost about 10 years after the Lehman crisis, where I'm not the economist, so I don't want to focus on that issue. But that is something we have to handle together. And that is something very difficult for us to live with the current system, which did not have the idea to cope with deflation and say stagnant economy. And more important thing is China is emerging with its expanding economy. Last September last year, I had a chance to exchange views with the Chinese side. And so I was a bit fed up with their also doc city type of approaches for international relations. So I raised all these questions and asked them how on earth you are going to find the space to fit with this expanding China's power, China's economy to this diminishing economic situation and difficult military situation. And there was the faintest idea answer from the Chinese side I'm still waiting for. So the difficult thing is how to live with emerging problems, including the DPRK, which has military, which has the nuclear and missile emerging capabilities. But the point is, and we shouldn't forget that China DPRK relations is not smooth, which is not well shared by Japan by the United States. But DPRK side is always cold to the Chinese side. And Chinese side is not really happy to live together the DPRK. So the current situation, the DPRK US talks is very threatening element for China. So there are very complicating situation around Japan. And that is what we have to pay attention. So let me discuss all things since 2010. The reason because 2010, I was back to the MOD from the seconded position of the cabinet office, where I was in charge of the abandoned chemical weapons issue. So I returned the MOD in 2010 with the status of the director general. And since then I have designed so many things, producing F-35, new guidelines, and etc. But always, you know, bureaucrats have complex ideas, try to attain more buzz with one storm. For example, you remember F-35B as operational on e-zimo class, but also that is easy to be carried by Osumi class transport ship. Remember, the basic design of Osumi was done more than 20 years ago. And still the designers and MSDF paid attention the size of the F-35B. And the size of the elevator is bigger than everybody expected. So our intention stays rather in the longer period time than the ordinary media people can assess. Therefore, the current plan, new guideline, is not really surprising to me except a couple of things. One, the current guideline is very, say, good position to encourage all other government offices and even the civil societies co-operate with the MOD's behavior, the FOD's efforts. That was hardly be true in the previous version as General Isabe described. The thing is, the national security NSS side was responsible for the drafting of the paper. And one more important thing is, however, this operational capabilities, operational cooperation between the SDF and the Coast Guard National Police has started already more than a few years ago. In other words, this guideline is the paper which also has past behaviors, past efforts on to the public basis. Thanks to many cases, for example, the operational cooperation between the National Police and Japan, sorry, the SDF started five years ago when the governor of Fukui Prefecture came to my office. Fukui Prefecture is well known with so many numbers of nuclear reactors and therefore, governor of Fukui was very much anxious about the possible terrorist attack on it. So he complained me that police force may not really be sufficient. So I asked my counterpart in the National Police Office and the governor is anxious about your capability and the police force said, yes, I agree. And therefore, police side need good cooperation with the backups of the GSDF. So I back to the national, so I back to the governor of Fukui Prefecture and look, we need your cooperation. We need a good space for enhancing, to arrange enhancing capacity of the GSDF to back up national police. And he was very glad to hear that and he allocated a huge area for the, for the helicopter sports. And that is sufficient, that was big enough to arrange a regiment type of mobilization of the GSDF for the rescue of the National Police once they are in danger possible assault of the terrorists. So all these touched efforts has been carried out last 10 years. And this guideline is really the occasion to certify all these past efforts were good, productive, and in other words, authorized to go further. One exceptional thing as certified which I didn't expect we are able to purchase with two reasons. One, poor ratio of operational capability as we've seen for the whole year. Because fixed wing is much more fixed and much more capable and operational ratio is much better than the vertical going up and coming down type of aircraft. Therefore, certify the cost a lot for the operation and maintenance. Therefore, I didn't recommend it when I was in the office to our three services, a attention of the size of the economy. And two, shortage of numbers of pilots. Because MSDF is sure to provide the platform, but MSDF has the faintest idea to provide numbers of pilots for jet fighters. So the question is, can the ASDF provide sufficient numbers of fighters, fighter pilots for the operation of the MSDF? Of course, this is going to be a very good case of jointness. And the Royal Navy has done it already, but it surely be the first very important trial. Modification of ISMA class DDH is necessary in order to provide more flexible operations for US Marines that is deployed in Iraq and that is the place where certified is going to be deployed as a first regiment of the aircraft. But operations of certify B by ourselves is different thing for us. So I'm still not confident honestly enough. Therefore, there are numbers of tasks we have to carry out through this guideline. But the important thing is, you'd better look back the US, Japan US security guideline that was adopted in 2015. That actually gives us the good understanding of the current aircraft that showed various issues. Although it's the 2015 guideline did not appoint the China as a threatening power, but it already provided the ideas of the defense of such an iron chains, jointness and new emerging threats in cyber and outer spaces. So for the bureaucratic society, in other words, nothing is new. We have to keep going on. And the incremental approach is rather comfortable bureaucratic approaches to the changing reality. Therefore, the difficult time is how to live together this expanding going strong China. This is another difficult situation. But as I pointed out, the China's relation with the DPFK is not smooth enough. My experience of this is through my activities of the abandoned chemical weapons issues. We have excavated numbers of Japanese chemical weapons projectiles very near to the Sino-DPRK border. Unlike the usual treatment, Chinese side requested us to bury it again with good camouflage. We are totally surprised. And why? Because the ordinary process is to set up the red flag, show something dangerous is underneath. But the other way is to hide everything away. And the Chinese answer was surprising because they told me that this is within the area of the infiltration of North Korean special force in the midnight. Therefore, we don't want this issue be detected by the North Korean side. ACW is a very successful bilateral coordination between China and Japan. No matter what the political weather is, therefore, we want to keep it. And we do not want to be disturbed by the North Koreans over common efforts. So that was the first time to see that how chewy the Sino-North Korean relations are. And my understanding was enhanced more and more in the last eight years. Therefore, the current U.S. DPRK talks is going to be very important. If that is going to be successful, if the North Korean regime is happy to find that their regime is well secured by the United States and by U.S. allies, that means threatening for Beijing because the U.S. influence is coming up to the North through the Korean peninsula. If the talks fails, we are going to face the year-long nuclear missile search from the DPRK. And in that case, our defense effort is going to be meaningful for the protection of Japan, including the introduction of Japan. So we are at the crossroads that what is going to happen over the Korean peninsula and what comes after that. In other words, this guideline was quite ambitious. But at the same time, I wonder how long this guideline could survive due to the changing political, military circumstances that is federaled over the Korean peninsula. So let me finish my presentation. But with a small correction, I resigned the special advisor's position of the military defense October last year. So my capacity is not official at any more. It's all my private comment. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Nishita. This was excellent and a good regional perspective as well. Now, Caleb, I'm really interested to hear your impressions of the NDPG from an American perspective. So what impact do you think the document will have on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-Japan security situation? What are the key challenges that the alliance will have to face? All right. Well, thank you, sir Yuri. And thank you to Carnegie and to the Pasekawa Foundation for having me here and for hosting this. As mentioned, I'm the director of strategy in the office of the secretary of defense. And we're the organization that produces the Pentagon's national defense strategy. And so we see the NDPG primarily through that lens. So I will preface my views today on the NDPG with some points on the national defense strategy. And I think what you'll see is a high degree of commonality between those two documents. But let me begin by just saying, as the first panel said and as others have said, that in the Department of Defense, we give the NDPG very high marks. We see this as a substantial development in Japan's defense policy. And I think it provides a path to ensure Japan's leadership in the region. As I mentioned, we see a number of parallels between the NDPG and our own strategy. I'll talk about each of these, but I'd bend them into two general buckets. The first is the way we characterize the regional security environment and then how we characterize the necessary response to that security environment. So to briefly touch on the American defense strategy, the national defense strategy characterizes the central challenge facing the United States as the reemergence of long-term strategic competition with great powers. And it specifically names China and Russia in this regard. And it goes further to say that the principal problem facing the Department of Defense is the eroding military advantage we see in key regions vis-a-vis those actors. And if unaddressed, this would lead to increasingly aggressive behavior that would threaten the rules-based international order that we've enjoyed. So the document is at its core about bolstering deterrence. I'd also note for this audience that while that is the document's focus, it's also clear-eyed about other threats to include the North Korea threat. The Department is not ignoring the dangers posed by that regime or by other actors to include cronians or counterterrorism. But the clear focus that that strategy provides has driven some significant changes within the Department of Defense because deterring great powers is a fundamentally different challenge than counterterrorism or the regional conflicts we've prosecuted for the past 20 years. And we pursued that change within the Department over the last year with three key lines of effort. And here again, I think you'll see a high degree of resonance with the NDPG. Those three lines of effort were a more lethal military, strengthening our constellation of allies and partners while encouraging more equitable burden sharing, and also reforming the Department's practices so that we deliver capability with more agility and with more affordability. So again, we see significant commonality with the NDPG really across all three lines of effort. And I'll just touch briefly on that. At first, when it comes to the security environment, we see a characterization between these two documents that's very similar. Both envision a security environment that's rapidly changing and the characterization is very similar. Both talk about concerns with the balance of power in the region and ultimately that what that leads to is challenges to the rules based international order. NDPG emphasizes deterring threats at its core and if necessary being prepared to respond. And for reasons I mentioned, we see a lot of resonance with the national defense strategy in this regard. Learned about this in the first panel, but both documents also recognizing a changing character of warfare that demands attention to new domains. The NDPG in this regard specifically mentioned space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. And we know that these new domains will also have impacts on the way we operate in the traditional domains that we know well, air, land and sea. And so that's going to force us and we're wrestling with this in the Department of Defense to think about new operating concepts. And that's going to be a commonality amongst us as well. But we welcome the NDPG's prioritization of both cross-domain operations because we see this similarly as well as advanced capabilities in cyberspace, air and missile defenses and standoff munitions. As I mentioned, and we talked about this also in panel one a lot, those new domains will also have impacts on the traditional domains. And so we know, for example, the acquisition of short vertical takeoff and landing F-35s, which we see as providing additional operational flexibility, both as mentioned for the ability to operate from additional locations as well as converting your ships in order to have stable capability, which we think will help with both dispersal and survivability in an unsurpassable. So those are some of the capability similarities we see. Beyond capabilities, both strategies see a changing landscape for innovation. Traditionally, the Defense Department funded a lot of its own innovation, but we see increasingly the need to look for commercial innovation and to tap those innovations for defense application. I mean, we see similar indications in the NDPG. Within the Defense Department, we've worked hard at this over the last year. We've stood up the Defense Innovation Board and we've stood up Defense Innovation Units in key technology hubs around the nation. So we'll be interested to see how Japan works with this industrial-based attack. It's also advanced technological sector on key technologies like artificial intelligence. That's a little bit about capabilities in the technology landscape. As I mentioned, the second line of effort for the National Defense Strategy is allies and partners. And here again, we see an enormous amount of commonality. We obviously welcome the affirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a cornerstone of stability in the region and also the welcome signal that we see in the NDPG that Japan wants to play increasing number of roles and leadership in the region to include building regional networks in bilateral, multilateral, and trilateral formats. It's indication about strong partnerships with India and working through ASEAN and the importance of maintaining the ROK-Japan-US trilateral relationship where the military-to-military ties can sometimes provide a foundation of stability. So as I mentioned, a lot of commonality really across the lines of efforts of our two strategies. And I conclude this part by saying that in addition to the direction that those strategies provide, we see both strategies really signalling significant change that's backed up by action. So we see Japan increasing its defense budget and also increasing its increases in foreign military sales that signals that it's serious about its new defense roles. I was also asked to say a little bit about the implications of these two documents for U.S.-Japan cooperation. And I'll do that really from, again, from a strategy lane here. I recognize that the relationship is multifaceted and happening at multiple levels. But I think that the fact that you see such alignment between our two strategies gives us the cardinal direction that will allow us to think about new areas of cooperation. And I'd frame it this way. I talked about a similar diagnosis and many elements of similar response. I think what you also see in both documents is a similar set of challenges when it comes to implementation. There are many that one could note, but I'll note a few that you see in the document. The NDPG makes note that the operational tempo of Japan's forces makes it hard to sustain them and taxes the readiness. And this is a constant challenge that we're trying to deal with within the Department of Defense. I've already noted it, but both organizations note the difficulty of leveraging advantages in the commercial sector and integrating those key technological advances. So it's another area we can think about. Both strategies in our organization stress capacity building with other nations. And in both cases, with scarce resources, we're looking to maximize our eternal investment so it only makes sense that we're talking to each other as we conduct those activities. And of course, the fact that we're both trying to transform our military in significant ways means that we can study together the effects that those combined future capabilities have, think about new ways that we operate together, and then assess the deterrent effects that we think we're having. So the bottom line for us is we're very high on the document. We see it as not only having similar aims, but also a number of similar challenges we think that provides a robust basis for cooperation in the future. Thank you for the emphasis on the common knowledge. What if I said no? No? Well, then we were good here. Thanks to Seth Ko and Carnegie for pulling this panel together and the discussion overall today. And really thanks to the other panelists for laying, I think, out so well the perspective, even if from outside government, if you will, a strong sense of the fighter viewpoint inside. And then, of course, from Caleb's perspective over at DOD. My comments that I'm about to give are, I just want to emphasize, there is not a full translation in English yet. So I am basing my comments off of conversations, news reports, briefings, and comments given here today. I'm very consistent with what I've heard from both of you. I wish I had radically different things to say to make the Q&A most interesting, but I guess what I'd say is I'm going to push, maybe push some of the areas a little further than they were stated, but maybe not further than you all actually think we have some issues. But first, let's talk about the backdrop of this because I'm probably the most free on this panel to talk about that. Here we have the Japanese trying to develop and have developed this document, five-year regularized process, and they're doing it at a time when their most important ally is highly disruptive on the international stage. Not disruptive can be good or bad. I'm not, but it's disruptive. And so they're sort of the tail on the dog, if you will, and the head is somewhere off, and you don't know exactly what it's deciding to do, and it's very challenging. So kudos to those who tried to, inside Japan, who tried to get ahead, if you will, understand where the U.S. might be going, try to keep closely aligned, and of course try to align, which I think you did very well, as best I can tell, with the national defense strategy out of the United States. And it seems like the cues were taken largely from there. But you have, of course, this backdrop of trade, in particular, being a highly problematic issue area, in terms of the President's personal views on Japan from the 1980s, but a strong relationship, seemingly some relationship between Abe and Trump, or an ability to work together, and at least some rhetoric around working in a bilateral way on trade. But trade is clearly, economics is clearly a major backdrop of what has to happen now on the defense relationship. At the same time, you had, I think, a real perturbation that's probably overly polite over DPRK policy, and the degree to which the U.S. moved out pretty unilaterally on that. And I would just say what you see today on China policy is actually mutually unilateral, where you have the Japanese moving forward in a relationship approach with China, you have the U.S. moving forward, hopefully they're sort of aligned, but they're not, don't appear to be combined. So again, that creates a backdrop of some uncertainty as to how to keep ourselves aligned on the security side. And then you see, on the security side, you see a clear increase willingness of the United States to step up operationally in Asia. You saw that from kind of the last year at best of the Obama administration, and then more clearly in terms of freedom of navigation operations and the like. And you see sort of a bit from the Japanese side in conversations that's clear, there's sort of a relief, if you will, that there's a view that China is a real threat, that the U.S. has sort of brought its coalesced itself as a community around the idea that the security challenge is significant. So that sort of gives you, I think, a basic background of where we are. So where do I think are the differences or slight tweaks from what we already heard? I mean, I think to me the most important issue for both the U.S. and Japan in these two documents that we've just talked about is how far are we getting beyond rhetoric? So good news, the rhetoric seems to be aligned, and the rhetoric seems to have forward momentum behind it in terms of we have the significant challenge that particularly surrounding China and E2AD. Obviously North Korea is also on the page. Presumably there's something like Grazone or something of that sort inside the NDPG document with some kind of sense of competition that's happening below the level of workers. Japan's certainly been dealing with that for a long time. The question is how much is, how do we kind of connect that sense of consensus on rhetoric to actual movement? And here is where I fear that the Japanese may be taking cues from the U.S. and also have some sort of natural tendency toward the incrementalism which you referenced. That concerns me. And the heavy emphasis on carrier-like capabilities and missile defense, while I completely believe those are necessary and important, if they are the overwhelming emphasis of where Japan is going intellectually and not looking to leap ahead technologies, if those are really just rhetorical. Space, cyber, unmanned. As I think in some cases for the U.S., they are much more rhetorical than they are real in terms of shift and emphasis. I think that's concerning. And I just want to make clear, I don't mean that just about investment because for example F-35 and missile defense cost a lot of money and it's understandable if that takes a lot of investment. But I am worried that the focus on those, which may in part at least be driven by the view that the president of the United States has a transactional interest in the purchase of the U.S. kit, may be overwhelming again this idea that we need a more leap ahead approach with the Chinese. So some of the things I would want to be looking for in the document or in statements from Japan would be how Japan is linking things like investment in again, cyberspace, information technologies to Abe's very forward-leaning AI societal STEM approaches, which also are having I think some challenge getting from rhetoric to reality, but at least that's a major national emphasis that's moving. So to the degree that this, the NDPG and then the investment portfolio can slow clearly with that broader whole of government approach, I think that will be important. The gray zone piece, the interagency piece, the degree to which we are integrating in Japan, that's a concern again that we have in the United States about the difference between the rhetoric and say the national security strategy, which speaks to that and then the lack of seeming momentum across the U.S. government to be integrated and active in getting in front of those threats. Same concern I think for Japan. And then I think the last thing I'd say is I'll be looking very much for the R&D and co-development opportunities for the U.S. and Japan working together. Those are areas that have traditionally been once we've worked on. Obviously the U.S. has had a major initiative for example with places like India, we can do better with a great ally like Japan than we have been. And I would just emphasize and I think for Japan for the demographic reasons that have been mentioned and are well known by everyone, the unmanned piece really I think there's an imperative for the Japanese military to be much more invested in how much can they automate. Doesn't have to be at the pointy end of the sphere, it doesn't have to be in terms of systems that shoot if you will, but there is so much more than that that can be automated and advanced with robotics and that's a great opportunity for commercial sectors and defense to defense to be working together. I'll stop there. Thanks, Kat, about your concerns, asking your concerns that were a trick versus reality. One of the most important, it's why do we misunderstood in Japan the reality of the cyberspace article nine of the present. Attribution is a necessary process to cry for where the threat comes from and decide. However, the sense of attribution is not well appreciated in Japan. Many people say article nine does not allow us to go beyond our territory. This is totally a silly comment, totally a silly idea because in the cyberspace, there is no sovereign state and there is no sovereign control of the territory. Therefore, nobody should be banned or should be controlled seriously by the interpretation of the article nine of the present. Therefore, the most serious issue between the rhetoric and the reality, rhetoric and the real politics is the near future, we have to discuss that what is necessary for Japan. How far we are going to follow the sense of pacifism, future theory. The real issue is coming closer than we expected or we imagine in the future. We're getting more and more aware of this difficult situation. Therefore, I think and I'd like to focus on the current and future debate not only in Japan but also outside of Japan that what our discussion of the cyberspace should be. What kind of rules and engagements should be shared in the cyber security. That is something quite meaningful to discuss the future of the Japanese security. So to comment briefly and I worked for Dr. Hicks for a number of years so I'm not about to disagree with her. But I guess I would just say to the point about the rhetoric seems right and now we have to see if reality will follow. Without disagreeing I would just say that yes, this is a perennial concern. It's a perennial concern with all strategy documents. We've been trying to implement the NDS for a year. We've made some progress but these are really hard issues. And I suspect they will be any time you're trying to undertake significant change in any. But I don't know if this was clear and what I was saying but what I was trying to say at the end of this is those are hard challenges but because we see things the same way that also forms the basis for where we hopefully can cooperate. So perennial concern and obviously the jury's out on how well we're implemented but hopefully we can get together since we see things the same way. Before I turn it over to ask the panelists so that I think we still have some time and we'll have time for the audience. So first of all how do you see the difference Japan with this guidelines? How important will it be? So I mean I guess I'll probably speak to this not at a strategic level if you will. I think the issue of deterrence is enormously important in both documents right as I mentioned bolstering conventional deterrence credibility is really at the core of the national defense strategy and I think also the NDPG. And there's an implicit at least in our strategy like theory of deterrence that puts a premium owned combat credible for presence which is the thing you see talked about in our document and as a result owned forces that are lethal agile ready and resilient. And I would say coincident with that is not only they need to build forces that do that from an American perspective but also the need to be able to operate those forces with our allies. So because the emphasis of our document is on generating that sort of deterrence capability I think it'll be an enormous cooperation that we'll see in the future. If we do this right and we do it together there's a there's a real premium put on making sure the messaging is correct right. Former Secretary Mattis when he rolled out the national defense strategy said look you know in a Dr. Hicks point about a multifaceted competition the role of the Department of Defense in that competition is to ensure our diplomats negotiate from the position of strength. What does that mean for us that means that you know our job is to ensure there's no incentive for any other nation to think that they can achieve it. It doesn't mean we inevitably see confrontation you know we certainly aim for you know sort of a pathway to transparency and non-aggression but the job of the Department of Defense is to make sure that those incentives are appropriate right. And so because that's a focus of our document I think the emphasis on deterrence. What meaning to read about the history of the power struggle over East North East Asia. It was the Chin Dynasty and 17th to 18th century for East North East Asia Siberian area included. And these territories were taken by Russian eastward development. Current very Bostock area used to be the Chin's area but finally became Russian territory. And the Russian power went down to the south direction and that ignited Japan's reaction to go up to the north. And Russia-Japan war between 2004 sorry 1904 to 2005 was a result of this confrontation between Russia's coming down to the south direction and Japan's sense of security. Then only two years after the Russia-Japan war we concluded the treaty with Russian side just realized the news rate of American capitalism coming from the east. There was another interesting development of the history. Finally all these power contests came to the end in 1945 the loss of Japan. And after that except Japan all three major players in the northeast became nuclear powers. Japan is not. Since then Japan decided to enjoy the American extended deterrence and that is a principle that can hardly be changed even though Korea is going to be equipped with the nuclear. The reason is the deterrence is a way to deter the war and the damage but once the deterrence is over once deterrence fails exchange of damages as a natural result of the. Japan is the country the most vulnerable to all these kind of damage exchanges among. Therefore Japan should enjoy and saying that it is moral issue that no new state should be attacked by the new state. So the extended deterrence is going to be meaningful and the last five ten years DOD and MOD and Pentagon has kept very good talks what the extended deterrence is and this conversation is still going on and this is going to solidify our future understandings why extended deterrence is bothered by the United States and how Japan is going to support. So I think this dialogue is going to be kept and this is going to give the very good foundation of the alliance. I'll build directly on that as I do think that is the that is the major issue. Had moments over the past couple of years where I think there was a concern of deep crisis on that. I don't think we're in one of those moments right now. I don't assume that that can't happen again if you will in terms of the rhetoric in particular from the United States. And of course the manner in which the U.S. proceeds and resolves to the extent that there's any resolution negotiations with North Korea I think are next most obvious time in which there will be potentially from Japan over how the U.S. views its commitments in general in the region and how that includes extended terms and how it might affect what Japan believes it needs to invest in conventionally or otherwise that goes beyond where the NDPG I think in the United States my sense is that there's pretty broad support for the direction in which Abe is moving with this NDPG and in general in terms of having people an active defense posture. I don't think that that stands let alone in Japan in the United States to a view that a Japanese nuclear capability buys for Japan for the United States or for the region. So I do think that is sort of the major deterrence question that right now is latent but could rear its head again. Thank you, Kath. Yeah, definitely a latent question. Yes, very interesting classic debate too. Now Caleb you mentioned that the national defense strategy and the Japanese documented NDPG share lots of commonalities share a similar diagnosis which can elaborate more on that and how closely do you think the two documents characterize threats and how do they diverge in threats? Thanks. Sure. So I mean I covered this to some extent in my remarks but you know I'll touch on it. So I mean overall I think there's a high degree of alignment how they how they characterize threats. There's obviously differences in you know sort of tone because they're different audiences. Our national defense strategy is primarily classified and so primarily a down and in document and that that lends to it a different a different tone than you have in a public facing document. But overall both in terms of the diagnosis of the security environment the characterizations and major threats I think there's a high degree of alignment. You know to the extent there are differences I think those differences are simply reflections of the different find ourselves in right. So we talk about the national defense strategy great power competition principally with Russia and China and Europe and Asia and that's a reflection of the United States as global commitments. You see in the NDPG again both of those actors reflected but also North Korea probably taking more prominence than than Russia though again Russia is noted and that simply simply seems to me to be a reflection of Japan characterizing its own security environment. So like you know differences of degree but a high degree of commonality overall is the way I would describe it. Right just to follow up question on that but the two documents also talk about competition and can't also talk about touched upon that as well. How how should we understand that? Can you elaborate more on that please? So this is probably the question we get most in our day jobs. You know we thought when we were doing the national defense strategy that we were very clear but it turns out that lots of people have different ideas about what competition really means. So I think if you're trying to do this definitionally the place that we would at least start on the U.S. side is with the national security strategy. And if you look at the national security strategy it tells us that it well it really defines competition as having three key dimensions. There's a you know a domestic sorry not domestic rather diplomatic a military and economic competition and then it describes those three areas as being accelerated by technology and information. Right so you know I think what you can refer from that is it's a multifaceted as Kat said this is it really points to the whole government nature of these challenges. And you know what it means for us is that in the defense department is that you know in many cases we may not be the lead for things. Right. I mentioned earlier the verbiage in the document that talks about helping our diplomats negotiate from position strength. Right. If you're thinking in a whole government sense then you know diplomats may be in the lead in some instances and our ability is to provide that backstop. Right. You know we often joke in the department defense that you know China can do a whole of nation and Russia can do a whole regime but you know we can't even hold DOD. Right. So but I think if you're trying to define it those three are probably your bedrock. Right. Obviously there are lots of gradations but in each of those right there are elements of the military competition and sub elements there. But I think that's the that's the bedrock from which we we start our sort of definitional process that helps. I also have one question for each son. Your feedback of the mostly positive very positive actually. How about I have to ask this domestic domestic constraints and public opinion. So how how would you explain or prepare the domestic public? How do you explain them the gap between Japan's traditionally defensive military doctrine and these steps forward towards a more assertive position. How would you explain that to the public? I think generally this document is well accepted accepted Japanese public. That is well encouraged by the very tough comment by the Chinese foreign affairs office spokesman Spokesperson that guy condemned it badly and that encouraged us that they gave me a very good mark for the achievement and that is the sense well shared by the Japanese public so the but still there exists difficult issues as I pointed out in our for discussion. We still have the shadow of the article nine of the question. The amazing issue as I pointed out is peace and security or adopted 2015 was not mentioned at all guideline because that load changes the interpretation of the article nine of the conflict. On the particular point of the corrective self the right of the corrective self-defense to be the government position is but then the new law just modified it not 100% but still to a certain level sufficient to cooperate with the United States meter it is became feasible for the the right of corrective self-defense therefore it's a very gradual approach well it's surely the Japanese tradition but how far we are going to and to that is something that you have we have to pay more attention however so far the things are fine but the important thing is what we are going to say in five years time um thanks I think we have 20 minutes for for Q&A yeah I will collect three questions if there are then we'll have the panelists reply to those so I'll pass it to you Stapleton Roy with the Wilson Center thank you for the very informative discussion that we've had here today um one could argue this is the policy panel that deterrent still operates between the United States and China and between the United States and Russia in terms of all out war but East Asia has two war fighting issues that could emerge one in Korea and one over Taiwan and recently there have been some very significant developments on Taiwan we've had the president of China making clear that this is a war fighting issue for China if Taiwan moves toward independence and at the same time the president of Taiwan has said that unification is out of the question and she's rejected that but the U.S. Congress has passed two non-binding acts over the last year that essentially are pushing the administration to move outside of a one China parameter by as by saying that our most serious our most senior policy and military officials should be permitted to visit Taiwan 40 years of U.S. practice has viewed such visits as inconsistent with the one China policy and yet the president signed the bills without making a signing statement so we've had this discussion about China Japan's defense posture but there's been no mention of Taiwan and yet Taiwan could very well be one of the precipitating factors in which Japan could find itself being expected to take actions in support of a United States response that Japan might find awkward I wonder if members of our panel could comment on this because one would expect under such circumstances from a policy standpoint that both the United States and Japan would be trying to avoid actions by Taiwan that might precipitate such a conflict and yet that's not the current pattern so it therefore is not a insignificant issue thank you You want to take the next question right away Minaya Solis from Brookings Institution I think it's been clear from the conversation throughout the morning that these national defense program guidelines are driven by the sense that the security environment around Japan is becoming more severe and we spend a lot of time talking about the China issue military modernization but I wanted also to expand the conversation and talk about the Korea Peninsula because I think that a lot of the challenges coming to Japan are going to come from that focal point just to highlight some of the troublesome trends that I see there is that it seems that there could be a second summit between the President and Kim Jong-un and it could be very possible that the President will not extract any hard court commitments towards the nuclearization and the more the leaders meet the more you actually Kim Jong-un becomes a de facto nuclear state the leader of a de facto nuclear state country then there's also the very the negotiations between the United States and South Korea on the special measures agreement that did not go well the discussion that perhaps the U.S. the President could decide to withdraw American troops from South Korea how that would impact Japan's security and Japan's feelings about the stability of U.S. alliances and then add to these deterioration in Japan-Korea relations South Korea relations recently over the decision of the Supreme Court regarding compensation claims for our wartime labor issues so how will Japan address all these issues emanating from the Korea Peninsula to add to the Taiwan question okay thank you I think we have a lot here so we'll start with Taiwan and Korea Taiwan risk and but I do suspect that the Japanese view is most desired and I suspect Caleb would like to hide under the table right about now on the on the first of those in particular yeah you're right you're absolutely right of course to raise Taiwan as a potential precipitant to a crisis in the region that then involves the United States and Japan both at a policy level and then operationally having to come together and I just you know I think your question meant both you kind of went toward the operational but I do want to start at the policy level because I think this gets into the issue of how Japan sees how it's going to grapple with the idea that it is of course a minimum a location for the basing of US forces that can be used outside of Japan for other purposes which is again one of those things that's then you know it's existed but it's hasn't come to any kind of crisis point but you could imagine it creates could it create an intense domestic problem for Japan to manage so I do think that's one of those factors that's always on the at least on the edge of the thoughts of US and Japanese diplomats and defense officials you know one that until it's tested in context it's hard to know exactly how how they how the policy end of that positions itself so for instance that the Chinese were to undertake some kind of precipitous military action that's a different context than if the Taiwanese which I think was the way in which you kind of got into the your road to war if you will was a entanglement from Taiwan to the US that implicates Japan in some way and of course that's the possibility but it leads to a different set of policy outcomes on the operational level as I just said I think it's a big challenge for Japan to think about how it positions itself in terms of capability development vis-a-vis different crises in the region I think joint experimentation and exercises are combined are incredibly important for the advancement of counter-A2A2A2 AD capability in general for the US and Japan but for Japan again there is layered on to this this question of exactly for what and how and they're different there's a divergence of interest so I think that's a concern and then at the kind of the grand level which you know I differ on how the Japanese view it I take your point which is well I'd broaden the point the US policy on Taiwan is and evolve you know Congress plays a role in the evolution of that approach that is not to be ignored in the US context the executive branch does not have unitary responsibility for foreign policy and Congress has chosen to assert itself a time and again on Taiwan policy and we are seeing that today that's the reality of how we need to think about but I don't think it's I don't think it predetermines the pathway today any more than it has in the past it certainly contextualizes how how we have to approach it so I think their factors kind of leaning toward you know do we consider this a lean toward a two you know a beyond one China policy and then I think there are other factors you can say they're a very consistent in our policy that we've been on one China policy so I don't think it's deterministic what's happened in the last year nowadays Taiwan issue and Korean issue is connected to each other I mentioned the historical background of the power struggle of a North-East Asia but the important point is Korea how do we be the player of this power struggle Korea was the stage of power game but Korea can how do we be the player in the past so for the first time in the history of the last 500 years we see Korea as an active player in North-East Asia nuclear capability missile capability therefore the historical wisdom can hardly support us to work out what the Korean's behavior is going to be but at the same time it might be good to remember once China intervened the Korean situation basically China fails the recent case is 1894 to 95 Sino-Japan warfare that was because of the power the struggle of initiatives of a Korean peninsula between China and Japan back to the history Sue dynasty failed and we can count so many dynasties which failed then the difficult thing is current Chinese economic situation is going to be very good very bad before coming here my good friend told me recent statistics showed that China's economic growth is less than 2% in nominal and below there in real time it's really surprising and threatening for me so if China fails it's E over Korean peninsula in order to save its face Taiwan could naturally be the next target for the China's grand strategy then there comes the difficult question for the Japanese side because South and territory Yonaguni island is very near to Taiwan used to be when Taiwan was a territory Japan is a part of Japan Imperial Japan there is quite common going Okinawa's fisheries go to Taiwan and going out from there while Taiwan's miners coming up to Okinawa for coal miners so there still exist numbers of Ming good society in Okinawa and Taiwan so the recent interesting case is the fishery right around Senkaku islands Japanese side accepted that Taiwan side has a right to go out there for the fishery due to the historical background and that is only for Taiwanese not for Chinese so this is the based on the wisdom of the past days but this might invite another anger from Beijing that you are going to separate Beijing and Taiwan so the Taiwan issue is going to be very serious and that is very near to the Japanese territory therefore we have to pay very serious attention Senkaku issue well it is discussed in many ways for the territorial issue between between Japan and China but at the same time Senkaku is the very interesting geopolitical place if China is going to control it they can have the place they can open the front against Taiwan from the north that is very unacceptable for Taiwan side so we have many difficult landmines in front of us related to Taiwan how to manage them honestly speaking I have no good idea to manage but and I'm very say in a sense unfair to the Taiwan issue because my son's wife is Taiwanese so I have my personal commitment there so I have many questions to answer but so far I don't have any good answers to them I'm very happy to let my colleagues come and stand okay we have one more question any other questions back as well okay please state your name and affiliation I thank you Steve Winters independent consultant I think this is for Caleb a few years ago the army training and doctrine people under general Perkins came out with their new operational concept which they called how to win in a complex world and actually at the time his classmate from West Point General Hotel took that over as the guidelines for the special operations command which he was head of at the time and as you're probably very familiar with that the whole idea is that things are new things are coming so fast and all things are getting out of date so quickly that you sort of have to have a meta position to to to really adjust to reality in it so it's Nishisan had mentioned how long the question how long the guidelines might last so it just seems to me this legacy thinking that we're all affected with as human beings is a real problem someone and I'll finish up with this someone said the situation today totally unprecedented never before in history is that human society has moved on to the internet this is not just new domain this is a new reality sort of going along with Ellen Musk and the battles over 5G and so forth and so on are battles over this new reality so could you comment about the thinking in the Pentagon because I thought Perkins came out with that was fantastic work that he did so I'll say a few things the first thing is I don't know the specific study that you're referencing you know I think in maybe Dr. Hicks will from her time in the Pentagon but you know in general terms you know the I think we agree with you that we see the security environment is changing and changing rapidly and you know Evan knows we're always trying to push past you know these sorts of legacy thinking it's very hard to do just cognitively right you know at the same time I think one of the differences that you see in the strategy that we've put out is the place that often leads you to is a place that says I can't know anything about the future and thus you know I just must maintain balance right and I think what we have said is no right like you know of course there's a large grid of the certainty and you should be humble as you try to predict it but we actually can say some things about where we ought to prioritize because we're concerned about you know some trends that we see that I've already talked about conventional deterrence and so on and because you know U.S. credibility is at stake in those instances right we think that those are the most important problems for the strategy to address and thus we focus on them right so you know I'm kind of agreeing in part and disagreeing in part of which is to say you know totally appreciate that the world is changing rapidly and in ways we probably have it accounted for and at the same time we tried very hard not to let us let that lead us to a place that just said and we can't know anything about the future so we must just be prepared for everything is that fair but just on that I'd like to ask you specifically recently at a talk here in D.C. Bob Work said said the Defense Department has identified I don't know there's 10 or 12 key technologies where the U.S. must maintain dominance and his his comment and he said I don't mean this critically but his comment was there's no way that we can be number one and all of these things we need to focus on one or two two at the most and put the national effort behind that so could what's going on with the Pentagon and that thinking that we're going to do everything no I mean I think the well yes and no the shorter answer is and and I'm not I'm not your foremost expert on this but the department does have a series of you know sort of key technology areas that it's pursuing right and that we think make a lot of sense so we are we are trying to sort of and it's you know I think I'll resonate with Dr. Hicks's point here that you know that we want to make sure we're trying to do as much of that sort of emerging technology we could work as we can at the same time I would also say to you that you know you know at a more conceptual level I think you can certainly see a focus within within our strategy and then supporting activities that says we can't compete everywhere and we can't compete over everything and we're going to have to be selective about that right and so then the question is you know what do you think is most important and we try to lay that out in the in the strategy obviously this is an iterative dialogue and more work will be done so on the one hand yes we have those technology areas of this we're trying to pursue them on the other hand you know the the thematic thrust of the comment is fair that we want to be judicious and victory do we have a question in the back thank you thank you very much like this question my name is Koji Sonoda with the Japanese Asahi newspaper and my question is to Nishi-san and my question is on Japan's national security strategy and actually some experts believe that the Japanese government should have revised the its national security strategy at the same time revising the with regard to the revising the NDPG and so because Japanese national security strategy was established in 2013 and it is a little bit old especially on the perspective on the security challenges of China and so my question is that why Japanese government did not revise the national security strategy at this time and also I mean like were there any political reason and so if you do not mind could you share the internal discussion of Japanese government on the national security strategy if you don't mind thank you no I don't mind because fortunately I was totally outside of the whole discussion related to the paper but I'm sure that the old drafting process related to the current new guideline together with five years plan everything was delayed in the last five years we have many scandals troubles inside of the NDP MOD and that delayed whole preparation process as you see the cabinet set up the consulting body for discussing the new guideline but as you see no paper was written no paper was proposed from that conference body which is exceptional compared to the past cases in other words it showed how case we had time to prepare the current so from the bureaucratic perspective I'm afraid there won't be any time to revise the security paper don't the NDPG and that is well bureaucratic analysis but at the same time what important is to catch up the current situation and might be good to remember the first comment from the opposition parties they said that the guideline should stay 10 years and five years the upper government revised that is too quick and enhance its warmongers positions much worse than ever and they encourage that that paper should shouldn't be revised next 10 years no matter what the situation is so many people can say many things but the reality is everything is changing so fast therefore quick remedy is vitally important to catch up the current development of the situation therefore the current initiative has outrun together with the new five years plan could be the maximum that the current government can cooperate so that's my analysis but that is my personal analysis and you may hear something very different from somebody involved to the whole class I think time's up and we can wrap things up comments from the panelists well very vicious document also good some good opportunities for U.S. Japan cooperation but also some concerns so thank you so much and please join me in thanking the panelists thank you so much for coming all the way thank you very much Sayori and my thanks as well to the panelists I'm grateful to them I'm grateful to the Saskawa Peace Foundation USA for its collaboration I'm grateful to you all for participating here today thank you and we'll see you again hopefully sometime soon