 Well, I had this plan that if we took a break and handed out the report, everybody would just take the report and leave. And the question and answer session would be short and sweet. Seriously, I think it's a tribute to the timeliness of the topic that so many of you have come here and I know that what you'd like to do is spend a little more time thumbing through it, and you'll actually be able to do that because I'm quite sure that there are a number of questions that are somewhat independent of actually what's in the report as well that we could entertain. So our process is we've got folks with microphones. Let's see, who's got the mics there? Elena has a mic and Jesse has a mic in the back. So if you raise your hand, wait for the microphone to come to you, put in your hand, hold it up to your mouth, and you'd be surprised. You have to actually, nobody in this room is technologically as unsavvy as I am. Tell us who you are and where you're from and then ask your question. So let's start here in the middle and then we'll go to the right side of the room. Thanks. I'm Dick Van Adder with the Science and Technology Policy Institute and you raised a set of options and you presented them as independent or they look like they're presented as independent options. What appears to be missing is the concept of an overall strategy and a linkage in relationship amongst options based upon an assessment of the factors that you have here, the cost, the requirements, the needs, the impact, et cetera. So do you see yourselves building something that would in fact create a broader strategy or call for a broader strategy, raise a second question, whose job is it to do that? There's actually a third question implicit in that question, but let me tackle sort of what we're going to do and then I think that gets part way to your question, Dick, but not all the way to the end. We recognize, first of all, that there are ways to assemble elements of the options that are not mutually exclusive. So these are not really, you have to pick option one, option two, option three, option four and while I'm not going to lean quite as far forward as my boss did earlier today, I think that it's quite likely that we'll assemble a set of potential recommendations that would cut across and integrate from amongst the options and other elements as well. The linkage of that to a broader strategy is, it seems to me, from a strategic planning process point of view, both the bottom's up question, which is the way we're coming at it, but also a top down question and we're not necessarily in the current operation planning on coming at it from that direction. It occurs to me that that's something we can think about, certainly, and perhaps take out from this the elements of the path forward that would be required to link to that broader strategy and that broader process. In terms of who's in charge, I'm certainly not prepared to go to that level yet, but I've spent a lot of my life wrestling inside the interagency process and the one thing we all know for sure is that if nobody's in charge, then really nobody's in charge. And I think that's going to be a critical aspect of it. It's not identified either as one of our evaluation criteria or as a particular set of options and in some cases it may be implicit, in some cases we may have to make it explicit. So I think we're sensitive to those questions. I don't know that we have a definitive piece to each of them, but that's how I see them linking together. You have anything you want to add to that, Greg? Everything you said was right on point. I don't think we go that far to the strategy. But one of the important things by going around to the different interviews and the different subsets of stakeholders was that each we're looking at the option to improve access from just their little window. And I think there's a value here of explaining that there are other windows or other avenues. So we don't go all the way to a national strategy, but we do say that we might want to stop looking outside the one stovepipe. All right, other questions here? While the mic's in the middle, I'll do the side and then we'll move back over to the other side. So, Jesse, we have a question right here. Thank you. Assumptions in context are certainly very important for any study like this. And I just want to be sure that I heard you correctly. At the beginning when you said that the Long March, I believe, was the most reliable rocket. I didn't understand that. And by what criteria do you make that? And you are? I'm Patty Grace Smith, the former associate administrator for commercial space transportation at FAA. Got it. Thank you. I would note for the record that the question of the Long March's reliability of being the most reliable launch rocket was actually not in our study, but in my boss's opening commentary. And he did, but now I feel like the witness for the administration who just blamed the president for my problem. And so that's not quite my ultimate objective here. I don't actually have the data for proving the validity of that statement, but given the catastrophic event scorecard, it's at least tied for the top in recent times in different versions. I think that the question of reliability is certainly one of the issues that we're going to continue to look at. I don't know that I would characterize the outcome of that assessment at this stage. So in a sense, I can't validate that statement, but I can't deny it either. And it's clearly something that we need to pay attention to and validate it one way or the other. We've got one over here, Elena. If I were actually in a hearing, I would have said, I'll have to take that one for the record. Okay. Yoshi Koizumiya from Japan Aerospace Agency. Expanding the commercial opportunity might conflict to keep or maintain the sufficient security level. And this issue should be highly prioritized. It's very important. So how do you work out to solve this issue? Well, the issue of commercial expansion versus security, of course, is kind of at the core of a lot of the government policy questions today. And your comment about should be highly prioritized. I don't disagree with that. Although I would actually think that where we sit right now, virtually everything we've touched on here is high priority. I don't think we have anything in our report that falls in the category of second tier of issues now, which makes it quite complicated and difficult to figure out. I think it's important to recognize a couple of changes in reality, both with respect to security of an individual payload and with respect to a system that manufactures that security through export controls and other technology controls. The U.S. depends upon two things in order to maintain its technological lead. One is obviously the identification of critical technologies that need to be protected in terms of who gets them and when they get them and what they can do with them. The second is maintaining that lead by continuing to invest and develop. Both of those have been key elements of our security for decades. But the world is so much different now, and it's not, Secretary Gates gave a speech last week, some of you will probably add it, most of you have read about it, in terms of laying out the national security challenge for export control reform, and he put it in the framework primarily of we have a system built for the Cold War, and we're not in the Cold War anymore. There was a very key sub-element that I think goes right to the heart of your question, and that is that in the past, it used to be that all good new national security technology was developed first within the U.S. national security community, and that is no longer the case today. And, you know, 15, 18 years ago, we had this big push for dual-use technology, right? My friend Dick Van Addis sitting there was either a precursor or a harbinger, I'm not sure which. But what dual-use technology meant in the early and mid-1990s was it was developed for defense, and then we figured out how to apply it elsewhere. We're in a whole new world of dual-use technology, where the technology being developed today is in the commercial global market. It's not being developed, and this is not true across the board. Obviously, there's plenty of key technology still being developed inside the national security arena. But increasingly, there are valuable technologies for defense and national security applications and use that are developed in the global commercial arena. And when you have a system that's set up based upon the predicate that you're going to have it first and then you figure out what to do with it, and you migrate that to a system that says somebody else develops it first, and you've got to figure out how to get access to it, and that's a different dynamic. And I think that's the interface that we have to approach the question that you've raised of the interface of security and commercialization. We can't stop the growth of the global commercial markets. It's just beyond our capability. And we've got to learn how to accommodate and live within that. We've got to learn how to both adjust our policies and our approaches, as well as what we depend on and how we accommodate everything from a contractual level all the way up to a technology development level. Question in the back. I'm basically Walker from the Secure World Foundation. I notice in your report when you're talking about leverage with foreign launch providers, you put Ariane Spass and the Great Wall Corporation in the same sentence. Obviously, U.S. policy towards France and U.S. policy towards China are somewhat different. Has your study contextualized engagement with Great Wall or options like that in the greater picture of U.S. China policy? I missed the verb in your question. Would you repeat that again? When you were looking at your study with your assumptions, were you looking at the greater picture of U.S. China policy when also looking at export controls and future partnership? Well, I could tell you that I'm still looking for exactly the precise definition of what U.S. China policy is but I think more importantly, we're clearly cognizant of the multiple layers of dynamics involving the question of use of China and occasionally actually those dynamics get in the way with France as well although I think that's behind us for the time being. But we're cognizant of that but I think we have to look at it analytically from the point of view of what's available today and if that doesn't meet the needs, what has to change in order to allow those needs to be met. So we certainly haven't taken off the table either policy changes or implementation changes as part of that evaluation but we haven't concluded what our recommendations would be in that regard. A couple questions up front here and then I'll go to the middle. So why don't you go first and then Vincent, are you going to let him go first? Yes. But just keep the microphone in handed to her. Vincent Sabatier. First of all with the last question if I remember well all rockets are managed by the MTCR regime so it's missile technology so we shouldn't forget that. It's a very important point in national security and as far as I remember China is not a signatory of MTCR right now. So that's the first point but then I had a question about the about the economic of the study. We've seen recently both ULA and the Japanese our Japanese friends with the H2 they pulled away from the commercial market. The reason is is it an industrial based question or is it an economical question because there is not enough market to sustain all those launchers and when you see that there are only 15 commercial GTO satellite clearly and the bankrupt of C launch lately clearly there is not enough business for everyone. So how do you assess the purely economic situation of the question? Assessing the purely economic situation of the question and actually we get at this in our fourth set of options which is are there ways to increase demand which would in fact be a fundamental way of changing the economy. Some of that will have to do with the evolution of the global market. When I look out into my blackberry the announcement of 3.2% real growth in the first quarter of the economy today that's a positive signal. About 20 years ago I had the opportunity to study what we were going to do with the defense industry at the end of the Cold War and how we were going to spend the peace dividend as if somehow the government was going to make that decision. One of the key conclusions was that there's almost no policy that will succeed in redirecting resources that would be better than 4% per year real growth around the planet. So to many ways we're subject obviously to where the global economy goes and where our own domestic economy goes. That said I think there are a couple of interfaces that come into play and we want to look at how those interfaces do. There's a big issue about how big do you need to be and can you use more and smaller so that the ratio of the cost of the payload versus the cost of the launch changes. And that's an economic analytical dynamic that I think bears some assessment in terms of where the break points are there. Not intuitively obvious. The second actually has to do with a third element that comes into play besides just cost and demand. And that is the government's role in providing availability. And for the government cost is not really the big driver and time is free. It's way more important to make sure that you have 100.0% reliability of success for military payloads and the extent to which you've got an integrated approach obviously commercial payloads takes not only second page but probably last page. That creates an economic circumstance in terms of trade-offs that companies just can't live with. You can't live with the uncertainty or not very often. We're not quite sure when your line will form when you can get in it and when you can get out of it and the potential for holding something up. And I don't mean to imply that we think that you should sacrifice national security in order to satisfy commercial launch demand but I think there are potentially better ways to integrate those two. All of those taken together can change the economics and both the demand and the availability side of it. I'm Robbie Sabatier. My question is with respect to the funding of the study. My understanding, I see John Warner here, Senator Warner here. Mr. Kiley, you worked for Senator Warner and I know John Emery's a good friend of Senator Warner's. We also know that Senator Warner has worked in the past and I think currently for the commercial satellite operators who have an interest in opening up the Chinese launch market to US-made satellites. And we believe and we know that that strategy failed on the Hill and with the administration. We did hear that they came to CSIS asking for this study which I understand is going to be an independent study but that perhaps they are partially funding it or have a huge interest in the outcome either because it will give them a reason to say, look, we do need the Chinese market open because there's no US launch market. All those SpaceX is trying to get into the launch market and opening up the Chinese launch market would kill that US industry, that budding US industry. What interest is in, are they funding the study? Do they have a valid interest in the outcome or is this truly independent? I think it's interesting you start out with that Greg Kiley worked for Senator Warner. If you look closely at the record you'll see that I actually worked against Senator Warner far longer than Greg Kiley worked for Senator Warner including four rounds of base closures which I had the opportunity for him to give me the benefit of his personal views of the wisdom of my course of action perhaps a number of times. But I think the point of your question is actually a very serious point. Let me describe to you how we undertake our work particularly in my group, the Defense Industrial Initiatives Group. Roughly half of our funding comes from corporate contributions to CSIS and there's an internal allocation process by which those funds are made available and from that I create essentially a core funding capability which I use to do many studies ranging from examination of professional services contracts contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, European defense industry, our own assessment of the relationship of government policies to the financial performance of the companies and independent assessments of particular industrial base issues. This falls into that category. There are contributors and sponsors who have multiple vested outcomes in the issue here some of which are in direct competition with one another. We face that in almost every issue that we undertake but I stand quite firmly on the both the independence of our assessment particularly on the independence of our recommendations when we get to the end. I spent 30 years in this business it's the only way I've ever done it. This is the only institution I know that I would have come to work for that meets that test and I don't think you'll find a single bit of evidence to impugn either the nature of the study or the outcomes. So your answer is no. Right. Nobody's influencing either what we do or what we say other than the shortcomings of our own intellect. We put it together. I didn't say we. And when I was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee there were certain critical periods at that time when I felt the United States Senate and indeed the full Congress needed an independent study. I turned to CSIS to perform that study. I was privy to General Jones headed the panel. So from the get go to the extent I've had involvement it is I can tell you this team behind me was fully independent and had I ever got in their way they'd a stiff army and I know it. I think though you know the question really is a question of process but I think the probably the more important measure is the outcome and I think I'm happy to let the study when we're finished stand for itself and any who have any questions about either the validity or the accuracy of the connection of the analysis to the findings and conclusions and recommendations we certainly have that discussion there. I hope that answers your question to some extent. I think I had next promised that we had somebody in the middle here. Yes sir. Right there. Thank you. Thank you. Ted Cronmiller consultant. You've noted in your study that the market for satellite launches is essentially flat for the foreseeable future. I think you've noted as well that there's ample capacity currently to launch what is expected to be available for launch. In addition there are going to be a number of new entrants and perhaps a reentry of an old outfit sea launch and the question that comes to mind is when you identify the risks such as the political risks that France may change its policies to the detriment of the interest you see at stake here or that there may be a failure among the mature and frankly fairly resilient systems that exist currently. Have you quantified that risk? Have you attempted to see how realistic it is that France, for example, would change a policy in a way that would injure U.S. national security in this regard? And have you looked at how much an interruption would actually occur in the event that one or more systems comes down? Thank you. That's an excellent question. I don't think that we have successfully quantified the risk. I think we have attempted to construct some mechanisms by which we would do that quantification at a minimum I think what we need to do is to sort of rank order them so that you've got some relative priorities of risk inserted there but quantifying it would require a level of sophistication of probability and outcomes that I think are probably beyond the scope of this study. But what I think your question points out is a more fundamental issue which is we can apply supply and demand and economic analysis to this situation as if somehow that's going to give us all the answers when in reality it's only a very limited part of the overall equation in terms of both opportunities and decisions for individual companies, countries, or users. And the political dynamics and the government-related dynamics that come into play, if in fact we really do have flat demand and I think one of the things that we intend to comment on is the reliability of that flatness of demand as a projection because there are things that could change it. And an increasing number of potential suppliers for launch, most of which are state-supported and state-supported for reasons that have something to do with something other than economic return on investment, that's a very different way of analyzing and prioritizing and I think folding the risk and the threat associated into that is even harder. So, you know, I don't think we've got that sorted out yet. Greg, do you want to add anything to that? No, I think that's part of the next step is to try and put a little bit more rigor to the risk sets and the relative, not an absolute figure, but the relative risks involved. And you know, Dr. Hamry suggested that you were all here to work today and I would suggest that any of you who can come up with a good approach to that, I would be glad to double your current salary. So that offers not to my staff. Thank you. Marjorie Chorland's Lockheed Martin. It's been a while since I've had to exercise my Evelyn Woodspeed reading talents. That's why we give you a whole month, actually. Thank you. So I confess I haven't read the entire thing just sitting here. But the question I have actually is sort of at the opposite end of the spectrum of the gentleman's question, which I think was rather specific, mine has something to do with a much messier topic and that is Congress. And the political element that needs to be factored into whatever analysis is conducted here. Now I did see a couple of references in my quick review to some of the activities that Congress has undertaken with respect to export controls in particular. Hope that, you know, we'll see the Senate acting on returning jurisdiction, et cetera. My question, though, is to what extent do you anticipate your report will factor in what is inherently a messy component of the policymaking process and that is the very intensely competing concerns on Capitol Hill around not only protecting, you know, discrete district specific elements of the industrial base, but larger concerns about national security, especially with respect to specific countries? The larger national security concerns, and both with respect to export controls and with respect to some of the other congressional actions, CSIS has had a longstanding change advocate position on that dating back through a number of studies over the last decade and beyond. And of course our president and CEO has been on the lead of that as he puts it. He's already undertaken three kamikaze missions on export controls and is about to undertake a fourth and perhaps the target will be better identified and established this time. And, you know, my group has a similar track record, including a report that we put out in the spring of 2008 as well. We are in the middle of a host of activities related to try to move the ball forward on that. It's not at all clear to me that that will end up in a report because I think we're more at the stage where we're interested in providing a forum for debate and collaboration. I was going to say compromise, but that's usually a bad word, even though it is ultimately what we have to do. Amongst all the various competing elements, both inside the administration with the Congress and those handful of other folks who can contribute intellectually without biasing the outcome. I think we're in a unique situation in terms of the potential for real successful change here for a host of reasons. We're early on in the administration. We have a very dynamic and capable cabinet officer who's pushing hard for change and who's had a track record of being somewhat successful in the last few years for the things he takes on. We've got the changing technology and global economic dynamic underway. We've got, I think, a clear recognition that we have the potential for national security harm from failing to change as opposed to national security benefit from failing to change. A number of other reasons I think we've got the nation faces an opportunity here and even the Congress will recognize that and I think there's a potential. Whether or not there's enough time left between now and the end of the 111th Congress to succeed or whether what we're really doing is setting a very capable and thorough and comprehensive stage for the 112th Congress to pick something up next year. As anybody's guess, I once stood up in a public platform in July of 1996 and guaranteed the audience that there was no way that welfare reform would pass that year. Six weeks later, this president was signing it into law so I don't really want to predict where momentum will go but I think the stage is very well set, the issues are very well engaged and this will play clearly a part. When we put out our 2008 study and as I mentioned, we started looking at the industrial base and ended up coming to the conclusion that export control reform was both a fundamental cause of problems and a real driver for dealing with them. We said at the time that space and the space industry, in general and particularly key elements, were like the canary in the coal mine and you really had to look because even though the dollars were fairly small with respect to overall national security expenditures and the national security technology environment, the relative importance of that contribution both to overall national security and to the national economy was way beyond the dollars being invested and spent in it and that if we were losing our technical edge there as a nation, both from a security point of view and from an economic point of view, that it really would make you ask where else are we losing and what are the potential consequences there. So it's bigger than just the space issue. I think it's a very strong signal but it's also potentially a pretty strong horse to pull the wagon. I hope that responds to your question. Greg, do you have something else? Yeah, I just wanted to add two seconds but I've not been at CSIS as long as David. I've only been here 18 months and this is about my fourth effort that I participated in but one of the things CSIS prides itself on and can correct me if I'm wrong is the analysis of practical solutions, things that are actually feasible and one of our criteria for the evaluation is this feasibility question which goes to all of what David was saying. I don't want to distress that point. On the side here, yeah, right behind you Phil. Thank you, I'm Phil Spector with Intelsat and I wanted to start by just saying Intelsat is the largest purchaser of commercial satellites in the world we're also the largest purchaser of commercial launches in the world. So we obviously welcome this study. I wanted to take exception with the statement that was kind of made in passing by the woman a little while ago to the effect that somehow having the Chinese a part of the normal commercial launch market would kill innovators like SpaceX. Intelsat is one of the largest fans of SpaceX for obvious reasons. We want more launch alternatives and SpaceX is part of that. But to say that somehow by protecting our domestic market we're going to get there and that somehow by not having competition and distorting the normal workings of a commercial market we're going to somehow have a better outcome for somebody in the U.S. when we haven't had anybody in the U.S. succeed at commercial launch in many, many years is just wishful thinking. Intelsat buys all of its satellites from U.S. manufacturers from Boeing, from Orbital Sciences and from Laurel. We buy none unfortunately of our launches from U.S. providers because there are none available. We had one commercial launch on the Atlas rocket last year that was something that was ordered many years ago and in fact took a very long time and with many delays to get up in orbit. We buy all of our launches from the French and the Russians and we would like to see for that reason a lot more competition in this marketplace of all kinds. The China problem particularly though is one in which I think Dr. Hamry's point before about the law of unintended consequences goes into play. You mentioned and it's a key part of your study here the U.S. Aerospace Industrial Base. One of the unintended consequences of current China policy is that we are directly harming the U.S. Defense and Aerospace Industrial Base. What's happened is that foreign satellite manufacturers TALUS in particular have designed around the ITAR requirements that prevent launch on a Chinese launcher. They offer ITAR-free satellites. Those satellites, the ITAR-free satellites mean that there can be no components manufactured in the United States. Someone mentioned Congress earlier interestingly component manufacturers for satellites are located in 49 of the 50 states. So there's some political interest here in strengthening the U.S. Defense and Industrial Base as it comes to manufacturing satellites. We don't help that at all by encouraging foreign satellite manufacturers to design around U.S. components. But that is one of the unintended consequences of current policy. I don't know to what extent your study addresses that. I haven't had time to do my own speed reading but I'm hopeful that the final study will address that point. I'm mindful of Senator Warner when he would occasionally look down at some of the lesser mortals who were members of his committee and say Senator is there a question in there? I don't think I detected actually a question that I have to resu... Oh, at the end there was a question whether it's in the study or not. To a limited degree it is but I think, Phil, you'll see it much more in the results of the analysis because it's clearly embedded in at least two and perhaps three of the option sets, options one and I think to a lesser degree options two and three will all address that question of whether it's in the study or not. I was nervous because I kept thinking you would get to the end and there'd be a question mark and I would have not paid close attention to the front end of the sentence there but I think I hope that responds to your question. You won't find it to your satisfaction in this version of the report. You will find it teed up I think to the extent that we'll take that on. Let me go with the person in the back and then I know I've got at least one more over here before I go back for round two with anybody. I'll try to get the round ones first. Hi, I'm Marcia Smith with spacepolicyonline.com. I'm just curious about why you decided to limit your study to medium and large payloads to jail instead of looking at the whole launch market as the table in your report shows there does seem to be a fairly healthy forecast for NGSO launches in the future and I'm sure you're more interested in the future than in today. So why did you do that? The reason we did is because our initial assessment was that that's where the stress and the interface between both demand and supply and on potential government involvement came into play. I think we'll have to look, as we do our continuing evaluation, at the sensitivity of that restriction to whether it changes the outcomes if we would expand that restriction to the smaller or for non-geostationary orbit though, I think the fundamental requirements just don't meet. Our basic thrust is starting with the national security implications of that and that's where the prime emphasis is from a national security perspective in terms of both the domestic capability that national security relies upon and the commercial global capability that national security relies upon. Those were our two fundamentals. Do you have additional? I think I have an unanswered person over here. Please raise your hand if you all think you're in line and I haven't called on you yet. There's one there, there's one there, and one there. Okay, good. Speaking of Congress, I'm Dan Ells from the Congressional Research Service and the question I would have, I'm basically a quantoid at heart methodologist and looking through here, I noticed that as far as hinging the arguments on ITAR impact of export controls, et cetera, et cetera, it seems to be a little thin on the actual data that would back that up and I'm currently undergoing or going through a literature review to try to ascertain if there are any studies out there that actually use hard data on the impact of export controls on the defense industry in general and space in particular and I'm wondering to what extent have you found some actual hard data on not only the dogs that bark, let's say export licenses that are denied, but also the dogs that don't bark. Industry has stated anecdotally many times and in many studies that export controls are adversely impacting our ability or willingness to try to export. Well, there is no data to back that up unless you can provide it. What export licenses do you not ask for because of the current structure of the system, et cetera? So to what extent will your study pry open that particular box? Dan, you have raised probably the key most unsatisfying element of this whole thing. Our 2008 study started on the premise based upon the survey data that that study was done on and was government survey data mandated and collected by the Commerce Department, analyzed by the Air Force in collaboration with us on that study. And the smoking gun is very hard to find. I think the way the co-leaders of that study described it is we can't find the smoking gun although the smell of gunpowder is in the air. But the reality is that you can find anecdotes but you can't array the data in a way that CRS would certainly find satisfactory. And my sense is that we're still not at the point where we can prove the case. I'd be happy to be proven wrong here. My concern though from a policy perspective is by the time we get to that point it's too late and it becomes an irreversible dynamic. What we've got is a lot of I guess I'm not a lawyer but circumstantial data the decline in technology share, revenue share, share of patents, the fundamental premise unprovable in a direct way that new technology developments will come elsewhere. But I will cite for you a parallel that did actually have data. I had the privilege a couple years back of chairing the National Academy of Sciences study looking at printed circuit boards and defense reliance on printed circuit board and in many cases these are neither printed nor boards but they do still have circuits. And there the global market has clearly gone in both of the directions that I described earlier away from U.S. dependent to global market U.S. has maybe 3% of the global market share now used to have 50 for many years and at one point had 100. And the increasing or the diminishing role that defense plays in that process DOD is probably 30% of the U.S. market and 1% of the global market. Actually I probably have those numbers too high. And all of the new technology developments are for the consumer commercial market which doesn't really care about 100.0% reliability your cell phone fails, throw it away and go buy another one. In fact they're kind of happy if it fails just not too quickly. And very little it has to operate in areas of high physical demand. There are commercial industries that do replicate both the demand for 100.0% reliability and successful operation in very extreme environments. And some of those operations have clearly demonstrated the ability to have Indian supply chain control over the critical elements of technology that go into even the critical sub-components of their printed circuit boards. And DOD has not learned the lessons from those other technology. One example for instance is the medical devices industry which has a fundamental need to have that reliability. They as luck would have it have a cost structure that allows them to recover the cost because we'll pay anything it takes to keep us alive. And they also have a tort structure which will make them pay anyway if they don't. And it's hard to replicate those for DOD. But there it's clear and the evidence would satisfy even a quantoid that the market's gone a different way. We are buying parts, DOD is, with part numbers and we have no idea where they came from, what's in them or what they'll do. They just have a national stock number stamped on them and we're using them and they're going into critical systems. We don't do that with space. We're a little better than that with space. Actually now that I think about it this may be in some of our satellites but we won't go there today. That's as close to a smoking gun as I can come but it doesn't prove the case on export controls. In fact it almost proves the case other than that because these are commercial consumer kinds of items that have essentially stayed outside the bounds. If I'm not careful I'm afraid I'll create an opportunity for Congress to set up a new wall here and then we won't be able to do anything in that regard for it. We do actually have indigenous, domestic fabrication plants that serve the DOD market at remarkable inefficiency, enormous cost, dramatically reduced performance and in many cases not even as good a reliability. That's not the answer. That never will be the answer here. I'd like to have the same case be made for the launch business but it's way more complicated just the components of printed circuit boards and way harder to get and improve the data. That's the best answer I can give you on that point. I think I had three more in line here, one here in the front, second row. Jeff founds Future on Corporation. Did you look at the role that NASA can play in stimulating commercial launch demand both with the ongoing commercial cargo programs for ISS and the proposal in the FY11 budget for commercial crew and how that might further stimulate commercial launch demand. NASA gave us quite a bit of excitement early on in the process here. We did not anticipate the President's budget decision and had not incorporated that into our approach at all and clearly both at the intersection particularly the industrial base level of where the man space flight changes in NASA's strategy whatever that ends up being or whatever ends up funded in the final budget and its impact on supplier base clearly has an impact. I think from a market driver point of view there's an impact, I don't think we can quantify that. I actually can't tell you what I think Congress is going to do and you might can tell me what you think Congress is going to do but we're going to have to see how that plays out. They haven't even given the appropriation subcommittees their allocations yet and so I have no idea what running room they have for the NASA budget inside the FY 11 appropriation. I think we're going to continue to watch that and see how it plays out. I think at the technology level there's clearly an interplay but now I'm back to Dick Van Addis question which I failed to answer at the beginning which is who's in charge of this and I don't know the answer to that question and I suspect we'll probably try to tackle that in our recommendations but perhaps not with a single point recommendation but a set of criteria that whatever decision has to be made would have to comply with. Just a two second follow-up. We started the study like David said before the NASA decision but I think that NASA decision kind of highlights one of the points one of our key starting points which is that the four sectors aren't extricably linked and making a decision in one sector without thinking through the implications and ramifications for the others is not good policy and I think Secretary Gates was the one identifying from a congress when asked if he had been consulted and I think his response was not adequately was on his on the record response. That was on the record and our discussions subsequent to that have not shed any new light on the coordination process for that decision. More specifically we haven't found any evidence that Secretary Gates was wrong when he stated on the record not adequately. I think we had one over here and one in the middle. Let's try the one on the edge first or Jesse easier for you to get to and then come around the other way. J.R. Dreyer consultant I'd just like to start off with a comment on the CRS question that the Academy's produced a book called Beyond Freedom not too long ago on ITAR. If you take a look in the back and see those tables some of that data is going to be my point of interest but what I'd suggest the directors may who works over there and she can provide you with some additional details. I've worked this in the past a large problem has been proprietary information that you sign an agreement you can see it but you can't quote it somewhere. My second part of this is I've been had the opportunity to comment on many of those studies that you started out at the beginning and what I find both there and here is the lack of answering the question where do we want to be what is that balance between military space civil space and commercial space and that's going to change 5 years 10 years, 15, 20 years out and I'm just wondering why you haven't looked at it from that standpoint. Why we haven't looked at it from the perspective of where do we want to be I think I would characterize that I've got this policy that says assured access to space but it doesn't quite answer the question for what and for what I actually think my personal opinion here and I really think this is beyond the scope of this study but my personal opinion is we've got a huge vacuum in terms of what our real space objectives are and parts of that vacuum are by default and parts are by decision and I would personally and a broader effort that would tackle that question that said we obviously have to assume something and I think it's incumbent on us and as you've noted often been lacking to clarify what those assumptions are as we've met with a number of the folks who've done some of these studies over the last 3, 4, 5, 10, 12 years particularly those that have had phrases in them about the importance of commercial space in whatever area they're looking at and then when we've asked them what exactly did you do on the commercial space because the most common answer we got was well we didn't really have time to get to that so we just kind of put it in there and I would like to think that we're not going to have that same excuse when we get to the end here but I take your comment very carefully and thoughtfully in that regard we got time for one last question and it's not going to be because I am mindful of the clock but I'll be happy to stay around and take some additional questions from folks as we wrap up. Well first let me say I applaud the process that you're going through seeking input and I think that a consequence of that is going to be that you are suddenly going from a very challenging data pull process to perhaps overwhelming data push process that will be coming toward you there are many people in this room who will have comments to make about the complex data sets that you have used I'll be coming to talk to you about launch prices which I believe have gone down over the last 10 years and we'll provide some our view of that and you'll assess that my question to you is do you have the flexibility if you need it to take the time to revisit your conclusion so you laid out a schedule I've done quite a few studies that's a demanding schedule to get comments by the end of May and then put out your results by June and I just would like to hear your thinking about how you're going to manage if you get a C change in your thinking or a fundamental change in the data that shifts the way you view things and requires additional analysis. That's a great question and I actually wake up to that question more than once a week we're going to stick to our timetable in terms of completing this version of our final report because we think we owe it to the ongoing process inside Washington to do that but we from the beginning have not seen this as an endpoint at which we then put our feet up and say okay that's done now what we're both hopeful and anticipating and I think planning for continued effort on beyond that and whether or not it is a further elaboration of the broader topic here a movement into some either sub elements or related assessment pieces that come into play because obviously this is much more than just access to launch there's a lot more issues on the table here remains to be seen and I think we'll have to prioritize depending on partly where the opportunity to influence the public policy decisions lie there because that's our real motivator and that's what our charter says that's what we're here for is to add value and contributions to that public policy debate and to provide the analytical underpinnings to assist there I think it's also true and very worth noting because if we're asking you to put some energy into giving us input we have to assure you that we're very comfortable being smarter tomorrow than we are today and to be wedded to any place where we are right now if in fact the facts and our analysis don't support it so with that I want to sort of terminate the official portion of this because we have reached the end of our time I want to thank you both for your participation and interest this morning thank you in anticipation of your continued involvement and input and if we get overwhelmed then we'll deal with it as best we can and try to sort out my line between the spurious and the serious will be determined by the volume as well as the importance the content but we'll do the best we can with all that comes out and I think your presence here indicates that we're not wasting our time by doing that and we're very grateful for that thank you all very very much