 Good day. I'm Colonel Jerry Morlock, the Director of the Combat Studies Institute. You're about to use a video series which our instructors have prepared for the sole purpose of approving your presentation of M610, the Evolution of Modern Warfare. We've taken care to make the course that you teach as similar to the one taught at Fort Leavenworth as possible and choose to add these tapes to your libraries in order to give you every advantage as you prepare to teach this new course. These tapes are similar to the weekly train-up sessions which we utilize to prepare our instructors here at Fort Leavenworth. My intent for the tape sessions was to provide you insights and tips on ways to approach the lessons of M610 that were not available in the instructor notes. I've drawn various instructors, military and civilian into the sessions based upon their specific expertise and historical background. They were asked to just talk to the lesson structure and content, giving you some additional information on the historical context and differing views on how to approach the lessons. These tapes will provide you a wealth of knowledge and direction that will significantly improve your readiness to teach our new history course. One word of caution regarding how to use these training tapes. They are not designed to be substituted for your instruction during the individual lessons of the course. As instructor preparation tapes train the training material, if you will, they are inappropriate for direct instruction to students and are not intended for that purpose. Our intent with these tapes is to improve your ability to lead the students' seminars by sharing tips and advice from some highly qualified experts. The Combat Studies Institute stands ready to provide whatever additional expertise or assistance that you may require and we've included the institute's phone, mail and email contact information on the tape if you should need it. Good luck with the evolution of the modern warfare course. Have a good time. Hi, my name is Mike Perlman. I teach at CSI Combat Studies Institute. I'm the F College at Fort Leavenworth. Jeff Shadburn, Jerry Brown, and I are going to discuss some of the issues here to lesson 11, the Pacific War. Hopefully you'll get some ideas that you can run with and probably do a better job than any of us ever do when we try to teach this course here, which really wouldn't be a high standard at all. Anyway, I'm going to throw out some questions here to my alleged subject matter experts. We've got here, for instance, you've got these three learning objectives. Analyze the major events in the Pacific War from 1943 to 1945. Let me number one say, I think this is a misprint. The Pacific War for the United States, of course, goes from 1941 from Pearl Harbor to 45 and we're going to focus here on the war as a whole, just not the latter period, which is the period in which the United States goes on the strategic and operational offense. Anyway, on Pearl Harbor Day, or actually before Pearl Harbor Day, the United States Armed Forces has been in staff talks with the British, so at least we have a strategy to be executed after Pearl Harbor Day. It's obviously a contingent strategy. It's to be executed if the United States becomes a belligerent. And essentially, well, subject matter experts, what is the strategy for the Pacific feeder in what is a global war? The first thing is to make sure you focus on the primary threat to the United States, which is what? Which is what? Which means against the Japanese Empire, you're going to have to have a strategic defensive action to ensure that you don't siphon off strength that you're going to use against Germany. Now, what is the war? Well, what's considered the worry in December 1941 if the United States goes on a two-ocean or two-continent offensive war in both directions at the same time? Worst case it, what's the response? I'm not sure what you're getting after that, but worst case scenario is Britain's been knocked out of the war and it's the United States alone. Only Britain? Well, where have we got another attack? France would have been knocked out in the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union has not done very well in the first six months of their war. In fact, when he's talking about the Soviet Union, they have entered the war at all. So it's an undivided Germany that's conquered Great Britain, France. Well, this is December 1941. The Soviets are on the doors of Moscow. They're on the doors of Leningrad. They've captured Kiev. They're moving in towards, well, not yet towards Stalingrad. They are hanging on by their fingernails. The worry is that if the United States does not reinforce Europe quickly, if it beats Japan, it will then have to turn around and beat Germany with who is allies. The United States is allies? Yeah, well, who will be? Do you want to take on the Germans one-on-one? Absolutely. The United States is the worst case? Absolutely, no allies. So your perfectly sensible solution is what? Is hang on in the continental United States while you build up your combat power to project it into Europe. And what does this mean for operations in the Pacific if for unforeseen circumstances we go to war with Japan? Wouldn't it be, by the way, better if we say did something which would deter Japan? I've got a brilliant idea. I mean, I'm so smart I can't stand myself just like you can't stand myself. Let's move the fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor on the grounds that this will deter the Japanese from moving at all. And therefore we won't have a war because we'll put them in a box. I mean, tell you, isn't that great? In fact, as long as we do that, why don't we put some long-range bombers into the Philippines that can reach all the way to Japan? Oh, you mean those B-17s? They can't reach Japan. That's true. They can reach into China. Well, they can reach Formosa, but all this will do. Oh, you guys. You guys are smart as I am, which says something to you. In other words, we won't have to use this stuff. We'll just make sure that they'll be so intimidated that they won't be a threat to America or British vital interests in the Philippines, Singapore, or what's then called the Dutch New Netherlands, which will become Indonesia after the war. Okay, we've agreed and they won't move? No, absolutely not. Japanese won't. They'll be intimidated and they won't do anything. Okay, so then we only really have to worry about this war in Europe. That's a great idea. How do you justify that in light of the fact that for the previous 30 years Plan Orange had been our primary strategic focus? What's this Plan Orange? I haven't heard of anything yet. Well, would you explain what this Plan Orange is? Plan Orange was one of the color plans that had been initiated back under the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Not Franklin. No, I said Theodore. Okay. As a contingent for the defense of our interest in the Far East. Which is particularly... Particularly the Philippines. Yes, so it's a hostage rescue plan if the Japanese take the Philippines. And this plan had been worked on for more than 30 years. It had been revised and war-gamed and studied. And everybody considered this to be the most likely scenario until the late 1930s. Well, likely scenario. Or a war in which the United States might become involved. Well, actually the most likely war we're going to have by most Americans is against Mexico. But if we go to war in the Pacific and the Philippines seem to be some sort of hostage it is virtually adjacent to Japanese home waters. They can take it. We have to have a plan to take it back. But by the way, if we put these B-17s in the Philippines in Luzon, Clark Air Force Base, and we move the fleet into Pearl Harbor, I guarantee you the Japanese will be too intimidated. So we don't have to rescue the Philippines. They'll simply quake in their boots. Of course, if I'm wrong, we got some B-17s that will be shot, will to be destroyed, not even getting off the ground. And we're going to have some battleships like the Arizona. Lots of good men are going to be dead. The next thing to look at to make that work is you have to be able to protect what you extend out there to intimidate the Japanese. And what, MacArthur, he predicts that he'll be ready to defend Luzon effectively against the Japanese by the summer of 1942. But before then, the Filipino Army won't be ready. So does this mean the Japanese look upon, obviously, a deterrent to us may look like a threat to them. And they have a window of opportunity to close this threat because if they wait, the Philippines will be stronger to defend. The other thing is that in 1940 America passes its first great naval building budget, the third Carl Vinson bill since, I don't know, since the days of Peter Roosevelt. This fleet will come in with, 12 new aircraft carriers, not these Jeep carriers, you know, the Big Angel Addis. I think it's 17 new battleships in 1943, meaning if Japan is going to move, they've got two to three years to move. And what looks like a deterrent, which is to stop them from moving, becomes a target to be hit. And in December 1941 through first years of the war, say through March or April 1942, what does Japan specifically or just in big pictures do? They try and extend the control of the Pacific as far as they can get it to create a large buffer so that as they go into war with the United States, if they can create that buffer, they can make it more difficult for the United States to reach all the way to Japan, and then they can take more control of the situation. They have time to do that. The Japanese Empire, as of December 1941, it is foremost they have camera, they've just established control of camera and bay, projecting out into the, and I was confused east and west in this world, east into the Pacific, the Japanese Empire is how extensive in December 1941? Well, it's not very far at that point because there are several obstacles that sort of thwart their locks, one of which is the Philippines. And so before they can extend their area of influence in the area in which they can exploit the resources of the Pacific, they have to take out the Philippines. But the Philippines is not sky blue. It is an obstacle on the way for what is, so we're talking about a five or six month, four or five month period in which in terms of the physical distance, the Japanese have the greatest conquest. Between December and April, in the history of mankind, five month period they are extending all the way to places nobody and the very few people have ever heard of in the west. Some god-awful place, Guadalcanal, or to the eastern tip of New Guinea, a place called Buna, in which does what to the U.S. strategy, which going into Pearl Harbor is to hold defensive perimeter from Alaska to Hawaii to the Panama Canal, beat Germany. And if Japan remains, which I say stubborn and doesn't listen to reason, after Germany is beaten then the U.S. goes on the offensive. The only problem with the strategy, like most problems with strategy is the opponent doesn't read the script. He doesn't know that he is supposed to in effect be satisfied on the other side, on his side of the wire, defensive perimeter and Japan is now threatening to close off America's contacts with specifically? With Australia. As Australia is going to be for the United States, something like Britain will be for the European theater, it is the major base from which America will project its combat power. And then the strategy, which means that now the United States by 1942 will be making commitments I guess it's mid-1942, commitments which it never foresaw in the original concept of strategy in the Pacific. And conversely, the Japanese have expanded far beyond their initial expectations. Because I guess they were putting the pedal of the metal and say, I'll go as far as my logistics tail can take me and there's not much physical. The resistance out there is natural. It is nature. It is the water. It is your own ability to simply get there. And they're extending far beyond their initial concept because as you said, Jeff, what? They have this idea that as further and further we extend, the more and more difficult it will be for the U.S. to push us back to our inner core empire, which we must maintain under all circumstances. In other words, I get in strategic depth and that's always a good idea. Well, not really. I think the Japanese will find that out. One of the problems they have in trying to establish that buffer is, and it's the other side of that, the second learning objective we have, even though we're going to look at the U.S. as far as the body command before the Japanese, the Pacific is a navy theater at which once the navy seizes the outer perimeter for the empire, it's going to be defended by the army. But the army's main effort is in China. And while they're prepared to... They will always be in China. While they're prepared to defend what's agreed upon in the Pacific, when the navy extends control past those agreed areas, it will cause the army forces not to be increased in the area, less strong and further out and won't be preparing defenses where they had originally agreed on on the outer perimeter. Because they will be in areas in which they are new to that area. New Guinea, the Solomon's. They don't have time to prepare and certainly the combat environment is horrendous for everybody. They spend so much time pushing out that they continue to push until there's anything about it. And so they have less time to prepare whereas if they would have had a less strategic depth they would have had more time to prepare what they had seized instead of less time to defend even more. Well, in this case it is horrendous as these two America ground forces first two battles. Battle canal for the Marine Corps with an army division. Buna Carther. And most of the casualties Americans are one of disease exacerbated by malnutrition. As bad as it is for us it's even worse for the Japanese. Because they are extended really beyond their reach. The Navy can relatively isolate this area. The Japanese were well fed and sustained I think they'd be holding Buna today. Most of their casualties are malaria and disease. We have a hell of a time getting combat power there. And it is relatively weak but they are a shell when we get into contact with them. Somebody says it reminds historians like Burma in the rainy season you in effect have got these two I don't know a lion and a tiger but they're chained down. And they only get the extent of a little paw out there because their problem is even getting out there at all. We have a company down a trail that's all you can come in you may have a whole division attacking you but only a company can come in contact at a time. Which is MacArthur's problem at Buna. The thing that the Japanese are such are so badly are so strapped of basic food and medicine that they are almost withering on the vine out there to begin with. Alright so we've got this in 41-42 and beginning in mid 42 the United States does make greater commitments that it had ever conceived but originally now commitment is justified as protecting the lines of communication to Australia. In other words I'm still considering this within the strategic defensive that I will have in the Pacific until we be Germany. But like many things in war you get a ladder up. Now you have beaten the Japanese at Buna. You have beaten the Japanese at Guadalcanal and then at Bougainville which is also in this area here of lines of communication to Australia. Now the question is what do we do next? Well you got two choices. One is once you solidified and held that line of communication wasn't that my purpose? Yes I says your one choice is at that point in time fall back on the defensive and shift your resources back to Europe. Your other choice is to change your mind and say look right now we've got them backpedaling we've got to keep pushing because if we don't they consolidate they dig in they fortify a tough nut to crack when you go after them in 1945 or 46 or 47 But there's also another condition that makes that possible and that is that mobilization is being more successful than anticipated more equipment is coming off the production line than you had anticipated. So now you have more resources to do more with. Now there's another issue on this because this is a theater of a global war and that is the United States is still not putting ground forces you have any great strength into Europe because we still have a Mediterranean strategy and how many divisions can you put into Sicily meaning that now because in effect the cross channel invasion is now being put on hold while America and the British are debating this whole strategy and this issue and the other thing is that the Russians have survived 41 they have survived at Stalingrad for the winter of 42-43 they are holding their own it would mean with all these issues I think we're going to change the nature of this European first strategy. So you're saying Germany all of a sudden becomes less of a threat? No, not less of a threat I think Germany remains a great threat but less than they were before we're not talking about Germany beating the Russians after Stalingrad we may be talking about the Russians exhausting and the Germans and the Russians which is a big fear in the United States about coming to some sort of understanding going back to the borders of 1939 or 41 it's a possibility but we're not considering as we did in December 41 are the Russians about to be closed off within a 3-4 month period? Germany may remain still the major threat but it looks like the Russians can hold their end of the bargain we have yet to find to get into northwest Europe a lodgement area in which we can commit these masses of forces and here is all these issues to say we're going to change the nature of Europe first or Germany first and it changes with the US where it once was hold in the Pacific win in Europe and then go on the offensive in the Pacific there will probably be a two year some people say three year difference between VE Day and VJ Day the idea is to go on a two ocean war and the difference in Europe first is we'll just have a surrender of Germany first and our people particularly Marshall is very good at this one we're going to be in trouble politically at home once we defeat Germany there will be a lot of people and it's Miller time as they do is that we better have a close window we better make this a bang bang finish you know three to six months maximum or else what's going to happen is remember we've got some disadvantages or advantages is that certainly the Russians and the Germans don't have they don't put war strategy grand strategy up to a political vote in fact neither do the British they will not hold elections during the war I say we're going to depoliticize this the United States is the only country in the world that has elections in the midst of the war if the public say hey you guys are screwing up we can if we can't we can find a new commander in chief anyway so in 43 we change the nature of this European first strategy and we say go on the offensive in the pacific but that doesn't tell me much go on the offensive with who as think pacific and in what avenue of approach towards the far east we have got the navy out of pearl harbor owning the central pacific we have Douglas McArthur commander southwest pacific area out of his base in Australia into new guinea trying to go towards excuse me the Philippines I guess the navy is on its way it hopes towards Formosa and well any good arguments for making Douglas McArthur sink pacific theater which would make southwest pacific area the main avenue of approach and having an effect the navy being the transport service for the army and of course protecting the army transportation from raids by aircraft carriers essentially as you already stated earlier the pacific is essentially a navy theater so that's to be said against it's a large body of water you're not going to do anything out there without the navy navy will not only transport you to and from where you're going it will protect your vessels as they go to and from it will also ultimately at some point in the future be responsible for carrying the war to the enemy well here well obviously this world I mean it isn't my fault that this world is two thirds water I mean it was at least me it used to be decapitated coffee but the question is is that the function of the navy to do what essentially the navy does for the european theater which is to get the army ashore and get it supplied now the navy loses the battle of the Atlantic we cannot get an army ashore but look we got a a europe he's not a european theater it's not europe wide a sheaf commander who's an army guy Eisenhower under the understanding that the army will be the lead service for beating Germany but you have to deal with Douglas McArthur who do I have to who is yes you can't avoid dealing with Douglas McArthur you can't talk about this war and not talk about Douglas McArthur by great he ranks the chief of staff he doesn't out yet but he doesn't by great outrank the president of the united states no but the thing is in 1940 Douglas McArthur is perhaps the only soldier whose name is known in every household in America at that time people like Dwight Eisenhower are still obscure colonels lieutenant colonels and people like George Marshall are still not totally known quantities but Douglas McArthur is a force I understand okay and you have to deal with this guy he has a name recognition he is a genuine American hero he has been a general officer now for 22 years longer than any of his soldiers will be alive well here so far what you have given me and I'm president of the united states is political advice about that this guy can raise a crowd against me he may be even a challenger if he resigns what Harry Truman used to say when military guys gave him political advice saying that's my business it's not yours and Harry Truman at this time was an obscure senator from Missouri thank you I'll make the point again which is thank you is that I don't want political advice from amateurs I'll go to politicians for political advice I'm asking you to give me a good military reason why I should not make the central pacific the main avenue of approach what is to be said for swapper well once again if you would let me do I have to proceed you can't you can't separate these issues from issues of personality and from issues of history in other words you want to give me these political reasons but you can't separate them I certainly can't separate the military from the political there's every reason to argue that the central pacific is the shortest route to Tokyo there's every reason to argue that that plan orange which had been worked on by the navy for three decades in fact came up with the best possible solution to defeat a Japanese threat in the pacific well what would be wish we had maps here what would be the downside of using this extraordinary fleet particularly these fast aircraft carriers as fire support for Douglas MacArthur's hopping up the spine of New Guinea back to the Philippines which I guess we could argue as a pace particularly when we could then reconstitute it as a submarine base to cut off Japanese supplies the southwest pacific area which is particularly its energy and petroleum supplies you don't need the Philippines as a submarine base Pearl Harbor works very fine all the more reason now then to argue that General MacArthur should be made some backwater commander except for the fact that he's got name recognition there's another reason and once again you perhaps disagree with it because it is a political moral obligation and that is when MacArthur goes on the national media in March of 1942 with his famous I Shall Return speech this is a commitment which the United States was going to find it very difficult to turn its blind eye to first of all we have a moral political commitment to the Philippines yes but you know how you can get the Philippines you force the Japanese to surrender in Tokyo and guess what they don't keep the Philippines I don't disagree with that what I'm saying is that it's not clear in perhaps March and April of 1942 when these deals are being worked out what's going to happen by 1944 when we have clearly taken the initiative when our sub campaign is being very effectively unleashed against the Japanese trade in the western Pacific when we have landed now in the Philippines when we also landed on numerous other islands in the Pacific and we have begun to figure out how to fight our way back across the Pacific nobody can predict in the early months of 1942 how successful the fast carrier task force is going to be that is all yet in the future there are people who make claims who prophesy who foresee but nobody can tell you yet how successful that is going to be and there are those Americans who have that great sentimental feeling for the Filipinos who have been painted in American propaganda as suffering grievously under the occupation of the Japanese if they do resist collaborators don't suffer for people who resist too and I'm not saying they don't I'm just saying there's a tremendous propaganda effort so far so far I haven't seen a single military well the thing that will not pass such things has given me lots of political reasons why presidents are get to office by being political people high level strategic decisions are often made for political reasons but political means a lot of different things you're talking essentially domestic political as opposed to international political it is a domestic political issue thank you when I run for county commissioner I know who to make my campaign chairman Jeff something is going to happen in November of 1942 there's going to be a congressional election which will perhaps be a mandate on the conduct of the war up to that point and 1942 has not been a happy year for the United States fortunes around the world no question about it is one of the things that reason why when Franklin Roosevelt gets into Guadalcanal which is the longest battle in American history you call it a battle it's a campaign less for approximately six months from August of 1942 to January is that he who is held doesn't want a loss to stare him in this face but now that we have got Guadalcanal the question and we made the decision for I think justifiable military reasons that the world has changed since December that we can go on a two ocean offense or a two continent offense at the same time the question becomes for the Pacific what should be the avenue of approach now MacArthur obviously wants to make it his area of operations minutes wants to make it his area of operations what would be the downside since you apparently don't think there is much I'm going to say before you get to the downside you ask for the military reasons why you should focus on MacArthur going up the Philippines the first one is to interdict the Japanese line of communication into the southern resources area if you focus on the central pacific first trying to get to the main islands in Japan you are not going to be able to invade the main islands in Japan until you can weaken their military machine that is essentially done through the submarine campaign not by taking the Philippines again that's not predicted that can be attractive there is another thing they would be more effective if we could liberate the Philippines even I can understand that when you were projecting all the way from Pearl Harbor your turnaround time and your petroleum expenditure just to get in this area obviously would like a base now it so happens that the submarines are effective prior to the liberation of Lausanne which I guess isn't really until December of 1944 but that's not predicted ok largely if you could retake the Philippines early early 1943 or mid 1943 and effectively interdict those locks from the Dutch East Indies then that would be a strong military argument for the Swapas the problem is however that in the early months of 1943 you're still mopping up in New Guinea you're a long way from being ready to go to the Philippines yet and you have other places that still have to be dealt with it's kind of interesting because when you look at the decisions that are being made they're based on time tables that are years out not in a matter of months they're trying to say we think in six months this is going to be the situation and they make decisions based on that prediction it's kind of interesting to watch that go on a second military reason if you're able to retake the Philippines you remove any threats to Australia that still exist from the Japanese that's not a major reason because from the Philippines they can only reach I think with air power into the northwestern part of Australia and there's nothing there which is probably overblown so you can still argue that that may be primarily a political reason as opposed to a military reason and then you also have the possibility of being able to bring in Filipinos but I don't think that's a major reason either a third and probably more important in a decision that could have been important in a decision to focus on the Philippines is to open up a line of communication into China that doesn't go to Taiwan that allows you to base aircraft in China so you can bomb Japan directly from China all the more reason now for going to Formosa which means to Formosa so you go through the Philippines to reach Formosa or else a direct move from the Central Pacific to Formosa now the problem there and that kind of gives a problem you can do that from the Central Pacific but then the flank of the Central Pacific approach is threatened from the Philippines so if you go through the Central Pacific to Formosa you need to again seize the Philippines to protect that left flank the Japanese strength in the Philippines ultimately is not its naval and sea power but approximately 300,000 men they will eventually move into the Philippines as we see in such battles as the Leyte Gulf Japanese naval power of course that's late in 44 it's land air power and then you're trying to predict well out but that doesn't mean that you can't have the main efforts still be in the Central Pacific controlled by Nimitz with MacArthur and the Philippines being a supporting effort ok since both of you guys failed this question and these poor people here listening saying you mean these guys can't even agree on what day it is and I'm going to have listen these guys for help I will summarize and then hopefully get on to another issue those good arguments for both sides if we had a map here you could see that particularly these aircraft carriers and particularly the way they're built by the American Navy they are built to have maximum amount of planes natural amount of of munitions which means as I've said before in a prior one they're made with teakwood decks rather than they are today with steel decks this is an extraordinary amount of combat power in I guess an area as large as two football fields there's nothing equivalent to it in ground warfare but it is very vulnerable and in Swapa area it is literally running a gauntlet it would be far, far preferable to use the Central Pacific which is masses amount of water with little I'm looking for the words not even islands what do we call them little atolls here in which an aircraft carrier whether job is to hide or disguise its position if it can be in any point in the circumference obviously it's safer if you go against a place like New Guinea by its very width you're cutting it it can only be in half the circumference I'm immediately cutting off 180 degrees of searching for it so it is hell for aircraft carriers but on the other hand what MacArthur does have there's no room for maneuver in aircraft carriers or capital ships or cruisers however what does MacArthur have as a military argument for Swapa and that is where once infantry gets a shore at places like Tarawa where can it maneuver straight ahead it can't it's a postage stamp Swapa is maneuver space for infantry MacArthur and he becomes an expert can in effect land behind enemy lines there is no landing behind enemy lines on these postage stamps Quageline or Tarawa in the Central Pacific that area may be safe for the Navy but it's hell on the Navy's army the Marine Corps but you know there is a prima ballerina and in the Navy it is the aircraft carrier and it is infantry that sacrifice to the prima ballerina and in Swapa infantry and supreme this is an army base and the Navy will be exposed there are good arguments to be said for or bad arguments to be said for either avenue of approach and the final American solution when there are good arguments or bad arguments on either side is ok same arguments for A same arguments for B and my final decision will be A or B is what? A and B do them both don't have a commander in chief Pacific area what's to be said for that type of final decision well one everybody gets a piece of the action again we're back to politics military what's to be said for military justification it presents some significant problems for the Japanese because there is no main effort for them to put their main effort against for defense and with their inability to maneuver across Pacific once the US Navy takes control of it it causes them to put their efforts on both avenues where the United States in spite of their adversarial relationship Nimitz and MacArthur actually cooperate they're able to shift the main effort back and forth between the two axes so that they're able to bring overwhelming combat power to bear on either axis on an alternating basis and they're able to do that because the increasing resources available to those forces are increasing that freedom if you have a resource constrained situation then you have to make a decision which one of those two forces will get the resources but as resources expand and they expand very well in 43 and more so in 44 you have now the freedom of action to choose one or the other or both and the correct decision in retrospect was to to do exactly what they did have dual main axes so this turns out to be a correct military decision perhaps done for incorrect reasons in other words, Roosevelt doesn't want to have a revolt in the army or a revolt to the Navy he can't make up his mind so he does what any politician will do in this situation but he cannot make a clear decision he will give approximately the same thing to each of these two petitioning groups which may be a hell of a way to run a railroad but it turns out to be the correct decision it works it gets the cargo there because you have enough engines but you have enough engines the question is not just whether it works because I think SWAPA if would have eventually worked the Central Pacific worked my question is is this the correct decision the best decision that could have been made and maybe it was made because we should have had somebody in the White House who would make a decision but he didn't he let an effect the situation dictate to him and it turns out to be what was the best situation yes are you an opinion on this or is this the one topic of the world you don't have an opinion on I'm prepared to say that if you judge it exposed facto it's the right decision well that's what we do in our business we judge everything exposed fact it's interesting as you look at it we're talking about unity of effort between the commands as opposed to principality of command unity of effort operations by an effect separate institutions if there's one will not subordinate to another wait I have a protest against this position that this turns out to be the correct decision for military reasons in retrospect well you said the correct decision we'll sell this one away from the camera you got to win the war yet well we may never get to it what turns out to be the downside I believe that central pacific we've got these aircraft carriers that once they get sunk takes three years to build they cannot be replaced they have to be used in the central pacific the real look upon this strictly as a pacific theater issue this dual approach turns out to be not a correct decision you're wrong as you usually are it turns out to be the correct decision one problem is that this is not a pacific war this is a pacific theater in a world war macArthur has got I guess it's two armies right he's got under his the sixth and the eighth this could have been eisenhower's it would have given eisenhower another army group for europe in 1944 those poor guys from september to march september 1944 to march 1945 are on the line and day out because there is no reserve eisenhower's strategic reserve so that he could do the type of punch a hole and exploit that the russians do which have a great operational reserves are with douglas macArthur in new guinea and that's the downside of a good decision but there are no decisions that don't have downsides okay I'm trying to give a brief separate wrap up now so I can get you out from watching this tape and back to your real work this is on how the war in the united states against japan ends for those who want a fuller rendition of at least my thesis I I can't say I recommend but you may want to read unconditional surrender to mobilization the atomic bomb it's an essay I wrote it's published at CSI it's for free so at least you'll get your money's worth what's the situation in 1945 Japan has never conceived the possibility of the conquest and the occupation of the united states they have always wanted by the force of arms to impose their empire in the pacific to make the united states accepted as a fact of life like say the united states accepted the british empire as a fact of life and they plan to do this in 1945 by raising up the cost in blood and treasure of continuing this war now in 1941-42 Japan had extended their empire from its core northern asian empire which is Korea Manchuria and northern china into what we talked about earlier which is everything from french indochina all the way east to the salamence intropical or southern asia now they've all lost all that by 1945 but they haven't lost their core northern asia empire and in 1945 at luzon okinawa and iwo jima the united states suffers 50% of the total casualties in six months time that it will it will suffer in the total war three and a half years at this time there are lots of singles that japan's strategy is working in that war wariness setting in on the american public and it becomes particularly acute after the e-day victory in europe because the united states obviously wants to celebrate what's the indication of this war wariness well demobilization of the u.s. army 450,000 soldiers combat veterans george marshall calls them the wheels that make the army run are demobilized early congress is talking about demobilizing another million men and we have yet to face what is the worse problem maybe in this entire war which is the invasion of the home islands of japan japan plans they know exactly what beaches we're trying to we're planning to invade have virtually called the time our order of battle meet that force on the beach head get back and then negotiate negotiate assist a peace treaty in which they will retain control of obviously japan itself there will be no demilitarization no more criminals the japanese army will retain control the japanese government and their northern asian empire well what's the u.s. response to that we demand unconditional surrender at the same time we demand demobilization of our own army so there's an enormous gap between japanese demands u.s. demands and also a growing gap between u.s. demands and the price and blood and treasure that the u.s. will pay for it how do you close that gap well in war you do it with arm conflict but i think we've about had it in the blood that we are willing to spill of our own blood and the way how you close that gap in 1945 you guessed it is the atomic bomb this way america can have its warings and demilitarize and change the political structure of japan without paying the price on the beach heads the japan would have extracted from us okay gang hope you enjoyed it