 Welcome to George H. Smith's Excursions into Libertarian Thought, a production of Libertarianism.org and the Cato Institute, narrated by James Foster. I'm Rand and altruism, part two. In my last essay, I summarized some leading ideas of Auguste Comte, who coined the word altruism and defended the subordination of individuals to humanity, the great being, as the ultimate moral ideal. I also characterized Rand's conception of altruism as the negative image of Comte's. The contrast between Comte and Rand could not be more stark. According to Comte, for example, humanity is divisible primarily into states, then into families, never into individuals, and man's emotional nature should be paramount over his reason. Similar fundamental differences abound throughout the writings of Comte and Rand. As we see in Comte's assertion that wealth should be held in trust for the good of humanity and that industrial chiefs should be viewed as representatives of humanity whose ultimate purpose is to serve humanity as a whole rather than their own interests. Although I doubt if Rand ever read Comte in detail, some of her statements appear to be direct responses in effect to his claims. Consider this passage from Roark's courtroom speech in The Fountainhead. Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage's whole existence is public ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of setting men free from men. Comte, in contrast, demanded the constant subordination of private to public life. Indeed, an important function of Comte's priesthood of social scientists, supported by the state, of course, was to inquire into every aspect of the private lives of individuals and expose to public condemnation any manifestations of selfishness. Since the primary moral duty of every person is to serve the interests of the great being of humanity, every trace of selfishness must be rooted out. And this, according to Comte, demands that we rid ourselves of the individualistic notion that people should have a private sphere of action in which they may act without regard to the good of humanity. Privacy, in the final analysis, is a refuge for selfishness. Comte, like Rand, viewed altruism and egoism as polar opposites, and they agreed on a fundamental characteristic of altruism, namely that it demands self-sacrifice as a moral duty. Both thinkers therefore understood that altruism and benevolence are not the same thing. Comte, as noted in my last essay, astutely recognized that benevolent actions are compatible with egoism. Altruism is an unconditional duty that must be observed in all cases, regardless of whether or not we feel benevolent toward others in particular cases. Mere benevolence will not suffice, according to Comte, because benevolence permits us to choose when to help others and such choices will frequently depend on egoistic considerations. Altruism demands that we subordinate self-interest to the interest of others, regardless of how we feel about them and regardless of their personal value to us. No such personal considerations are permitted in Comte's theory of altruism. Rand pushed the point even further, arguing that benevolence is in fact incompatible with altruism. As she wrote in The Man-Haters, a column published in The Los Angeles Times in 1962, many people believe that altruism means kindness, benevolence, or respect for the rights of others. But it means the exact opposite. It teaches self-sacrifice as well as the sacrifice of others to any unspecified public need. It regards man as a sacrificial animal. Rand's views on benevolence and related matters such as charity have been persistently and egregiously misinterpreted by her critics, so we need to explore her position, which is fraught with political implications in more detail. Rand's arguments about the incompatibility of altruism and benevolence are rooted in her conception of egoism, so we cannot hope to understand the former unless we first understand the latter. This is a daunting task, one that I cannot cover in detail in this series. Rand's theory of egoism, like her theory of altruism, is complex and richly nuanced. As an example of what I mean, consider what Rand wrote in a letter, 5th of March 1961, to the philosopher John Hospers, after noting that egoism is the basic theme of the Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, Rand continued, The traditional concepts of an egoist are represented in the Fountainhead by Peter Keating and Ellsworth Tooie. Keating is the unthinking parasitical range of the moment second-hander, Tooie is the Machiavellian Schemer or Powerluster. The relation of these two types to Roark is made amply clear. The theme of the Fountainhead is to demonstrate in what fundamental sense and manner Roark is an egoist, while Keating and Tooie are actually selfless and why the traditional concepts of egoism are destroying the world. Even longtime fans of Ein Rand might be surprised to learn that she intended the characters of Keating and Tooie to be representative of the traditional concepts of egoism. Moreover, what are we to make of Rand's statement that it is owing to the traditional concepts of egoism that the world is being destroyed, given that she typically placed the blame on altruism? Facile critics of Rand, and they are legion, would probably answer my question by accusing Rand of inconsistency. Of course, these are the same critics who do not take Rand seriously as a philosopher and so refuse to take the time and effort needed to understand her theory of egoism and how her theory is inextricably intertwined with her condemnation of both altruism and the traditional concepts of egoism. A good deal of my series on Ein Rand and altruism will be devoted to this issue. Let's begin our exploration of Rand's theory of egoism with a bit of trivia. In the introduction to the 25th Anniversary Edition of the Fountainhead, 1968, Rand, after saying that she wished to leave the text untouched, called attention to one minor error. The error is semantic. The use of the word egotist in Roark's courtroom speech while actually the word should have been egoist. The error was caused by my reliance on a dictionary that gave such misleading definitions of these two words that egotist seemed closer to the meaning I intended. Webster's Daily Use Dictionary, 1933. Although the word egotist was left unchanged in later printings of the Fountainhead, changes had already been made seven years earlier in the reprint of Roark's speech in For the New Intellectual, 1961. There, on two occasions, egotist was silently altered to read egoist, and in another excerpt, The Nature of the Second-Hander, egotism was changed to egoism. The reason for Rand's later dissatisfaction with egotist should be apparent. Her early misuse of the term suggests that she had not yet mastered some nuances of the English language. When we call someone an egotist, we usually mean that he is conceited and boastful, that he has an exaggerated sense of his own importance. This does not describe Howard Roark and other protagonists in Rand's fiction. On the contrary, it is the precise opposite of the character traits that Rand wished to convey. In the introduction to The Virtue of Selfishness, Rand argued that altruism confuses two distinct questions, namely, what are values, and who should be the beneficiary of values? As Rand continued, altruism declares that any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any action taken for one's own benefit is evil. Thus, the beneficiary of an action is the only criterion of moral value. Rand rejected this beneficiary criterion of morality. The intended beneficiary of an action is not a criterion of moral value, nor is it a moral primary. Rand explained in a lengthy letter 29 April 1961 to John Hospers, the traditional view of egoism assumes that the standard of value by which one judges the worth of an action is not a principle, not a specific premise, not a defined concept of the good, not any objective consideration, but only the beneficiary of an action. It assumes that the beneficiary is an ethical primary and a standard of moral value. If an action, regardless of its nature, is intended to serve your own benefit, you are an egoist and traditionally evil. If an action, regardless of its nature, is intended to serve the benefit of others, you are an altruist and traditionally good. This leads to all the vicious contradictions that I discuss in Galt's speech. Rand condemned the traditional view of egoism as a groundless, unwarranted, unjustifiable package deal because it focuses solely on motivation while bypassing more fundamental issues such as the nature of values and why man needs a coda values in the first place. I certainly maintain that an egoist is a man who acts for his own self-interest and that man should act for his own self-interest. But the concept of self-interest identifies only one's motivation, not the nature of the values that one should choose. The issue, therefore, is what is the nature of man's self-interest? With us see why Rand viewed altruism and the traditional concept of egoism as two sides of the same coin. Both treat the intended beneficiary of an action as a standard of moral value, whereas it is nothing of the sort. In Rand's approach to egoism, the desire to further one's own interests does not make an action morally good, nor does a desire to help others make an action morally bad. These are secondary considerations that can be viewed in their proper light only after the truly fundamental problems of ethical theory have been addressed. Peter Keating was a traditional egoist in the sense that he sought to advance his career through any means necessary and Ellsworth Tui was a traditional egoist in the sense that he sought power over others. But neither, as we shall see, was an egoist in Rand's sense of the term. Thank you for listening to Excursions. To learn more about libertarian philosophy and history, visit www.libertarianism.org.