 Good luck at time, everyone. I'm Audrey Tang, Taiwan's Digital Minister. I'm really happy to be here virtually to share with you Taiwan's record of preventing deaths from COVID-19, which stands very close to Vision Zero. Yet we are closest to Wuhan, fault of the pandemic. As of April, 2022, Taiwan had recorded less than 900 deaths due to COVID since the beginning of 2020. Despite the fact that the annual bi-directional flow of visits between Taiwan and Wuhan typically has numbered in the tens of thousands annually before 2020. And our public health achievement has taken place chiefly with other kinds of governmental dictates, such as business and residential lockdowns that have aroused controversy and cause economic and psychological distress around the globe. To be sure, Taiwanese authorities measures have received various criticisms, as one would expect in a thriving democracy. However, on the whole, the public has strongly approved of our overall approach. In some cases like mask wearing has even request greater stringency. On 31st December, 2019, a young physician with the screen name NomorPipe posted a message on PTT a student-run social media bulletin board. NomorPipe's message reposted an allot she has seen on social media platform Weibo from Dr. Lee Wenliang, a researcher in Wuhan and a post-reads. Seven new SARS cases have been discovered in the Huan and Seafood market. Many PTT participants upvote to NomorPipe's post and Health Ministry official Dr. Luo Yijun checked PTT, noted Dr. Lee Wenliang's credibility and notified the Health Ministry's team of experts that have been organized after the 2003 SARS outbreak. And this team of experts exercising its authority instituted health inspections for all flight passengers coming in from Wuhan the very next day, the 1st of January, 2020. And that action marked the beginning of our expeditious response. Underlining this rapid response was institutional and legal reform sparked by lessons from SARS infections in 2003. And the SARS outbreak of 2003 resulted in over 180 deaths in Taiwan. It was reported that Taiwan had the highest mortality rate, 14%, of frontline healthcare workers in the world during 2003 SARS outbreak. Some local hospitals refused to emit patients suspected of infection. Poor coordination of national and local authority and lack of preparedness by health officials provoked widespread criticism. And many observers characterized this episode as the bitter SARS experiences. Indeed, that episode had often been called a dress rehearsal for Taiwan's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the institutional and regulatory failures of 2003, the executive and the legislative branches moved to repair the crack foundations of the institutional structures for epidemic control. An early initiative was the establishment of the National Health Command Sansa in 2004 with the Central Epidemic Command Sansa or the CECC as one of the components. You see, our communicable disease control act, the CDC act, is the primary legal basis for measures to combat epidemic. It was criticized after the SARS absolute, both for the vagueness and for the legitimation of very harsh measures, such a compulsory, indefinite quarantine without clear compensation for resulting damages and the lockdown of specific hospitals. So the legislature proceeded to enact various amendments to bring the CDC act in line with the strictures of interpretation 690 for our constitutional cause, according greater protections for individual liberties and for human rights. So now the CDC act contains, for example, the Article 8, which gives the Ministry of Health legal authority to declare the existence of an epidemic, in which case the health ministry can establish the CECC. Article 17 consolidates power to the executive branch, addressing the problem of confusion between central and local authorities during the 2003 SARS outbreak and streamlining decision-making authority. The executive branch implemented a series of important reforms, consonant with the amended CDC act, with a view toward better preparedness whenever the next epidemic might strike, creating what has been called a SARS playbook. The most significant of these reforms was the strengthening of the personnel structure of the CECC and the clarification of its authority. The CECC chaired by the health ministry but was participation by other relevant ministries, co-ordinated not just the health ministry's public health initiatives, but also caused the tune for other ministries' initiatives concerning immigration control, surveillance and risk communication to the public. So in Taiwan, responsiveness to pandemic disease and similar threats is embedded in our national institutions. President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen called a cabinet meeting for 20th January 2020 to coordinate government strategies for controlling the pandemic. Each ministry was assigned tasks that were to be accomplished with immediacy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was assigned a job, for example, of ensuring an adequate supply of personal protected equipment. At a time, mask supply fell far short of spiking public demand. By March, Taiwanese mask production was sufficient. So excess supplies were sent to many countries suffering shortages in a campaign we call Taiwan Can Help. Keenly conscious of the governmental failings during 2003 SARS episode, the CECC officials this time adopted a highly precautionary approach. Restrictions on travel took first priority. The CECC barred entry to travelers from Wuhan on 23rd January, suspended tours to the PRC on 25th January in advance of the high travel, lunar New Year festivities and bought all visitors from the PRC on February 6th. On March 19th, entry by all foreigners was suspended. Taiwanese returning from abroad was subjected to the 14-day compulsory currency. At a first during late January 2020, the CECC had not gone so far as to require mask wearing by the general population in the course of daily life indoor or outdoors, largely because initially insufficient masks were available to meet the public demand, requiring an initial rationing system allotting three masks per week to each resident and a government set low price. So in the first couple of weeks, the extent, the nature of such measures arouses some criticism regarding both restrictions on individual liberties and interference with residents daily lives. However, the measures have been proven as very effective in protecting public health and that effectiveness is self-solidified public approval. And then key elements of the government, immigration, police, health authorities especially, coordinated a set of measures to identify infected persons and their contacts to avoid contagion by confining those tested positive and those who might be affected. The first step was the amalgamation of Taiwan's separate information storage systems into a single integrated system in which all relevant authorities had contributed. Taiwan's national health insurance system covering more than 99% of our population provides an electronically readable card to every member containing the person's medical records and payment history. The national immigration agency maintains the electronic records on individual travel to and from other countries, permitting identification of possible infection vectors from abroad. And telecommunication companies data tracking specified customers mobile phone use were also integrated into the data base together with the camera based traffic surveillance data from the police. So the health ministry and the CCC could thereby access every patient's records for information about their health status and could locate those who were possibly infected. After the first confirmed COVID-19 case, a traveler from Wuhan was reported on 21st January, 2020. CCC introduced guidelines for testing or quarantining of individuals deemed at high risk. And these included people who had recently traveled or lived abroad. People who had contact with the symptomatic travelers from abroad or with other symptomatic or confirmed cases. And of course people with pneumonia. For those required to be quarantined, a 14-day home or hotel quarantine period is mandated. Starting in mid-March, 2020, the quarantine were enforced by the electronic fence system. Telecommunication provider received a list of mobile phone numbers of people required to undergo quarantine or isolation. They can determine within a 15 meter radius the location of each mobile phone. And a phone user left a location of their designated quarantine or isolation site or turn off the phones. Well, this is a modified police, civil and health authorities. Again, these measures arose controversy from both the standpoint of civil-liberty and practical interference with daily life. To head off such criticism and to provide a solid legal basis for the measure we have taken, the executive branch proposed and the legislature speedily enacted the COVID-19 Special Act. These statutory provisions gave the government extensive enforcement tools for pandemic control. But for the most part, the government chose not to employ them in draconian fashion. Rather, the primary strategy was persuasion and the construction and strengthening of a social consensus, advancing good public health practices. The key element in this strategy was risk communication, chiefly employing fact and humor rather than threat and fear. CCC held daily life coverage press conferences to provide accurate up-to-date information on COVID incidents and prevalence and uncontrolled policies followed by open Q&A sessions and employ social media for these purposes as well. Dr. Chen Shizhong, Health Minister, was our public face for the government's risk communication efforts, setting artifacts and dispelling misconceptions rather than threatening sanctions for disobedience of enforceable rules. Minister Chen was not the only public face of our risk communication tactics. Putting into practice what we call humor over a rumor, the CCC also had an actual spokesperson dog, a Shiba Inu named Zhang Chai. Whenever CCC rose out a measure such as physical distancing, the participation officer would walk back home, take a new photo of the dog and say, for example, when your indoors keep three Shiba Inus away, when your outdoor keep two dogs away. It's very creative and people share that all the time. Of course, during the pandemic, we're not immune from the worldwide plague of infodemic or misinformation about health. Part of the strategy has been to sometimes sanction certain individuals, social media posts under the Social Order Maintenance Act, a practice that has drawn criticism, alleging a chilling effect on free speech, even though we did not do any administrative takedowns. On the whole, however, the governmental approach to pandemic control has been to favor persuasion over compulsion, outmeaning the infodemic. The approach has succeeded remarkably well and I think a confluence of factors has aided our relative imperviousness to the ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, the first is geographic, insularity provides insulation. The second is our preparation of the legal and institutional infrastructure to cope with pandemics following our bitter experience with SARS in 2003. A third possible contributing factor is perhaps counterintuitive. That's Taiwan's exclusion from the WHO, the World Health Organization, due to opposition from the PRC regime as the People's Republic of China. Many Taiwanese have long distrusted official information from the PRC. One reason of that distrust is the lack of credibility of PRC-based information during the 2003 SARS episode. Thus, unlike many WHO member nations who tend to rely on WHO recommendations, we adopted this self-help approach. Other elements contributing to our success might be ascribed to the general heading of cultural factors. One is the traditional acceptance of mask wearing. A second factor, perhaps a bit speculative, might be a higher level of risk aversion in the health sphere in Taiwan compared to many Western nations. In reaction to occasional increase in infection incidents of low to moderate gravity, they'll be viewed as ordinary in Western nations accustomed to far larger infection incidence statistics. Alarm bells have been sounded in Taiwan, and CEC's recommendations have been tightened despite only a tiny increase in the mortality statistics. The public has generally responded to those alarm bells by acceptance of the increased restrictions. The prevalence of public fear of the risk of infection, even low to moderate ones, is borne out by the high demand for vaccinations. For example, the eagerness of getting boosters seen during January 2022. Another cultural factor has to do with values of mutual respect and family solidarity. Respect for expertise embodied in governmental recommendation for hygienic practices, announced by renowned medical leaders, has enormous influence. So what does this respond to the COVID-19 pandemic have to say about the nature of Taiwanese society? I'd like to conclude with the words of my former colleague in the cabinet, Professor Ye Jun Rong. There's a social solidarity in this nation. We have our disagreements. Our parliament is rambunctious, but we keep to the rules out of a sense of community. This is a disciplined democracy. Thank you for listening. Live long and prosper.