 So we're going to turn to our first panel, then we'll take a coffee break and come back and have a discussion up here on the panel and with the audience. And following that, we have Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Wendy Cutler speaking for lunch. Joining me on the panel are some veterans of this conference, well-known academics, advocacy advisors and diplomats in effect for their countries on Asia Pacific economic integration. First we'll hear from Dr. Zhang Zhengping, Director of the Department of International Economic Cooperation at the Institute for International Economic Research at the National Development and Reform Commission. Dr. Zhang is on call all across the Asia Pacific region to comment on APEC, RSAP and various international trade and financial agreements in the region. His degree is quite interesting, I'm going to have to find it because I want to know if he still does this. Landscape ecology, which is fascinating, and of course economics for his PhD. And then we'll hear from Professor Shujiro Urata from the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies at Waseda. Urata Sensei is also involved in multilateral and Japanese economic research. He's on the Japan Center for Economic Research at Nikkei Shimbun and a senior advisor to the Economic Research Institute for Asia area. And then finally from Singapore, Professor Hank Lim, Senior Research Fellow for the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, a professor at National University of Singapore and the Chair of the Academic Advisory Board for Area, this multilateral economic research group that's been established in Asia. So we'll hear from each of the speakers on their perspectives on developments in Asia Pacific economic integration, and then I'll call on my friend and colleague Matthew Goodman to give some comments, and then we'll take a break and come back and try to sort it all out with you in a discussion. So let me first ask Dr. Zhang to start us off. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Green. Actually, I hope today China's economy can like your surname's color, becomes greener and greener. That's our top mission. I will, firstly, I'd like to thank both CSIS, as well as JETRA, U.S. Army for this conference. So this is the second time for me to come here. It's my great pleasure and honor. Also here, I will introduce very briefly regarding the new stage of Asia Pacific economic integration. All of you know that this year, AIPAC annual conference will be happened in China in this autumn. So this year, also, I studied Asia Pacific economic issues. I will introduce three parts. The first one is a foundation of AFTAP becomes more solid. And the second point is AFTAP, that's one goal and one dream of all economies in the region. And the third one is three layers of Asia Pacific economic integration. That's my personal idea. Regarding the foundation of AFTAP, you know that this is a not new idea. A few years ago, Australia and other economies in the region already proposed AFTAP. The problem is that in the past, there was no TPP, you know, 12 members. At that time, there was a very small P4 and P8, something like that. At that time, we have no, you know, so a lot of important bilateral and trilateral free trade negotiations. Today, we are very happy to see that new finished bilateral negotiations that Japan, Australia, ROK, Australia, as well as Canada, ROK. Meanwhile, China, ROK, China, Australia, it seems that this year or next year, there will be results. Meanwhile, China, Japan, ROK already on the track of negotiation. Another very important fact is that TPP already finished more than 80 percent, you know, content negotiation. RCEP also have four rounds of negotiation. You know that based on two tracks, based on so a lot of bilateral and trilateral free trade agreements, based on, you know, there is a new information sharing mechanism, that's a new start point on promoting and coordinating for RTA and trade and investment liberalization and facilitation in the region. So I think that that's a very good foundation for AFTAP. Actually this time, for China side, we just have a proposal of AFTAP feasibility study instead of AFTAP negotiation. You know that actually I already talking about comparative parts proposal, today AFTAP becomes more tangible and more practical, more feasible. Meanwhile, look at, you know, free trade agreement, those bilateral and trilateral free trade agreement effect, that fragmentation effect in the region, as well as spaghetti bow effect. So I think that it's right time for us to promote AFTAP. Also you know that in Qingdao, last May, in this May, actually all, most of economies in the region already agreed to study on the roadmap of AFTAP. Of course, you know that there are some of uncertainties of bilateral and trilateral RTA will be, you know, the problems for AFTAP. The second point regarding AFTAP, personally I think that's our, you know, medium and long term goal and also that's belonging to our one dream. I think that if you look at the possible approaches, there would be, you know, maybe more different scenarios. Maybe one scenario is that from TPP to AFTAP. And the second scenario would be maybe from RCEP to AFTAP. And the third one maybe both on the basis of, you know, FTA, TPP and RCEP on the two tracks in the near future, maybe they could become convergence and then, you know, that's formulated AFTAP, blah, blah. So I'm afraid that now for all economies in the region, it's time for us to study on the possible, you know, roadmap and the possible scenarios. I think that all economies in the region should have open mind for multi-approaches to AFTAP. Today, we can find that TPP has a very obvious progress. On the other hand, we can find a lot of conflicts between developing economies and developing economies within TPP negotiators. Even if within developed economies between Japan and the U.S., you also have, you know, tough missions to be, need to be result, result. Of course, you know, that regarding rules for late commerce such as China and ROK, at the end of last year, good man, he is sitting here. And, you know, Professor Tan from Singapore, they have, you know, different viewpoints on the, on that rules. For example, United States said that for China, if you want to join TPP negotiation, you have to negotiate with every members. But Professor Tan said that in case that China wants to join, okay, you can join, no problem. So this type of things, you know, how to deal with in the future, that's the issue. Of course, you know, that regarding China's attitude changes on TPP. Last May here, I was talking about, you know, six types of misunderstanding made by Chinese scholars. Today, I'm very happy, you know, that actually after I present here, at the end of last May, the spokeswoman from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, said that TPP 10 plus 3, I saw as 10 plus 6, all of them would be possible approaches for promoting Asia-Pacific economic integration. And then spokesman from Moffcom China said that China will seriously study and follow TPP progress and study on the feasibility of joining TPP. So I think this is a very objective and very positive attitude on TPP. This year, Premier Li Keqiang in Bo Run Tan also says that China will be happy to see TPP members make consensus. I think this type of attitude shows that between China and the U.S. and in Asia-Pacific region, actually I think that between China and the U.S., we should have a new model of, you know, China-U.S. relationship. Meanwhile, we also hope that, you know, on one hand, China will not oppose, will not against TPP. On the other hand, we also hope the U.S. can support RCEP negotiation. So that will promote Asia-Pacific economic integration. Last point regarding three layers of Asia-Pacific economic integration. I think that trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, that's the top layer and relying on rules and regulation constructing in the region. And the global value chain and Asia-Pacific production network, that's the middle layer and belonging to supportive role, can play supporting role. And the third layer, that is communication and connectivity, that's the bottom layer and very fundamental roles will be played by this one. If you're talking about trade and investment liberalization and facilitation from BOGA GO to today's FTAF TAP, you can find that's the main goal of APEC. Meanwhile, you know that you can find that today APEC is going from facilitation action plan also to liberalization of trade and investment. Especially if you look at environmental product list, if you look at information sharing mechanism, also maybe next one will be IT product treaty. You can find that today APEC is gradually from non-binding mechanism to both non-binding mechanism plus binding mechanism. I think this is a very big progress. Of course, I think that FTAF, TPP, RCEP, all of them should be complementary to WTO. And I also very happy to hear that United States government spokeswoman says that TPP and RCEP is a complementary relationship instead of a competitive. The next one is some of scholars said that RCEP and TPP maybe will building block towards WTO. I don't think so. I think that TPP, RCEP just cover maybe 10, 20, almost 20 economies. But you can find that WTO rules are covering more than 160 economic in the world. Global value chain, you know that this year is very, very appreciated by APEC meeting. And we hope that this type of activities can promote Asia Pacific production network. Actually, APEC is a very good case for GVC. Like China, you know that today China has a very big transferring trade surplus from Japan, from ROK due to East Asia production network. That's why we need to reform global trade statistic system in order to truly reflect China's trade surplus against the U.S. According to my institute study, we found that if you look at China's trade surplus against the U.S., more than 36 of China's trade surplus actually belong to that type of transferring trade surplus. That means the trade surplus scale between China and the U.S. not so big as the statistic showed. But I have to confess that China's development is benefiting from East Asia production network. Today China has already gradually become one of the biggest outward investors in the world. China's outward investment is booming. So I think that it's right time to promote, you know, from East Asia production network to Asia production network. In that process, a lot of developing economies in Asia Pacific region, they will have opportunities to be involved in global supply chain and to get precious development opportunities. So this figure shows that by depicting specialization and extraction in the trade chain cooperation in Asia Pacific region, actually we can extend the space and the field of industry cooperation. Actually we can create cross-industrial and long-chain tracing from agriculture to manufacturing and from manufacturing to service sectors. And that means all economies in the region can obtain the long-term and sustainable development opportunities, reduce trade conflicts, achieve the diversification of export markets. So I think this kind of activities should be promoted by all economies in the region. This case shows that in East Asia production network and industrial specialization, you can find that Japan, Philippines, Singapore, they have their different advantages in regional production chains. So as China, we, of course, we are good at example. But I think that this type of model can promote regional economic cooperation and regional integration. Every few words on the new round of China's reform and opening up in China, a demographic dividend will be disappeared in the next 5 to 10 years. And it's very urgent for China to promote innovation-oriented economic model. Meanwhile, pre-national treatment and the negative list for both foreign investors as well as private investors already have a part of the project in Shanghai. Meanwhile, BIT negotiation between China and the U.S., between China and the E.U. and the governmental procurement agreement negotiation between China and the E.U. in progress. You know that today China actually already determined to be the practical and constructive promoter on trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. We will promote Asia Pacific production network construction as well as we will try to set up China's free trade agreement network in Asia Pacific region as well as in global society. Lastly, regarding communication and connectivity, both for hardware and software, both for people to people communication, as well as infrastructure to infrastructure. I think that in the region there are so huge demand, but lack of enough fund. For example, for Indonesia, only one country, their infrastructure fund demand will be about 160 billion U.S. dollars. But you know that Asian Development Bank can only provide 100 billion U.S. dollars, their Asia infrastructure fund. That means we have to explore other possible fund in order to support infrastructure connectivity in the region. So very briefly, I'd like to say that in case that we can combine three different layer and then maybe we will have our comprehensive framework to promote regional economic integration. So that's my viewpoints. Thank you for your attention. Thank you very much for the introduction. While I'm waiting for my slides to appear, I'd like to make a few observations. What I'd like to do is to first discuss regional arrangements, FDA, TPB and RCEP. I don't know, am I supposed to do something? Okay. Sorry. Yes. So I'd like to do two things. First to discuss mega-FTAs in Asia-Pacific and then turn to the issue of Japan's FTA strategy. I'd like to, I'm trying to avoid the overlaps. So let me go directly to brief comparisons between TPB and RCEP. Although there are many areas which overlap, but in my view, there are several important differences. One is the level of comprehensiveness, TPB more comprehensive compared to RCEP. And also the level of trade and FDI, foreign debt investment and liberalization. Again, TPB is more, more so-called high-level liberalization, although we don't know yet because both of them are under negotiation. And then another difference is the treatment of developing countries. According to the information that I have, TPB does not provide so-called special and differential treatment to developing countries, whereas RCEP puts a lot of important emphasis on special and differential treatment. The reason is quite obvious, RCEP has several developing countries, specifically so-called CLM, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and also India. They are, or compared to other countries, lower level of economic development, so they cannot really maybe accept some of the conditions which can be accepted by more developed countries. So these are some of the big differences. Recognizing these differences, I think, well, as I agree with Dr. Jiang and Ishige-san too, they are and they should be complementary rather than conflicting. Having said that, I look at these two frameworks somewhat differently than Dr. Jiang or maybe Ishige-san. I think they are quite different and they will stay different and they will coexist. This is just my view, okay? And I call this stage as approach to regional economic integration in Asia-Pacific. That is, for developing countries, they can participate in RCEP, but they cannot participate in TPB from the start. And while they grow economically being a part of RCEP, they may be able to become a country which can accept the conditions which are imposed by TPB. So first step, RCEP, and then second step, TPB. And then, in my view, TPB will become FTAP. And hopefully FTAP, with maybe like TTIP and Japan-EU, will become a kind of basis for next generation of WTO, which deals not only border issues but behind the border issues. So this is how I look at the possible future developments of regional economic integration in Asia. Again, stage as approach to regional economic integration. Now let me turn quickly to Japan's FTA strategy. First, I'd like to emphasize that Japan can benefit from participating in many FTA strategies including, of course, TPB, RCEP. And of course, that, I guess, comment can be made for other countries as well, including the United States. And let me look at the, let's see, FTA performance, so to speak, of Japan. This looks at the, this is called FTA coverage ratio. This ratio shows the proportion of trade that Japan has with FTA countries to Japan's total trade, and this is for Japan. This is like less than 20% compared to the U.S. at the moment is, I guess, 40%. And China is about the size of Japan. But compared to other countries like Chile, Mexico, Japan is by far much lower rate. In other words, Japan, maybe along with China and the U.S., has a huge potential to be gained by expanding its FTA network. Another indicator that I look at is called FTA trade liberalization ratio. This shows a percentage of tariff lines committed to be eliminated in total number of tariff lines. For Japan, in the case of Japan Philippines FTA, Japan committed to liberalize 88.4% of tariff lines, so less than 90%. Whereas U.S., U.S., say Peru, or say Australia, U.S., FTA, this 99% may be a bit higher than what it is. I got, I saw some lower number, like 97%, but still much higher than what Japan has achieved. And of course, the higher, the better in terms of its impacts on economic growth. And it is very obvious why Japan has a very low liberalization ratio because of difficulty in liberalizing agriculture. And this diagram shows the tariff rate for a selected number of agriculture products, which receive very high, heavy protection, beginning with konnyaku-yumo and rice, peanuts, and so on. But I have to say, on average, agriculture protection given to Japan, there is average agriculture protection ratio, which is not so bad compared to countries such as other agriculture-importing countries like Korea, Norway, Switzerland. But again, the special feature of Japanese agriculture protection is the heavy protection given to few selected products. But of course, that makes it very difficult for government to liberalize or to accept a high trade liberalization ratio for Japan's FTA. But these are some of the numbers which come from so-called simulation exercise. And the question is, of course, what would happen to Japan's GDP if Japan participates in TPP and RCEP? The numbers vary depending on assumptions, depending on a model that they use. Japan's cabinet office comes up with this 0.66% growth of GDP from 12-country TPP, which is much lower than other figures. And one reason is that Japan's cabinet office number only deals with trade liberalization and not on liberalization and FDI on others. So naturally, the numbers are much smaller than others. Peter Petri, Flama, and Fanzai, they did produce these numbers for their study. There, Japan can expect 2.0% increase in GDP by participating in TPP, and 1.8% from RCEP and 4.3% from FTA P. And Dr. Kawasaki from Japan came up with even larger number. So the point is, though, we can expect positive impacts from FTA participation. Yeah, I just, let's see, before, and I just like to make this last point, which I have at the bottom of the slide. We talk about the benefits of FTA, because you can expect expansion of exports to FTA trading partners. But all these simulations show us the biggest benefit come from opening up of your own market. So that, I think, is a very important point, especially from economists like me. I'd like to emphasize that. You open up your market. You sign up for FTA for your own sake. So this is a very important point. And now, but again, it is rather difficult to open up everything for Japan because of the high agriculture protection. And some of the argument that the agriculture protection is to make are shown there. They say Japan's self-sufficiency in food supply is already low. It would be even lower if we open up our agriculture market. Opening up agriculture market has a negative impact on the environment and so on. Some of these points can be justified, but I have to say protection is not the first best policy, for example, to deal with this environment. The first best policy is to, say, give subsidy to some maybe environmentally friendly activities. So agriculture protection is not the first best policy. Even some of the argument they make may be justified. And I'd like to make two other points on agriculture. There is an interesting study which tries to estimate the cost of protection to consumers by protecting so-called five sacred agriculture products. They estimate $240 per person, like $1,000 per family. And this is quite a big money, especially when we know nominal income of Japanese, average Japanese declining. And there's a discussion when we have discussions on raising consumption tax. There's a discussion of exempting tax on food because to deal with possible regressive effects of such income, such tax on the poor. But if we remove protection, we don't need to discuss this kind of exemption of food items from taxes because we'll get the same effect. So again, liberalizing agriculture protection will benefit the poor and the maybe old. And finally, removing protection will give benefits to ambitious farmers. We talk about exporting of agriculture goods. That is very important. One effective way of promoting export of agricultural product is to remove protection of agriculture because with protection, you look at domestic market, which is profitable. But with that protection, you have to look outside the foreign market and that will lead to increasing export. Just a few concluding remarks. Abinomics seems to be working, in my view, although they have only two arrow shots. First arrow is aggressive monetary policy and second arrow is a flexible fiscal policy. And we are waiting for the third arrow, growth strategy, to be shot. And important components of growth strategy is FDA and particularly TPP. And with growth strategy, I hope Japan can get back on so-called growth trajectory so that future prospects of the Japanese economy will be more optimistic. But to do so, we need to open up. And in my view, there are ways to deal with this possibly negatively affected sector. Provide safety net is one way to do it. Another way is to gradual liberalization. So there are ways to deal with possible negative impacts. And there, I'd like to kind of discuss with US participants, say, concerning your experiences in TAA, like adjustment assistance program. That seems to be very interesting, but we don't have that. Again, let me emphasize that the argument that I made is for Japan, but the same argument can be made for other countries, including US. So I'd like to see market opening, not by Japan only, but by the US and maybe China, so that all countries can benefit. Thank you very much. Thank you, Michael. After the big powers in Asia, China, Japan, so it's supposed to be Michael Goodman, supposed to speak for the United States. So the three invited panelists are supposed from Singapore and to speak on the perspective from Southeast Asia. Now, Southeast Asia is often, especially in Washington. DC area here is below the radar, not very much, because flying very low. But nonetheless, I think I would like to mention the importance of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the 10 nations, in the context of the regional integration in the Asia Pacific. Well, first of all, we have to know about the status and update on the ASEAN economic community, the AEC. The AEC blueprint to be completed by 2015, so a year and a half ago, it is estimated to be completed about 80% on average. The good sector is almost 100%, while the service sectors and investment sector will be much lower. ASEAN 6, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, and the Philippines will have highest course of completion compared to ASEAN 4. Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. Now, on this, there are two types of scorecards, they call it, how much the percentage of completion of the ASEAN economic communities. Officially, there is one from the ASEAN secretariat and unofficially, but requested by the ASEAN Economic Minister, the area, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, which is based in Jakarta, has a very more comprehensive. So for those of you who would like to compare and all these things, you can look at the area website, area.org. So these are the details of itself. I'm not going to go to details of it because we are running our, running behind time. We're supposed to have a break by now. So I just go through the main things and emphasize the issues that are providing insights and issue that may have big policy implication with respect to the role of U.S. and Japan and for that matter, China. One of the objectives of ASEAN is a single market and production base. And this also is often misquoted and not clearly understood. There are interpretations to it. So I think this is the, however, it is best viewed not as a regional integration per se, but as a coordinated and concerted domestic reform initiated among ASEAN member states in order to make the countries and the region more attractive investment destination, a more competitive production base, a more robust and equitable economic region that is connected to the global marketplace. So this is very important to understand that it is not, it sounds like economic community associated with European community, but it's not. Sounds also like trade negotiation. It's also not trade negotiation. It is concerted coordinated efforts among the 10 ASEAN member states to accelerate and coordinate the domestic reforms. So it means trade negotiation, trade politics and trade policies is not that critical. By end of 2015, the ASEAN would have achieved a single production base, particularly on the 13 priority integration sectors. PIS such as agro-based, air transport, automobiles, electronics, E-ASEAN, ICT, information communication technologies, fisheries, healthcare, logistics, rubber-based, textile and apparel, tourism, wood-based and healthcare sectors. So for American companies, for Japanese, Chinese and all these things, so the PIS sectors, particularly of great interest because these are the first line of defense where opportunities abound. The ASEAN may not achieve a single market but would have a significant progress 80 to 90% in implementing liberalization, facilitation, equally important and connectivities among the 10 ASEAN member states. So ASEAN economic communities has three elements, liberalization, facilitation and connectivities because of the divergence different stages of growth but also because of the geographical proximities among the 10 member states. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, what is it seen from the Southeast Asian or ASEAN perspective? RCEP negotiators have not progressed much after the fourth round of negotiation. The fifth round will be this month in Singapore on the 23rd of June, just a week to go. The RCEP negotiators have agreed to establish working groups on trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation and working group on competition and intellectual properties. So the first round, second round, third round and last one in Nanning, China, basically the trade negotiating committees and the working groups exchanging notes and discussing those issues. So it's not properly in a negotiating stage. RCEP negotiators have also agreed to set up some working group on sanitary and veto sanitary SPS, measures and standards, technical regulations and confirmation assessment procedures for discussion at the fifth round of RCEP negotiators on 23rd June in Singapore. ASEAN centrality is important concept in RCEP. However, so far ASEAN has not provided the substantive initiative in RCEP negotiation except as the facilitator of the process. So this is a very important point. So in the sense as a driver, you have to not only provide the facilitation, the environment, the structure, but it's also you must provide initiative for the substantive discussion to it. But so far, RCEP is only on the meeting, the first, second and third and fourth is only just the trade negotiating committees and the four working groups. And now they will additional the on intellectual properties and competition working group. It will be the first time to be discussed in the Singapore next week. It could be, it could be necessary at this juncture for non ASEAN members to champion or to drive the RCEP negotiating process as scheduled based on the principle and objectives for negotiating RCEP, officially adopted by ASEAN trade minister in Simriff, Cambodia in August 2012. Perhaps Australia and New Zealand with the support of China, Japan and Korea could initiate some important breakthrough in negotiating forward on rules of origin, co-equal rules, trade facilitation, service liberalization and non-tariff barriers. So these are the identified issues that have to be given prime priorities. The completion of RCEP as originally scheduled end of 2015 coinciding with the completion of AEC is crucial for the full economic benefits of regional economic integration in East Asia. So in a sense that for Asia Pacific integration, the AEC is priority number one. And RCEP is divided. Some Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United States are members of the TPP negotiators. But I think RCEP also very important, the ASEAN 10 plus the ASEAN 6, the China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand. Trans-Pacific partnership at the latest TPP round of negotiations in Singapore in February 2014. The meeting was unsuccessful to secure a draft consensus deal which was supposed to be ready by April 2014 during the visit of President Obama to Japan. The difference over market access tariff on imported goods as well as common trading standard over a range of issues including labor regulation and environmental protection, prevent a negotiator to reach a draft consensus agreement. It is therefore not likely to reach an overall draft agreement to 014. But as the previous speaker, as well as a congressman has pointed out, I think the issue is boiled down Japan and US and also all the trade TPA, Trade Promotion Act, which is very much important in completing as well as in negotiating the TPP. Lately China has seen a different perspective on TPP. Its position has shifted from being cautious to positive as it begins to recognize TPP economic importance and potential as a driver for its domestic structural reform. And this is also has been emphasized by previous speaker. If the US can base its TPP approach as it did when China was applying to become the WTO member, then perhaps there would be more receptive response from China. This again, the chairman, Ishege Sun, also has indicated about this development. TPP without China membership is one form or another is considered by many Southeast Asia as unrealistic and confrontational in regional integration approach. A special and differential treatment for developing negotiating countries should be considered with respect to time of implementation, but not on the level of standards and qualities. That again, Ishege Sun mentioned is that the time is the essence in addition to the substance and the in a negotiating process. Summary and conclusion, the Asia would be on schedule to be completed by 2015, not in full to some ASEAN member states and mainly in the good sectors in the Artiga dimension. Some service sectors and in the investment sectors. ASAP has yet to decide on the modality of negotiation whether it is based on negative least approach or positive least approach. And this will be discussed next week in the Singapore on the fifth round of the ASAP negotiation. After the fourth round, ASAP negotiation have not gone much beyond setting up working groups. The concept of ASAN centrality has worked in taking the initiative, but not in driving the substance of ASAP negotiation. So something somehow the game change, the game has to be initiated and championed by non ASEAN members. The TPP negotiation have failed so far to reach a draft consensus agreement to complete the negotiation into 2014. And this very much depends on the two side, Japan and the United States. Dynamic and internal domestic environment on the US and external environment in the region have complicated the process in reaching a consensus on draft agreement in TPP negotiation. That against the congressman has alluded the process of this trade promotion act as well as the elections coming elections and the initiative that the president is required on the United States part and Japan Prime Minister Abe. A more flexible gradual pragmatic approach are required. So there exists an opportunity for China participation in the TPP negotiation. The US should take note of this emerging opportunity and talent. So because in the past, TPP was considered as a pivot point of the US in a way to balance the rise of China. So now has dramatic change on the Chinese side. So certain initiative on the US side should be taken. Having a more flexible approach in TPP negotiation could provide a pathway for a parallel and converging process of TPP and ASAP in the region. I mean flexible approach in a sense that you don't have to compromise on the principle, but in negotiating you can skirt around and navigate. For example, in the negotiations of US, Singapore, FDA, as you know chewing gum cannot be imported to Singapore. But somehow a very clever negotiator said for medical use, for medical use, for health reason and all these things. So it saves the negotiation. So it's accepted. You can import to gum if it is considered for health purposes. For example, also another very creative way and on this state procurement, government procurements. In the TPP with Malaysia, for example, it is unless you prepare to change the constitutions or Malaysian constitution, it is not doable. But you can skirt around it probably on defense, on securities issues and all these things. Government procurements maybe for Malaysia because it has a Bumi Putra policies. So somehow you can be creative and negotiate in such a way that you can conclude TPP. I personally think it should be on a timely basis and probably by mid next year TPP should be completed. I think this is the main things of my presentation. Thank you. Thank you.