 So, another area that is in some sense doing better and in some sense, let's see, is Latin America, where we've seen extremely weak performance by the Brazilian economy, which has fallen into a deep recession, is now projected to finally come out, but not come out very strongly. Argentina has suffered as well. The commodity exporting countries of the West Coast, Peru and Chile, have been doing less well than in the immediate past, but the poster child internationally, I think, for poor economic performance has been the absolutely disastrous performance of the Venezuelan economy in the context of the crisis that we all know. There's new news here that I thought would be of interest to this group. We heard some somewhat odd-sounding announcements by President Maduro of Venezuela about something about refinancing, restructuring, re-something the debt after having made a very large principal payment and with another large principal payment due next, is it next week? But luckily, Elena Daley is here, who is very well-versed in what's happening there, and I thought it would be of interest to all of us to give us just a brief update on where things stand, where this is likely to go, how long it's likely to work out, and all the details that I'm sure you can provide expertly. Thanks, Elena. Well, thank you, John, and thank you for adding me to this distinguished panel. Now I have Queen Elizabeth, real Queen Elizabeth moment, so thank you, John and members of the panel, for inviting me to speak today. I'll just spend a few minutes giving you a quick, maybe a quick state of the union address for Latin America, not a poster child, as you once mentioned, John, that what Venezuela does best of any of the countries is putting a wrong foot forward at every given turn. And it's certainly, you know, you're aware of long-lasting humanitarian, economic, political crisis in the country that's been going on for a while from the previous President Chavez and inherited by President Maduro, who doesn't have much of wiggle room, but to continue corrupt and adverse policies. So we had all this crisis, but you know, even two years, two weeks ago in Washington when Discuss This Matters at the IMF meetings, we were still wondering whether there will be a real debt crisis in Venezuela, because obviously the levels of debt are very high. It's 143 billion total debt for the small country of Venezuela, it's enormous, but the payments have been made, so the balloon of debt crisis and debt restructuring was not up to weeks ago. Everyone was expecting that last Thursday when an enormous substantial chunk of 842 million was due, a principal payment by Piedevesa, the state company of Venezuela. It will not be paid, it would not be paid, it was paid with some trembles over Friday whether the fiscal agent delivered those payments to the bondholders, it did happen. Moreover, yesterday President Maduro came up with a decree and that's the quote, decreeing refinancing and restructuring of external debt of all Venezuelan payments. It is, you know, that the phrase could be analyzed and will be analyzed, I'm sure, by reporters, but from a debt restructure perspective, I've been doing it for some time, especially in the region, in Latin American region, it has all the signals of this debt restructuring being quite unique and unusual. I guess that this time would be different and different from Argentina, from other countries in the region and different from Greece, obviously, but Argentina is on everyone's mind when one thinks about debt restructuring in Latin America. So to my view, that would not be your father's debt restructuring. So why, first of all, the debt stock is not only enormous, it's very diverse. Bonds represent 52 billion out of 143 billion dollars and the other components are commercial paper, exit arbitration awards that already exist and promissory notes and so forth. By the debt composition, this reminds me only of Iraq debt restructuring because it's very diverse and intricate. Also, and this is enormous and why it would be of enormous importance to the U.S., because Venezuela is a sovereign debtor with enormous commercial ties to the United States. So the risk of possible hold-out creditors in the restructuring and hold-out creditors are the ones who don't voluntarily go into restructuring and hold out until such time as they can just file a legal action. We remember Argentina, for example, and the very difficult situation with the hold-out creditors that took years to unwind. So the risk of hold-out creditors is therefore more acute in this situation because of that exposure to the U.S., because of the commercial ties to the U.S. And so how long will it take? Well, in the military, there are two terms that I once read, R-O-M and W-A-G. R-O-M stands for rough order of magnitude and W-A-G stands for wild guess. So I think if you take together the debt composition, the exposure to the U.S., the role of Pidvesa, the state-owned company, a commercial entity, the fact that there are OFAC sanctions in place that would prevent creditors to even participate in a meeting that was called by Madura for November 13. So all of that makes, you know, let me give you my wag, that it will take some time, but it all depends on manufacturers involved. Thank you. Yeah. Bottom line here is structurally this is going to be one of the most complex debt deals of all, not least because a huge amount is owed to Russia and China in formats that are uncertain and the, moreover, the Sinequanon for Venezuela, I would say the good part is I don't, my understanding, correct me if I'm wrong, there is as opposed to E.G. in the 80s or even some more recent cases, there are no financial institutions of consequence at risk from their holdings of Venezuela debt. That's correct. At the same time, it is possible, the Sinequanon for the Venezuelans is to avoid legislation or, sorry, let litigation that would tie up their ability to export, for example, oil. And so I think a question all around is, is that much of a risk because if it is, that could be disruptive to the world energy markets at least for some time, couldn't it? That is absolutely correct. And the role of China and Russia in Venezuela and debt, the exposure of these two geopolitically important countries to Venezuela and their ability to influence the flow of commodity in the country might just, and it's just again, a guess might incentivize the countries to come to an aid to Venezuela in that management situation. And Russia and China. China's exposure is roughly between 18 and 20 billion Venezuelan, but their interest in the situation is actually the flow, the non-disrupted flow of commodities into China. So here I see an opportunity for them to come to some sort of a resolution outside court and John, you're absolutely correct that the fear that drives Maduro's government to be current on payments of principle is the fear of litigation. Old sins cast long shadows and the shadow that Argentina, that restructuring cast on the region and beyond is still quite dark. And there the litigation was tied up up to 40% of that stock of Argentina and lasted for years and years. There is a solution, the collective action clause in the document, but it goes in a little bit technical. I can take those questions outside. So complicated, super complicated, some dangers, and it's going to give I'm sure mainly a lot of lawyers a lot of work for years, perhaps years to come. So that's, depending on your point of view, could be viewed as a positive. Okay, so thanks, I think that sums up I think our discussion on the economic outlook with one issue of exception that I think some of us may want to comment on, and that is if there has been a something that has perplexed economists and has been this seeming lack of relationship between labor markets, labor market conditions that has been known by economists as a Phillips curve, the idea that there is some regularly understandable, predictable relationship between levels of popular vernacular, levels of unemployment and rates of inflation. And what has perpetually or the last few years come as a surprise is especially in the US, but not just in the US, also in Japan, tightening of the labor market seems to be unrelated to developments in wages and therefore in broader inflation. I think, Nara, you were skeptical that that's going to, that this current situation is going to continue. Is that, what is the basis of your skepticism that the current fail will trade off is going to be sustained? Well, simply, if the unemployment rate in the US, for instance, were to come down to 3%, do you believe there will be no inflation under such circumstances? If the unemployment rate of Japan were to come down as low as 1%, surely inflation would flare up. So there should be some inflection point. And as I said, in history in Japan, it was below 3%, somewhere between 2% and 3%. Whether inflection point appears in that range or will have to wait until the unemployment rate drops below 2%, well, it's questionable. But my guess is, as far as Japan is concerned, Mr. Abe is really anxious to pressures on both labor unions and big companies to raise wages. In Japan, every spring, there will be big negotiations between large labor unions and large companies' management. So Abe administration may use taxation on, for instance, retained earnings as a threat to large companies' management to accept large wage increases next spring. This is my pure speculation, which may happen or may not happen. I don't know. But if I were Mr. Abe, I would do so, to end deflationary psychology. So let's see. But in that... Motoshige Ito is closer to Prime Minister, so... You know, something about it. Would you care to comment? I would just ask about this labor market. Yes, if you look at aggregate data, such as unemployment rate or job offer... You're talking about Japanese data, yes. If you just look at only aggregate data, yes, labor market is very tight. We often, in Japan, just look at job offer, job-seeker ratio. It's now 1.5, which is highest in the last 40 years. But if you look at the individual sector, some is only 0.3%, and some is 3 or 5. So there's very significant discrepancy among the industry. So if labor can be very easily reallocated, well, no problem. But there seem to be very structural problem, maybe because of the technological change, or maybe because of just other factors. So I just would like to... We'll come back to the bottom. This is another country's situation, whether just macro data is enough for us to look at just the relation between wage and unemployment, or very structural problem is not existing, which makes it more difficult for the wages responding to the tight labor market. I wasn't expecting... I wasn't expecting to say anything along these lines, but I think... This is not about the Phillips curve, by the way. This is about supply and demand. If the demand for labor goes up, shouldn't the price go up. And I can pass along, having followed it a little bit, some of the American experience, which is along these lines, it's highly differentiated by region. So I was just a couple of weeks ago at the Boston Fed, and the session before mine had the five state economists reporting on the five states which are in the New England region that's the responsibility of the Boston Fed. In each of the five states, with the exception of Maine, the principal economic problem is labor shortages. There are 400,000 jobs unfilled in Massachusetts as of today. At the same time, in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, labor force participation rate has gone down 4% since 2008, which is an unprecedented fall in the labor force participation rate. So there are massive regional differences in the labor markets. So not only has social mobility declined in the U.S., but interregional mobility has declined. And there is some speculation that this is associated with the collapse in housing prices, because if you were living in Michigan or in Ohio, and your house price declined by 50%, you can't move. You can sell your house for half of what it was worth 10 years ago, but you can't buy anything in a place that would have jobs that you might take. So the American experience is that there are substantial areas with massive labor shortages and other areas where labor force participation continues to decline. Although I would just add the caveat. When folks say we have massive shortages, labor shortages, we have all these openings and can't fill them, but they don't result in wage increases, makes you wonder, what do you mean by a shortage? It means you're just in a place that you're away from the equilibrium. Absolutely. Often it's about a skill mismatch. And when you don't have the skilled labor in the area, then the only way to overcome that, you can't raise the wages of those who are already employed to fill an unfilled job, you have to bring in people from outside, which used to be done through H1B visas and those involved in cutoff. What do you want to say, something? Yeah, I just want to underscore effectively the point about structural change. So the Phillips curve is this kind of short-term macroeconomic relationship. But more important in the last few decades is the structural change. So in the United States, wages have been stagnant. Particularly wages of male workers, particular types, white male workers have declined even as labor productivity, the aggregate number, has been increasing very substantially. And so that has resulted in a huge increase in the share of capital in GDP and a falling share of labor in GDP, about an 8% swing over something like 30 years. So this I think is, so perhaps we shouldn't be surprised if you have these long-term trends that you're not getting the impact on wages that you would expect from a short-term relationship. So what may be going on is that underlying, while kind of aggregate demand is picked up, underlying this is a technological shift and globalization shift, which is reducing the demand for unskilled workers and at the margin, these people need to work. So they accept lower wages, right? So the adjustment is a kind of combination of a demand shift, but also a structural shift, which is leading a lot of the workers to take jobs, which they couldn't get before during the crisis. But they're taking them at lower wages than they would have at the past. In the past. And at the same time, because of the same technological change, you have demand for skilled workers that are not being fulfilled. And maybe it's temporary, but you will get the escalation of wages at the high end, but not necessarily will you see this at the aggregate level? So is this kind of stuff that's going on that microeconomists just don't focus on? So here's where I wanted to get it. Oh wait, one more comment. Isn't competition the name of a game? When there is heavy competition, there is heavy competition between different parts of the world and everybody has internalized in their thinking. The mindset is if I increase my salaries, you know, I'm going to either be uncompetitive or maybe the option is to send the plant in another country. If everybody thinks that both the company managers and the unions and the people, the fact that you have a couple of IT specialists that you cannot find or that you have a couple of skilled people that you have shorted off will not have any impact on the bulk of it. So I agree with you, but I think I'm not sure that technology is a reason. I think it's more global competition which installs the idea in the mind of everybody, I cannot increase my costs. And I will not increase my cost, period. So here were the two points I was hoping to, I think, emerging from this discussion. We heard that the economic outlook with some exceptions, some relatively modest exceptions, remains a relatively favorable one. And nobody really thinks that that is at any risk short-term save some kind of political, geopolitical disruption. In other words, that the global economy looks like it's going to stay in pretty good shape in the near term. Next, what we've heard is also, or despite that, the continued good growth is not expected to turn into accelerating inflation anytime soon, even in the case of our believer of the Phillips curve, right? Net result, it is understandable why central bankers, all key central bankers, are either continuing on their course of very accommodative policy or withdrawing it very, very gradually so that policy in the stance is still accommodative, even if some of the accommodation is being withdrawn. This, of course, has been associated with rising asset prices. So now my question to the panel is, do you think, if anybody wants to comment on this, is this been a mistake in that once again we are, as folks, for example, at the BIS would tell you, we are running risks with financial stability by focusing on, focusing monetary policy on goods and price or goods and service inflation and ignoring asset prices once again. Does anybody want to comment, Andre? Yes, I think this is the key question. The question is what will be the next financial crisis and when, of course, when I cannot answer. If you look at the, too bad, too bad, too bad. We were hoping. I wouldn't tell you it would become rich. No, I think we're almost 10 years now from the subprime crisis, right? And remember, basically the subprimes were assets which were relatively high yielding and supposedly liquid and there was a large amount of them, of those assets held by banks especially and investors. And at one point somebody realized that they were not liquid and they rushed for the door and that's when the party stops. Now, if you look at the present situation, there is one asset which has grown into numbers which are amazing, actually several times the amount of subprimes and that's exchange-traded funds. Now exchange-traded funds, as you know, I suppose, are a way to invest with very, very low cost in either stocks or indices or commodities. But basically you have to keep in mind that they are usually derivative-based products. In other words, in theory initially you could, the banks which issue those old managers who issue these funds could buy the underlying asset and trade the asset. Actually they don't do that. They do it partly only. They buy some assets and then they buy derivatives. Now most of those ETFs are supposedly liquid. Now as you know there is a move towards passive investment now because it's been proven that it's very difficult for an asset manager to get a better performance than the indices. Exchange-traded funds, the rough number of outstanding today I think is roughly four trillion dollars of outstanding, trillion. I just read they represent 30% of the trading volume on the US market, equity market, 30% of the trading volume. There's supposed to be liquid. Fund managers love them and everybody believes that it's liquid. As long as there is no external shock, it's okay. But when there is an external shock, which can be geopolitical or it can be maybe rates which go up faster than expected and people rush for the door, that will be the first, I think, one of the first victims. And of course now the banks don't have that much amount of those. But fund managers do. And fund managers have to either give the money back to investors or remember what happened in 2007, in the August of 2007 when BNP Paribas said that one of their money market funds could not be refunded immediately because there was some unliquid securities involved. Now it took another year before the crisis, but it was the first thing though. So I'm worried on that because today everything is fine. There is liquidity and go back to your question. There's so much money around that there is liquidity. But everybody is looking for yield. And what do you find yield? Do you find yield and bonds? Corporate bonds, not government bonds but corporate bonds. And you find yield in indices in the stock market. And the cheapest way to buy stocks today to trade stocks is an ETF. So that's my worry. And I know nobody is able to predict how it will happen. Last time everybody was wrong. It wasn't what I expected. So it may not be this, but it's clear that there's one large risk we have today. Not next month, but in the next year or two. But just to be clear, the source of your worry about potential illiquidity as opposed to simply falling prices is what? As you know, John, liquidity is always the first problem. And then liquidity, as the consequences, has insolvency. Because if you cannot, no. Yes. In the case of the subprimes, subprime actually, the subprime universe was relatively small. But they got subsumed in CDOs. Derivatives based. Of course. But the main problem was they were treated as liquid, like you say. From people who hadn't done the due diligence and didn't know what was in them. So when the subprimes values collapsed, nobody knew what was inside the CDOs. Or almost no one knew what was inside the CDOs. And since you didn't know what was in the CDOs, you didn't know how to value them. Hence the problem with the band. For me, I was at the fund at the time when Bampei Paribas said that that's when I concluded this was a big, big, big crisis coming. But also, since I didn't know what was in my portfolio, I didn't know what was in your portfolio, so I was no longer willing to do business with you, but that's what killed liquidity. So not to say this is wrong, but with the ETFs, it's a slightly different story. You know what's in there. It's different because it's investors, you're right, rather than banks. But if it starts, I mean, if there is this, then you have a problem of the bond market reacting, the sub-market reacting, and that has consequences. Right, indirect. Exactly. I have a similar concern over the functioning of the international market in general. Few things. First, market making capability of security dealers as well as FX dealers have declined significantly because of Dot Frank and the Basel 3. So, you know, this is one thing. Second, credit risk taking has also been restrained in the banking sector and pushed to shadow banking, as you correctly pointed out. The third point, Andrea also mentioned that passive investors have grown during the past decade and so have indexed products. And active managers get fewer and fewer. And I'm afraid the dearth of active managers makes the market prone to herd behavior, which could induce runs in the market when a shock is applied to the market. So, perhaps high-frequency trading, other machine trading based on a similar algorithm may exacerbate this panic if it happens. Well, in the case of Japanese government bond market, the U.J. has bought up over 40% of the market and the market has become so thin as to occasion squeezes of particular issues at times. Still, no. So, these are the elements, warring elements with respect to the function of market in comparison to the beginning of the Lehman crisis. You know, subprime invited a crisis in a very different mechanism, which you correctly, opaqueness and, you know, everybody lost the confidence and counter parties and survivor you all and the trust in the system all crumbled down at the time. But this is a different source we are seeing. Apparently, 50% of all the toxic U.S. mortgage assets at the time of the crisis were on European balance sheets. So, hence why it spread globally so quickly it was a globalized phenomenon. But today, you have very large investments in bonds. The banks have bonds for government and corporate bonds. That's one thing. You mentioned program trading, of course. The good news maybe one, one is that it's known and usually the crisis happens on something which is not known or not anticipated. So, that's one good point. The other one is that markets now have you, how you call the secret breakers when there is it kind of a brush, but that doesn't help it help for short term, but it doesn't have a word. Exactly. So, let's not go in there. If you allow me, you made a good transition with a birthday I'm celebrating in the privacy of my room tonight, which was I became group CFO of credit agriculture first of August, 2007. And I had my first- At the definition of a poison challenge. Correct. And I had my first quarterly earnings presentation this moment in November where basically I moved into disclosing some subprime losses. And I say some because we are just no clue. And then in December I was the first, which actually I don't regret even if it was a kind of sticker on my back for many years. I was the first to tell, we will not replay it, but for some of the people who know, remember in 1986 when Chernobyl exploded, there was a thesis that France was the only country not touched by the Chernobyl cloud. And I said, which was not very well said actually, I said the subprime cloud has eaten France as the others and we must recognize that we have been hit. Which was, nobody wanted to talk about it. And we were the first to do a profit warning on subprime. And to be honest, I remember I went to the board now it's 10 years ago I can't tell. And the board says so better, how much do you want to say? I don't know, several billions. What do you mean several? Yeah, maybe two, maybe three. Finally I think when I was three billion in December 2007, the final bill was over five billion for each of the large French banks and the Germans and everybody else. But that was really a very vivid memory actually. And I think, so celebrating this birthday tonight in my ring, you're invited to the show. But there's a good news I think and coming back to your point, John, is that the preliminary reaction was the right one. I think this is a moment, the international momentum prevented us from repeating the 1930s mistakes. I mean, we have avoided a sharp rise in protectionism. We have avoided austerity measures of the stimulus, which at the cost that we were seeing public debt jumping, but we avoided that. And besides demand and few accidents, the banking system was prevented from totally collapsing. So I think we should celebrate this and we've survived. That's I think a positive thing. So the point is really where are we now? And I will not speculate on where the next crisis will come from. But my analysis, I've had the privilege, if I may say, to be a regulator and a regulator. So I've seen both sides of the equation. And I think today we are at a point where to a certain extent we have patched up the system. So we have, I mean, again, and it was probably the right thing to do. So we pushed on monetary policy and we discovered new frontiers of monetary policy. We've pushed on regulatory policy and we discovered new frontiers of, and we've done that year by year. I don't think there was a plan. If you had a Jean-Claude Fisch in 2008, oh, you will have this quantitative easing forever and you will buy unlimited amount. Wow, what I'm talking about. I mean, nobody had this view at that time. And I think we have experimented. And at the end of the day, it's okay because we are still alive. And I don't think we're in a pre-World War III situation. So let's be happy of that. But it's a problem is that now people are a little bit tired after these 10 years. And I remember I say that with Marcus being here. We had this great discussion at the Peterson Institute 10 days ago on rethinking macroeconomics. And one of the conclusion I discussed actually after, it was organized by Olivier Blanchard and Larry Summers and discussed that with Olivier is that people want to go back to normal. There is no real willingness to rethink at the end of the day. We've done all of this when he has bankers. Yes, let's normalize military policy. Let's come back to the pre-situation, which is impossible. So my point is, so we've patched up the system, we've survived, but we have not an holistic view of how do we finance our economies? We have not addressed that question, which was at the heart of Bretton Woods in 1945 at the heart of the Reagan-Satchel revolution. We have not addressed that question. So now we have, I would say the banks struggling with their profitability. You have the asset managers searching for yield. You have the pension funds, which are running, I mean, growing deficits and so on and so forth. So we have a system which is struggling to find where it goes. And you have, of course, massive misallocation of capital. I mean, people are buying zero-way German bonds, which have zero interest for anybody, and they miss a big opportunity elsewhere. So we have this moment where on top of that, everything is more and more paralyzed by compliance, risk, bureaucracy, I mean, whether it's anti-monet laundering, financing of terrorism. You name them. I mean, I'm now starting my own business. I mean, to imagine that one of my investors was a very well-known CEO of one of the top 15 companies in the world. It took him three months to be able to give you a check on his personal banking account that I could receive in my bank because he had to send the photocopy of the passport of his mother or whatever. It's crazy. So my point is really, we are at a moment where, again, we are alive, but we need to think what comes next. How do we address that issue of, how do we finance the economy and how do we restore trust in the system? Because at the end of the day, people don't trust the system anymore. I mean, this is part of, I mean, there are many explanations behind the Brexit, behind Trump, behind whatever, but I think the financial crisis is one of these many issues. If we don't restore trust, that will be part of the next crisis. So I think we should really rethink, and here is a place, and there are many other places, about what do we want to do collectively? And that is question with the financial stability goal. And I remember, I said, but what is it that we want? And interestingly, I cannot quote Mark Carney like this, but he spoke personally, but in a way, the point is, it's not our business. We are not here to define a business model. We define the rules, and capitalism will find the business model. I'm not so sure, to be honest. I think it has to be a co-construction. And we are not there, I don't think we are there at all. So people think about, I mean, the big objective that we have assigned for the world be the sustainable development goals, we climate and change discuss downstairs, et cetera. I mean, we need money for that. We need, I mean, we don't need people to put money in Germany. We need people to put money in climate. We need people to put money in health, in agriculture, et cetera. It's not happening. It's not happening. So people say, oh yes, great, you have this great revolution of impact investment. Well, that's great. It's very tiny. And I can tell you, the minute the US treasury go back to 5%, I mean, impact will vanish and people will just come back to the whole game. So I think we are at a moment where we all need to be somewhat smarter. In a way, investors are panicking with zero or very low yield. So they need to be, to sink out of the box. But it's striking because compliance does not allow you to sink out of the box. It's very difficult. I mean, the central banks are nervous about the monetary policy. I mean, the government are nervous because they are, except Germany's are most of the fiscal stress. So they don't know what to do with their money. And on top of that, I mean, the multilateral system is also constrained by the Trump position. They will not get any additional money and flexibility. So the system needs to sink out of the box and it's paralyzed because the system does not allow you to sink out of the box. So how can we move this? How can we really coordinate this? For me, this is really the real question forward. If we want to break this misallocation of capital, if you really want to work through it, it's very difficult because as you rightly said, global governance is no longer the name of the game. I mean, you have the Chinese, there's a new Chinese definition of socialism and the Chinese flavor or whatever. Then you have the Brexit, then you have the Trump things, et cetera. How do we organize these things? I just have no clue. That's why I'm a little bit nervous. If we have another crisis, can we recreate the miracle of 2008? We prevented the whole world to collapse. I'm not sure we are in a state of mind where we are capable of doing this again. And that's really what worries me. That's so much where and when, but how do we address these things if we are incapable of sinking the system we want to do? So we have been a little bit too long, but you know me. No, I was just, only that I was hoping at the end you were going to give us the solution. But the solution, again, I borrow from a conference made at the Peterson, actually, from your successor, David Lipton, at this great world. And he says, the problem today is that all our cars have a nameplate in Ohio and we should all move to California. And what did he mean with that? He said, I don't know if I'm likely to remember that conference. He said, Ohio is on house in order. Everybody wants to do his data things at home. And it's not the way forward. The way forward is California, CA, collective action. But it's very challenging. How do we create a condition that the US, the China, the BRICS, et cetera, are capable of working together and not kind of building walls, borders, distrust, et cetera. And that's really what worries me. Yes, although I agree that the problem we have, I think one of the problems is, especially I would say in the financial system, if we don't know where we're going, then any road will do. So what we've evolved is a regulatory reform that said, this bad thing happened, we're gonna make sure it never happens again. That bad thing happens, we're gonna make sure it never happens again. But if you say, what is the system, what do we want the system to look like when we're done? The answer is, and what would the regulatory environment or structures look like to make that happen? There is no answer to that. And you've been waiting and then we'll come to you. Yeah, go ahead ahead. I would like to go back to your original question about monetary policy and its impact on assets and asset inflation, as well as the good prices of goods and services. And then how can you finance an economy? I'll go back to Beirut's issue. Before that, I would like to give a short expose about what to tell you that Lebanon had not actually suffered from the global financial crisis. As a matter of fact, Christiane Weyer, the governor of Bonk de France came to Lebanon a year later in 2010, I think. And he said, I just came here to see and learn what you guys have done so that you're able to weather the global financial crisis. What we have done, we have actually done lots of preemptive policies, preemptive measures, that prevented that from happening. We don't have a subprime. As a matter of fact, we have banned derivatives. We don't have derivatives in our, in our, so this is why the, during that period, Lebanon has witnessed a growth of eight to 10% 2008 and nine to 10. We had that kind of growth over that time. And as a matter of fact, for the first time in the history of Lebanon, we have witnessed an influx of deposits by 24% during that time. That never happened again. Usually it's not that much. Now, what the central bank did do to actually stimulate the economy and at the same time make sure that it's not impacted the inflationary. We have targeted our inflation at the same time. We didn't, we had, let me go back to you in my statement. We have, and back in 2013, we have come up with a policy which we call a stimulus package. Whereby we lend banks $1 billion and we've been doing that since. We gave them $1 billion at 1% interest rates. So that's the cost of fund. They in turn would pass it on to the consumers. And although banks now as we speak and go into the fueling the economy, banks have $20 billion right now ready to be used. And if they use the $20 billion out of $200 billion in our economy, which is by the way, Lebanon's economy is $52 billion. We're not talking about a big economy, but we say that we have deposit base in our banks of almost four times our GDP, that's a lot. $20 billion are available, but those are not cheap funds. They cannot, they have to bring them up in the PPP, private public partnerships and other other uses. So that had stimulated the economy and we were able to part of this package, 50% of this package went to real estate development because we had determined at that time that real estate actually can trade along with it, 20 to 30 businesses and professions along with it. So this way, we have lots of real estate developments. But things have changed. While they were in larger sizes before, now they went to what the market has needed. So we have done that. We have $20 billion available in an economy of $54 billion now. We have stimulated the economy and the central bank stimulus package has contributed to 50% of the GDP growth since 2013 with no fail every single year and we were able to quantify that. And we have targeted some economies, the knowledge economy, the research and development, real estate, education, anything that has to do with technology. Thank you.