 final session of the Japan update in which we'll have a conversation about repositioning the Australia-Japan relationship. I think as Brett Mason said this morning, perhaps at no time has the Australia-Japan relationship been closer than it is today. The relationship suggests that I should retire from my job. It's in great shape. This year I've seen the two countries sign the Economic Partnership Agreement, a free trade arrangement that sees a deeper trade and investment liberalization regime between them bilaterally than they have ever had before, built of course upon the 57 years of close engagement after the signature of the Australia-Japan Agreement on Commerce in 1957. And the last notice that actually fundamentally important agreement on friendship and cooperation in 1976 signed between the Fraser government and the Mickey government at the end was. So the economic relationship has been put within a new institutional framework. Alongside that there's a new security declaration in Japan at the time of the Abe visit to Tokyo between the two governments, the second such declaration. We'll come back to that in our discussion. And as Brett said this morning, the rapport between the two prime ministers Abe and Abbott symbolizes the intimacy there is in the relationship between the two countries. It's really quite a remarkable thing to see and that all goes well for the future. So in this sense I guess the relationship's already been repositioned because if you look at the relationship over the last 20 years or so there's been a lot of activity there, founded on a very solid base, but it was in a kind of a drift. You know we had an active period when we had annual ministerial meetings, lots of visits both ways round by high level political leaders. But that drifted away and the last year or two has seen really a dramatic revivification of the relationship at all levels. And the promise that the arrangements that have been put in place will develop further more substantially down the track. So I think we can talk about where we've got to and how we've got there, but we also want to talk in this session about where we might go, what the potential of the relationship is going forward and in that sense the repositioning of the relationship as well. So welcome to the panel. We've got a panel that covers the whole spectrum of the relationship, a very impressive panel. Dr. Amy King from the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies here at the ANU is a lecturer in the Center who specialized on Japan but also on the Japan-China relationship especially going back to the normalization of relations between Japan and China in the 1970s. Professor Yoshihide Soeya who's a professor of international relations as you know and political science in the faculty of law at Keio University and is well known to us here in Australia as a leading thinker about developments in Japan's international relations and international politics and developments in Japan's position in the region and in global affairs. And Shiro Armstrong who's co-director of the Australia-Japan Research Center here in the Crawford School at the ANU. So welcome to the panel. I thought what might do to start the conversation going is to ask you each actually to reflect upon the relationship today in particular is that a scripture of it by if you like those who have a vested interest in it like myself or the Parliamentary Foreign Secretary or those of us who are at this meeting today, do you think that's a good descriptor of the relationship, the most intimate and the deepest relationship we've had between the two countries ever and is it on a base that justifies that descriptor? Maybe we turn to the Japanese first Yoshi how do you see the relationship from not only a specialist perspective in Japan but but how the relationship is viewed more generally in the relevant policy influential community in Japan? Well before that I would like to thank organizers for inviting me to this pre-stages second time second year Japan update and Australia is all the time my favorite destination so and I come back here from time to time I wish I had more invitations but having fans well I think my frank immediate response to your question directly is there is not much discussion I mean spontaneous discussions about recent developments between Japan and Australia and I think that that is not necessarily a bad sign perhaps because the relationship is so natural and there is no major problem except a big creature swimming in the ocean and image of Australia is very positive and I would assume the same is true more or less here in Australia a vis-à-vis Japan and so so I think maybe it's fair to say that the relationship is in a way taken for granted and it's not a big surprise to see kind of cordial relations between the two leaders evolving but but having said that I think the negative side of that you some some are taking for granted reality in Japan is there should be more appreciation of the importance of the relationship just taking it as a natural partnership because as you said there was second security declaration signed by the two leaders but the first declaration was in 2007 year 2007 at that time our Prime Minister was also the same person Prime Minister Abe and Japan and Australia signed AXA on the basis of that security declaration acquisition and cross-servicing agreement between the two militaries and of course the kind of joint activities which Japanese and Australian militaries can engage in are kind of typical non-traditional security domains there is no element of traditional security cooperation and so I think these these things should be given more emphasis explicit emphasis as an important development particularly for the Japanese side because this you know AXA is the second AXA which Japan signed with foreign countries after the United States and the fact that we could do that with Australia no other countries I think it should be very significant in talking about how Japanese you know regional security engagement you know has evolved in recent years and I take it very seriously this is a very important development not only in the relationship between us but for Japanese you know regional security engagement well I want to come back to that later on just general impression first one thing that interested me though was how you observed that the relationship was little noticed in Japan I mean the Abe visit here had a big impact in terms of public reaction in terms of press did it get that kind of impact in Japan or not it was reported I think you know reasonably well but but in terms of impact I'm not quite sure at least to be frank again I myself had not had such discussions with any of my colleagues yeah Amy would you would you accept our general description of the relationship as it is now yeah I think I would absolutely and I think as Professor Sawyer has pointed out you know there is a an earlier history to this closening particularly under the Abe administration the first time around but I think what really marks this period is a characteristically different one is that the economics and the security have both ratcheted up if you like I think you know looking right back to the 50s obviously the economic community in Australia was much more enthusiastic about the relationship with Japan and I think the security community it's fair to say was deeply ambivalent probably until the late 80s and then really under the Hawkeet in government we started to see the opening up of a security relationship with Japan that was accelerated under Howard with the with the signing of this the security partnership agreement elevating the relationship to that level but I think what the difference between now and I guess the last period of coalition government in Australia and the last period of of the Koizumi in the Nabe period in Japan is that the Japanese side is now a lot more receptive to moving further on security than they were the previous time around and so I think last time around under Howard Australia wanted to take the relationship in security terms a lot further than Japan was prepared to go and I think now we're seeing some greater appetite in Japan to to go further with that and should your general observations the relationship yeah look I agree with both Amy and soya son and especially the fact that it has been taken for granted and underappreciated it's such a deep and broad and stable relationship economically and politically that doesn't get much press today and I think the the visit by Prime Minister Abe helped highlight to us here in Australia anyway it gave us an opportunity to talk a bit about that how important Japan was and highlighted by the EPA that was signed so to talk about it being the closest it's ever been I'm not sure I haven't lived through the ups and downs as others in this room yourself would have but I'm in in more recent times I think because it has been taken for granted I think this is a useful year to reflect on the relationship let's turn to the economic relationship which is the base as Amy said of building up a broader relationship including touching on security areas and we've got this new economic partnership agreement with with Japan how does that change fundamentally the economic relationship if it changes the economic relationship um well I don't think it's a game changer for the economic relationship as I mentioned already we have a strong economic relationship it's worth taking a step back and recalling Japan's our second largest second most important economic partner 80 billion dollars in trade and investment annually and that's without the the EPA before the economic partnership agreement it was very good to get it signed it was seven years in the making it was a niggling part of the bilateral relationship but now we can get that out of the way and get on with with business it benefits some sectors Australian farmers and some service providers but given how large the economic relationship is it's not a game changer in one sense the strictly bilateral relationship between Japan and Australia on the trade side is shrunk not absolutely of course but relatively so it's a much smaller proportion the trade relationship with Japan than it used to be of Australia's overall trade relationships so how does the economic partnership relationship play into that is it likely to boost the share of direct trade between Australia and Japan or doesn't it have much significance in that particular respect well the evidence on these agreements these bilateral preferential agreements free trade agreements if you will that that are trading concessions between countries there's not much evidence of them having significant you know positive economic effects on economic relations and I don't think this one will have a measurable effect on the relationship you look at the literature there's very little evidence that these agreements matter all that much I think there the Productivity Commission did a review into this in 2010 they can make a difference but I think they're sold more to the public as an economic agreement whereas they should be recognized as as more of a political agreement too so Japan's trade share in Australia might be falling relatively it's still a very very big still second largest export destination second largest economic partner that's it's very significant it's just it's not going to have the same effect at the 57 and 76 agreements had that you mentioned those agreements were multilateral in character the 57 agreement recognized Japan as an equal trading partner for Australia we treated Japan equally as we treat all other trading partners and the 76 agreement did that for investment and more opened up a little more tourism and people movements so those were agreements that had significant measurable impacts on the economic relationship because they weren't sort of preferential they were multilateral recognizing Japan giving it most favored nation status that's treating it as an equal to all other countries one can I yes please I'm not the economist I cannot talk about it from please do point of view political point of view as already I said in the previous session my agriculture is the biggest issue as far as Japan's conduct of this practice goes but previously starting with Singapore I mean yes I think we started with countries with which we have less of an issue about you know agriculture products but Australian case there was a good culture product and so despite that you know the agreement was reached I think that's very important and so that should be more highlighted and and in the discussion of agricultural thing in Japan I think there are two major concerns one is of course stability of supply you know the conservative politicians make an argument if you really too much you know upon foreign countries when food crisis happening you know and so forth I mean there there aren't much you know huge possibility for that happen but that kind of argument is politically very strong and the other issue is food security right safety you know food safety and I think with respect to those two Australia has basically no problem I don't think Australia would use you know this as a political tool you know that in its game diplomatic game with Japan to be frank we have a concern about China for instance if we become too much interdependent and the China could use economic means for political purposes but but there is no worry you know that sort Australia and it was food safety too perhaps you know there should be no no no basic concern so a great cultural thing with Australia I think is an example with which to we can discuss domestically you know about those basic concerns and so so these these I think political aspects of free trade agreement with Australia I think I my view students should be should be emphasized but I think you make a really very important point that this agreement distinguishes itself by Japan's willingness to negotiate free your access to its agricultural markets and that's symbolic in a number of ways partly because it signals a new commitment to liberalization in Japanese agriculture consistent with Abe's third arrow for example and it also potentially plays into broader liberalization beyond Australian access to the Japanese market access to others our American partners of course aren't too happy about the extent to which we secured liberalization of access to the American markets but show how important you think the Australia Japan agreement will be in the positioning in TPP on liberalization of access to America to the Japanese market for the American supplies right well as you say it's the first agreement Japan signed that had any serious agricultural liberalization the rest with a lot of Southeast Asian or developing economies except for Switzerland that as I really said earlier protected agriculture at home while tried to expand trade and investment abroad so in that sense it's significant it did include some cuts into some significant liberalization into Japanese agriculture but the biggest beneficiaries being Australian beef producers still weren't happy with the access that we got it wasn't as much as we wanted and I think that's can tell you give you a sign of how much further we could have gone and how much further really Japan has to go so I think the United States wasn't so happy about the EPA that we reached on the the cuts in agriculture because I think they were watching how serious the Japanese government is in liberalizing agriculture it has been said it's a priority of the government it's part of the third arrow if they were serious about the third arrow and structural reforms they would use the Australian bilateral agreement they'd use TPP and any other agreements to make strong commitments externally to deliver what they want to deliver at home and I think there's a lack of evidence in that in in the TPP so far with the trying to negotiate and give up as little as possible in these negotiations as opposed to realizing well we want to open up our agriculture and services sectors here's a good vehicle to help us do that with a bit of pressure from the outside so in that context in the context of this morning's conversation the conversation this afternoon about the structural reform agenda in Japan and also about the politics of structural reform in Japan especially on agriculture do you think that Australia made the wrong call and backed away from the negotiation too early yielded too quickly on the deal it did with Japan and the bilateral FDA or should we have hung in there for bigger access in the context of the leverage that the TPP negotiations might bring to bear on that's a that's a really difficult question to answer I think it was right to strike the deal when we could we don't know how long the TPP negotiations would last and in the end it'll come down to a bilateral negotiation between Australia and Japan Australia and the United States on market access anyway that's the way that's the TPP is being structured so if we can get a deal early which we did that brings in and I think there's talk about implementing before April 1st next year in that case liberalized agriculture twice next year we get two big chunks next year I think you know you take what you can get when you can get it and that was a good sign I think they seized the opportunity and there's nothing like a good political relationship between our two Prime Ministers to help that happen so we can declare victory on that front Amy what about the security declaration the one in two thousand and seven yes and this year what's the substance of that from the viewpoint of deepening and broadening the security relationship between Australia and Japan well as professor sorry I already mentioned the 2007 agreement focused largely largely on non-traditional areas of cooperation things that weren't particularly controversial if you like to other neighbors in the region weren't particularly controversial for Japan at home I think what we're seeing now is is sort of a move more into the traditional end of that security cooperation I would say that I think a lot of the the closest security ties are happening at the rhetorical level at the moment you know we saw very soon after Prime Minister Abbott came to power lots of new language about Japan as Australia's best friend in Asia and an ally albeit one with a small a apparently and you know very strong support for Abe's efforts to revise or reinterpret the Constitution around collective self-defense so strong strong rhetorical support from Australia on all of those things in terms of sort of practical substance what we're what we're seeing is a new agreement on exchange of defense technology and science and sort of practical cooperation particularly in this maritime technology we're seeing new air ground and naval exercises between the two militaries most of those are actually trilateral so they involve the US as well so they're not necessarily just exclusively at the bilateral level but linking up sort of the three points of the alliance if you like and you know we may see an agreement on submarines with Defence Minister Johnson's in Tokyo at the moment and has reportedly formally asked Japan for assistance with Australia's submarine program although it's still there are still reservations about exactly what we will commit to and we're holding open the possibility of a domestic deal or you know another European submarine deal so you know I guess it's watched this space in terms of tangible cooperation and exchange of technology in that regard. Doshi, do you share Abe's view of where the things are at the moment and what about going forward with this agreement or declaration? I think that's clearly the direction which our relationship is taking but of course there is another question to our extent we can go and as far as that you know kind of limit goes I don't think for instance what Dixamel said kind of you know slippery slow school arguments are not not right I mean we're not going to go that far and but if you expect too much out of this I think you tend to be kind of disappointed so I think the important thing between Australia and Japan is to have a clear sort of conceptual agreement or framework and for what purposes you know we are doing this and rather than simply getting excited about the expansion of you know the the margin of our cooperation and I think in that sense a security declaration this year as well as 2007 are very indicative of the nature of our cooperation. First of all this is not a cooperation on traditional security domains I don't think this has any elements of for instance balancing against anybody for that matter China most importantly and it doesn't have perhaps any serious elements of working with the US for instance in the traditional domain I mean substance of Australia Japan cooperation and I kind of hesitate to say this because but it's a but I have to say at one point it's a typical middle power security cooperation I think substance is a typical middle power security cooperation in you know multilateral security non-traditional security issues disaster relief and so forth and so conceptually we should be very explicit about that in order not to create unnecessary you know sort of disturbances I guess this middle power middle power security cooperation there's different kinds of middle power security cooperation and just picking up Amy's observation about the nature of the activities that are encouraged under this cooperation agreement basically let I hesitate to say this too but I guess our political leaders in Australia in carrying us forward with us but persuaded fairly convincingly to see this cooperation through the prism of the US alliance relationship from this perspective so how does that play before yeah I think there are two two aspects of our security cooperation one with one aspect has to do with working with the US and this has more elements of traditional security I think the how to engage us or how to kind of streamline our alliances you know with the US between Australia and Japan and so so this triangle has elements of traditional security but the kind of you know bilateral security cooperation I think this this is kind of different and I think we are engaging in those two sort of you know different levels of security games but my point is kind of traditional aspect of you know working with Americans again this has to be managed very carefully and very strategically but I don't think there is much that you know Australia and Japan can add I mean to this except to to make the US presence here more effective functional and for instance Japanese Australian military cooperation with Americans in order for them to you know exercise their power I think that's kind of too much to expect and that I don't think that's happening so so these two dimensions should be I think conceptually you know distinguished and and and the engaging in those two level you know kind of diplomacy I think this difference should be more explicitly I think appreciated and you want to come in on that yeah I mean I think I think this question of expectations is really important and I think there is a lack of clarity around that at the moment and partly it's because political leaders get excited and they talk in much more expansive language than perhaps the policymakers are ready for or believe is actually realistic or that the institutions themselves are prepared for but language of alliances and security partners you know that means something or it could potentially mean something and I think we need to to think seriously about whether or not it's a slippery slope metaphor or something else whether or not we are sort of sliding in that direction and that's something that you know we should we should be publicly debating a colleague of mine Brendan Taylor has has just produced a report that will be launched next month here at the ANU looking at what Australia Japan security cooperation means in terms of potential Australian contribution in the event of a conflict not a war but a some kind of crisis or small scale conflict in the East China Sea and I think that's the sort of thinking that we need to be engaging in and as I guess a second point I just raises you know during Prime Minister Abe's speech in the Australian Parliament he didn't speak all that much about the US alliance it was much more about Australia and Japan cooperation and I think that was quite interesting so you know to what extent is this about a contribution to the US alliance or is this about something separate to the US alliance as we know the US and Japan are currently in the process of revising their defense guidelines and I think it will be important for Australians to watch that space and see you know what that might mean for you know trilateral cooperation in the region as you say the debate is yet to be had to some extent although you see elements of the debate starting to emerge now with some of our political leaders defining what it does and doesn't mean in their terms even if not as the government might say it just coming back to that issue though Yoshi you mentioned we should be careful about the expectations that Amy emphasized as well as being very important what what would inhibit in particular in Japan the development of a closer security relationship of both times between Australia and Japan would you say I think in practical terms and between the two administrations I mean in charge of this affair there should be no you know major concern or constraints I think the trend is I think to do more I think that's that's what's being I would assume discussed you know between bureaucrats or those those people in charge of these affairs and and so in that sense I don't think there is much concern or constraint and if there is a constraint I think this was a case of 2007 and acts I think Australian side expected more from Japan wanted Japan to do more but Japan couldn't because of its very usual well-known constraints so if you really read the document it's it's not such a big deal you know just a mutually supplying waters or contain it so you know and those kind of things and but unless there is such an agreement in document of course two militaries cannot you know operate on the same grounds so in that sense this is very significant you know it allowed both militaries to work together but if you look into the substance it's it's not really such a big deal and so so constraints us there I mean mostly coming from the Japanese side you know Australia Air Force is now bombing you know ISIS but I cannot imagine that they would come ever for Japan in the foreseeable future or for many many many years to come so so so that itself is a constraint and and perhaps when you ask the question you may have had some aspect of Japanese domestic you know constraints or resistance again if you look at the substance I say I don't expect that but if you feel there is such a thing this would come from sort of different level of concerns particularly maybe from the fact that this is Prime Minister Abe himself who is enthusiastic about this expansion of Japan security role and it Prime Minister Abe involving being involved in this kind of affair we tend to create certain image right and that certain image of course is a dominant image I think held by for instance a Japanese immediate neighbors and Chinese and maybe South Koreans too and so so that complicates I think this business but but this is different this this difficulty is quite different from difficulty innately there I mean in the security relationship between Japan and Australia and so so that's that's one possible real real you mean kind of constraint if there is and but that's that's very different from again the substance was a security cooperation I take this question that Amy mentioned which is the possibility of some kind of purchase substantial military purchase from Japan either technology or equipment you know if we were I mean I'm one of those in Australia who believes we should buy our submarines from someone so we shouldn't make them here because it's very expensive to make them here so and there is this loose discussion of the possibility of buying them from Japan how would that play out in in Japan I think again a slippery slope school would make the usual argument but I myself advocate of the middle power strategy is not very much worried I think but but I don't think our relationship would go that far Japan setting submarine to Australia still I cannot imagine as an actual policy I don't know if Prime Minister Abe decides to do this how domestic responses would be this might go but so I may be wrong but you know that's a it's not really a sea change but according to a certain person from a certain perspective it's a huge change in Japanese security policies so again it's a matter of perception you know rather than substance of security cooperation and Japan engaging in technological cooperation with foreign countries I mean military technology and again that's not a big deal I mean that's that's a usual practice of you know all the countries in the world and when I went to Sweden some time ago Swedish defense industry people wanted to develop this you know military technology cooperation with Japan you know tremendously and so Japan working with Sweden you know jointly working on you know military technology again again it's not a big deal it's a usual thing and so for us to become familiar with this kind of thing it's a it's a it's a again it's not a small issue as far as Japanese audience is concerned and it's not a small issue as far as Japanese neighbors are concerned perhaps so so again here the same issue I mean the gap between substance of you know security cooperation and particularly certain perceptions about Japan engaging in this kind of new new business what about this issue from Australian perspective how does it play into our various interests domestically and in the region more broadly yeah I mean on the submarines I'd also just sort of make the point that I mean I think there is from what I understand quite a bit of concern just within the defense science community within Japan about technology and so I think you know while we might all support the idea of technology sharing from an economic standpoint that you know Japan hasn't had a history of doing that necessarily and so there are concerns there but I you know I think there are a lot of big debates on the submarine issue that still need to be wrestled with the cost is one obviously but not just the you know the price tag when you purchase the thing but the lifetime cost of maintaining that which is something we don't know enough about from the from the Japanese side the sort of the long-term endurance of the ship and their ability to sort of patrol for long distances that's a particular concern for Australia being as we are at the other end of the world the ability to put American combat platforms onto Japanese submarines or whomever submarines we purchase so there's lots of sort of big issues around the capabilities that we that we might want from these things then there's of course the whole domestic labor argument as well which has been a big deal for the Labor Party and we heard I think quite an unfortunate speech by Bill Shorten in my own hometown a couple of weeks ago which sort of harked back to kind of a militaristic history there that we wouldn't I think is an helpful way of talking about the Australia-Japan relationship but does speak to as a domestic manufacturing sector so there's there's lots of big debates there that that politicians you know going to have to wrestle with and I don't think we are quite clear yet on where that that's going to go I want to talk with you a bit more about repositioning the relationship going forward and then I want to throw it open to the audience because I'm sure there are a lot of questions out here that will encourage a broader discussion of the potential of the relationship but sure just going back to you for a minute on where we're at and potentially going forward one of the big positives in the relationship on the economic side in recent years has been the big surge of investment interest and of course the agreement that's just been signed elevated the opening for really Japanese investment in the Australian economy and the investment thing is of course is not untied not only to the bilateral relationship but also our positioning with Japan's business in the regional economy that again changed our relationship brought it on a par with the relationship was established on the investment side under the US agreement how do you see that going forward in the economic relationship you're right I didn't talk about the lifting of the investment threshold so so now the threshold has been lifted from 250 odd million to one billion dollars before it has to be screened by our foreign investment review board so it's a liberalization significant liberalization quadrupling of the threshold for Japanese investment into Australia but this sort of gives it equal treatment to the United States in New Zealand and South Korea we've got this in the South Korean agreement and it's expected that the same will happen with the Australia-China agreement when that gets finalized and so this is it's negating some discrimination Australia faced relative to US investment from the United States investment from New Zealand and potentially from South Korea and China but I think on that front given that we've liberalized our threshold investment threshold to these preferred partners I think it's time to think about lifting the threshold unilaterally for the foreign investment review board that's another issue but it is a significant part of the EPA and for Japanese investment into Australia the the other thing you mentioned is about how that helps Japanese companies not just in Australia but in the region and something important that I think about in terms of repositioning the bilateral relationship both Japan and Australia have China is our number one economic partner our most important economic partner and Asia is where our economic bread is buttered Asia more broadly because it's not just a China relationship it's it's complex supply chains and production networks so Australia and Japan's interests are in deepening that economic interdependence in Asia and across the Trans-Pacific with the United States and so I don't understand a lot of the hard political security military cooperation but I do believe that is it talked about much easier it's easier to discuss these zero-sum issues the political security issues in a context of a more interdependent economic relationship not just bilaterally but but with more partners there's a positive sum element to economic cooperation that I think helps on on these political security issues and if I might just go a little further I think one of the achievements the significance achievements significant achievements of Australia Japan in diplomacy was the creation of APEC very much led by Australia and Japan in helping create a broad framework in the region for economic cooperation and I think we're at a time where we we are looking for something like that again we have the TPP ASAP agreements in Australia and Japan are in both and so it's about fashioning these to have a broader more inclusive economic cooperation arrangement in the region well let's talk a bit about going forward both on the economic side and the political security side so you know APEC's out there it's part of the framework but we've got the TPP under negotiation and we've got this broader regional comprehensive economic partnership under negotiation as well Australia and Japan are involved in both of them and as was discussed earlier and as the Mexican Minister said in Washington yesterday very much the TPP has turned into a giant Japan US FTA negotiation so how do you see us taking our cooperation forward beyond the foundation that's been laid in the partnership agreement that we signed this year in that context sure well the TPP involves a number of Asia Pacific economies it doesn't involve China India Indonesia doesn't involve Australia and Japan as you mentioned in the United States and then the ASAP agreement a regional comprehensive economic partnership agreement involves the ASEAN plus six of the ASEAN plus Japan China Korea India New Zealand and Australia but doesn't involve the United States now if these agreements get concluded and exclude important economic and political partners in the region like United States on one hand Indonesia China on the other they're not so helpful for for economic cooperation I mean these especially the US China relationship having two separate frameworks two separate agreements that have different rules governing them is not congenial to helping the bilateral relationship so I think with Australia and Japan in both it's a matter of having making them less exclusionary and over time so that there's an opportunity for these other countries to join to make them more inclusive and and make operation lies the open accession clauses that are supposedly in both of these agreements sorry to jump in is there is a sign that Japan is keen to make these agreements less exclusionary I think we're hearing that in Australia perhaps but I'm curious about the Japan situation I I don't know and I don't think so from what I can see I think the priority now is is hunkering down in a bilateral negotiation with the United States on on market access and and that's priority number one and it appears as I said before giving up as little as possible so I think there's not much thinking I don't think there's much thinking in the region more broadly but in Japan about making these agreements inclusive over time and more open to other members but so you're not backing away from the TPP negotiation when you say backing away well you're not we you're not discounting that as a major platform for deepening regional cooperation well it doesn't include China Indonesia a number of other partners in the region so I find that problematic if it but it deals with the big issues between Japan and the United States yep so that's an important priority in Japan is clearly on that at the moment yeah but I think when that's done then what next and I think then the focus has to be on this regional comprehensive economic partnership that includes its neighbors as well as the complimentary Japan China Korea trilateral agreement so I think you know while the focus now very symbolic political politically hot TPP is what everyone's focused on I think that's not the only game in town and while that's important to get done I think it's it's worth thinking about moving forward after that and there are other agreements and other frameworks that do need attention after that so you mentioned earlier that you know Australia and Japan did work really very closely together diplomatically and economically in setting the APEC framework up do you see similar opportunities for Japan and Australia to work closely together in this broader Asian economic cooperation arrangement most definitely yeah that was a time when everyone was trying to deal with Japan's rise and really deepened cooperation beyond what existed which was basically we didn't have frameworks to talk about these things region-wide we have a few more now actually we have a fair few we've got East Asia summit let's focus on the economics we have existing APEC framework but I think given the need for deeper cooperation and regional integration as many of these countries are proposing these binding agreements such as RCEP and TPP and so and it's not decided no one knows what the region is going to look like what these arrangements are going to look like five years hence little on next year I think it's there is a strong bilateral but also beyond bilateral platform to work from in shaping these from the inside I'm going to hand it over to the audience in a minute to pose some questions to the panelists but before I do just let's reflect upon what might be the potential shape of the security political relationship between Australia and Japan going forward Yoshi you hinted that there were significant opportunities to develop a serious political security relationship between the two countries which would assist the interests of both countries would you like to say a little bit more about ideally how you'd like to see that evolve well again this is my middle power concept sorry repeating this I think what's being achieved between Japan and Australia should be a regionalized regionalized shouldn't be kept just between ourselves and theoretically in practice it's not going to happen unfortunately but there are seeds and potentials there real potentials is to involve South Korea Australia and South Korea I understand have much more comprehensive security agreements and in fact AXA to I guess you have access between the two militaries and Japan and South Korea came very close to agreeing to AXA during the administration and I hear that document is almost complete but they are simultaneously negotiating military information act and and that was complete but the signing was postponed because of the political developments and so so tried actualizing this sort of you know typical middle power cooperation among Japan South Korea Australia I think in theory at least there are potentials there and it's up to political environment and political leadership and so so I think in that sense we can lead maybe we can repeat what we did in creating APEC in more political and security domain it's a it's a regional multilateral cooperation I mean that's that's the game what would the show you know tangibly what with the shape of such a cooperation arrangement well for for instance having trilateral AXA among Japan Australia South Korea and three militaries engaging in the same sort of you know peacekeeping disaster relief activities I think that's a beautiful scene and and and I think that's possible I think that's possible and then maybe and again this is not ganging up against China of course this has no elements of balancing it has elements of creating regional infrastructure of multilateral security cooperation which is terribly lacking and I think Japan and Australia are the kind of best partners in promoting such a new regional initiative in political and security domain so that's in a way a repetition of APEC in a different domain it'll have to be done with a lot of diplomacy yes really so it doesn't send the wrong signals that's right exactly exactly so so in that sense political leadership matter I think very much how you present this and I'm not sure whether apparently perfectly fit or not I would not comment but that's very important Amy would you like to add to that well that's probably a nice place to pick up I mean political leadership and selling this is critically important and Prime Minister Abe has been very active in in selling his message to certain countries in the region he's been very active in Southeast Asia and here in Australia in India and elsewhere but the two key countries that he needs to really sell that to China and South Korea and what a great piece by Ben Asione in the most recent quarterly that's just been launched today picks up on this point you know over the last 20 years the regional sort of security pact has been based on this idea of engaging with China getting the benefits out of China's rise but also hedging against the risks that China's rise might pose and we're seeing I think a sharper turn towards the hedging side of that largely because of China's behavior over the last little while now the problem is though when we can't move completely to the hedging side we we're not in the Cold War for all the reasons that Shiro's pointed out we need that economic engagement with China the region all depends on it Australia and everyone else so we need we need some kind of renewed pact some new diplomacy new ideas about how this region will will exist and in most importantly I think how the two great powers in this region China and Japan can actually happily coexist but well let me throw a bit of a damp squib on this Yoshi I was in Japan as you know over the last week or so I was talking to a really quite senior Japanese strategic analyst there and basically he said to me all this middle power diplomacy has gone from Japan we're in a different period now we're in a different era has never been there I wonder would you say that was the right judge I think I'm the only one who's arguing well let's throw it open to the audience for some questions now and I'm sure there'll be a lot of questions and please direct it to anyone you wish to all the panelists at all yeah number one thank you Gensuke Yoshida political minister of the embassy of Japan in Canberra thank you for the panels for fascinating conversation this is rather a common then question one of the aspects that deserves more attention in Japan common endeavors is maintenance and developing of rules-based order surely this is not a bilateral endeavor but endeavor shared by the like-minded countries that since Japan and Australia are two of the exemplary international citizen citizens we rightly deserve to take leadership in this endeavor when we say Japan and Australia share the same strategic vision and interests I think we mean that we share the vision of the world or international order that we wish to comfortably live in that's the world that is the world order open and the ball fair and equitable predictable and stable in which rule of law prevails and the countries or actors are not invited or misled to misbehave or misuse power to achieve its strategic goals resulting to use of force or coercive measures so we can work together to strengthen rule of law especially in Asia Pacific region and that is what promised abbey advocated when he delivered I think that's a comment but I think it's also carries a question with it which would be useful have some comment on it I want to extend the question part of it in a way because a rules-based order has to do with the the upholding of international hard law hard international law in various ways and various conventions and norms on the political side it also has to do with upholding the rules and norms of the international economic system which are also in a state of fluidity for a number of reasons and which of course the framework of the G20 the summit of which we're hosting here in Australia this year is directed its attention to in the short term and and hopefully more in the longer term so from both the political side Amy or Yoshi and from the economic side I wonder if you'd like to respond to this comment question I mean I completely agree there's there's been a huge appetite for this phrase rule of law in the last year or so not only in Japan but also in China where Xi Jinping very frequently refers to the rule of law they mean something quite different I think you know I rules-based order is a lovely phrase partly because it's quite ambiguous and it's ambiguous when we drill down to what we actually mean and what kinds of rules we're talking about and when we're talking about for instance things like freedom of navigation and surveillance activities in territorial waters and all these kinds of things stays in the region interpret those rules and norms differently so I would absolutely agree with you we do need more discourse about that but and to be blunt it needs to involve not just the partners that normally talk to each other but it also needs to involve China as well because we can't I don't think we can assume that dictating rules to China will solve any problems we need to actually get these actors on the same page to agree on what they actually mean by various rules this is clearly true also on the economic side unless all the partners are involved in rule and norm formation then there's no adherence and unless you have everybody in the room some of whom are going to be quite difficult to talk to in the initial phase of this process then you're not going to get any effective rules and norms Josh you know coming on it not the economic side the political side yeah I think I cannot think of anybody who disagree with the importance of this and so how to put this into practice as sort of regional infrastructure I think there should be those initiatives and and in the end and engaging in China is of course very important and in this sort of evolution of you know making rule of law and other values as foundations of Asia Pacific order and but I don't think Prime Minister included we have not yet you know reached that's a level of operationalizing this concept necessarily and and if as long as this is taken as expression of sort of countermeasures against against Chinese some of you know what we see as aggressive options to some extent this has some merits but I think there are limits and I don't think we have gone through those limits necessarily and yeah that's it under what we're okay on the economic side we have a global framework through the WTO the multilateral trading system that has rules for trade global rules for trade that that all members sign up to when they join and these have served us very well in the since World War two they've underpinned confidence in economic exchange between countries and trade has grown rapidly and allowed countries to open up with confidence knowing that other countries have signed on to these rules and signed up to these constraints so I do worry about you know the stalling of the Doha around in the WTO the lack of further liberalization has given a lot of countries sort of not the green light but they've used as an excuse to do some of the rulemaking outside of the global framework and bilaterals but importantly regional agreements like the Trans Pacific Partnership this is more about rule setting than market access really and the problem with fragmenting the rules of global trade and having different rules for different partners is I think a really good example of how important the global trade rules are it comes to a lot of work I've been doing with Amy on Chinese rare earth metals so this is everyone's familiar with the case of the Chinese supposedly stopping exports of rare earth metals to Japan which China has a monopoly in producing 97% global supply after Senkaku Dio you flare up supposedly these exports were stopped and these exports are very important for Japan in high tech manufacturers high high-end goods that Japan relies on to export and instead of whatever you think happened whether there was a trade embargo or not there's very little evidence for there being a trading bar go in fact there's no evidence we can find this wasn't resolved by Japan the United States and Europe and other economies putting you know escalating stopping trade with China or retaliating it was settled in the WTO the dispute settlement mechanisms very active still very robust and China abided by the finding that it actually slowed down exports of rare earths to try consolidate its own domestic industry so this is an important example of where the global trading system can help resolve issues peacefully in a respected body and these are constraints and rules that China and others signed up to voluntarily in their accession to the WTO there's a bigger issue there in areas beyond these particular rules in the G20 but we'll leave that for a moment and ask for some more questions who would like them okay Hasegawa sir here in the middle and then Koichi Hasegawa from Tohoku University my question is how about the civil society level Australia and Japan's citizens relationship in case of Japan and mainland China and in case of South Korea and mainland China I don't know in South Korea and Japan in in both cases we have a lot of NGO and civil society's activities to exchange how about in the relationship between Australia and Japan can you show some special activities to include understanding each other I let the panel have a go at that first but then I'll ask Murray to come in on that because he's been deeply involved for a number of years as ambassador in the relationship would you like to start my personal involvement experience has to do with the program which Mitsui trading company is organizing here in Australia they are giving it is a scholarship or they invite a group of select Australian University students to Japan for a month or so and I've been biting them in my class one of my classes every year and we are going to do this in December this year also having discussions between students and discussions are very beautiful and in a very very productive and just confirms the importance of commonalities of their of course values preferences and exchanging views about these stage and regional affairs and no obstacle whatsoever and so it's very natural yeah but I don't know to that extent how many those activities are being conducted but I just happen to be sponsoring sure yeah I think there is a lot that is happening and I'll defer to Murray McLean to give you a broader picture but I learned that just last week we signed our 109th sister city relationship between a Australian Japanese city or region so that's pretty significant we have a lot of exchange programs in fact I have an announcement here to make I was waiting for the final session but now seems a fitting time the jet program the Japan exchange and teaching program which is sends a lot of students from students graduates from Australia to Japan to teach has an information like next Monday night here at ANU and Matt French over there has more information so it's a huge civil society interaction between the two countries no if you can say a little bit about that yeah look I won't take much time it's been effectively said already because but I'd like to make one point and that is that in terms of our relationships that is Australia's relationships with Asian countries I think the level of community and the civil society relationships is second to none the reason this has been going solidly now for 50 plus years and it's been was all part of the reconciliation process between Australia and Japan in the post-war period and as very much integral to the growth of the bilateral relationship which was usually seen in headlines as the economic relationship but the underpinning of it has always been a very very active community level of relationship between school visits I mean I think there's something like 60 or 70,000 Japanese school children that is not a university level students coming to Australia every year for a week or two that's the most that Japan sends to any country and Australians through these sister city relationships and provincial relationships and state to prefectural relationships have been going on for a long time I think the challenge really in the future is that this level of activity can not only be sustained but to continue to grow because let's face it the news out there for young people is that China's the game and it's important that Australian young Australians do have associations with China but it's a very important not to drop the Japan level of connections that we have at the community level because it's brought so many you know through the jet program which of course is a Japanese initiative there are many people in government and in our embassies and and other universities who've been through this program it's been a highly successful program and that's part of the thinking behind the current government's new Colombo plan that young Australians more young Australians will go up to Japan at the university level and include a second in industry or wherever and that's all very important I think because if you don't have the trust and the understanding at the grassroots level then you can't do bigger things such as free trade agreements or security or strategic relationships one of the first country or the first country that Australia put in place a working holiday program with was Japan and similarly the first country that Japan put in place a working holiday program with Australia that's also played a very important role in extending the civil relations between our two countries I should just I should as the chair of the Australian Japan Foundation say that that's the whole point of our organization and we give about 40 grants a year and we get about 150 applications and they're always very high quality and it's all about trying to foster non-government community and other levels of relations let's take one or two questions before unfortunately we have to close this session yep there's one up the back here my name is Fuad Karouta I'm physicist I'm not politician I have a question I mean you you have been mentioning the necessity of economic growth economic cooperation in Asia including China on the other hand when we talk strategic and military things we are excluding China for obvious reason how you think we can go with these two lines in parallel and second if we look at what happened in east Ukraine in the last period with Russia do you think this is not giving some wings or we'll give some wings to China to create some incident major incident in Asia also to divert the Chinese population from what is happening in Hong Kong now any last question and we're questioned up we'll throw that those two questions over the panel it's a great question and it's beautifully phrased we the answer is we can't we can't afford for our economics to move in one direction and our security to move in the other partly because the economic relationship is just so important but also because we don't we can't slide into a war you know we don't want that scenario do we to unfold and I think that's why so many of us are concerned about the Japan the state of the Japan-China relationship albeit one that you know in the last few months does seem to be sort of improving slightly in there you know is likely to be a meeting in November I think the fundamentals of that relationship are profoundly unhealthy at a time when as Professor Samuels has mentioned Japan is trying to escape from the post war in its national identity the Xi Jinping government is clinging very tightly to this idea of maintaining the post war order in which Japan was given a very specific role as a non-normal military power and all the references that we hear coming out of China to the Cairo Declaration the Potsdam Declaration sort of symbols of that I've done some research earlier this year on China's new idea of a new type of great power relations with the US which is great but it doesn't talk at all about Japan and that's a real problem and so you know I think the the goal has to be for for those of us in Australia who care about this regional relationship to do all we can to try and work out ways to get those two states to engage in that mutual reckoning process not an easy goal which is why I'm glad and I'm an academic and not a policymaker. What do I add to that Shira? Yeah look on the first question I think for a starting point it's important to have dialogue and cooperation to minimise the misunderstandings and minimize the risk and when you don't have leaders meeting and you have bad relations between Japan and China for example and that doesn't help and so I mentioned before having you know a strong economic relationship to build on which is what we have in between Australia, China, Australia, Japan, Japan, China and the rest of the region that's a positive sum it's a nice place to to get together and and talk such as the APEC summit and on the sidelines of the margins these leaders can meet and talk about these issues if it's possible and so I think it is important to have the bilateral top leadership visits meetings for communication and and furthering shared interests so it is in the shared interest of these countries to have peace and prosperity and stability and so I think that's a starting point for for making progress on the security front and on your second question I think China is a very different case from Russia China's much more integrated into the regional and global economy and depends much more on its neighbours for its trade and investment and other links that it's it's not in China's interest to do anything like that cause conflict as little did most likely have the effect of destabilising their economy and this and therefore cause social instability so so maybe that's a little bit naive but it's deeply deeply integrated into a regional economy we should end it here but I do want to ask you one or one last question which you can answer in one minute we've talked about some of the important dimensions of the relationship as it as they look at the moment and going forward a bit but in looking forward at the potential of the relationship what one or two things would each of you highlight as important priorities in the development and deepening of the relationship between the two countries sure why don't you start beyond what I've said already well there is a lot of potential because of all the things that we've talked about the deep relationship and what Murray said how close we are how familiar we are and so I think it's really spreading that kind of closeness with the two countries further in the region I think that's potential to do that may sound idealistic but to Yoshi that corporation can have more than one minute because I wanted to respond to that question also oh yeah and I think these days I think in in international conferences we see such scenes as Chinese scholars saying something like you may not like us but we are the reality or we may be now getting back to the traditional place in Asia and you know the things are coming explicitly from them and I think this so-called new model of major power relations has a lot to do with it I think this this model has to again two levels I think China is perfectly ready and wishes to coexist with the United States at the global level in dealing with global issues and even including trade and issues in the liberal international order I think China is perfectly ready to live and continue to develop under the premises of the so-called liberal international order at the global level but in Asia that's where we have doubt and one Southeast Asian diplomat said very eloquently like I don't think China wants to rule the world but they simply wants to rule us and I think there is no perhaps contradiction I mean in the Chinese mind between economic interdependence and security friction between security friction is largely in the context of this seeking China-centered Asia but there is no contradiction of that aspiration with Chinese readiness to coexist with the US in other domains on one premise which is US should accept that Asia Pacific is wide enough to accommodate interests of both countries and I don't think US is gonna do that easily therefore concerns about security I think this the picture so from the Chinese world views perhaps there is no contradiction Asia with China at the center is a natural Asia I think Chinese really believe you know there should be nothing wrong about it you know we are benign and you shouldn't be so worried and and and but so that causes some problem and how to deal with that so this is your answer to my question I think that's the biggest issue between Japan and Australia we should have the serious discussion about the nature of the rise of China and we should have the common assessment you know from the common viewpoints and then we should have common strategy which is not of course ganging up against China immediately but it's a comprehensive strategy and if Australia and Japan cannot engage in you know serious dialogue about those quite serious substantial issues which would decide the future of our life you know at this time of the rise of China and I think the ultimate hope as far as I'm concerned lies in Chinese liberal internationalists I think Chinese liberal internationalists know very well future of China doesn't exist unless they continue to live under the premises of liberal international order and and I think Japan is is in a very critical position because when Mr. Danshaoping came to Japan and he knew that Japan would be the first country which would help China modernize reform through foreign direct investment as far as foreign official you know assistance so I don't say that Japan created today's China but Japan played a very important role and in creating today's China and also Japan was one of the four runners in the negotiations of Chinese entry into WTO we are the first country among developed countries to concluded bilateral you know with China and our intention was of course to bring China in liberal international order and so Japanese foreign policy toward China has been like that for many years you know not to mention after diplomatic normalization in 72 until very recently and the importance of Japan for China I would assume has not changed but you know Matsushita Konosuke talked to Mr. Danshaoping and Danshaoping asked Matsushita to invest in China and he said immediately yes and then went to China and the aftermath of that we saw last year smashing the Panasonic factories what happened what went wrong and so Japan should think about it very seriously and Chinese should think about this relationship very seriously having those you know positive records of history in mind. The last word to you Amy. Can I just steal Soyuz and so on. I mean I think I think just to reiterate that remembering these earlier periods and even earlier the 50s and 60s being absolutely crucial as well but I guess the one the one indicator I would would say for the Australia-Japan relationship in particular is clearly discussing expectations about what the security cooperation is for. Join me in thanking the panel for what's been going on. To make some concluding remarks and then I'll thank a few people at the end. Thanks so reassuringly I'm only here to close the proceedings so I hope that today's Japan update has left you with sense that you would like it would have liked it to continue longer and and would like more. It's deliberately designed as a one-day event for people like you the thinking community on Australia-Japan relations and on regional policy issues and what we're attempting to do is to interrogate and reframe what we think we know about Japan and its place in the world. So I'm delighted today today that we've been able to do this from the standpoint of multiple disciplines we've heard from history, political science, economics, linguistics, environment, international relations and finally to my great delight as a professor of law we got to rule of law at the end. We also heard a little bit about strategic bankruptcy today and I hope that we've convinced you that at least for ANU Japan is a strategic priority and also something that we regard as a very valuable asset and our intention is to remain a very long-term stakeholder. So I want to just close off by first of all thanking you, the audience, conversations need partners and it's a tribute to the quality of the presentations today that you hear at the end and still engaging very actively. We genuinely welcome your suggestions for things that you would like to see as part of the thematic focus for the future updates. Our Vice-Chancellor Ian Young formally opened the proceedings this morning with praise for some of our senior Japan specialists here at ANU and I want to join him in congratulating Professor Peter Drysdale on his recent honour from the Japan Foundation. But as a dean I have to say I really also want to recognise and celebrate the rising stars that we have here at ANU focusing on Japan and who make the field across all of the disciplines so dynamic. So on your behalf I'd like to thank the co-conveners of today's Japan update. Professor Simon Avernill who's the director of our ANU Japan Institute and both Dr Shiro Armstrong and Professor Ipe Fujiwara who are co-directors of the Australia Japan Research Centre and of course all of their staff. We particularly want to thank our major sponsor for today the Australia Japan Foundation under the chairmanship of Ambassador Murray McClain and to acknowledge with thanks the support of the Embassy of Japan here in Australia. I've probably preempted much of what Shiro wanted to say but let me hand the podium to him to thank the hardest working people today who are our speakers. Thank you all for being here. Thank you Veronica and you did thank most of the people I wanted to thank but that's okay because I'd like to thank them too and thank you for everyone for sticking with us all day. It's nice to see so many familiar faces in the audience and it did make the sessions lively. The speakers who came from afar from Japan and the United States to share and make accessible some of their deeper research which is really important to us and what we try to do here at the ANU and especially the Crawford School to not just do our research but to try and make it accessible to everyone. Again thank you to the Japan Foundation Australia Japan Foundation and the Japanese Embassy for all the support and importantly my team Rosie Tran Akira Kinefuchi and Kaise Iwano who's up there and the extended team and Jill Mulbray for her help earlier on in the update before she got a promotion left us and the East Asia Forum team more broadly and just before we all leave as Veronica said we are very keen for feedback on today's proceedings both the substance the organization of it the logistics we do intend to run it next year and in the future so any feedback you can give us is most welcome and most helpful and there are some hard copy surveys out the front but for now I'd like to thank everyone for staying and hope to see you next year Japan update 2015 thank you