 I mean, just to follow up on Cliff's point there about the quarterly reviews, there we go. That's absolutely true. We will be under what's known as post-programme surveillance and post-programme monitoring until essentially 75% of the funds that were drawn down will be repaid. So I guess that will take me up to retirement. Okay. So in terms of my remarks, I'm going to provide some personal observations on the country-specific recommendations that were made to Ireland by the European Commission as part of the European semester last week. As Barbara outlined, the CSOs are essentially the culmination of the European semester, the process of enhanced economic governance in the EU that has been in place since 2011. So this is the fourth cycle, but it's the first time that Ireland has formally participated in the process, having exited the joint EU IMF program at the tail end of last year. Having said that, again, Barbara outlines that we informally participated in the process for a number of years, pretty much since the process began, because the government decided in 2011 and each subsequent year that it would submit stability program updates and national reform plans to the Commission. So we did actually, the documents were reviewed by the Commission and we did get country-specific recommendations on an informal basis each year. They were essentially to continue to implement the program as was the case. So just by way of background and in terms of the macroeconomic backdrop that wonder pins the CSOs, I think it's fair to say that there's a broad consensus in terms of the short-term outlook for the economy between ourselves, as articulated in the stability program update that was published in mid-April, and the forecasts within this were endorsed by the Fiscal Advisory Council, as is a requirement, as is a legal requirement under the so-called TUPAC, the two pieces of legislation that apply to EURO area member states. So we're projecting, and I'm talking about the blue bar here, we're projecting output growth of 2.1% for this year, accelerating to 2.7% next year. The 2.7% projection assumes consolidation of just over 1% of GDP for next year, so the 2 billion figure that is put about in the media quite a bit. The Commission are a little bit more conservative in terms of this year, they're projecting 1.7. These are the DGECAFIN forecasts that were published in the spring macroeconomic projections by the Commission. The Commission is projecting that output growth accelerates to 3% for next year, but there's an important caveat here. The projections are on a no fiscal policy change basis. So this is an issue that all member states have to deal with. Unless the consolidation instruments are specified in sufficient detail, the Commission does not take the consolidation into account. So as a result, output growth is stronger, but the deficit is correspondingly larger than we would have assumed that the Commission is projecting a deficit of 4.2% of GDP. But as I say, that does not include additional consolidation. And that would be one of the problems that we would identify with the CSO's in the sense that the Commission only take into account measures that are sufficiently specified in detail. As you know, government policy is that the measures are actually specified on budget time rather than six months in advance. And we think that's appropriate. So there's a little bit of an issue over that, although I mean it's fair to say it. It's not a game changer. Over the medium term, so the blue lines here for 16, 17 and 18, we are projecting output growth of just north of 3%, which is in line with the estimated potential growth rate of the Irish economy, leaving aside sort of the uncertainty surrounding such estimates. Leaving aside actual growth rates, what I think is more important is that we're seeing a rotation of demand. Incoming data confirmed that domestic demand, having fallen peak to trough by over a quarter is now taking over the baton. So we're seeing a rotation from net exports to domestic demand. The investment cycle is leading the way after years of under investment relative to GDP. We've seen very strong investment growth over the past couple of quarters. And that's projected to continue for this year. With the strong investment growth and the increase in the capital stock, firms are readjusting their capital labor ratios, generating employment, generating labor income, which combined with a fall in the household savings rate is leading to consumption growth. So the two biggest components of domestic demand, namely capital formation and personal consumer spending, are contributing positively in the short term. Now, we do see a positive contribution to output growth over the medium term, but that is conditional upon policies being implemented to unlock domestic demand, okay? So what are these policies to unlock domestic demand? What are the policies that will safeguard economic growth into the future? Well, from an apartment finance perspective, we see them as three-fold, essentially ensuring fiscal sustainability, complying with the various fiscal rules, the nominal deficit rule, the structural deficit rule, the debt correction rule, and putting the debt ratio on a downward path. That is expected this year. We do think the debt ratio has peaked and is now on a downward path. But it's important that that is maintained over the medium term. In terms of the financial sector, there are two interrelated priorities. Firstly, there is the need to address the high levels of household and NFC indebtedness, NFC non-financial corporate indebtedness because excessive debt in the private sector is weighing on domestic demand. So policies must involve dealing more efficiently with the non-performing loans, currently about 25% of the loan book, maybe about 17, 18% of the mortgage book. So dealing with non-performing loans is an issue. There will undoubtedly be a capital cost associated with this, but it's already built into the sort of peak hour exercise. Secondly, the recovery and investment to date has largely been driven, we think, by the multinational sector. Let's be honest, the multinational sector faces zero credit constraints. A more sustainable recovery and investment over the medium term is contingent upon better access and on more reasonable terms to finance for SMEs, who quite frankly are the lifeblood of the economy, the account for about 70% of employment and about 50% of growth value add. Finally, product and factor market reforms are needed in order to boost the potential growth rate of the economy to improve competitiveness in order to boost the shock absorption capacity of the economy. So we see those as a sort of medium term challenge. So in this regard, the country specific recommendations are broadly consistent with addressing the challenges that we see. If you look at the documentation itself, I count between 30 and 35 actual actions that the commission specifies. They're grouped into seven headings, into the seven recommendations. And what I've done here is kind of further grouped them into three broad categories, fiscal, financial sector, and supply side recommendations. In terms of the fiscal, the commission is recommending the correction of the excessive deficit in a timely manner and subsequent convergence towards the MTO. I'll come back to that in one second. The commission is also recommending reforms to the budgetary architecture. In particular, they are suggesting or recommending that multi-annual ceilings and expenditure become more binding. Again, this is another area that we would tend to disagree with the commission. If you look at the legislation, the ministers and secretaries act in 2012. It is clear that the ceilings are actually legally binding. So we do have a little bit of an issue there. Turning from the macro to the micro, the microeconomic aspects on the fiscal side talk about the need to make the tax system more growth friendly, more environmentally friendly. The need to improve value for money in healthcare spending. So it's difficult to disagree with any of those. The financial sector CSR is essentially boiled down to accelerating pace of private sector debt resolution, including mortgage debt resolution, as well as improving access to finance for SMEs, both bank-based finance, as well as diversifying away from bank-based finance. In other words, a deepening of capital markets. In terms of structural reforms, the commission focuses on the need to improve competition in the legal services sector. Personally, I thought this recommendation could have been a little bit wider. Yes, we all recognize that greater competition is needed on the legal side, but there's lots of other sheltered sectors in the economy that need to be opened up to competition. Barriers need to be dismantled. Barriers to entry need to be dismantled and so forth. The commission also recommends an improving the functioning of the labor market to inter alia at more aggressive active labor market policies, boosting female participation rates, addressing skills mismatches through training and so forth. So again, it's difficult to disagree with these. Focusing just for one minute on where we might have a comparative advantage, that would be on the macro fiscal recommendations. The commission is recommending that we correct the excessive deficit. Next year, in other words, bring the deficit below 3% of GDP. This stems, as you know, from the council recommendations issued to Ireland in December 2010 when we entered the program. So we were given a five-year time frame in order to correct the excessive deficit. Most people would typically see that as broadly appropriate, given the sort of trade-off between the need to repair the fiscal accounts on one hand and support aggregate demand on the other. I think it's important to outline as well that the SPU, the stability program updates, confirms that we are on track to correct the excessive deficit in a timely manner by next year. But that's only step one. Step two will involve a move to the preventive arm of the Pact from 2016 onwards. The key requirement here is to make progress towards the balance budget rule, what we know, what we call the medium-term budgetary objective. For Ireland, that is zero. It takes into account the long-term aging in the population, the need to ensure fiscal sustainability and so forth. So the balance budget rule is set in structural terms and it's set in structural terms in order to avoid prosyctical fiscal policies. So there's a strong theoretical underpinning to that. The problem though relates to measurement issues. These measurement issues pose serious challenges for Ireland and for other member states, given the openness of the economy, given the openness of capital and labour markets. Structural balance is essentially an unobservable variable, unlike the headline balance, which is relatively easy to measure. We need to rely on estimation techniques for estimating the economic cycle and subsequently the structural budget balance. You can often get counter-intuitive results, which is problematic. It can potentially lead to suboptimal fiscal policies and it is an area of big concern that we will need to be conscious of from 2016 onwards. We're not alone, lots of other member states are in the same boat, but Ireland is a little bit of an outlier given the openness of our factor markets. So that is an issue that we will need to come back to in the short term. Sorry, I've gone on a little bit, I'm off to the final slide. So in conclusion, given the sort of macroeconomic challenges that we face, I think most, though not all, of the recommendations are broadly appropriate. They are essentially a legacy of the programme. Most of the recommendations were issued under the programme and sort of they remain to be implemented. Some of them are structural in nature, so obviously it will take a long time before we reap the benefits, so to speak. I think they're on the whole appropriate in terms of the level of specificity. They're in line with the spirit of the semester, whereby the commission is more interested in the goal rather than the policies to get there, in other words, they're not overly prescriptive. The main areas of disagreement, as I outlined, we believe our expenditure ceilings are sufficiently binding from a legal perspective. I would query the need to specify ex ante the specific consolidation instruments, and then there is the big issue regarding operationalising the balanced budget rule. Barbara mentioned at the start what the next steps are. The CSOs are currently being discussed by the various committees and then the various council formations, the ACAFIN Council, the Employment Council, the Competitiveness Council, the Social Council and so forth. The European Council is due to sign off on the CSOs at the end of June, and ACAFIN then will formally endorse them at the beginning of July. From an Department of Finance perspective, we will need to take on board the fiscal recommendations in the draft budgetary plan, which will be submitted to the European Commission in mid-October, again in line with the so-called TUPAC. Thereafter, the process will begin again next November when the commission produces its annual growth survey, and that will kick off the process again. So that's the sort of next steps. So I'll leave it at that. Thank you very much.