 Well, first of all, I have to apologize for my slides because I wasn't well organized enough to actually have them ready when they were requested and I'm really sorry. I looked at them this morning and I thought they are not as good as they should be, but they are what they are. So apologies. What I'm going to talk about is really a work that I have been doing with colleagues in Colombia over the past two and a half years. And this is really, this is my personal, I'm just finishing an article and it's my personal reflection, so that we've just finished a book in Colombia in Spanish on this. And now this is just my personal take on it, trying to make sense of some of the issues that came out of this work. So, well, I'm not really going to talk about like everybody else about business and human rights. So there is a link to business and human rights, of course. What I'm really concerned about is more transitional justice and in the context of transitional justice, to what extent corporate actors, but in particular individuals, because I'm going to focus on criminal liability, criminal responsibility of economic actors for their role in armed conflict, to what extent that can be addressed by transitional justice. So maybe briefly, because I'm not sure that everybody is familiar with transitional justice very, very briefly. Transitional justice is really, it's a, well, one can talk about the definition forever, I don't have the time, but what it is mainly about is a society trying to come to terms with a period of mass human rights violations. So it's really either in transitions from a conflict to peace, as in Colombia, or from repression to democracy, like, for example, in Argentina, Chile and other countries in Latin America. So in these situations, what we face, first of all, is, of course, lots of problems in terms of administering justice, because this morning, the Colombian colleague I think has just left, and we heard about Colombia, and we heard about the massive scale of the human rights violations. So we are talking about millions of victims, and we are talking about thousands of perpetrators. And so, of course, if you think about that scale, it's already clear that you cannot bring everybody to court, you cannot really have criminal trials against everybody. You can't really have reparations, full reparations, as you would have under normal circumstances for the harm you cause someone. So you have to, already, there are lots of trade-offs involved in thinking about how do you deal with this. Colombia faces the additional problem that this was a negotiated peace. So as we again heard this morning, those of you who were in this room and listened to the Colombia presentation, what we heard there is that, and what, of course, most of you will know, is that in Colombia, basically in Havana, there were several years of negotiations between the Colombian government and the largest guerrilla group FARC. And so they negotiated this peace agreement, which causes, of course, its own problems because of the compromises that you have to reach in this process. So now the negotiating parties for the government and the leaders of the FARC. But what they came up with, well, maybe let's talk about the more general issues first of all, and then I'll come to Colombia. So in general, and this is a problem in the context of Colombia, as we've heard about over these two years, international law and transitional justice as maybe part of international law, although that's debatable as well, and what extended is even law, a special area of law. But it's based on international criminal law and international human rights law and international humanitarian law. So it has basis in international law. Of course, as we know, international law is very much state-centered, and this is why normally transitional justice processes focus on the role of state actors, and then in the context of conflict on the role of the armed groups, but it doesn't usually focus on anybody else. And so we don't really have in international, first of all, we don't really have international precedence, really, telling us how do we actually include these other groups if we think they played an important role in the conflict. If they did, then there might be a good reason to actually want to include them and hold them to account as well. But we really have very, and this is what this came to light very much in the context of the Colombia work, very little international experience and very little international precedent. In fact, I was invited and I felt like a total cheat. I was invited several times to meetings as an so-called international expert and I was always asked to talk about international experience and I always had to say, well, there is very little. I'm so sorry, but there is very, very little you can actually draw on. And including the academic debate is very much at its beginnings. How can you actually include, should you include, and if so, how these actors in these already very precarious transitional justice processes. But one of the reasons why in Colombia this came up was because Colombia really tried to negotiate a peace agreement, whatever one might think about it, but what they were definitely trying very hard was to negotiate a peace agreement that would stand up to international scrutiny. So they, and part of that was the awareness and particularly in the context of the inter-American system of the state obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish, and that that includes all actors. So it does not just include state actors, it doesn't just include the crimes committed by the armed groups, but if there are other actors who had a role to play and had an important role to play, the state obligation extends to them as well. And so this is why from the very beginning, already during the negotiations in Havana the question arose how to do it. Now, very, very briefly, because Colombia is interesting because they have an ongoing transitional justice process, the justice and peace process. I don't really have time to say much about it, but this started in 2005 and this is a peace process that focused on the demobilization of the paramilitary groups. And it offered paramilitaries who demobilize alternative sanctions of five to eight years of imprisonment for truth and reparations, very simplified version of this. But what happened in, so it was only limited to them, it excluded everybody else. Now, one of the problems with that was that in the context, so they got these alternative sanctions, but against these very, very broad confessions. So during these very, very long confessions, they came up with all sorts of information about all sorts of other actors. So they might have, they might say, you know, we did this, that and the other. But the, all of these different economic actors, partly companies, partly small business, partly landowners, all sorts of different groups, they actually paid us, they partly, they asked us to do this, they gave us logistics, they were the beneficiaries of the land grabbing and the land displacement, etc. So a lot of information came out, but because they were not included in the transitional justice process, the problem was that the transitional justice, the specific tribe units set up with these alternative sanctions, they didn't have jurisdiction over them. So they then had to refer these cases to the ordinary jurisdiction, which caused, well, a fragmentation. I'm a bit reluctant to use the word after this morning, but it caused a fragmentation of the process. And, and lots of problems with it. And partly because, of course, for the economic actors, because they were excluded, there were no incentives whatsoever to confess to the contrary. Because they, to them, ordinary criminal sanctions would apply. So that was the situation when they thought in Havana, they thought about how to deal with this. And basically one of the reasons, so one of the reasons why they in Havana did think about including them is because the information was there. In the justice and peace process, a lot of information had come out about the important role of these actors. So question was how to deal with them, rather than whether to deal with them. And very, very briefly, because I am conscious of time. This is just, these are just a few of the aims of the objectives of the special jurisdiction for peace, which is the criminal justice component of the transitional justice, the current transitional justice system, the one that followed the peace agreement with the FARC. So they want to satisfy the victims' right to truth, offer truth to the Colombian society, protect the rights of victims, contribute to achieving a stable and lasting peace. And already we can see there are quite a few tensions between these various objectives, even if you leave outside the more complexities like bringing in other actors. Now, when the special jurisdiction for peace was, when it was first established and when the peace agreement thought about how it envisaged it, it was given jurisdiction over everybody. Everybody who had any role in crimes that had a relationship with the conflict, with the armed conflict, was under the jurisdiction of the special jurisdiction for peace, including then of course economic actors. So for once that came out in December 2015, this was decided. So then we spent about two years trying to figure out how this could possibly be implemented, because as I said, there is very, very little international experience. What does that actually mean? So they have jurisdiction. But if you see this inclusion of these actors in the context of the Colombian peace process, which gave largest possible amnesties to the guerrilla fighters, and then at the same time included everybody else, the question was what does that mean? So what it seemed to have meant, and I'm saying all of this in the conditional because quite a few things have changed since then. What it was meant to mean at the time was that they should get far further stretching waivers of criminal prosecution against truth and reparations, and only really in the situation of where they were the most responsible for the most serious crimes, then they would actually face criminal sanctions, but they would get exactly the same possibilities of alternative sanctions as the primary perpetrators. Now then this caused enormous fractions, and of course economic actors are a very powerful sector of society. They did not like the idea at all that they were included, which is interesting because actually I always thought, if you look at me, how am I doing for time? You're okay, you've got another five. Oh fantastic, I was just misinterpreted here. Okay, perfect, great. So basically I thought this is actually good for them. If they go, most of them are going to get, they are actually going to get out of this legal certainty in the form of waiver of prosecution, the large majority of them would get it, and maybe very, very few might potentially face criminal sanctions, but if they do, what they would get is these alternative sanctions, which are much better of what some of those got who actually were. There were very, very few cases in the ordinary jurisdiction in parallel to the justice and peace process, but there is for example a case where several company directors were convicted and they got punishments of 14 to 16 years, which is of course quite a lot more than what they would get here. But they are such a powerful group and they had such a powerful lobby that they managed to almost derail the transitional justice process in Colombia, and in the end, in November 2017, the Constitutional Court intervened and the Constitutional Court had to actually, it had to decide whether or not the implementing legislation was constitutional, and what they decided was it was unconstitutional what had been decided in Havana and was then part of this legislation implementing the peace agreement, and that now the special jurisdiction for peace only has jurisdiction over these third party actors, including economic actors, if they voluntarily go. So now we have a system whereby they can decide if they want to go, they can go, they can confess, they can pay reparation, and then depending on the level of the responsibility, they either get a criminal sanction, a lower criminal sanction, or they get in most cases the waiver of prosecution. If not, they can take the chances in the ordinary jurisdiction and there is widespread impunity, and so it might be a good bet unless there is a lot of information about them in particular, then it might be a good way. But of course we now again have parallel jurisdiction and we have some problems. So coming to some first lessons, of course this is all happening, the special jurisdiction for peace only started working on the 15th of March, so it's a bit early to really have a lot of proper lessons from Colombia. So this is really just more about the process and the discussions and the problems. So first of all what we have is economic actors did play an important role in the conflict. What we don't really know and what I think the jurisdiction should try and figure out is to what extent were they actually responsible for the crimes and to what extent were they actually coerced because of course a lot of, in many cases in Colombia, they can actually rightly say there was extortion, there was coercion, etc. So we really need to be able to distinguish very clearly. But what we can learn from Colombia then is if there was a special transitional justice process like what they are doing now, the main possibilities of dealing with these economic actors are, as far as I can see and it would be interesting to see what you think, three. Either we leave them outside completely as was done in justice and peace, or we include them as they tried and treat them exactly the same as the state actors and the combatants, or we have this hybrid system that we have now and they have the choice to go either to take part in transitional justice or stay outside of this. These are probably the main ways of dealing with this. So now just some, and I might not have time to go through all of this or will not have time. If you leave them outside of the transitional justice process, of course it doesn't mean that therefore they cannot be held accountable, which is why I personally always thought it wasn't beneficial for them, because if they go, then they get legal certainty, but if they stay outside, then of course what we are dealing with here, maybe just to give the context, I'm just too focused on the legal side, but if you think about, for example, financing. So we're talking very much about complicity in this context. So we're talking about, for example, this is maybe the most well-known case, Chiquita, and the allegations are that they spend millions and millions of Colombian pesos per month paying the both sides, in fact, and they of course use this money to carry out a very serious criminal offences. So then the question is how do we actually deal with this? But what we do know is these are crimes against humanities and their involvement in that will not prescribe, there is no, it's not a statute bar. So therefore, if they don't go, 30, 40, 50 years later, people can still bring them to court. This is what's happening in Argentina at the moment. 40 years after the military dictatorship, there are criminal trials against various company directors. So that is part of the problem. So therefore, I always thought it was actually positive for them. Now, including them, then, well, let's maybe not even focus on the reasons why they are easier to just imagine. But some of the problems is, of course, first of all, the fierce resistance of these actors who really have a lot of power in these very fragile situations. So then the question is it really the best way of dealing with this that you include them from the outset when they actually really can spoil the whole process, which they almost, sorry, can I just have half a minute? Okay, but then also a big problem is the lack of clear legal criteria because we have a lot of experience in thinking about how do we define the responsibility of the direct perpetrators, those who actually carried out the torture, the killings, the displacement, etc. But how do we actually define the level of responsibility of those who gave money? Is it really at the same level? Is it something different? So there are all sorts of open questions here, and this is why I am still, after all this time working there, I'm still a bit torn about so at the moment my personal lesson is more that I appreciate the complexities of these problems because I really think there is a lot to be said about trying to include them, but at the same time there is also a lot to be said about thinking about sequencing and actually leaving them outside and then thinking about further down the line how to deal with these actors. But what I do think is, and with this I finish, that it is not an option simply not to do anything and ignore their role. The question has to be how do we address it and Colombia can, I think, tell us a lot, but obviously we'll have to wait and see how it develops. Thank you.