 But no karaoke. No karaoke for me would be fatal to all of us. Great presentation. Thanks so much. Obviously, the arm sail thing is that the elephant in the room, while I was traipsing around the Galapagos, the Chinese seemed to be sort of escalating their rhetoric against the sale, certainly at the senior academic levels. I think the other day we saw that, you know, specifically threatening Boeing and Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. None of my clients will ask. So a couple of questions from that. Is this what we're hearing now beyond the norm? How do we square the circle or put the round peg in that we're concerned that we not do or say anything that seems to be lowering our support, yet obviously making the arm sales meets your criteria of very public demonstrations of support? Is this year's Chinese rhetoric something really serious? How do we factor how they're likely to behave? Will it hurt their cross-strait? You know, these are the kind of questions of what you start pulling the sweater. You don't know where the hell to stop. And I think we'd all benefit from your sense of, you know, yeah, these sales are coming. Are the F-16s really part of it? How is that likely to affect the big picture and the bilateral U.S.-China picture? Thanks. The Obama administration, I think, has rightfully emphasized the very great importance of the U.S.-China relationship and the many issues that we need to work on if China doesn't. If China is not a player on climate change and responding to the financial crisis, it is really difficult to make serious progress. Of course, China is not the only country in the world, and so other countries need to join in as well. But I think that this message of China's growing importance, perhaps, is being interpreted in Beijing, is providing China with leverage on this specific issue. And I would argue that they are probably miscalculating. I think that from what I've read in the media over the last week, we are hearing comments from Chinese, and most of them are scholars. The tough language is primarily coming from military researchers and civilian scholars, but there, of course, have also been some pointed statements opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan by Chinese officials. But some of these comments by scholars might be seen as trial balloons. These are messages being put out that the United States should be made to feel pain that China has put up with the Taiwan Relations Act long enough, and the U.S. should be compelled to withdraw it. And I do think that if China really expects that its importance to the U.S. is so great that it's going to influence U.S. policy to Taiwan to the extent of ending arms sales, then I think that they have miscalculated. The line that has come out of Beijing about arms sales recently is strong opposition to sophisticated arms sales, which presumably means F-16 CDs. So the reaction to the... This is the original 2001 package. So the reaction to that notification from Beijing is strong. I think it's perhaps stronger than... My guess would be a bit stronger than the administration expected. And some senior officials have condemned it. And I think that's probably reflecting several things. One is a desire to forestall or try to preempt F-16 sales. Although Beijing can live with this package, the F-16 CDs I think they see as sophisticated arms sales and more problematic for them politically. Another factor I think is... This is conjecture, but I think there's an appreciation now in Beijing that President Obama's China trip did not play well in the U.S. press and that he is under considerable pressure now to show some toughness. And they anticipate that the Dalai Lama will meet with the president. There may be other trade things coming down the pike. So in that sense, as Bonnie suggested, trial balloon, I would say, shot across the bow, whatever your metaphor is, I think there's an expectation this is coming. And the last thing is... And here I'm on thin ground, but I would suggest that I think there's a sense in Beijing, certainly among the blogosphere and the commentary pressing the government, that the situation has changed, that China is now the United States Bank or that China has considerable influence now in the United States and that Beijing ought to be using that leverage. That runs smack dab against another instinct, which is reflected in President Hu Jintao's statement, was it in August, Bonnie, to the diplomatic, visiting ambassadors in July, that the U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship for Beijing and keeping that stable is critical for Chinese diplomacy. So there's some internal tension here, I think. But at the end of the day, I think Bonnie is right. The administration would be making a huge mistake to suggest that it is going to now back down on things like arms sales or other issues because of the rhetoric coming out of Beijing and the key challenge will be to not back down while managing a stable relationship. So I'm sorry for going on so long. During the campaign, I worked for McCain and Jeff Bader and I used to comment offline that this was the first presidential election in some time where China was not a major issue, where the two candidates weren't beating each other. You think about Ford at Carter and Carter to Reagan and then Bill Clinton with the butchers of Beijing and so on and so forth and the strategic competitor comment of Condi Rice in 2000. This was the first presidential cycle where both sides are fairly, I'm looking at Richard Bush, fairly steady, fairly bipartisan approach, which gave the administration in some ways an unprecedented amount of leeway politically to start crafting its China policy in the first year. The irony may now be that in the second and third years they're being forced into the politics of China that they were able to avoid the first year. I would agree with both. The one question that I don't think we covered, Chris, was how does this impact cross straight and my guess would be not very much. It's one of the sort of unique characteristics that the Chinese take their displeasure out on the seller as opposed to the buyer. And that seems to be, Taiwanese seem to be well aware of that and therefore are much less hesitant about worrying about the consequences. The attitude that I seem to hear in Taiwan was, well, this is one you Americans have to suck up for us and they don't seem to be too worried about Chinese response. But I'm going to try to sort of go to the opposite sides of the room to cover across straight. So Nancy, let me ask you next. Nancy Bernkoff-Tucker, Nancy Bernkoff-Tucker, Georgetown University. This is directly to Mike. U.S.-Japan relations are not as good as they might be and the discussion has been largely on issues of American military in Japan, perhaps that the new government wants to improve relations with China a lot and that makes us uncomfortable. How does Cross-Straight figure into this and the possibility of real CVMs? Is this going to worry the Japanese, scare them? What kind of reaction are they likely to have? Could everyone hear the question? No. The question was, to paraphrase, now that U.S.-Japan relations are a little wobbly, I forget the word you used, but difficult is the prospect of Cross-Straight. CVMs are going to worry the Japanese side. It's a hard question to answer because in any democracy you have a variety of views and Japan's democracy and coalition government now is particularly untidy and it's particularly difficult to ascribe one view on this. You have Vichiro Ozawa, the secretary general of the party who took a delegation of over 600 political followers to Beijing. I'm told Hu Jintao shook every person's hand in the delegation, which means something. I don't know what. It's a lot of purell. And in contrast, you have people like Seiji Maihara or Aki Nagashima, the vice defense minister who are pretty strong on the U.S.-Japan alliance, pretty hardline, frankly, on China. So within the DPJ, it's hard to say what the common view is. Operationally, the relationship between the U.S. and Japanese bureaucracies and the U.S. and Japanese military is excellent. And my own sense is most of the DPJ also has a pretty strong commitment to the alliance, but they're having difficulty sorting out how they're going to handle some specific issues. The most problematic is Futenma, this Marine Corps air station in Okinawa. In some ways, that's the biggest problem for Taiwan. Because if this... Some people say, you know, it's just one air base. Why are we letting the whole U.S.-Japan alliance get all tied up around this? And I think in Hawaii today, Hillary Clinton is going to talk about a broader vision for the alliance so that we're not completely consumed with Futenma, but it's pretty darn important. If Prime Minister Hatsuyama, by putting this decision off on implementing Futenma, causes it to fall apart, then the rest of the package, which involves moving Marines to Guam and relining bases, is going to freeze because the U.S. Congress will not pay for it. The new facility in Futenma that's in dispute is a condition for the overall move, which will mean that the U.S. presence in Okinawa will essentially freeze in its Cold War structure, which will be very frustrating for the Okinawans, for Tokyo and for the Marines and everybody involved. And that starts to raise questions about how sustainable that presence is and how much support there is in Japan for the U.S. foreign presence in Okinawa, which is strategically important across the region, but especially on the Taiwan Straits. So if I were in Taipei, I'd be watching this very, very nervously. Even if the DPJ has the right intentions, the signals it sends are problematic. And, you know, dissuading China, the PRC from thinking it can use force to resolve the Taiwan problem, is, you know, a particular mission for the U.S. because of the Taiwan Relations Act and so forth. But the U.S. Japan Alliance plays a critical role in that. And the strengthening of the revision of defense guidelines, the strengthening of U.S. Japan interoperability over the last decade or so, I think has been a really important factor in Chinese thinking about how it approaches the Taiwan problem and the utility of force. And so to the extent that's wobbly, it doesn't help. But that said, I think Takoko will talk to his friends in Tokyo and hopefully we will get through this. But the next few months will be uncertain. I wouldn't be the shameless self-promoter I am if I didn't mention to you that on Friday at the Willard Hotel from 10 to noon there will be a public forum on Japanese domestic politics hosted by the Pacific Forum. And from 2 to 5 on Friday, again at the Willard, there will be a public forum on the U.S. Japan Alliance where we have been and where we are going, featuring Bill Perry and Rich Armitage and a couple of others. It's open to the public. If you need more information on it, give me an e-mail address and I'm happy to send you info. Now I saw a gentleman, yes, right here. Hi, thank you. David Ahn from the State Department. A question following up on Mr. Michael Green's comments on superficial versus kind of substantive or effective CBMs. I'm wondering the impression would be that CBMs should be mutually binding. So how would constraints imposed on Taiwan not also bind China? Could you kind of go more into the nuances? Or how would it increase in Taiwan's disadvantage? How would that lead to an increase in Taiwan's disadvantage rather than lower tensions on both sides? I'll let you start and Bonnie will connect. That's fair. That's the usual pattern. Well, as Bonnie pointed out, see she can't correct me if I quote her. As Bonnie pointed out, this is a unique dynamic because Taiwan is in a far more vulnerable position and has limited, if not zero capacity to attack the mainland. It's overwhelmingly a threat aimed in one direction. So any binding CBM that freezes or constrains Taiwan's ability to continue improving and making up for gaps in readiness and capability and interoperability is not threat reduction. Even if there's a degree of mutuality to it. And frankly, even I would think that mutual steps at threat reduction will be pretty tough because there's also an imbalance in transparency. It's not to say they shouldn't be on the agenda for the longer term and address, but those are, and by the way, I'm out of the box a bit. I'm not suggesting in any way the U.S. would, in the future, blanket oppose these things. But it would be a concern or something that would be watched to make sure it didn't lock in not only the imbalance, but lock it in in a way where it continues to accrue to China's military benefit. Well, first I should say CBMs are unlike, as you know, arms control treaties. I mean, they're not legally binding. They're sort of politically binding. The upside of that is that they're sort of easier to enter into. The downside is that then they're easier to back out of. And so there has to be political will on both sides to do that. So binding is not quite a word that I would apply to CBMs, at least certainly not in the legal sense. But I think that the really important thing from the mainland and Taiwan to do are to continue to engage in what I would call a process of reciprocal unilateral CBM steps so that each side can take some measures to signal political goodwill to the other side. Now, in a preliminary stage, those steps are likely to have more political meaning or significance or symbolism than real military significance. And Mike talked earlier about a few missiles or hundreds of them could be pulled back but could be rolled forward in the event that the mainland wanted to do so. And that's an important point, but it would nevertheless be politically symbolic and a useful gesture to begin that process of pulling them back. Eventually, the hope is that they would be dismantled and destroyed. And more recently, President Ma has pointed out that of course the threat to Taiwan goes beyond the missiles. We spend a lot of time just talking about the missiles, but it's far broader than that. And he has now said that publicly. And so I think that steps, particularly since the threat is asymmetrical, that both sides need to think about what they can do unilaterally to build some trust with the other side. And those steps may in many cases be asymmetrical. Through negotiations, there might be different kinds of CBMs that could be agreed upon, but there's a lot that can be done in the near term and even in the longer term unilaterally. This gentleman right here is standing in the back. John San with CTI TV of Taiwan. It's kind of interesting that it is the U.S.-Taiwan relations that probably need some urgent CBMs, that we are here to discuss cross-strait CBMs. But anyways, I have a question with regards to a point already discussed by Bonnie and Mike to some extent, but I'd like to explore a little bit further. Usually CBMs work best between rivals or adversaries of equal strength. What would be the incentive for the PRA to really agree to embark on this? You know, beyond superficial measures like accident preventing, rescue missions, you know, the real CBMs, what is the incentive for the PRA to do this, particularly when arms sales is not going to come into play? Thank you. Well, I think that's an important question, but I want to take it up to a higher level and ask what's the incentive for the mainland more broadly. I mean, the PLA itself, more narrowly minded, may see that there is little incentive in cutting back the deployments that they have made, but the PLA doesn't make final decisions on the mainland. And so I think it's really important to ask more broadly why should China engage in this process. And I would argue that if China has the goal of improving relations with Taiwan, settling differences with Taiwan, and preventing that Taiwan, from moving in a direction toward independence that it doesn't like, that needs to take very significant steps to really win over the hearts and minds of the people. I think that the shift in China's policy away from a policy of pushing for near-term reunification and emphasizing more a process, the process of peaceful development that CBMS fits in very well with that new policy, as stated by Hu Jintao, to develop a peaceful development across the straits and to convince the people on Taiwan that China has good will for them, not ill will. There's a hell of a lot that China needs to do in order to achieve that goal. And as long as the people, as President Ma has said, as long as the people of Taiwan face this huge military opposite them, how are they to be convinced that the mainland really does have good will? So I think there's a lot of incentive there at the top. But for the PLA, I think it's understandable they would be more narrow-minded. I completely agree with that. One of the things we, I think, in the U.S. discovered with the EP3 incident, with the more recent incidents in the South China Sea, is that crisis management is difficult with Beijing because civilian control of the military is so opaque, if not weak. Yes, Hu Jintao chairs the Central Military Commission, but up and down the bureaucracy you don't have the kind of connections that you have in our governments between the civilian bureaucracy and the military, and you don't have the kind of transparency. So in some ways, from my perspective, when you pursue transparency in CBMs with China, whether it's Taiwan or the U.S., part of it is testing the ability of the civilian officials to manage the PLA, or the extent to which there is a crisis management capability or connection within China. In some ways, CBMs, in other words, are a little bit of a test and an exploration of the nature of the other side's decision-making, transparency, and civil-military relations. And if it goes well, then that reinforces confidence. If it goes badly, it makes you wonder about it. Yeah. The gentleman standing in the back, and then after him, the fellow in the red shirt. Michael Fante, I'm the DPP liaison here in Washington. Thanks again for a great presentation. I just wonder, Bonnie, if you could explore a little bit for us. The question of transparency of the MAW administration on a variety of issues has been a critique of the DPP, certainly. It covers a range of issues, and obviously the consensus building that's necessary for serious CBMs is an issue here that you've already spoken about. So I wonder if you'd explore for us a bit of what kind of input, if any, you got in your conversations from people who are considered, quote, green, that is lean towards the DPP side of the equation and whether there's any real incentive on the Chinese side to include a broader range of people in the discussions about CBMs. Well, we certainly did talk to members of the DPP, and I should point out and do point out in the report that the DPP, when it was in power, was a strong proponent of confidence-building measures with the mainland. In fact, if you go back and look at Defense White Papers from Taiwan from 2002 and 2004, there's a far lengthier and more detailed section on military CBMs than there is in the current one that has been released under Mayin Joe's government in 2009. There were specific proposals such as establishing like a no-fly zone in the strait where fighters on both sides would remain a certain distance from that centerline, and the mainland did not respond positively to that. But certainly, the DPP has strongly advocated CBMs and would want to be consulted. I think the Taiwan people would want to have an input on issues relating to cross-strait relations. I think that from the Chinese perspective, there has long been recognition that excluding the opposition, not having any kind of dialogue with the opposition is really not in Beijing's interest. I would say they have not done enough to engage DPP members, but they have certainly invited individuals not as representing their party and individual capacities, some of which, in fact, I recall last year there was a conference on the mainland and two DPP members went and were subsequently expelled from the party. So the DPP obviously has to see that there is a value in talking to China as well. It's a two-way street. Gentleman in the red shirt. Hi, Matthew Simmons, DOD. My question is, if China made a desire to walk in any agreements made with MA part of 2012 because of its political weakness, but if a DPP resurgence occurs, wouldn't that invalidate any agreements that MA may agree to and that were made without a domestic consensus in Taiwan? And does China realize that? I think clearly, potentially, anything that is agreed upon could be reversed, but sometimes once governments agree on something and they begin to see some value in what they are doing. For example, if there were a hotline established, would it necessarily, perhaps it might fall into disuse, but it would still be functional, just as sephine rats continue, for example, to exist, even though they were not performing the same kind of functions that they are performing under the MA government. The hope, of course, on the mainland side is that the things that they would establish would survive a KMT regime. I think they're perfectly aware of the fact that there are no guarantees and some kinds of arrangements, I think, would be more likely to survive than others. There are some things that occurred during the DPP administration that also haven't been reversed. The disbandment, what was the word that was used? The deactivation. The unfreezing, right? The implementation, yeah. Right. Of the, what was it called? National Unification. Thank you, National Unification Council. I appreciate that. Obviously, it was very difficult. Ma Ying-jeou chose not to reverse that, even though that was something that he would like to have seen remain in place. And so, sometimes it's difficult for new governments to reverse what happened, agreed upon by previous governments. Part of a TPP to power, especially now viewing the mass of popularities is going down. My question is, in case TPP does return to power in 2012, which some observers believe that it's not something impossible, what will happen? How about the WHA? And how about the ACFA to be signed? And how about the other agreement already signed? Your question is, in the event that Ma Ying-jeou has another four years, what will happen? No, no. In case... If the DPP comes to power. Up to the DPP, if it were to come back to power to decide whether or not it would continue to honor if there is an economic framework agreement, and I would say the same that I said to the previous questioner. If there is some value in that economic cooperation agreement, I think it would be very difficult once you have removed tariffs on specific items to completely reverse that. You might not go further. But I think that there are people in the DPP today who are saying publicly that an ACFA is right for Taiwan. For example, I think Xu Xinliang today said publicly that the DPP should not oppose a cross-strait economic framework agreement. There have been others like, for example, former Vice President Annette Liu who have said that there should not be a referendum against the ACFA because that could be... The odds are that it would not pass. So I think there's a lot of different views within the DPP, and it remains to be seen if they came back to power and the policy would be on the specific issue. I'm Kun Huang from Army War College. It's good that I'm here as a scholar so I can speak freely for the first time. Usually I don't. It was great discussion in here, but I want to phrase in the Chinese phrase that... 內行人看門道,外行人看熱鬧. That means if you're insider that you look into the niche point but if you're outsider you only look and watch for the cheerfulness. I would describe as most of the people right now describe this relationship has been improved unprecedentedly well ever, but I would caution... I would describe in the phrase this is a beautiful wave that has many, many sharp quarries all underneath the water. Let's look in the back of the history. It has gone back. This MCBM or CBM, you know, it's one way or two, you know, one way or the other. Let's don't forget about MCBMs. Serve is not a final purpose. It's one of the two. The final purpose is driven by the political trust, and I also think all he implies is that there are so many so many who agree with me there's basically lack of political trust and that's the real question. Let's go back to the history of constitution both sides. There is a real problem here. You cannot get MCBM or CBM going unless there's one problem which is I think we're on the track which is 92 consensus, that's one China. As far as you want to interpret which China, let's leave that in ambiguous because for the good to both sides, yes. So the question is, the question is until the China and Taiwan recognize the sovereignty which is recognized by both sides are the same. The sovereignty should be and the territory should be shared by both sides unless that is recognized in some kind of form. There is no room for MCBMs. There is no room for other things. Let's look at the real deep. So my question will be how do you create that room as a facilitator that most of the people here and I think Richard Bush in five years ago, four or five years ago were mentioning his book Untied the Knots. He mentioned a lot of points in there. How do we be that facilitator here in the US for creating that environment? I think we should... I would agree with you that the absence of political trust is the problem. The two sides obviously do not agree fundamentally on the issue of sovereignty. But I would disagree that there must be an agreement to share sovereignty or have some solution on the settling the differences over sovereignty before CBMs can be agreed upon. The reason why we have had progress in the cross-strait relationship, one of the reasons is because sovereignty has been shelved for the time being. Both sides are crystal clear about their respective positions and they recognize that it is not in their interest to try and solve the sovereignty issue in the near term. So I think that it's important to use the opportunities that exist now to build greater political trust as you say and to postpone the discussion of sovereignty down the road. And I would add that although many people in this country and other places are concerned that relations between Taiwan and the mainland will get too close, I myself think that we have seen a significant amount of progress in the two sides of the straight relationship. We probably will see more, but the dangers of them hitting insurmountable obstacles in opposite directions, having a reemergence of tensions irrespective of whether the DPP comes back to power by the way. I think that that is perhaps more likely than a real settlement of differences that results in ultimate unification. So I worry more personally about setbacks in this process than I do about real integration and unification between the two sides. Richard, thank you for the plug on this book. Thank you. I have Mike Gosney from MIT and NDU. I have a question about stronger US-Taiwan relationship and how it ties into CBMs. Both in Bonnie's recommendations and it sounds like Mike agrees that this is almost a requirement to get to CBMs and to get the Taiwanese to be able to go along domestically is to have a stronger US-Taiwan relationship. This goes back 20-plus years of the six assurances and the idea of needing Taiwan to feel strong enough so that when they interact with the mainland and negotiate with the mainland, they don't feel like they're going to be coerced. This kind of sounds like a newer version of that argument. When we then bring the way the PRC views this back into play, many of the same things that you would want to see, the same things that the PRC would view as interfering in this and sending signals to separatist forces and all that. Is there any evolution on the mainland side of seeing the link that we like to push between stronger US-Taiwan relations as being a requirement to get to CBMs? Bonnie talked about a recognition that Mind Joe's weak, that there's a lack of domestic consensus. Can they either change in the PRC or anything that the US can do to help sell the PRC on that link itself of saying that we need to have stronger US-Taiwan relations to get to CBMs? I think the short answer, you can correct me. I think the short answer first is that there is little appreciation on the mainland side except when you get maybe one person in a room and nobody else is listening. There are individuals who will acknowledge that if Taiwan feels insecure and vulnerable that it is not likely to continue this policy of moderation towards the mainland and to move forward and to negotiate some of these sensitive issues. So I would say the recognition exists in the minds of some individuals whether it has percolated up to the top leaders, I don't know. But on the official level in Beijing, there is no acceptance of the notion that a strong US-Taiwan relationship is helpful. And I would argue that at this particular juncture in time, especially, that a strong US-Taiwan relationship is in Beijing's interest and that includes arm sales. That if my NGO is seen as tilting toward China and as a result the people vote him out of office that will not make China happy. They would certainly like to keep him in power and keep the KMT in power. And if Ma feels so insecure and so pressured by the mainland and vulnerable to coercion by the mainland then he will slow down or not move beyond the economic issues that have been the focus of negotiation so far. So I would say that a strong US-Taiwan relationship at this particular juncture in time is helpful for Beijing and I would encourage China to recognize that and limit its opposition to arm sales which I understand why they are opposed, but to limit it to rhetoric and responses that do not have a prolonged extensive negative impact on the US-China relationship. I only briefly add that you can get CBMs with a weak Taiwan. They're just not the CBMs you want. And as the Colonel pointed out the purpose is not to have CBMs as to reduce the risk of conflict to build confidence reduce the threat if you can. The other thing I would say is that the US support for Taiwan in terms of cabinet visits, arm sales and so forth goes beyond this question of cross-trades dynamics and really gets to the heart of the question of what the rise of Chinese power means. If the rise of Chinese power means that we no longer that we change the policies on basic relationships like the TRA with Taiwan then that has implications for the credibility of our alliance with Japan with Australia, with Korea, our relationship with India across the whole Asia-Pacific region. So it's not just a matter of helping facilitate cross-trades CBMs and confidence. It's also a question about a much more fundamental question about the nature of how the US and the region integrates China in a positive way. I appreciate it, Ralph. It's Peter Spiegel with the Wall Street Journal. That's it to Chris's opening question about arm sales. Frankly, you may have just answered the question so it may be moot, but the dynamic that you described in your opening comments about Beijing concerned that all these gains they've made with KMT since they came to government may be lost because of diminished political support within Taiwan for the current government. That would seem to argue that the reaction towards the imminent arm sales would somehow be different, that they are conscious that MA is losing support and therefore would moderate their reaction to arm sales. It sounds like what you're saying is that in your discussions with the PRC side, there is no awareness although there's awareness that the KMT is in danger politically, there's no awareness that the rhetoric on the arm sales is in any way affecting that. Can you address what you heard from the PRC in terms of the rhetoric and how it could affect KMT popularity domestically? For those in the mainland who follow this, they do so very closely. They quote polling numbers. They note that Ma Ying-jeou's support has been well below 30%. We were there just in the aftermath of the typhoon and the government was being very, very harshly attacked and that was cited as a cause for urgency to begin to address more sensitive political and military issues. So there's certainly awareness and I think on the mainland we have to remember that domestic politics trumps everything and there is a perception in the mainland and I don't have a way of proving this. Perhaps they do polls internally that they don't share with the outside but there certainly is a claim that the leadership is under great pressure from the domestic population to protect China's sovereignty, territorial integrity that Taiwan along with Tibet and Xinjiang are China's core national interests and so there with this perception that there is criticism from the domestic population, there is a sense in the leadership that they have to be tough and if you combine this with what I said earlier, their assessment that their position in the world has grown and the United States is valuing the U.S.-China relationship more and we're on more equal footing because they own so much of our treasury bonds that this then provides they believe greater leverage over the United States on this issue and this is where I would point back to what I said earlier that I do think is a miscalculation, that ultimately the United States has its interest as well and it's not just interest in U.S. relations with Taiwan as important as those are but it's also our credibility throughout the entire region and more globally and the commitments that we make to our allies and I would say that when in 1996 when the Clinton administration dispatched to aircraft carriers to the region it was not just to respond to the threat that China's missiles faced as they were being fired toward the island the way the administration thought about how it would be perceived by other countries in the region and our broader reputation in the region. I think I just had a brief coat I think that's exactly right and this is what President Obama might call a teachable moment in some ways it's all the more important now and I think my sense is this is where the White House is judging from their actions this month it's all the more important now to illustrate that the financial crisis has not changed the fundamentals that the President will see the Dalai Lama that arms sales will move forward and even if that causes a rough patch in U.S. general relations my sense is the administration is prepared and strategically and politically sees it as necessary to go down to go down that road and Secretary Clinton and her comments to the post tried to put some context around it and emphasize the positive but I didn't detect anything that would suggest that there won't be a pretty firm moving forward on some of these issues even if Beijing doesn't like it over the next few months I would say in some respects as we all know the Chinese have painted themselves in the corner if we say we're going to sell bow and arrow to Taiwan they have the same harsh reaction and it's the end of the world but when you talk to Chinese privately my sense is that they do make a distinction between the 2001 package and the F-16 season D's that is the real difference in China and they can probably huff and puff and not do much more on the 2001 package but it would be very hard pressed to ignore F-16 season D's I think there is sort of a distinguishing point there I think Barney's point is also very true I have run a number of different US-China conferences and one of them my closing remark to our Chinese colleagues was beware of premature arrogance the Chinese I think have become extremely overconfident and will probably do a little bit of miscalculating and it's only natural that they're going to test to see just how how far they can push and I think they'll get the push back and it will be a useful lesson as we go forward Please join me in thanking both Barney and Mike in our questions