 So you can turn the cameras back on and any recording devices that you may have. I'm Ernie Bauer again. I'm the chair of the Southeast Asia program here at CSIS. And it's a real pleasure for me to be introducing our third and last panel today on, and as we talk about Asian architecture ahead of the three summits in November, the APEC EAS and G20 summits. And we've got a terrific panel with us today. I really appreciate these gentlemen sharing their time away from very busy schedules to join us. On my right, we have the newly ensconced David Shear, who's our assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and the Pacific. You know that David had come back from Hanoi to do this job. He was our U.S. ambassador there. David is an expert on China and Southeast Asia. I think for many of us who are sort of in the trenches every day on these issues, we couldn't think of a better person for the Pentagon to put into this role. Next to him is one of the top Southeast Asianists in the United States. And he also is Singapore's ambassador to the United States, Ashok Mirpuri. He was most recently Singapore's ambassador to Indonesia. He was, in the past, has been Singapore's ambassador also to Australia and to Kuala Lumpur and has a long career in the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working on Asia-related affairs. And finally, a good friend and a real hero of Southeast Asia and Asian policy in the Senate is Chris Brose. He works with Senator McCain in Senator McCain's office. Previous, before that, he was a senior staffer in the Senate Armed Services Committee. And Chris rose through the ranks doing some pretty interesting things, including writing speeches for and advising people like Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. So he really knows what he's doing and has spent a lot of time in Asia, more than most Senate staffers, unfortunately. So without further ado, what we want to talk about in this panel is architecture as it relates to security. I'm going to ask my colleagues to kick it off in the order that we're seated in and then we'll open up the panel to some question and answer. So, David, it's over to you. Thank you very much, Ernie. I'm back at CSIS and it's a great honor to be joined up here with Ambassador Mirpuri and Chris Brose. I've been in my job, my new job at DOD for almost exactly one month now. And I can tell you from my experience during that one month that Secretary of Defense Hegel certainly has a very strong personal interest in Asia and East Asia. Given all of his history, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, my chain of command are deeply committed to the rebalance to East Asia. And we've seen that most recently in Deputy Secretary Works' travel to the region. You'll see a flurry of senior-level meetings and encounters this fall, including coming up a Security Subcommittee meeting chaired on the American side by myself and East Asia's Assistant Secretary of State, Danny Russell. In Tokyo next week, Danny and I will also be going to Seoul before we go to Tokyo. You'll see a defense consultative talks with the Chinese. You'll see military consultative meeting and security consultative meeting with our ROK allies. Also in November, of course, President Obama will be visiting Beijing and defense issues will, of course, be part of his agenda in his bilateral discussions with President Xi. So again, the rebalance is among the highest priorities on my agenda as well as on my senior leadership's agenda. And you'll see me focusing very clearly on rebalance-related issues in my earliest days in my tenure. I'd like to share with you some of the issues that some of the big issues I'll be focusing on, I think, as Assistant Secretary of Defense over the next months and years. And the first one is modernizing our alliances and partnerships. There's a lot on the agenda in this regard, from the review of the defense guidelines with Japan to the OPCON issue with our ROK allies to updating the defense framework with India, which we mentioned in the joint statement in Prime Minister Modi's recent visit to Washington, to the EDCA with the Philippines and the FPA with Australia. All of these are foundational issues in the strengthening of our alliance architecture in the western Pacific. And all of these will guide the way in which we shape our alliances over the next 10 to 15 years. We're going to want to finish strong on all of these agreements. Successful conclusion and implementation matters. And this certainly will set the stage for closer cooperation between the United States and its important allies in East Asia and the Pacific. A second very important big issue we'll be working on is solidifying the military-to-military relationship with China. Secretary Hagel had a very good meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi the other day here in Washington. The foreign minister was here to, of course, to review U.S. bilateral relations and planning for the President's trip to Beijing. As you probably have seen in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, both sides recommitted to working on a set of confidence-building measures, and we will be working on that set in advance of the President's trip to Beijing. A third set of big issues we'll be working on is knitting together allied and partner cooperation. And Evan Medeiros spoke during his remarks of our trilateral partnerships, particularly U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan-India. But we're also interested in encouraging greater cooperation among our allies and partners in East Asia. We're very gratified to see increased cooperation between Japan and Australia, between Japan and India. We're also gratified to see greater diplomatic coordination between partners and friends like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. All of this greatly strengthens security and stability in the Asia Pacific, and we believe can contribute to the reduction of tensions, particularly in the South China Sea. Another area I'll be focusing on, of course, is strengthening U.S.-Azion defense ties. We've seen the establishment over the past few years of the ADMM+. We've had great progress in building regional defense cooperation. Secretary Hagel certainly is very interested in his encounters with his counterparts during Shangri-La dialogue at the ADMM+. And most recently, also recently in April in connection with the U.S.-Azion defense ministerial meeting in Honolulu. And we hope that that can be a future fixture in our defense relations with ASEAN. Of course, as we work all of these issues with our partners, friends, and others in East Asia, we'll also want to be working with them to manage disputes and issues that generate tension. I don't need to mention how important maintaining security and stability, particularly in the South China Sea, is to us. Our position on this has been made crystal clear. On many occasions, it's going to remain a very strong focus for me and for my leadership in DOD in the coming months. Why don't I stop there and let my other friends comment. Thank you, David. Ambassador. Thank you, Annie. And congratulations again to you and CSIS for putting together this conference to look at some of these bigger pictures in the Asian architecture and in particular security architecture, because how critical it is for U.S. interests going forward. I wanted to look both at the big picture and at ASEAN's role, because as an ASEAN ambassador here, much of the architecture really focuses around ASEAN centrality. But the main reason why the architecture is important is that the region has enjoyed a peaceful and secure and stable environment for several decades, something that many of us, in fact, take for granted. And these conditions have enabled growth and prosperity, which is the key thing that we want to see out of the Asia Pacific. So the regional architecture, both the security and the economic architecture, is really designed to preserve this. But in this post-Cold War geopolitical environment, we're starting to see fairly dramatic shifts. And that's where conversations about the architecture become important. The environment is shifting and Southeast Asia in particular is becoming more complicated as a region as we have to reposition ourselves in the context of Washington's and Beijing's search for a new equilibrium. The regional dynamics are complex. It's no more than just Washington and Beijing. There are other major powers that continue to adjust their relationship with each other and with ASEAN. And tensions in the region have risen and there are several potential flashpoints that have to be managed. And that makes the architecture a very important issue for us to look at. Now ASEAN's role and this term of ASEAN centrality has in many ways played a very crucial part in maintaining regional peace and security. But I don't want to overplay this role and ASEAN's strategic weight. Those of you who know ASEAN and know the rest of the region, you know that this is ASEAN's central role is probably due to the fact that we are a neutral platform rather than because we carry such a strategic heft. Because in that neutral platform, ASEAN has offered a space for all major powers to discuss issues of concern to build trust and to promote cooperation. What ASEAN has done has been to promote an open and inclusive approach and welcomes the engagement of all major powers. It's a critical part of ASEAN that we're not just an inward-looking organization of the 10. We're an outward-looking organization that includes our dialogue partners and other major powers with us. And this is characteristic in all the ASEAN-led mechanisms that we have made put in place that form a regional architecture that is open, inclusive and outward-looking. In particular, we value the contribution of the U.S. to all of these ASEAN-led forum, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit. For more than 60 years, the U.S. President has been a stabilizing influence that has underpinned Asia's and ASEAN's growth. There are, and we will hear this regularly, multiple and overlapping structures of this ASEAN Regional Architecture that reflect in many ways the complex diversity of the Asia-Pacific region. From our view, this overlapping structures actually makes the regional framework more flexible and resilient. Let me go through briefly each one of the structures that we have in the security area. The first and the longest running has been the ARF, which was created in 1994 as a forum for security discussions that were engaged not just the major powers, but also middle and smaller regional powers to preserve their stake in the regional stability in the post-Cold War era. For example, the ARF today is the only multilateral security consultative framework in the region in which the DPRK participates. Another structure that we have is the ADMM Plus, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus, which came into force in 2006. Its establishment of the ADMM first was really the commitment of ASEAN countries to have their military establishments to work together to address transnational security issues. We then expanded this to have the ADMM Plus, which comprises ASEAN with the eight other EAS partners, that has become not just a channel for dialogue, but also an action-oriented avenue for defense ministers from the region and beyond to come together to discuss practical solutions to manage peace. And they have done exercises that pull together various militaries into these operations. The third structure is the EAS, which we are all looking forward to next month, which the President will attend. And with the expansion of the EAS was established in 2005 and its expansion in 2011 to include the U.S. and Russia, it has again brought the major powers together into a leaders-led forum. The key focus now for the EAS is really to focus on consolidating for the future. And while it remains a leaders-led forum for strategic discussions of the future, what ASEAN is very keen to have brought into the EAS as well is areas of functional cooperation and these really this add to the agenda and help to build on the architecture in order to keep the mechanism alive and healthy. It adds a certain balance to the structure and ensure that the EAS remains a credible forum for constructive cooperation. And various ideas in which the U.S. can play a role in some of these functional cooperation areas include obviously disaster management, education, finance, energy, which you spoke about earlier this morning. And looking ahead at all these structures, a frequent complaint and almost criticism has been that all these ASEAN-centered regional architecture structures have emerged into a spaghetti bowl that people find difficult to unravel. From ASEAN's point of view, these mechanisms actually each play a unique role and they complement and reinforce each other to serve the common interests of maintaining regional stability and growth. The perspective of trying to rationalize the security architecture into a single arrangement or to try to impose a hierarchy among them will be very difficult, if not impossible. Instead, our view is that these regional structures and architecture should be allowed to evolve, adapt and find a natural dynamic equilibrium at their own pace as we improve ways to get better coordination and develop synergy among the mechanisms. And in this regard, we've now actually welcomed the dialogue partners to give their ideas for the future of this architecture and taking on proposals on how to improve the existing frameworks. But what is critical in all this is that we must ensure that we, the regional architecture, for all the reasons that they have been successful is that ASEAN remains very much at the core, keeps that place as a neutral platform and continues to reflect the diversity of the region and remain open and inclusive. Indonesia, in particular, from ASEAN has proposed an Indo-Pacific Treaty and next week in Jakarta, the EAS workshop on regional security framework will meet to discuss this further. And these are some of the ideas that we're looking ahead of how can we make the whole architecture much better. Let me say a few words about the U.S. engagement. As I said earlier, the U.S. has played an integral role in the regional architecture and remains a critical and unique component in the future. It is important for the U.S. to stay engaged and this engagement must be broad, based and multi-pronged. The region appreciates the U.S. continued support for ASEAN centrality and has come across time and again in the various comments and speeches that have been made by U.S. leaders about how important the ASEAN centrality is in the evolving regional architecture. And importantly, ASEAN and the U.S. share many strategic perspectives and we should work together to continue to build up the existing institutions and keep the architecture open. We also welcome the U.S. support for key principles like peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, the right of freedom of navigation, and the right of overflight. So in conclusion, let me just summarize the three principles that ASEAN really looks at regional architecture from our perspective. First, ASEAN should be at its core in order to maintain ASEAN unity and cooperation. Second, it should reflect the diversity of the region. And third, it should remain open and inclusive. So as there are multiple and overlapping structures that are sometimes redundant, from our point of view they actually make the regional architecture more resilient and stable. And from our point of view, the architecture should follow the agenda rather than vice versa. Thank you very much. Excellent. Thank you very much. Chris, I think you want to give the ambassador a round of applause for that. I heard it coming. I don't want to deny that to you because it was organic and it was coming your way. Chris, over to you. Thank you. Thanks, Ernie, and thanks CSIS for having me here today. Obviously, look, I'm extremely flattered to be among the company that I'm in. Clearly, you can tell one of these things is not like the other. My first name is not Ambassador. And by way of making the point further, I was telling Dave earlier that I think my sort of signature accomplishment on Asia this year has been playing some small role in the confirmation of Dave Shear. So you can sort of see clearly what you're getting here. Look, Congress is not a participant in Asia's architecture and maybe you can all be thankful for that. What I'd like to try to do is just give you a little bit of a sense of how the Hill is looking at some of these security challenges and kind of back into the Asia architecture question. And what I'd like to try to do is sort of frame it in terms of two questions both of which kind of appeared on the cover of the Economist this year. And I think these are the two questions that are really kind of overhanging. And the first, this was a couple weeks back, very plainly, what does China want? This is something that I think as members of Congress are looking at the region, they're increasingly traveling through the region. Yes, it's still a small group. It's not by any means extensive to the entire body. This is a question that I think members of Congress are confronting. They want the United States to have and believe the United States can have and should have a very constructive relationship with China. They see all of the benefits and all of the common areas of cooperation between the countries. And they recognize that there's a lot of upside there for both countries together. And yet they look at a sort of a pattern of behavior that is concerning to them. And the pattern of behavior is something like this. It's a series of actions that are not sort of purely diplomatic. Neither are they purely military. They sort of occur in a gray area. There appears to be sort of a strategy of incremental creation of facts on the ground or in the air at the sea. And there's a concern, I think, that this is what we are seeing is sort of a long game, an attempt to incrementally move by move, change the status quo unilaterally, never in a way that sort of fundamentally trips a wire and triggers a response on behalf of the United States or others, but nonetheless continues to move the needle such that five to ten years from now we're all looking back. And it's a very different region that we're looking at. And I think the sort of prevailing view in the Congress is, look, China thinks about its foreign policy. So when people say, well, China, surely you know that you're causing other countries to gang up against you to criticize you, et cetera. You're driving them closer to the United States. I think the kind of prevailing view on the Hill is, well, there's intent there. Even if we have to infer it from action and, you know, that intent is perhaps unsettling, which is this to some extent does reflect conscious action. And it's about more than the particular territorial claims that we can discuss today further. It's about, you know, a conscious attempt to challenge the balance of power and change it about even changing key elements or challenging key elements of the international order, particularly the peaceful resolution of disputes. And most fundamentally, I think, as an American is concerned, it's a challenge to the American presence and sort of historical role in Asia and commitments to countries that we have, either formal treaty commitments or otherwise. So I think the question that I think many members of Congress and the sort of prevailing view in the Congress comes back to is, again, what does China want? The second sort of security challenge that I'd point out, maybe somewhat provocatively, also appeared on the cover of the Economist and it was what would America fight for? Now, fight is not necessarily to be used literally, but I think the point is what is America ultimately seeking to do? What are we truly committed to doing? What are our red lines, et cetera? And I think, you know, as members of Congress, congressional staff travel through Asia, particularly ones who are, you know, maybe less experienced there, they're struck by a prevailing sense and pervasive sense of doubt and question about the United States. And this isn't so much a question of, you know, questioning America's capability. You know, there's a lot of capability economically, militarily, et cetera, although I think increasingly people are questioning that too as we see the effects of sequestration and declining budgets, et cetera. I think it's more a sense, and again, this is what people sense traveling through the region. It's a question of America's resolve, commitment, judgment, you know, what it's ultimately seeking to do here. And, you know, there are different reasons for this. Obviously, I think there's the sense of people looking at our opinion polls. Obviously, they can discern that Americans aren't too into foreign policy at the moment, that may be changing, but there's a question of sort of national distraction to what extent Americans are focused on this. There's also, you know, sort of the question of national dysfunction, you know, the question of, look, America can't even fix its own fiscal problems. How much are they really going to help us when we need them? There's that doubt that lingers out there. And then, look, I mean, I would say when it comes to Asia and security policy, there's a lot of bipartisan cooperation, and it really is an area that is somewhat unique from other aspects of our foreign policy, where I think there's broad consensus on the rebalance. That being said, I think there's a real question about whether the rebalance is sort of coming into being. And that is a sense that we hear as we travel throughout the region as well. Is this more rhetoric than reality? And I think part of this, too, is, you know, it's a question about the U.S. response to Asia. And I mean, I heard most of Evan's speech and most of it I would agree with. I think the question is not, is America doing something? Clearly America is. The question is, is what America is doing adding up to a set of actions, you know, unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally, that is fundamentally impacting China's calculus as it presses out in the East China Sea, South China Sea, et cetera. And look, there's the other piece of this which overhangs it, which is that this isn't just about Asia. You know, our sense and things, something that I think many members of Congress have been struck about, is how much in their conversations on security issues, you know, with Asian partners, the topic comes back to Ukraine and what's happening there and how the U.S. is responding. Or last year, the response to Syria, the sort of crossing of the purported red line and the lack of follow-through and many people in Asia asking what are the implications of this for us? And maybe that's an unfair question, maybe it's out of bounds, but it's real. And that's something that I think, you know, again, many members of Congress are very sensitive to. So I just say in conclusion, you know, the architectural issues that we're discussing here are very important and there's a lot of potential for them to resolve these kinds of challenges to clarify people's views and thinking. But, you know, age-old problem, you know, geopolitics really determines the capacity and ability of architecture to function. And I think when it comes to the geopolitics right now, you know, the two questions that I tried to lay out today are really concerning. There are questions that I think here in this town we're still sort of seeking answers on and trying to come up with better answers on. And it's still going to overhang, you know, our diplomacy and what we're seeing as the region comes together in November for these summits. Thank you very much for those remarks, Chris, and thank you for the panel for your excellent insights. I'd like to start with a question and then open the floor. And the question is, many have argued that the foundation of long-term security in Asia is economics. And I didn't hear any of you sort of talking about that. I wonder, would you agree or do you think it's sort of a separate channel that security thinking is linked to but it's not related to? How do you think about it? I snuck in one word that said economics. And then Chris, of course, referred to the economists throughout so you know that, you know, how the whole thing, but you know, it is, they go together. Because we had the morning discussion on the economic architecture, I didn't want to get into all that. The key thing that obviously is there is TPP. It's top of the mind of every Asia Pacific leader whether or not they're in TPP. Because even those who are out wonder what it means for them and how can they get into it. And those who are in obviously are in the throes of very difficult negotiations to get it done. And in particular, for the US, the constant conversation that comes up in all meetings is, when are we going to get this thing done? It really is that key, not just about the economic future of US interests, but also the key of the strategic engagement of the US in the region. It's becoming in many ways a test of how people see the US engagement in the region. And I think that looking ahead, that's what we want to see get done. There are other elements obviously of the economic bits as well, the entire trade structures. We have RCEP that does not include the US. The ASEAN economic community comes into force next year. All these things are happening. But for the US, I think getting the TPP done is a critical thing. I want to address your question from a slightly different angle by saying, by drawing on my experience as Ambassador to Vietnam, some people have said that the rebalance is primarily a military strategy and I want to try and counter that impression. In Vietnam, the rebalance certainly, and throughout the region actually, it certainly brings all of the tools of state graft together to pursue our interests in the region. In Vietnam, we were pursuing, we were using the diplomatic tool by increasing our diplomatic coordination with the Vietnamese, particularly on regional issues within the multilateral context. We, on the economic side, we of course are negotiating with Vietnam as a member of, as a TPP partner. And both Americans and Vietnamese, I believe, recognize that TPP is not just, will not just benefit us economically, but it is also strategic in many ways. Finally, we very strongly promoted defense cooperation with Vietnam and we see the fruition of our efforts in that regard with the partial lifting of the ban on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam just yesterday. So our implementation of the rebalance in Vietnam certainly was multi-pronged and again it relied on all the tools of state graft to pursue our interests and that's what we're doing throughout the region. And if there's uncertainty in the region, it shouldn't be uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to continued peace, security and prosperity there. Thank you. Just a very brief point. I agree completely with what both Dave and the Ambassador said. TPP is critical to get done without it. It's going to be a real problem the U.S. faces and totally agree that the rebalance cannot be one-dimensional. I think that the challenge is that if you look at the sort of economic trend in the region, it is toward greater integration. It's a very positive trend. I think the concern is that the security trend may be heading, if not in the opposite direction, not exactly in the same direction. Maybe not fragmentation, but certainly rising tension. This is something that Evan Feigenbaum, Bob Manning have pointed out. Can you continue to have economic integration when you have rising security tensions and strategic challenges? Is that something that is sustainable or not? Thank you. Okay. The floor is open. Let's start here. This gentleman in the front. Again, just please tell us your name and your affiliation if you have one. Thank you very much. My name is Jason Zhang. I'm a reporter with South Korea's Yonam News Agency. I have a question for Assistant Secretary Shear. You mentioned the OPCON as one of the issues that are related to the modernization of the alliances. As you know, United States and Korea plan to announce an agreement on delaying the OPCON transfer when they hold the annual defense ministers meeting later this month. Can you tell us about how close the two countries are to agreement at this point? Thank you. We agree with you that that remains the deadline for our discussions on OPCON. Of course, we're discussing a conditions-based approach to OPCON with our ROK counterparts. And this is going to be an issue that I certainly focus on during my presence next week in Seoul. You're getting good at this defense. Emil. Gentleman in the front. Thank you. Great presentations. My name is Emil Skoden. I'm a retired Foreign Service Officer and formerly Ambassador Brunei. I'd just like to ask the other two panelists to answer to the extent they can. The question is a crisp post. Ambassador Murpuri, in your opinion, what does China want? And Ambassador Shear, in your opinion, what would America fight for? Unlike members of Congress, ASEAN embassies do not know what China wants. You have to ask the Chinese that. But China is a very important presence in Southeast Asia. They are a growing economic presence. They have become the number one trading partner, I think, for all ASEAN countries. And we value the relationship that is being built economically. Tourists, traffic, trade, investment, their proposals and ideas for how to link the region closer together, their ideas of connectivity. So from where they sit, as the economy grows, I think that Southeast Asia will benefit from their prosperity. And then the question that keeps coming up obviously is, and Chris has tied this link, can you have this economic integration when you do have ongoing security tensions? And that is something that Southeast Asia discusses extensively with the Chinese. We're talking about the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, moving that forward. Because what we want to do is, again, to use the ASEAN platform to try and manage these tensions. And there are these tensions do arise. And how can then ASEAN work together as a group in the maritime security space where not all of us are claimants? How do we work together as 10 to work with China to work out a framework where there are certain rules that we all respect and move forward towards? I strongly agree with the ambassador on this. It's clear that I think one of China's highest priorities is to maintain an atmosphere and a situation in East Asia that allows them to continue growing economically. And I think that's probably among their highest priorities. Of course, the Chinese want to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity. That's always been among the highest priorities of the People's Republic of China. The question is how you do it. And that takes us to the second part of your question. I think among our highest priorities in the region is to increase respect for the rule of international law. And this has been an issue in the South China Sea and an issue in the East China Sea as well. And we will look to our partners and we will look to China to work with us to strengthen the rule of international law in our interactions with the Chinese throughout the rest of the year and in the future. A gentleman here. Thank you. I'm Xu from Taiwan, China. And I have a question for Mr. Bruce. You have just made a very interesting comparison between the situation in Eastern Europe and the situation in East Asia. So I'm wondering that with the U.S. to adopt something like the double standard attitude to the maybe to the risk or regional emergency happening in these two different regions. And or American will adopt the same standard when facing the regional risk of the international tense or the urge for American to intervene or at least to watch carefully. And is there the variation indeed exists? Is that decided by the public opinion or public concern in American society or is it decided by any other factors? Thank you. I could just submit the question. Is there a double standard that's being applied to U.S. policy in Eastern Europe and U.S. policy toward Asia? Look, I mean from where I said no, I think that the policy that the U.S. is trying to fall in both places is consistent in the sense that we're objecting to what Russia is doing in Ukraine because they're violating the sovereignty of an independent country. They're clearly not trying to resolve disputes peacefully. And I think that in both parts of the world, you know, the goal here is to uphold a rules-based international order that the U.S. has played a significant role in for the past 70 years. And I think we see both as obviously very different challenges, but in some sense similar. Thank you. I'm Ching-Yi Chan with Shanghai Media Group. I have a question to Mr. Assistant Secretary. You just mentioned President Obama will visit China, and what will be on his agenda when he visit China in terms of strengthening military to military relations with China? And also the U.S. just left the long-time ban on providing lethal weapons to Vietnam yesterday. So how do you think about that, and will that create more stability or more instability in the region? Thank you. Thank you very much. As I mentioned in my remarks, we want to create a strong, stable military-to-military relationship between the United States and China. At the Sunnylands Summit in 2013, President Xi proposed that we explore establishing a set of confidence-building measures between our two militaries. And we reaffirmed our interest in doing that at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. We're looking at two different kinds of confidence-building measures right now. One of them is a notification of major military activities effort. The other is on rules of the road, rules of behavior for air and maritime encounters. And we're discussing both of these, and we hope to have something positive to say in this regard during President Obama's stay in Beijing. On your second question, we established a comprehensive partnership with Vietnam in 2013 when President Tsong visited Washington. We're in the process of implementing that comprehensive partnership in all areas of the relationship. And we thought it was only appropriate, as part of implementing the comprehensive partnership, that we look at lifting the ban on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam, which we think is about time that we did that, given the growth of our relationship with Vietnam. We believe that this will help Vietnam contribute to regional peace and stability. It will help Vietnam in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, for example. And it was time. The reason we did it partially, because we want to see further progress in human rights on the Vietnamese part, but we thought that the current progress was sufficient for us to partially lift the ban relating to items relating to maritime security. I just wanted to follow up on that and ask Chris. You guys worked on that, the Vietnam issue on the Hill. Was there bipartisan support for that move? Yeah, there absolutely was. I mean, this was something that we had been working on previous to the decision. The lethal arms embargo is maintained under executive authority. It's not maintained in law or statute. So it didn't require an act of Congress to ease it. But the administration, I think rightly, wanted there to be political support for this. You know, wanted the Congress's reaction to be favorable. And I think what we were able to do, Senator McCain introduced a resolution back, I guess, two weeks ago. And had on it, you know, as co-sponsors, Senator Pat Leahy, Ben Cardin, Senator Corker. So, you know, very key leaders of the Senate when it comes to Asian issues, Asia policy issues. So yes, there was a very, very good degree of bipartisan support for it. It's just a question of now kind of building further upon that. Okay. The young lady here. Hi. My name is Nadia Chow with Liberty Times. First of all, I would like to ask Mr. Davis here. Taiwan is asking for the U.S. to help to build the indigenous submarines. First of all, I would like to know, you know, has any decision been made from the DOD's point of view? And also, do you think this will contribute to the stability or the security of this region? Thank you. Of course, the U.S. remains committed under the Taiwan Relations Act to providing Taiwan with the defense articles it needs to maintain its security. I have been strongly committed to this throughout my career, particularly during my stint as the Director, as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Chinese Affairs when I was in the State Department. I continue to be strongly committed to that. And the question of submarines is under discussion. No decisions have made yet, but as part of our overall interactions with the region, we'll of course be staying in close touch with our counterparts from Taiwan on this and a range of defense-related issues. Thank you. I'm David Carl. I'm a business consultant. I'd like to get back to the question of what does China want? The question presumes that China is a unified actor and capable of presenting or acting in a deliberative, rational way. Another way to look at this is that China's foreign policy actions are actually reflective of factional struggles within the leadership, robust bureaucratic actors that are resistant to party leadership. I have a colleague in Beijing who's sent me a message last week that he's heard rumors of an assassination attempt against President Xi. I'm wondering if, instead of thinking of China as a strong state capable of these foreign policy, assertive foreign policy behavior, that what we're seeing is actually reflective of internal weaknesses. I have no doubt that domestic political considerations contribute to Chinese foreign policy decision making. I have no doubt that strong bureaucratic interests also contend for influence within the Chinese governmental firmament, just as they do here, just as they do everywhere. Part of our challenge is the fact that the Chinese aren't transparent about their decision making, particularly in defense relations. Part of our effort at engaging the Chinese in this area is to help them increase their transparency in the defense area. And that will be part of our goal in pursuing these confidence-building measures. I'm André Sauvezot and I'm the Chief Representative in Vietnam for the Interstate Traveller Company, and this is a wonderful panel. But my question is this. The wonderful speaker from the President's Executive Office, Dr. Evan Madero, says, he was wonderful when he sounded very strong and positive about our ability to get TPP done. I wish I felt as confident as he does. So my question is, what's your prognosis, I mean probability, 60%, 70%, 40%, what's the prognosis, and what are the biggest obstacles to getting it done? Are they with protectionism in Japan or with domestic policy here in the United States? No country is more in the game on trade than Singapore, so Ambassador, can I ask you to take a swing at this one? I heard recently that the TPP will be done by November. They never specified the year. So we've been hearing this every November, every time we come together for an APEC meeting. I wouldn't hazard a guess of when we're going to get it, how long it's going to take, but I want to give you a sense of how difficult it is to get it done. Singapore already has a bilateral free trade agreement with the U.S. And very different type of economies, one very large, the world's largest economy, and one Singapore's small island state. It took us a long time to get a bilateral free trade agreement, just between two countries. Can you imagine the complexity of 12 countries, including the world's third largest economy, including countries like Vietnam that have to make fairly significant changes, economic changes, Canada, Mexico, covering 40% of the world GDP and not just trying to get an agreement among 12 of us that's called the TPP, but also bilateral agreements among each one as well. So you look at the complexity of that and you can understand why it's taking us some time to make sure that we get a good agreement. When you want to have a 21st century agreement as that is what the expectation is, then we may have to take time to make sure that what we get is something that is useful for everybody, that makes sense. But you need to give the negotiators a bit of room, rather than putting deadline after deadline, November after November. I think they're working at their best to try and get it done. The leaders obviously have given directions of what they would like to see done. And we're hopeful that as soon as it's ready, I'm sure there's no reason to keep it away, but just try and understand and appreciate the complexity that goes into putting this thing together. And as I look at the process, I'm in fact sympathetic to them that given what they're trying to achieve. Chris? Yeah, I can just say a word on the domestic politics piece. You know, I think the part of the challenge is that it's incredibly regrettable that the Senate did not give the Administration Trade Promotion Authority. That ultimately came down to a decision by the Senate Majority Leader. So I think an added challenge to the incredibly complex negotiation that's ongoing is that if you're a trading partner of the United States, are you going to put your best offer on the table if you're suspicious that you might not have to then negotiate with Congress afterward? I still think that this can get done. I think it's too big to fail. When it gets done, not clear. What I would simply say is I think politically speaking, you know, whether this happens this year maybe not, but there is certainly a window of time to do this in the beginning of next year, possibly the first six months of next year, if there's the will to do it, if there's an agreement to do it. Once you slip past that, the challenges you get into American domestic politics where you get into the primary cycle for presidential politics, that tends to play to the extremes. So I think what you don't want to see happen is this thing drags so far into next year that it begins to get wound up into American political cycles spinning up again. Hi, my name is Matt Field with NHK Japan Broadcasting, and this question is for Assistant Secretary Shear. You mentioned that you'll be going to Tokyo and they're unveiling a set of guidelines, and I was hoping that you would share more details on that, and particularly if you could touch upon collective self-defense in Japan, that'd be great. Thank you. We certainly welcomed the Japanese cabinet's decision to review the collective self-defense issue. We welcome any opportunity to strengthen the alliance and for Japan to play a stronger role in the alliance. I'll be going to Tokyo with Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Danny Russell. We will there hold a session, we will chair for the U.S. side a session of the SSC as well as the SDC, and it's our expectation that we will release the interim report on the guidelines, not the guidelines, the revised guidelines themselves, but an interim report on the guidelines which will sort of map the way, help us map the way forward for the ultimate revision of the 1996 guidelines. And for those that don't know those acronyms, SSC and SDC? SSC is Security Subcommittee, SDC is the Security Defense Committee. Sorry, I didn't mean to put you in. That's not fair. I mean, you should see the book that he got when he went to the Pentagon of acronyms. I think it was probably two encyclopedias. The gentleman in the back here. Sorry, I didn't put you on the spot. My name is Takashi Oshima from the Asahi Shinbun. This is kind of a follow-up question, but from your perspective, what is the most important aspect or issues in this defense guy during review process? And secondly, what is the most important aspect or issue from the United States perspective in this whole defense guy during review process? And secondly, how do you think this review will contribute to the regional security? Thank you. I'm going to answer the second part of your question first by saying a strong U.S.-Japan alliance is a foundation, is a keystone for overall regional security and stability. That's been the case for decades. I expect it will be the case for decades in the future. And to keep that alliance strong and vibrant and up-to-date, we periodically review the guidelines, and that is our aim in doing so on this round. Right. The gentleman right back here in the blue shirt. William Kim, VOA. I have a question to Panagwan's architect. Deploying a third missile defense, the barrier into South Korea now is pretty controversial and not okay. So would you clarify what Panagwan's clear stance on this issue? And additionally, our Asia Pacific commander, Admiral Locklear, said last week that North Korea's military is taking steps to field a raw-mobile ICBM that could threat the U.S. And also Washington-based NGO Dory & Norris said earlier this week that North Korea has completed a major upgrade of its main rocket site. So would you evaluate how about this issue? Is this a minor threat, actually? Thanks. We're always concerned about developments in the expansion of a North Korean threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula. And we are always discussing that very closely with our ROK counterparts, including their developments in the missile area. We've made no decision on THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, and we've not discussed THAAD deployment with our ROK counterparts. But we do discuss generally the issue of the missile threat to South Korea, and we look forward to working with our ROK ally to meet any potential missile threat to Korea or to the region. I want to inject a question. I was involved in a couple of the meetings while Prime Minister Modi was here from India. And I have to say, the energy around that visit was incredible. We haven't really talked much about India, and I wondered if, you know, I think a lot of us who work on these set of issues think the new sort of power shot is looking, you know, coming over the South Pole over Australia and Indonesia and Southeast Asia and looking at both oceans, the Indian and the Pacific. What are the prospects for India to be a player now under Modi in this new emerging security architecture across the Indo-Pacific? Anybody care to take a swing? Well, I think Prime Minister Modi's visit to Washington was very successful. Those of you who have read the joint statement have probably noticed that there was a very strong defense component in that joint statement. The two sides agreed to renew the now 10-year-old defense framework, and we will be addressing that issue with our Indian colleagues very soon at senior levels. We held the first round of the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative just before Prime Minister Modi arrived. This is an effort to increase our technology, defense technology cooperation with the Indians under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology. Frank Kendall is very interested in pursuing this with the Indian side. I think we, and he will be visiting India in the near term. I think this is a very important aspect of our relationship, and I think we're ready to move forward on it. We also discussed the desirability of increasing our overall military-to-military cooperation, including in exercises, and I would look for a stronger US-India Malabar exercise in the future, perhaps with Japanese participation as well. These are all very positive developments in US-India defense relations, and we'll be looking to carry forward on the momentum of the very successful visit here by Prime Minister Modi. From ASEAN, we've tried for a long time to keep India engaged. India is a participant in the East Asia Summit, and Prime Minister Modi will have his first outing at EAS next month in Myanmar. And India plays a very important role from the ASEAN perspective. We bring them in economically, politically, strategic discussions. Even before Prime Minister Modi took office, they have been there for some time. They're in the ARF, they're in the ADMM+. Each one of the structures has them as a key player. It's how I think that the general expectation is while they will play a role in the region that Prime Minister Modi will focus on domestic economic issues, as all political leaders do. But we encourage them to continue to play an active role throughout the region. I'll just say it very briefly. Senator McCain and I were in New Delhi in July and had the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Modi just after he came into office. And I think we were certainly struck that there's a lot of opportunity here. There's a lot of opportunity for the U.S. and India to sort of regain some altitude in a partnership that I think over the past few years has lost quite a bit of it. Hopefully the meeting here, the visit here, is a good first step in that regard. I think our hope and sort of a hope that's shared in the Congress is that we'll be really ambitious, that we'll have the sort of genuine strategic consultation about how we view the world, what we want the world order to look like, and really sort of bring it back to those kinds of questions. Obviously the sort of domestic priorities that the Ambassador mentioned are going to be very important for India. U.S. can make a huge contribution on that and really be sort of a partner of choice for India. But I think when it comes to the issues we're talking about here, one of the things that we're also very pleased to see is the extent to which India is building its relationships with other countries in the region. I mean, the India-Japan relationship is obviously the one that's got a lot of focus and we see that as hugely valuable and hoping, kind of building on frankly what Evan had to say today, that the U.S., Japan, India can really sort of build that trilateral out, really put strategic content into it and elevate it. I think that would be an enormous positive signal. Thank you. Well, we started the day with one of the real advocates and practitioners of developing modern Asian architecture, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, and he talked a lot about constructive realism and a sense that the key for him in all of this discussion of regionalism and regional architecture is really the need for countries to find a common narrative that focused on public goods that you could use to build confidence. And I found throughout the day that whether we're talking about economics or energy or security issues that the panelists in general agreed with Kevin that that's where the progress is going to be made. And I think I hope you'll join me in thanking this panel and thanking everyone who put the concert or put the program together. Thank you.